













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
  i 
Influencing innovation structures and 
processes in agro-industries dominated by 
subsistence producers 
  














The University of Edinburgh 
2016 
  
  ii 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that this following thesis is my own work and that, to the best 
of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by 
another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted 
for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other 




Vera Florida MUGITTU 
  
  iii 
Preface 
This study emerges from the work of the DFID-funded Research into Use (RIU) 
programme to commercialise rural poultry production in Tanzania. The programme 
was implemented between July 2008 and June 2012 aiming to collect and share 
lessons on how best to enable innovation in developing countries’ agriculture. RIU 
was implemented in six African countries, including Tanzania where it worked in 
four commodity chains, i.e. rice, maize, dairy and poultry subsectors. This thesis 
focuses only on what was done in poultry. 
In the rural poultry industry, producers are rural households who typically keep an 
average of one to ten local chickens mainly for social purposes. To most families, 
producing for the market is not the main goal of keeping chicken. So they mostly 
adopt the traditional management system where almost no cash investment is done. 
Breeding is therefore natural, feeding is by scavenging and no veterinary drugs are 
used except for occasional public vaccination campaigns against Newcastle disease. 
Usually there is no special housing for chickens. The flock usually shares the main 
house (mainly kitchen or store) during the night and roam outside during the day. 
Therefore, this is an activity which even very poor households with small pieces of 
land afford to do. 
When RIU started, keeping chicken under the traditional system was dominant in 
Tanzania by almost 94%. This was despite the many scientific discoveries on 
commercial poultry breeding, nutrition, health management and disease control 
strategies. Seemingly, both public and private initiatives, including government 
extension services worked towards preserving the ‘traditional-ness’ of this system. 
They practically avoided introducing commercial inputs and technologies already 
used by urban poultry producers. This trend can be traced back to three scientific 
arguments that: One, local breeds of chicken have low genetic potential1 hence they 
are unfit for commercialisation; Two, ‘the poor’ cannot afford to invest in ‘modern’ 
technologies, as doing that alters their farming systems towards unsustainable 
                                                 
1 Research explains that, compared to exotic breeds, local chickens lay fewer eggs, take longer to 
reach sexual maturity, and have a very high feed conversation ratio causing them to gain weight too 
slowly. 
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economic equilibriums; and Three, local breeds of chicken are more resistant to 
diseases (an argument which is still contested by some scientists2) hence they don’t 
cost much in terms of vaccines and veterinary services. Additionally, consumers 
preferred the taste of local chicken and hardness of its meat caused by slow growth 
and the perceived health benefits from organic production. However, despite 
preferring local chickens, most Tanzanians consume eggs and meat from 
commercially raised exotic chickens because they are cheaper, more available and 
well packaged. 
Therefore, for the past five decades the three scientific conclusions have shaped the 
way different actors intervened to develop the industry. Those include the 
government, researchers, donors, NGOs, private investors and even farmers 
themselves. In other words, the perceived non-commercial ability of the breed, 
coupled with its perceived ability to withstand harsh conditions, and the generalised 
(and even eternalized) poverty state of rural dwellers, have locked the industry into 
the traditional management system which involves very low levels of investment, 
including investment in technology and innovation. Consequently, research, policy 
and practice have reinforced a single development path in rural areas which 
interlocks ‘rural households’, ‘local breeds’, ‘low innovation’ and ‘self-sufficiency 
(as the goal)’, while reserving the alternative commercial paths for the relatively 
wealthier and urbanised (or peri-urban) citizens.  
If I am to elaborate further, these scientific arguments have been interpreted and 
translated to shape how the industry appears today. For example, economists’ 
interpreted that, if local breeds of chicken are unfit for commercialisation, then 
investment in technology and innovation along the entire chain (i.e. from production 
to consumption) will not generate returns. Consequently, what we now see is low 
investment trends from both public and private sector to produce local chickens, and 
Government’s focus to improve the genotypes of the indigenous flock through 
promoting cross breeding with exotic cocks. The government also imports exotic 
breeder stock for commercialisation. These are the two strategies found in the 
                                                 
2 See (Minga et al., 2001) and (Roothaert et al., 2011) 
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National Livestock Policy document which guide the development of the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania. 
On the other hand, development programmes and organisations interpreted the 
scientific findings as describing a breed suitable to the context of those who cannot 
afford to invest in commercial enterprises. That the breed is just right for the 
vulnerable and the marginalised people because very little investment is required. As 
a result, such organisations promoted local chicken keeping as a popular strategy to 
supplement rural income especially for women, the marginalised and other 
vulnerable groups like victims of HIV and AIDS. Supporting family poultry 
production also became popular among nutrition programmes with the argument that 
it is ‘the most affordable’ source of animal protein. Thus for the past 50 years, rural 
poultry production in Tanzania, as in most African countries, involved local breeds 
only, and was promoted and sustained under ‘low-input-low-output production 
system. The low-input-low output poultry production system is also promoted and 
reinforced by the international community from whom African governments draw 
most policies.  
When RIU intervened in the industry, it did not start with the above presumptions of 
how the industry should operate, or which breed and production system is 
appropriate for rural areas. Rather, it started by asking rural producers what they 
wanted and facilitated processes to meet these expectations. So when rural producers 
said they wanted to earn more money and get out of poverty, it was logical and 
necessary that they commercialised their poultry enterprises. This meant they had to 
keep more chickens, control diseases, supplement feeding and engage with the 
market. Therefore, despite the economic and social limitations present in the target 
areas at that time, RIU supported rural producers to commercialise their poultry 
enterprises. This means, RIU focused on what producers wanted and worked to build 
the capacities needed to achieve that. 
Therefore, using different approaches, tools and facilitation methods, RIU promoted 
industry-wide technological changes which increased farm productivity and 
consequently improved rural incomes. Reading the RIU final programme report I 
concluded that, before 2008, the Tanzania rural poultry industry was not well 
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organised and it had no significant commercial value. So it was not attractive for 
private sector investment and was not viewed as a commercial activity that could 
improve rural livelihoods. The number of chickens raised was very small and 
transactions in the industry were limited, informal and not recorded. Therefore, the 
introduction of RIU interventions built business networks which connect rural 
enterprises with urban business for learning and growth. Specifically, the number of 
chickens produced and production cycles per farmer have increased and triggered a 
business sense in the industry. As a result, hatcheries, drugs and feed suppliers have 
increased and improved their production and supply to respond to these new business 
opportunities. Also, as the number of rural producers increased, transactions along 
the value chain also increased and were formalised. This means the programme 
transformed the indigenous poultry industry from Sector four (village or backyard 
production) to Sector three (Commercial poultry production system) as categorised 
by FAO. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore two folds. First is to investigate and explain 
how innovation behaviours changed and why. Secondly, to extract policy and 
research lessons and contribute to the on-going search for ways to promote 
innovation in industries dominated by subsistence producers. The study therefore 
straddles economic development and innovation systems research to specifically 
explain how innovation processes (which include technological, institutional and 
organisational changes) can be deliberated promoted to create equitable growth in 
developing economies.  
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Abstract 
This thesis examines innovation structures and processes in rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania. In 2005, FAO categorised the rural poultry production system in Tanzania 
under the lowest sector IV with very minimal biosecurity measures and with no 
commercial orientation. By 2012, a DFID-funded Research into Use (RIU) 
programme transformed the industry to Sector III which represents a significant 
commercial orientation and relatively higher bio-security measures. This thesis 
explains how RIU achieved that. 
This analysis is presented from three perspectives. First, the path dependence 
framework is used to present the observed dominance of the traditional poultry 
production system as a ‘lock-in’. The study makes it clear that before RIU, mental 
frames, resource allocations and how dominant powers behaved reinforced low 
innovation tendencies. Second, using the agricultural innovation system (AIS) 
framework and the concepts of ‘organisational thinness’ and ‘fragmentation’ (also 
from path dependency theory), it explains that by making rural producers feel self-
sufficient in inputs and knowledge, practices in the traditional system disconnect 
producers from engaging with other actors. Third, the concepts of ‘innovation 
broker’ and of ‘exogenous shock’ are used to present RIU as an external force or 
facilitator which instigated a transformation process. RIU facilitated a large number 3 
of rural producers to produce for the market, and which was sufficient enough to 
create a significant demand for inputs and services. This demand triggered new 
investment and re-organisation in the supply chains. Then, RIU supported actors to 
solve capacity problems that emerged from the shock. RIU is therefore presented as a 
flexible ‘innovation broker’ who played different roles and allocated resources based 
on circumstances on the ground. 
The thesis makes several contributions. It presents a case of how a public action can 
promote innovation in industries dominated by subsistence producers by playing the 
                                                 
3 This number of producers which was needed to trigger and justify demand or supply varied from one 
situation to another. For example, the number of producers needed to produce sufficient demand for 
chicks (and therefore trigger supply) was different from the one needed to trigger and justify the 
supply of vaccines in a particular village. The number or capacity therefore varied from one 
commodity/input and geographical area to another. 
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role of an innovation broker to support a significant number of producers to change 
routines and interact with other actors. It also shows that rural growth can be 
achieved through linking rural enterprises with those in the urban instead of 
supporting rural actors in isolation. It basically makes it clear that African agriculture 
needs re-organization, so that technological changes can follow as a consequence.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
This thesis is based on an action research programme titled ‘Research Into Use (RIU) 
programme’ which I coordinated for four years in Tanzania. It is an independent 
piece of work using data which I collected after the programme ended. The analysis 
presented here is therefore independent of everything else written about the RIU 
programme. As an attempt to distance myself from my relationship with RIU, I 
decided to go back and read programme reports, field diaries and watched videos to 
re-establish what happened. I also sat down with programme stakeholders, including 
ex-staff and validated what I came up with from the RIU artefacts. I also used new 
data which I collected through interviewing both programme and non-programme 
beneficiaries. The interviews captured perceptions and views about the programme 
which had not been reported before. Data from non-programme beneficiaries also 
helped me to establish the ‘before commercialisation’ situation which is more 
generalizable and which contrasts what RIU did in a manner specific to this study. I 
also collected data from other secondary sources e.g. from Government reports, 
budget speeches, etc. 
In this study I am broadly concerned with what constrains innovation in subsistence 
agriculture, and how the public sector can intervene to promote transformative 
processes that guarantee inclusive growth. I particularly pay attention to the nature of 
high risk (Roll H. Kristin, 2006), and high transaction costs (Cadot, Dutoit, & 
Olarreaga, 2010) embedded in subsistence agriculture which are argued to affect the 
rate of technology use and innovation in such sectors. Grounded in innovation 
systems thinking, my focus is to establish how technological and institutional change 
can be deliberately promoted to increase productivity and profitability in agro-
industries dominated by subsistence producers. By subsistence here I mean lack of 
scale, very little marketable surplus and erratic market participation-only rarely done 
to meet ad hoc cash needs (See Carr, 1997; p.291). 
 2 
Increasing agricultural productivity and profitability is very important in reducing 
global poverty because about 70% of the poor live in rural areas where agriculture is 
the mainstay (Dixon, Taniguchi, Wattenbach, & TanyeriArbur, 2004; Rosegrant, 
Ringler, & Benson, 2006). This is emphasised in the rediscovery of agriculture in the 
international development agenda after 20 years of neglect (Anandajayasekeram, 
2011; Dethier & Effenberger, 2012). Specifically, African agriculture is very 
important for global food security solutions as it has access to about 60% of the 
world’s arable land (AGRA, 2013). Agriculture remains very important to Africa as 
crop and livestock farming continue to be the main source of livelihood for about 
70% of her population (World Bank, 2007). 
According to the World Bank report of 2010, more than 50 per cent of Africans live 
below the poverty line with agriculture as the main economic activity (World Bank, 
20104). This makes agriculture very important in addressing poverty in Africa 
because gross domestic product (GDP) growth from agriculture is known to be at 
least twice as effective in reducing poverty in Africa as non-agricultural GDP growth 
(Cervantes-Godoy & Dewbre, 2010). According to FAO’s report5 (2009), there are 
around 33 million small farms of less than 2 hectares, representing 80 per cent of all 
farms in Africa. This means subsistence agriculture6 which is known to be less 
productive and uncompetitive, dominates the sector. 
Notwithstanding its fundamental role for poverty reduction, economic growth and 
global food security, African agriculture is generally understood to have low capacity 
for growth and development (AGRA, 2013; World Bank, 2007; Rajalahti, 2009). The 
sector is said to be dominated by poor smallholders who use poor technologies to 
                                                 
4 Global Economic prospects, 2010 
5 This was FAO’s report to the High-Level Expert Forum on How to Feed the World by 2050 held in 
Rome in October 2009 
6 Subsistence agriculture is self-sufficiency farming in which the farmers focus on growing enough 
food to feed themselves and their families. The typical subsistence farm has a range of crops and 
animals needed by the family to eat and clothe themselves during the year. Planting decisions are 
made with an eye toward what the family will need during the coming year, rather than market prices. 
Tony Waters writes: "Subsistence peasants are people who grow what they eat, build their own 
houses, and live without regularly making purchases in the marketplace." This is a common 
misconception. In fact many "subsistence" farmers have important trade contacts and trade items they 
can produce because of their special skills or their access to resources not available to other 
"subsistence" farmers. (see Marvin P Miracle, "Subsistence Agriculture: Analytical Problems and 
Alternative Concepts, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 1968, p292-310.) 
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produce very little for the market (Collier & Dercon, 2009; Dixon et al., 2004). A 
disconnect is also argued to exist between the production segment of the sector, 
which is largely in rural areas, and the inputs, services and outputs markets 
predominantly found in urban areas (Collier & Dercon, 2009). The disconnect is 
argued to make agricultural production and marketing in Africa risky (Roll et al., 
2006), unprofitable due to high transaction costs (Cadot, Dutoit, & Olarreaga, 2010) 
and less attractive for investment in innovation (Collier & Dercon, 2009; Kilelu, 
Klerkx, Leeuwis, & Hall, 2011).  
African agriculture is also known for its failure to respond to broad economic 
reforms and to the past 50 years of agricultural aid (Eicher, 2003), although much of 
the blame on the latter is put on perceptions and choices of approaches rather than on 
how the agriculture sector functions. Therefore, despite previous significant 
investment in agricultural research and development, African agriculture still lacks 
the basic inherent capacity to jump the ‘low investment-low output-low income’ trap 
and gain the ability to adapt to global changes (Andy Hall & Clark, 2010; Klerkx, 
Hall, & Leeuwis, 2009a).  
A growing number of agricultural development scholars consider the recent shift 
from linear to systemic thinking in tackling agricultural challenges a promising 
solution (Anandajayasekeram, 2011; Knickel, Tisenkopfs, & Peter, 2009; Spielman, 
2005; High, 2004). This consensus stems from the understanding that unlike linear 
approaches, system thinking appreciates the complex nature of agriculture, and that 
this is a truer reflection of how the sector functions (Anandajayasekeram, 2011; 
Spielman, 2005). Therefore, agriculture is now widely appreciated as a sector to be 
approached with less determinism (Anandajayasekeram, 2011; Dixon et al., 2004; 
Klerkx & Hall, 2009a; Spielman, 2005). Essentially, this way of looking at 
agriculture opens up new horizons for theories that look at agriculture more 
holistically as opposed to reductionist (High, 2004). More critical however, is the 
ability to go beyond the conceptual understanding of these theories and derive 
practical frameworks for effective agricultural policy and practice (Hall & Clark, 
2010). 
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This study therefore feeds into this line of thinking by examining and documenting 
the recent work of a DFID7-funded Research into Use (RIU) programme in the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania as a case study, to empirically explain how structures 
and behaviours of rural agricultural systems can be externally influenced towards 
meeting pre-determined broad development objectives like poverty reduction. The 
study straddles economic development and innovation systems research to explain 
how innovation can be deliberately promoted in subsistence-based industries. 
By analysing what RIU did, the thesis contributes to on-going research to understand 
how multiplicity and heterogeneity of actors in the agro-systems can be embraced 
and managed towards increasing agricultural innovation and performance in 
developing countries. The thesis makes it clear that a significant number of actors 
needs to change their routines in order to transform a subsistence industry. And to 
achieve that, there is a social cost of building minimal conditions for innovation in 
such industries. Building those conditions include ‘creating a mental shift’, 
stimulating demand for innovation, and building capacities to articulate needs, seek 
solutions and utilise them. 
The research also gives an empirically based understanding of institutionalisation of 
the innovation broker role (Geyskens, 2012; Klerkx et al., 2009a; Klerkx & Hall, 
2009; Preissing, 2012) in building innovation networks that involve rural producers. 
It explains that it is possible for the public sector to build innovation networks that 
promote learning in rural-based industries. The thesis makes it clear that, rural 
development programmes can play a facilitation role where the entire industry is 
supported to change as a system. The facilitator thus requires capacity and resources 
to embrace agricultural complexity by allowing interventions to be shaped by the 
context instead of being fixated on predetermined plans of activities. In fact, by 
analysing the complex process of changing mentalities, building linkages, managing 
multiple actors, synchronising processes, and building system capacities which was 
done by RIU in Tanzania, the research, in its own right provides an alternative 
approach to rural development. 
                                                 
7 DFID is the UK Department for International Development 
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1.2 Introducing Tanzania rural poultry production  
Poultry keeping is widely practiced in Tanzania as part of income diversification 
strategies adopted by most households in the country.  In rural areas the activity is 
largely subsistence-based and often managed by women and children (Kitalyi, 1998). 
To rural households, keeping poultry birds is both an additional source of household 
income and a cheaper source of animal protein.  
There are two major poultry production systems found in Tanzania,  namely the 
semi-intensive or intensive system which is normally practised in peri-urban and 
urban areas on a commercial basis and the dominant backyard traditional system 
(indigenous chicken production system) practiced in the rural areas (URT, 2006). 
The government of Tanzania estimates that more than 94% of the rural households8, 
which is about 66% of all households in the country, keep indigenous chickens under 
the traditional system. These indigenous breeds form over 90% of the entire poultry 
population in Tanzania (Msami, 2008a) and are supplying 94% of the poultry meat 
and eggs consumed in rural areas (URT, 2015), and about 20% of the urban and peri-
urban consumption (Match Makers Associates, 2010; FAO, 2008). 
Figure 1: Proportion of chickens kept under different poultry management systems in Tanzania 
 
 
Source: Tanzania National Sample Census of Agriculture, 2002/2003 
 
Prior to independence in 1961, there was no policy for poultry development in 
Tanzania. The poultry sector was entirely dominated by indigenous breeds of 
chickens kept in the rural settings for the purpose of meeting social obligations, such 
                                                 
8 Nearly 8 out every 10 Tanzanians live in rural areas and mainly depend on agriculture as their source 
of livelihood. 
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as rituals, meeting dowry obligations and offering gifts in terms of eggs and live 
chickens to colonial masters. The scenario remained the same after independence up 
to 1967 when the Government started to regulate the poultry sector with a strong bias 
towards promoting commercial production of exotic breeds through semi-intensive 
and intensive production systems in urban and peri-urban areas (Kaijage in: RIU, 
2011a; p.7). Therefore, two poultry production systems exist in Tanzania with the 
traditional system specifically reserved for the rural areas and the commercial one 
promoted in the urban and peri-urban areas (FAO, 2008; Msoffe et al., 2010). The 
commercial system which involves keeping improved breeds of chicken, use of 
specific technology packages and application of improved practices, is reserved for 
the relatively wealthier producers who can interact with actors in poultry supply 
chains mostly found in urban areas, and whose behaviour and institutions are 
oriented towards the market. 
The Tanzania National Livestock Policy of 2006 is very clear on the government’s 
desire to develop a commercialised and competitive poultry subsector by 2025. 
However and despite the significance of the contribution the indigenous poultry 
makes in the subsector and in the general livelihood of most Tanzanians, the 
Government is inclined towards promoting commercialization of improved breeds. 
This inclination is informed by research on socio-economic benefits of large-scale 
commercial production of exotic chickens. Exotics breeds are argued to have higher 
genetic potential, specifically for fast growth and for egg production than indigenous 
breeds (Grobbelaar et al., 2010; Rodríguez et al., 2011). Advantages of vertical 
integration are also documented as a contemporary poultry management system 
where the entire value chain is managed under one or few distinct firms to minimize 
production costs and risks. In such a system, quality control is relatively easier and 
efficient (Momoh et al., 2009). However, the approach increases monopoly in the 
sector and therefore does not promote equity. 
Therefore, for close to five decades, the traditional poultry production in Tanzania 
remained a backyard activity with insignificant commercial value and was not 
viewed as a commercial activity that could improve rural livelihoods (RIU, 2011a). 
In 2009 the traditional industry was estimated to worth only 140 million Tanzania 
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Shillings (USD 117,000). The reasons for the low commercial value included the fact 
that; the total number of indigenous chickens raised was very small as most farmers 
kept between 5-10 birds each, some for over a period of 12-18 months; transactions 
on poultry inputs and services were limited, informal and not recorded because 
breeding was natural, chickens were free ranged, and hardly ever treated or 
vaccinated; and no formal output markets and value addition existed (Ibid).  
The low commercial value made the sector neither important to the government nor 
attractive for private sector investment. Agribusiness companies especially input 
suppliers and other service providers found no business to transact with the rural 
poultry9 producers hence did not invest in the industry. Likewise, regulation of the 
subsector by the government was minimal due to the subsistence nature of the 
subsector and lack of a functional value chain (Match Makers Associates, 2010). 
Consequently, the overall investment in the industry remained very low. Moreover, 
research argued that indigenous chickens have low genetic potential thus unfit for 
commercialization (Malago, 2009; Ngeno, Vander Waaij, & Kahi, 2014). This 
perception was sustained even as studies continued to demonstrate that productivity 
of indigenous chickens can be significantly increased by improving nutrition, disease 
control, production methods for day old chicks and housing, among other 
recommended poultry management practices (Minga et al., 2001; Malago, 2009; 
Goromela et al., 2006; FAO/IEA, 2006). 
For fifty years, government policy, research findings, NGO interventions and private 
investment decisions have been biased against commercialising the rural poultry 
production. Consequently, local breeds of chicken (which research tends to associate 
with low innovation levels) are now politically and socially embedded in rural life to 
the extent that most sources of poultry knowledge and technologies which are 
accessible to rural dwellers, do not favour commercialisation in rural areas. In turn 
this created a large group of rural poultry producers entrenched in traditional poultry 
husbandry practices. Having a large number of socially oriented producers in the 
industry has made it harder for knowledge, policy and investment providers to 
                                                 
9 The terms ‘indigenous or local’ ‘traditional’ and ‘rural’ poultry industry are used interchangeably 
because all rural poultry producers kept indigenous (local) chickens under traditional system. So the 
indigenous chicken industry is traditional and rural, and vice versa. 
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change general innovation behaviours. Consequently, resources were pushed even 
further away from the industry and the rural poultry production became even more 
socially entrenched to the point where it has become harder for an individual to 
switch out of it. 
Of interest here is the observation that most rural poultry producing households have 
other farming activities where they actively engage with input and output markets, 
but they deliberately keep chicken under the traditional low-input system which is 
not market oriented.  Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to explain how a public 
initiative can alter such a dominance of low-intensity production system, and 
facilitate a switch to increased outputs. 
1.3 Explaining RIU’s work in the poultry industry 
In July 2008, RIU started to intervene in the poultry industry. The purpose of this 
action research programme was to collect and share evidence-based lessons on how 
best to enable innovation in developing countries’ agriculture. RIU was therefore 
designed to create partnerships at different levels in order to build capacity to 
promote innovation and adoption of research outputs (Mur & Nederlof, 2012). 
In Tanzania, RIU sought to explore ways to improve local innovation capacity for 
increased use of research, new knowledge and technologies in developing profitable 
agribusinesses. It worked with four commodity chains, i.e. maize, rice, dairy and 
poultry. However, this study is only concerned with what was done in the poultry 
industry. RIU Tanzania reports10 tell a unique story of how RIU transformed the 
indigenous11 poultry sector in Tanzania from being a backyard activity that no one 
took seriously, into a commercially viable sector now attracting significant private 
sector investment. Government attention to support and regulate the industry is also 
observed to have increased.  
In 2008 FAO categorized the indigenous poultry production system in Tanzania 
under Sector IV (village or backyard production) which is the lowest category 
                                                 
10 Visit www.researchintouse.com for programme documents, reports, policy briefs and news. 
11 Note the RIU programme uses the term ‘indigenous poultry industry’ with a focus on the breed of 
chicken raised by rural producers. However, I have used the term ‘rural poultry industry’ because in 
my analysis I have gone beyond the breed of the chicken.  
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representing actors with very minimal biosecurity measures and with no commercial 
orientation (See Table 1-0: below). RIU transformed the industry to Sector 3 which 
represents a significant commercial orientation and relatively higher bio-security 
measures (RIU, 2011a). This study explains how the transformation happened. 
Table 1-0: Status of the poultry sector in Tanzania: FAO categorization 
Table 1: Status of the Poultry Sector in Tanzania 
FAO Classification of Poultry Production Systems  Status in Tanzania as of 2003 according to FAO  
Sector 1: Industrial integrated system 
 High level of bio-security and 
birds/products marketed commercially 
(e.g. farms that are part of an integrated 
broiler production enterprise with 
clearly defined and implemented 
standard operating procedures for bio-
security). 
Sector 1 is non-existent in Tanzania, bearing 
in mind the fact that Grand Parent Stock 
(GPS) operations are not conducted. (FAO, 
2008:11)  
Sector 2: Commercial poultry production system  
 Moderate to high bio-security and 
birds/products usually marketed 
commercially (e.g. farms with birds 
kept indoors continuously; strictly 
preventing contact with other poultry or 
wildlife).  
Sector 2 represents high levels of commercial 
poultry production in Tanzania, mainly 
involving Parent Stock (PS) and hatcheries, 
but also raising commercial poultry (layers 
and/or broilers). The operations are medium-
scale, embracing different levels of 
integration. (FAO, 2008:11)  
Sector 3: Commercial poultry production system  
 Low to minimal bio-security and 
birds/products entering live bird 
markets (e.g. a caged layer farm with 
birds in open sheds; a farm with poultry 
spending time outside the shed; a farm 
producing chickens and waterfowl).  
Sector 3 represents farms involved in the 
intensive commercial egg and broiler 
production from hybrid chickens. Small-scale 
(urban & peri-urban) commercial production 
farmers raising commercial layers and broilers 
were classified in this category. (FAO, 
2008:11)  
Sector 4: Village or backyard production  
 Minimal bio-security and 
birds/products consumed locally.  
The Tanzanian local chicken production 
system fits well into Sector 4  
Source: Adapted from FAO classification,(FAO, 2008; p.11) 
 
After RIU facilitation, both public and private sector actors now consider poultry 
production in rural areas a viable economic activity. The activity is now boosting 
household incomes and building business networks which involve rural producers. 
Such networks involving urban and rural businesses in poultry did not exist before. 
The volumes traded have increased and triggered investment in innovation and 
technologies to expand supply, meet quality and standards, and increase efficiency in 
logistics. These changes have attracted government regulation and public investment 
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to support the industry. For example, the government has invested in a vaccine plant, 
poultry breeding research and more donors are funding programmes to develop the 
supply chains. Table 1-1 below summarises the changes.  
Table 1-1: Changes in the rural poultry production after RIU interventions  
What changed From To 
Production scale No scale (subsistence) Small-scale commercial 
Number of birds kept 1 to 10 100-300+ 
Type of breed Local Cross-breeds 
Production system Traditional (extensive) Commercial (semi-intensive) 
Use of commercial inputs Zero-to-low use Significant use (80% increase) 
Growth rate 1.5Kg in 12-18 months 1.5Kg in 3-4 months 
Production cycles once a year three batches a year 
Mortality rate High (80-90%) Low (between 2 to 4%)  
Housing None Improved. I.e. building shades and fencing 
Use of veterinary services 
& bio-security measures  
None Improved; I.e. full vaccination, treatment, 
disinfection, nutrition, sanitation, traffic, etc. 
Commercial chick 
production 
Very low (total capacity 
500-2000 chicks/week 
and not registered) 
Established and formally registered 
fourteen12 medium-scale hatcheries (total 
capacity of 250,000 chicks per week.  
Market for poultry 
products 
Irregular and informal 
Most products were 
consumed locally 
Regular and party formal; An integrated 
marketing system for live chicken emerged. 
Most products are sold outside the villages. 
Value addition None Formal screening, packaging and branding. 
Service delivery model Through government 
projects, NGOs etc.  
Contract farming to produce table eggs, 
broilers, and fertilised eggs for hatcheries 
Government regulation Low High (Hatcheries, feeds, drugs, vaccines, 
transportation of chicks, eggs, etc. are 
regulated for quality and consumer safety) 
Source: RIU end of project report (RIU, 2011b) 
Basically, RIU linked rural producers with urban organisations and increased their 
opportunities to learn, do business and innovate. Producers’ behaviour changed that 
made them attractive for partnership with upstream actors. Significantly, even 
without adopting pure exotic breeds rural producers managed to change from 
traditional (extensive) to commercial (semi-intensive) production system. This thesis 
explains how RIU’s external facilitation supported rural producers to switch from a 
                                                 
12 Data on poultry for 2015 show the number of hatcheries for local chicken has increased from 14 in 




socially entrenched traditional production system to a commercially oriented one 
which entails higher levels of innovation. It explains the underlying process towards 
this shift as an alternative approach for promoting innovation in industries dominated 
by subsistence producers.  
1.4 Research objective and questions 
The main objectives of this research are to describe, understand and explain 
innovation behaviours in subsistence based industries, what influences them, and 
how they can be externally influenced as a system through a pubic initiative towards 
meeting broad objectives such as poverty reduction. 
In order to meet the objective, the study investigates the Research into Use (RIU) 
programme’s work in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania as a case study. It 
analyses the behaviour of the industry before and after the programme intervened. 
This implies understanding how producers behaved before RIU, what was actually 
done by RIU and how the industry responded (i.e. what changed).  
Therefore, the main question on the RIU experience is, ‘what actually happened and 
how?’ However, the study is guided by three research questions presented below. 
Q1. Describe: What drives or constrains innovation (in terms of demand and 
utilization of new knowledge) in the rural poultry industry? 
 Focusing on system structures and actors’ behaviours (including 
perceptions, expectations, routines and interactions) 
Q2. Understand: Why is innovation generally low in the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania? 
Why are interactions low in the industry in question? What determines 
(promotes/limits/blocks) interactions in the industry? What sustains low innovation 
behaviours (in terms of demand and utilization of new knowledge) in the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania? Why was innovation low despite the growing market 
demand for poultry products, existence of a large body of poultry innovations (i.e. 
husbandry practices, technologies, etc.), and the public interest to reduce rural 
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poverty through funding a range of agricultural and poultry development 
programmes?  This question is linked to the first question on what drives or 
constrains innovation in the poultry industry. 
Q3. Explain: How can innovation behaviours and structures be influenced towards 
a shift to higher innovations levels in industries dominated by subsistence 
producers? 
That is, how did RIU promote and establish interactions? And how did the industry 
respond? How did RIU increase the demand for innovation and investment in the 
industry, and how were multiple interactions and learning promoted among 
heterogeneous actors in the industry? An industry which was subsistence-based and 
dominated by many players where majority were small and with limited capacities? 
What was constraining innovation in the industry in the first place? And how did the 
programme overcome it? What support mechanisms, institutional arrangements and 
configurations of actors were established to facilitate and support the innovation 
process? And how did this succeed despite the strongly held view among policy 
makers and scientists about the low genetic potential and productivity of indigenous 
chickens? And more importantly, what was the role of the public investment in all 
this?  
1.5 Study arguments and contributions 
The main study argument is that external facilitation to stimulate and establish 
multiple interactions and learning can significantly promote innovation in industries 
dominated by subsistence producers. And this is achieved through the following: 
First, by facilitating ‘a mental shift’ among a significant number of producers to 
change how they manage their enterprises. Specifically, this study refers to making 
rural producers produce for the market in order to justify use of new knowledge and 
technologies. This means re-organising farm activities (or enterprises) beyond self-
sufficiency and become ‘self-insufficient’ in inputs, knowledge, etc. and therefore 
create affinity for other enterprises as sources of inputs and knowledge, etc.;  
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Second, by creating a ‘demand shock’ where a significant number of producers gets 
supported to demand and procure significant (aggregate) amounts of knowledge, 
materials (e.g. inputs and technologies) and other services. The intention here is to 
create mechanisms that make poor producers gain the financial and organisational 
ability to send ‘considerable noises’ or ‘demand signals’ to the markets (e.g. poultry 
inputs, service and knowledge markets) to justify a reorganization of the markets to 
accommodate rural producers’ needs. This means supporting poor producers to gain 
what they currently lack in order to operate in input and output markets; then, 
Third, using a ‘bottleneck approach’ to build system capacities for actors to respond 
to the shock and gain the ability to respond to the demand signals. This includes 
building suppliers capacity to supply quality inputs and services; and building 
producers’ capacity to utilize what is being supplied (e.g. train producers how to 
administer vaccine, feed chicks, etc.). Basically, it is to build the entire system’s 
capacity by synchronising actors and their operations until the system adapts a new 
equilibrium. This involves building sustainable partnerships for efficient input and 
service delivery (i.e. inputs, extension, regulation etc.), and product marketing.   
Basically, what is described above is a set of processes that trigger a significant 
demand (from a significant number of producers) for knowledge, innovation and 
investment, then enhance capacities (i.e. of all actors) to satisfy this demand. In 
making this argument, the study contributes to knowledge in three ways: 
 The first is to demonstrate that subsistence industries are actually 
experiencing forms of ‘lock-in’ caused by entrenched practices that extend 
far beyond the behaviour and choices of individual producers. 
 Second, the study demonstrates that the process of facilitating and promoting 
innovation in industries dominated by subsistence producers gets shaped by 
the context as it shapes it. Thus facilitators require the ability to change and 
act from, and on a constantly changing context while at the same time 
maintaining the ambition to meet a shared vision. 
 14 
 The third contribution is methodological. By studying and describing 
processes as they happened in detail, and as much as possible in their 
original chronology helps to analyse why and how innovation decisions are 
made by actors, their response (both individual and collective), and how the 
system changes as a response to facilitation. 
 The fourth contribution is theoretical suggesting a multi-disciplinary 
framework in analysing agricultural innovation. Specifically, the following 
theories are explored in this study: (i) the Path Dependency theory and 
concepts of lock-in, organisational thinness and fragmentation are used to 
explain why low innovation persists in subsistence agriculture. The concept 
of ‘exogenous shocks’ from Business Cycle and Economics theories is used 
to explain how externally driven disruption can be facilitated to break path 
dependency; and (ii) Demand Shock theory is explored to predict if an AIS 
can be subjected into a ‘demand shock’ and trigger innovative responses 
from heterogeneous actors; (iii) Analysing the role of agricultural 
commodities using the Actor Network Theory (ANT) in determining 
interactions in agro-industries is also found very useful. ANT emphasizes 
the fact that, the nature of commodities influences choices of technologies, 
routines and knowledge to be demanded and supplied, thus determining 
which actors should interact. 
1.6 Linking with wider debates on subsistence agriculture 
The question of why innovation is generally low in the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania can be linked to a much broader question of why subsistence agriculture 
which is known to operate at low innovation levels, and offer less gains, dominates 
the agriculture sector in sub-Saharan Africa by almost 80 per cent. It is also linked to 
the continuing debates on how to increase agricultural performance in the continent.  
Defining subsistence agriculture is not straight forward although the most preferred 
definition relates to the share of marketed produce where the lower this share is the 
higher is the degree of subsistence orientation (Abele & Frohberg, 2003). Sometime 
the nature of crops is also used to define subsistence farming where crops are 
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characterised as “cash or food crops”, with the former being unlikely to be 
predominantly grown under subsistence mode. In situations where the farm 
household neither sells nor buys, but consumes everything it produces, lack of access 
to inputs is expected to constrain production to particular techniques and in most 
cases to entail low productivity levels (Cadot et al., 2010).  
However, this is a relative definition because the share of outputs sold on the market 
and the share of consumption bought from it vary. Hence where to draw the line 
between a ‘subsistence farm’ and a ‘market farm’ is a matter of judgement (Ibidi). 
Cadot and his colleagues suggest that a proper understanding of subsistence 
agriculture is needed based on identification of which markets exist and which don’t 
because where labour markets function better than outputs markets, households can 
supply labour for off farm employment and gain cash which is in turn used to 
procure agricultural inputs and therefore break the key analogy of subsistence 
households not being able to buy inputs because no output is sold. In all these 
attempts to define subsistence production one finds similarities on issues related to 
smallness of the market share, low input use and lack of consistent response to 
market needs and opportunities. This means subsistence production is not driven by 
market but rather by household needs, be it food, cash or leisure. It is also evident 
from the literature that subsistence producers deliberately choose low-return 
strategies to manage production risks (Abele & Frohberg, 2003; Cadot et al., 2010). 
According to Heidheus and Bruntrup, cited in Abele & Frohberg (eds), (2003; p.2), 
subsistence agriculture is closely linked to a low level of economic development also 
seen as synonymous with backwardness and inefficiency, holding down economic 
growth and economic performance. It is mostly found both in today’s less developed 
countries and in the early stages of industrialised countries. Typically, subsistence 
agriculture is characterised by a low-external input level and low productivity (per 
land and /or per labour) and a general lack of efficiency of resource use. In economic 
terms, subsistence agriculture is argued to be a low production sector, whose actors 
seem to behave irrationally and therefore found to be resistant to change and 
innovation (ibid). Subsistence agriculture is also argued to display low 
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responsiveness to policies and is therefore difficult to influence through 
developmental policies (Seavoy, 2000; cited in (Abele & Frohberg (eds), 2003). 
Contrary to the above arguments, some analysts see subsistence agriculture as a 
sustainable economic system because of its autarchy (Doppler 1991; in Abele and 
Frohberg (eds.), 2003). Others see its continuing existence as a proof of efficiency 
while others see it providing a relief from curses of globalisation and modernisation 
(Abele & Frohberg, 2003). These arguments are challenged by Abele and Frohberg 
(2003) who argue that autarchy is prone to production risks that cannot be buffered 
by functioning markets. Moreover, subsistence agriculture yields lower incomes than 
market-oriented agriculture. And since it has been proved that the lower the national 
income is, the higher is the number of subsistence plots, then it is possible to 
conclude that subsistence farmers are overall disadvantaged, and that subsistence 
agriculture is really a problem. As Braun and Lohlein (in Abele & Frohberg, 2003) 
correctly put it, in a global sense, subsistence production is becoming less and less 
viable as it misallocates such a significant labour and natural resources to unrealised 
gains from trade and specialization. 
Reading African development reports, strategies and plans, it is evident that altering 
the existing high prevalence of subsistence agriculture in Africa is very important. 
The reports argue that, in order to end poverty in Africa, the continent’s agricultural 
sectors must transform into becoming more knowledge-based and more market-
oriented (Juma, 2011; NEPAD, 2006; Yee-Cheong, 2005). Specifically, Africa is 
said to need rural enterprises which are profitable, competitive, and well linked with 
the urban dynamics for services and markets. At this point it is important to note that 
sustainable economic change in poor countries is influenced powerfully by science 
and technology, and in particular, technology development in African agriculture is 
of key importance for welfare reasons. Therefore, meaningful agricultural 
transformations and poverty reduction in Africa will have to be anticipated from 
growth in smallholder agriculture brought in by their ability to innovate through 
increased utilization of new knowledge and technologies. This is in essence 
overcoming subsistence agriculture which is currently dominating the sector by 80%. 
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Numerous attempts to develop subsistence agriculture were previously made but 
failed (Abele & Frohberg, 2003). These were mainly done through agricultural 
development policies that aimed at making farmers produce more for the market. 
However, the focus was on introducing new technologies and innovations without 
addressing other numerous factors surrounding the subsistence producer. As a result 
about 80% of farms in developing countries are still under subsistence production 
despite the markets brought by global technological change, urbanisation, 
industrialization, improvements in infrastructure and transport, and international 
trade. It also happens despite the over 50 years of development efforts which actively 
supported the switch from subsistence to market production (Eicher, 2003). 
Existing literature lacks empirical evidence of how innovation can be promoted in 
subsistence-based industries to achieve sustainable industry-wide transformation. 
This happens at a time when it is increasingly becoming evident that existing 
approaches currently used for farmer empowerment and agricultural technology 
transfer have failed to influence innovation behaviours of a significant number of 
African rural producers and to gain capacities needed to escape the ‘subsistence 
trap13’.  
Generally, factors mentioned in the literature as causes of persisting subsistence 
based agriculture are mostly external to the producer. Very little is mentioned on 
internal dynamics surrounding the decision-making processes within such a 
household. This includes the role played by the continued exclusion of such a 
household from interacting with non-subsisting producers or actors in the same 
industry or production system in manners that challenge behavioural status quos. 
Where the external causes are mentioned, very little is mentioned about the 
institutional and cognitive factors causing them. This study contributes to the 
investigation on what causes the dominance of subsistence agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa achieved by interrogating behaviours, routines, attitudes and 
structures of the entire system where subsistence producers operate. The study also 
attempts to provide a practical approach to alter the dominance. 
                                                 
13 The concept of ‘subsistence trap’ is used by Wouter Zant when discussing barriers to exist 
subsistence agriculture. See (Zant, 2005) 
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1.7 Linking with discussions in innovation systems and 
path-dependency 
In this section I am going to talk about innovation and innovation systems approach 
to demonstrate how these are linked to the analytical framework chosen for this 
study. The discussion departs from the national systems of innovation (NIS) 
framework, and since the NIS is too broad for this study, I will focus on the 
agricultural innovation systems (AIS) and not the regional, sectoral or the 
technological systems of innovation. 
1.7.1 Linear vs. systems-oriented innovation process 
Literature classifies theories of the innovation process as being linear or systems-
oriented. A linear view of the innovation process means that “science leads to 
technology and technology satisfies market needs” (Gibbons et al., 1994). It thus 
envisions a smooth, unidirectional flow from basic scientific research to commercial 
applications. In this model there is no feedback from the several later stages of the 
innovation process (i.e., product development, production, and marketing) to the 
initial stage of research, nor is there feedback between any of the other stages. The 
linear view is very simplistic and unrealistic. It is also highly consistent with neo-
classical economic theory’s “market failure” which calls for both direct and indirect 
public support (Edquist & Hommen, 1999). However, in practical terms these 
theoretical formulations do not assist the development of specific innovation policies 
because they do not indicate the amount of government intervention required, the 
particular fields in which it is required, or the type of intervention required (Ibid). 
Whereas, the systemic view of the innovation process which led to the emergence of 
systems of innovation (SI) approaches which theorize non-linearity and 
interdependence (Edquist & Hommen, 1999) explicitly recognizes the potentially 
complex interdependencies and possibilities for multiple kinds of interactions 
between the various elements of the innovation process. Nine characteristics of SI 
approaches have been identified by Edquist and Hommen (1999) and are crucial to 
this study. Those are; (1) they place innovation and learning processes at the centre 
of focus. (2) They adopt a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. (3) They employ 
historical perspectives. (4) They stress the differences between systems, rather than 
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the optimality of systems. (5)  They emphasize interdependence and non-linearity. 
(6) They encompass product technologies and organizational innovations. (7) They 
emphasize the central role of institutions. (8) They are still associated with 
conceptual diffuseness. (9) They are conceptual frameworks rather than formal 
theories. 
1.7.2 Evolution of systems of innovation (SI) theories 
The theory of innovation can be traced back to the works of Adam Smith (1776) and 
Ricardo (1821) who noted the influence of innovation (i.e. new production 
techniques and new division of labour) on output and society and started the 
discussion on innovation and technological change in agriculture (Spielman, 2005). 
Ricardo’s analysis introduced factor bias as a determinant of the technological 
change on productivity, income and welfare. He therefore distinguished technologies 
which increase productivity and those reducing the cost of production. It is Ricardo 
therefore who provided an early analytical framework for studying the form and 
nature of innovation and its impact on social and economic wellbeing (Ibid). 
Following Ricardo’s analysis, other classical political economists like List (1841), 
Mill ([1848] 1965), and Marx ([1894] 1990) developed interest in the social and 
economic effects of technological change. Particularly, List is credited with the 
earliest description of a ‘national system of political economy which was further 
developed by Lundvall and Freeman into the innovation system concept in which 
production results not only from the activities of the firm but also from those of the 
social and economic institutions(Christopher Freeman, 1982; B. Å. Lundvall, 2007). 
Later Leontieff (1941) contributed further and introduced the input/output analysis 
that established the industry level ‘system’ approach to production later used to 
explain innovative processes (Spielman, 2005). 
In 1934 Schumpeter laid the corner stone of the modern innovation systems approach 
by distinguishing between invention, innovation and diffusion. He also distinguished  
between product, process, and organizational innovation (1939, p.87 cited in; 
Spielman, 2005; p.4). Schumpeter analysed the market and institutional conditions 
that generate innovation. According to Nelson and Winter (1982), in the 
Schumpeter’s system, innovation is endogenously determined by the behaviour of 
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the entrepreneur and his or her financiers and by the institutions of private property, 
business traditions and capitalist competition 
The development of SI approaches has therefore been influenced by different 
theories of innovation such as interactive learning theories and evolutionary theories 
(Edquist, 1997). The main theoretical origins of SI approaches also include a sectoral 
or technological system approach (Carlsson, 1995), and both broad (B.-Å. Lundvall, 
1992) and narrow (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993) versions of a national systems 
approach. Lundvall’s views exemplify the broad national approach which relates the 
national context to interactive learning theories of innovation (B.-Å. Lundvall, 1992). 
Using previously developed innovation theories within a conceptual framework of 
“national systems of innovation” a framework stressing processes of learning and 
user–producer interaction was developed. In Lundvall’s view, some kind of SI 
approach is arguably inherent in any perspective that sees the process of innovation 
as interactive (Lundvall 1992: p.8). The notion of interaction paves the way for a 
systemic approach. The focus on interaction within national systems also highlights 
the importance of institutions and organizations beyond the market. Several 
innovation theorists have convincingly argued that the model of the isolated, profit-
maximizing firm is an inappropriate tool for interpreting certain important aspects of 
innovation processes. Many of the actors and organizations involved, such as 
governmental or private non-profit organizations, are not primarily governed by 
profit-seeking motivations. Legal conditions, rules, and norms will also significantly 
affect an organization’s inclination and possibility to innovate. Both non-profit and 
profit-oriented organizations, like firms, also interact with each other in complex 
ways when pursuing learning and innovation (Edquist and Hommen 1999: p.67). 
How firms interact and why they do so is also analysed in this study as a pathway to 
understand what can trigger interactions among different actors in agriculture. 
Interactive learning theory’s strong emphasis on institutional analysis led to the 
identification of a broad realm of economic relationships and innovative activities 
that belonged to “neither market nor hierarchy”. This, in turn, allowed for another 
important influence on SI approaches—namely, emerging theory and research on 
networks of innovators (C. Freeman, 1991). A significant literature exists on 
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networks as a special form of economic organization between markets and 
hierarchies, and much of this work has dealt in various ways with themes such as 
learning and innovation. In particular, Håkansson’s work on industrial networks 
(Håkansson 1990) has been cited as an important influence on SI approaches. Due to 
its interest in studying patterns of linkage structure among firms and other 
organizations within fragmented markets, a major theme in this exploration of 
industrial networks devoted to collaborative development of new technologies has 
been the investigation of vertical and horizontal relations within networks. In this 
approach, it is recognized that all user–producer (or customer-supplier) relations 
constituting inter-firm networks must, by definition, involve some degree of vertical 
integration (although, by definition, vertical integration can never be complete in an 
inter-firm network).  
Conceptualizing systems of innovation as evolutionary systems in which institutions 
matter and learning processes are of central importance has significant implications 
for influencing agricultural innovation in developing countries. In particular, SI 
approaches provide for a much more detailed analysis of innovation processes than 
the linear approach discussed above. From an SI perspective, analysing innovation 
involves analysing interactions, and which in turn requires analysing intensity, 
typology and behaviour of actors involved within a particular system. It also provides 
for the analysis of other factors i.e. technological, institutional, economic, social, 
environmental etc. which also tend to influence innovation as a process. 
In this study innovation is seen as a co-evolutionary process combining 
technological, social, economic and institutional change. This makes production and 
exchange of technical knowledge not the only prerequisites for innovation but a 
balance amongst new technical practices and alternative ways of organizing, beyond 
technology adoption. It is therefore seen as a complex process resulting from 
multiple interactions involving different actors. Specifically, agricultural innovation 
is broadly viewed as an outcome of agricultural innovation systems (AIS)(Klerkx, 
Van Mierlo, & Leeuwis, 2012). 
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1.7.3 Innovation systems perspective in agricultural research 
The innovation systems perspectives on agricultural research and technological 
change present a significant change from the conventional linear approach to 
providing an analytical framework that explores complex relationships among 
heterogeneous agents, social economic institutions, and endogenously determined 
technological and institutional opportunities. This is to extend the innovation systems 
approach from studies of national innovation systems in industrialized-country 
manufacturing to developing country agriculture, and shift the emphasis from a 
unidirectional technology transfer approach to a more complex, process-based 
systems approach (Spielman, 2005: p.ii). 
According to Klerkx eta al, (2012: p.459), a wide range of approaches to agriculture 
has emerged over the past 40 years and some of the well-known examples include 
the Transfer of technology approach (Jarrett 1985), Induced Innovation (Ruttan and 
Hayami 1984), Training and Visit System (Hulme 1992), Participatory Research and 
Participatory Technology Development (Farrington am Martin 1988; Neef and 
Neubert 2011), Farmer First (Chambers et al. 1989), and Agricultural Knowledge 
and Information Systems (AKIS) (Rolling 2009). The authors explain that while 
agricultural innovation studies appear to have developed in relative isolation of 
generic innovation studies which focus on industrial innovation, there has always 
been a degree of cross-fertilization. That generic systems studies have influenced 
systemic thinking in agricultural innovation studies, and vice versa (p.459). For 
example, the works of Checkland (1981) and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) have 
influenced AKIS thinking (Ibid, p.459). 
In their paper titled ‘strengthening agricultural innovation capacity: Are innovation 
brokers the answer?’ Klerkx, Hall; and Leeuwis (2009) summarise that, systems 
thinking in agricultural innovation has evolved over the years, through several 
approaches such as agricultural knowledge and information systems (e.g. Engel 
1995; Roling 2009), Farmer Field Schools (e.g., Tripp et al., 2005), the Australian 
Landcare movement (e.g., Wilson, 2004) and the Farmer First movement (e.g., 
Scoones and Thompson, 2009). Recently, a blending of insights from the agricultural 
innovation literature and industrial innovation literature has resulted in the concept of 
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agricultural innovation systems (AIS) (Andrew Hall, Bockett, Taylor, Sivamohan, & 
Clark, 2001; Pant & Hambly-Odame, 2013; Roling, 2009). A national AIS is defined 
as: “a network of organisations, enterprises and individuals focused on bringing new 
products, new processes and new forms of organisation into economic use, together 
with the institutions and policies that affect the way different agents interact, share, 
access, exchange and use knowledge” (Rajalahti, Janssen, and Pehu 2008; p.6-7).  
Beyond researchers, extension agents and farmers, an AIS consists of all types of 
public, private and civil society actors, such as inputs and processing industry actors, 
agricultural traders, retailers, policymakers, consumers and NGOs. For specific 
innovation processes, flexible and dynamic innovation networks are formed from the 
network of actors present in national AIS or across different national AIS. These 
networks have been referred to as innovation coalitions by Biggs and Smith (1998), 
multistakeholder platforms by Röling (1994), innovation configurations by Engel 
(1995) or as public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Spielman and Von Grebmer, 2006; 
Hartwich and Tola, 2007; Hall, 2006). Besides stressing the fact that innovation 
requires involvement of many actors and effective interactions amongst these, the 
AIS approach recognises the influential role of institutions (i.e., laws, regulations, 
attitudes, habits, practices, incentives) in shaping how actors interact (Andrew Hall et 
al., 2001; Riikka; Rajalahti et al., 2008).  Although there is much emphasis on 
knowledge creation, exchange and use in the above definition of AIS, innovation 
systems need to fulfil several other functions that are essential for innovation. These 
functions include fostering entrepreneurial drive and activity, vision development, 
resource mobilisation (e.g., capital), market formation, building legitimacy for 
change and overcoming resistance to change by means of advocacy and lobbying 
(Hekkert et al., 2007 cited in Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009: p.411). 
1.7.4 Linking path-dependency with innovation systems perspectives  
The study also adopts the Path-Dependency Theory (PDT) to analyse the persistence 
of traditional-low innovation poultry production system in rural Tanzania. The theory 
emerged in the 1980s to counter neoclassical assumptions about the reversibility of 
economic decisions (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Magnusson and Ottosson, 1997). 
Frequently used to analyse trends in innovation (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Coombes 
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and Hull, 1998), the theory is best known for the notion of ‘lock-in’ which argues 
that, a technology or technological regime may be quite flexible when it first 
develops, but over time steadily more fixed pathways become established. The 
theory assumes that different pathways could have been taken (i.e. there is no single 
equilibrium), thus highlighting the influence of (possibly minor) historical events on 
the emergence of a particular pathway (Ruttan, 1996; Hogg, 2001). Once one option 
gained advantage (i.e. market share), other factors provided positive feedback to 
reinforce its pathway. These factors can include: capital or learning investments sunk 
in one option, which inhibit change; increasing returns to scale or information, which 
reward dominance; network externalities, when interests of different actors converge 
on an option; and familiarity, which reduces risks from uncertainty (David, 1985; 
Wolff and Recke, 2000). Besides such structural factors, a pathway may also be 
reinforced by norms or routines associated with a particular technological regime, 
similar to how Kuhnian paradigms influence scientific research trajectories (Dosi, 
1984; Coombes and Hull, 1998). Thus, while choices are rarely completely fixed, 
innovation often follows established pathways due to the cost of changing pathways, 
or because the norms or routines of a technological regime preclude alternative 
approaches from being considered. This literature on path-dependency therefore, 
emphasises system-level analysis, focusing on technological regimes (Berkhout, 
2002). Analysing the rural poultry industry with such a broad, historical perspective 
is expected to uncover other factors for low innovation tendencies in rural poultry 
production besides producers’ poor resource base or lack of production skills and 
technologies. 
Wolff and Recke (2000) and Hogg (2001) highlight the difficulty of inducing change 
in innovation or practices, as technological regimes can be well-established. ‘‘At the 
institutional level, professional bodies, career structure, and education and training 
programmes anchor the mode’’ of research (Hogg, 2001, p. 101). Exploring the 
norms, routines, and policies affecting production can help address this question, 
suggesting possibilities for changes. Path-dependency takes a somewhat aerial view, 
saying relatively little about why certain pathways get selected. Theories from 
science studies, particularly on the social construction of technology (Pinch and 
Bijker, 1984; Mac-Kenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Bijker et al., 1987) and actor 
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networks (Knorr Cetina, 1999; Latour, 2005) address this. While these theories are 
often portrayed as incompatible with each other, and with path-dependency, it is 
possible to integrate some of their elements to provide a deeper analysis of 
technological change (Shrum, 2000; Bruun and Hukkinen, 2003). Social construction 
theories argue that technologies can have interpretive flexibility, especially during 
their early development, with different social groups (e.g., farmers, scientists) having 
their own perspective on whether a technology ‘works’ for them. Closure occurs 
when one social group’s perspective dominates, or when a technology changes 
enough to work for all relevant groups; this helps stabilize technological pathways 
(Bijker, 1992; Bijker, 1993). Actor-network theories (ANT) can shed further light on 
the process of closure, showing how power works through the interaction of social 
actors with networks (of other actors, but also inanimate actors such as policies, 
funding rules, infrastructure, or other technologies) (Latour, 1987; Latour, 2005). 
Integrating economic and social theories on technological change can enrich our 
understanding of how technological pathways become established and fixed (Bruun 
and Hukkinen, 2003). 
Therefore, PDT opens up the black box of technology development, giving a better 
understanding of current practices, and how sunk investments, network interactions, 
and normative discourses underpin these practices. It is useful for analysing the 
scope for institutional change – as its historical approach places research choices, and 
their implications, in a wider context. Path dependency basically refers to processes 
or systems whose outcome evolves as a consequence of the process’ or system’s 
history (Martin and Sunley, 2006, p. 399). While path dependency denotes a more 
general view of systemic characteristics, three particular concepts have emerged 
from the path dependency literature, i.e. organisational thinness, fragmentation, and 
(negative) lock-in (Grabher, 1993, Isaksen, 2001, Asheim et al., 2003, Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). These concepts emerged because of their relatedness to particular 
problem regions such as peripheral regions (organisational thinness), metropolitan 
regions (fragmentation), and old industrial regions (lock-in) (Isaksen, 2001, Tödtling 
and Trippl, 2005). Organisational thinness refers to a scarcity of relevant actors (key 
organisations, firms and institutions) which possess resources that can facilitate 
innovation activities (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). In this thesis, the PTD’s concepts 
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of lock-in, organisational thinness and fragmentation are used to analyse the intensity 
of different actors within the rural poultry industry (as the AIS under study), their 
individual and collective behaviours, and how they interact. The information is then 
used to establish how the outcome and evolution of these factors are a consequence 
of the industry’s history. In addition, the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is also used 
to explain the role of agricultural commodities e.g. chicken (as ‘non-human actors’) 
in determining types and levels of innovation processes within an agricultural 
innovation system. 
1.7.5 Scaling ‘up and out’  
The idea of ‘scaling up and out’ is increasingly becoming important in analysing 
innovation processes within systems. Literature presents different dimensions, types 
and implications of scaling process in terms of approaches and strategies to achieve 
scaling (Wigboldus & Leeuwis, 2013). Conceptually, literature distinguishes 
between scaling up and scaling out, and between horizontal and vertical scaling, and 
more. According to Wigboldus and Leeuwis (2013), scaling out involves replicating 
while maintaining same attributes while scaling out leads to new attributes (p.6). 
These processes happen all the time with or without human intervention and work 
differently for different scale levels. In their opinion, any intervention involves 
scaling processes from beginning to end and what is important is to understand our 
scaling efforts in relation to other on-going scaling processes’many of which cannot 
be or will not be affected through the intervention’ (Wigboldus & Leeuwis, 2013; 
p.iii). The authors argue that, neglecting such dynamics may result in failing to see 
things go to scale (p.iii). 
In their book, Wigboldus and Leeuwis (2013) compare the complexity and 
mechanisms for scaling out and scaling up processes. They conclude that scaling up 
involves a change in qualities and properties of the object of scaling and therefore 
involves more complexity. On the other hand scaling-out essentially involves 
replication of an existing ‘prototype’ which makes the process relatively less 
complex.  However, both processes require understanding of the scaling up 
mechanisms that led to the phenomenon at hand. According to Creech (2008; 
Wigboldus & Leeuwis, 2013), the scaling up process requires negotiations, 
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diplomacy, patience, flexibility, time and resources to be successful. This is linked to 
this study’s interest on understanding how innovation can be facilitated externally to 
promote technological and organizational changes within industry/AIS and meet 
broad objectives like poverty reduction (for example). This attempt to steer and 
control scaling processes is of great interest when it comes to understanding how 
innovation can be promoted for wider impact. Linn (2012) introduces the concept of 
‘scaling up pathways’ as tools to best learn strategically how change happens (Linn, 
2012). He basically interprets scaling as ‘ensuring the quality of development impact, 
reaching out to those left behind and ensuring sustainability and adaptability of 
results beyond replicating successes to cover large groups or populations’ (Linn, 
2012, cited in; Wigboldus & Leeuwis, 2013; p.13). In this thesis, and without getting 
into details, both scaling up and scaling out are explored as indirect (almost 
unconscious) scaling mechanisms achieved through playing facilitation and 
brokering functions. 
1.8 Context of investigation 
The empirical data on which this analysis is based come from three main sources. 
First I interviewed ex-RIU staff to understand how the programme was run and to 
access the programme database and reports. Thus most data on RIU processes came 
from RIU archives and from discussions with ex-staff. This information was later 
crosschecked by interviewing producers who engaged with the programme. The 
second source was interviews carried in Songea and Njombe districts where RIU 
programme was not implemented and commercialisation had not taken place. This 
group acted as a control and data collected explains current innovation behaviours in 
rural poultry production. The third source of data was interviews with RIU target 
group. These included producers, input suppliers, extension service providers, etc. 
This group provided information on perceptions, outcomes and impact of what 
transpired during the programme. Basically, they explained what was done by the 
programme, what changed in the industry and how they perceive it. 
The data was collected at different times between September 2012 and March 2014 
using a variety of ethnographic methods combining observation, focus group 
discussions, and semi-structure interviews. Data from RIU reports and databases 
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were first interpreted to capture the sequence of events. Then a meeting was 
organised with ex-RIU staff and selected producers to comment and approve the 
sequence before more data was collected to explain each event. After sufficient data 
was collected for each event, another meeting was held with a different group of 
selected producers to validate the information. 
Therefore, the study examines both the RIU programme and community in which it 
intervened. This helps to understand how the two shaped each other towards the 
observed transformation. Studying the RIU programme provides a true reflection of 
cause and effects of the facilitation process, while interviews provide a true 
explanation of community’s response to the facilitation. Since data were collected 
from real events, triangulation and validation was relatively easier especially during 
focus group discussions where I used to cross check most of the general responses. 
Being an ex-RIU staff was both an advantage and a problem especially when 
interviewing RIU target group. It is possible that I might have influenced some 
respondents, either positively or negatively. However, triangulation through asking 
similar questions during focus group discussions and allowing long discussion 
around questions proved to be useful. Most data collected happened to be consistent 
across the different sources, and with very few gaps. Furthermore, RIU happened to 
have a thorough documentation of events and reflection and it made data collection 
much easier. All ex-RIU staff were also available for interviews and their memories 
of the programme were still fresh. 
In the analysis I am not trying to evaluate the performance of RIU. I am also not 
pretending to argue that their approach is the best for improving productivity in 
subsistence agriculture. However, what I seek to explain is what the programme did, 
how it was done, what eventually happened, then elaborate on the lessons that 
emerge for policy and practice, and for future research. Therefore, my analytical 
focus is to a large extent biased towards describing what is reported to have 
transpired on the ground as explained by interviewees, written in RIU reports and 
what I personally observed. Therefore, since I have not dwelt on critiquing the 
programme with the intention to argue what was wrong or right about it, or what 
should or shouldn’t have happened etc., my expectation is that I have not put myself 
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in defensive positions that could trigger data manipulation. Therefore, in the analysis, 
what the programme did and what happened on the ground is ‘the reality', on which I 
have built my interpretations. 
1.9 How the thesis is organised 
The thesis is organised in ten chapters. I began by introducing my motivation for, 
and the significance of the topic, introducing the rural poultry industry and the RIU 
work in the industry, the research gap, the research questions and study 
contributions. I explain the broad concern of the study which is to understand what 
constrains innovation in subsistence agriculture, and how the public sector can 
intervene to guarantee inclusive growth. I also explain that the overarching question 
of this study was developed from observation of the challenge of low agricultural 
performance in Africa caused by the dominance of subsistence production even after 
50 years of investment in agricultural R&D.  Linked to this is the theoretical 
challenge that even with the newly embraced systems thinking and theories in 
tackling agricultural challenges, the ability to go beyond the conceptual 
understanding of these theories and derive practical frameworks for effective 
agricultural policy and practice is still limited.  
Addressing these theoretical challenges, is now explored through the ‘innovation 
systems’ research which considers innovation a product of multiple ‘interactions’  
and ‘learning’ among heterogeneous actors; and that innovation processes can be 
‘induced’, ‘facilitated’ or ‘brokered’ to increase productivity and performance. The 
RIU case study is suggested as the suitable research design which will allow answers 
to the research questions regarding the observed dominance and persistence of low 
innovation /subsistence tendencies, and how that can be deliberately changed. 
In Chapter 2, I establish the link between the RIU programme as the case study and 
the main research questions. I clarify the study situations that emerge from the RIU 
experience, and use them to guide the choice of theories. Three study situations are 
identified as; the Tanzania rural poultry industry as the system which was influenced 
by RIU; the ‘commercialisation process’ as an iterative process of introducing new 
knowledge, new ways of managing poultry farms, new inputs, new technologies, 
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new innovations, new mentalities, etc. to produce poultry for the market; and the 
RIU programme as a ‘deliberate action that induced and promoted changes in the 
industry. I then explain my choice of theories to analyse the three situations. I also 
describe the main study characters based on the roles they played in the RIU 
programme. I further clarify my focus on the collective behaviour of the 
heterogeneous rural poultry producers, from which their power to influence the 
system is derived. I then explain how I re-constructed this ‘collective actor’ from 
being viewed as a ‘victim’ of market failures and bad policies, into an actor with 
powers to ‘choose, to ‘interact’ and ‘relate’ in order to learn and influence 
behaviours and structures in a network or a system.  
In Chapter 3, I build on the discussions in Chapter 1 to articulate the research 
design and methodology for the study. I explain how study questions will be 
answered using the single case study research strategy and elaborate how data was 
collected and analysed. I describe the process of designing and conducting the 
research and justify my choices, including reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed design. In the chapter, I explain how the challenge of generalization 
from a single case study is approached by clarifying how the case study produces 
theoretical propositions (not statistics) usable in future contexts and organisations. I 
also explain how the ‘Framework Approach’ is used to analyse and interpret data.  
In Chapter 4, I review the literature on rural poultry industry in Tanzania and 
highlight the industry’s value chain and its characteristics. My intention is to present 
a brief background to the industry under study, and describe behaviours and 
structures that existed before RIU intervened as seen by ‘others’. This sets the stage 
for answering the three research questions. I therefore describe the value chain and 
the dominant breeds, and how these influenced how the industry behaves today. I 
also explain how the research findings regarding the genetic potentials of the local 
breeds influenced policy decisions on how to support the industry. I also review the 
dynamics of the industry before and after the Tanzanian independence in 1961 which 
puts to light the existence of a dual production system and biases in the poultry 
industry. I explain the existing bias towards maintaining poultry production in rural 
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areas under the traditional system (where innovation is low), while promoting the 
commercial system in urban and peri-urban areas using exotic breeds. 
Chapter 5 is my first empirical chapter where I present findings from the field, 
particularly pertaining to the first research question. In the chapter, I show how the 
Path Dependency theory, using the concepts of ‘lock-in’, ‘organisational thinness’ 
and ‘fragmentation’ explain the observed prevalence and persistence of traditional 
poultry production system in rural Tanzania, and thus explain the observed low 
innovation tendencies. By categorizing the lock-in further into ‘cognitive lock-in’, 
‘structural or resource lock-in’ and ‘political lock-in’, I present my findings to show 
that the industry under study is actually experiencing a lock in. I also analyse the 
industry’s innovation context and explain how actors in the five domains of the 
Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) have promoted low interactions and therefore 
low innovation tendencies in rural poultry. I also describe how interactions in the 
industry were low because of ‘biased mental frames’ which promoted fragmentation.  
In Chapters 6, I present empirical findings explaining how RIU unlocked the 
industry from the situation described in Chapter 5. The analysis describes how RIU 
deliberately embarked on unlocking the Tanzanian rural poultry industry from the 
path dependency situation established in Chapter five. I therefore present RIU as an 
external actor facilitating processes to create new thinking and promoted interactions 
among different actors. These processes stimulated investment and therefore reduced 
the organisational thinness and fragmentation that existed. Using data from RIU 
reports and interviews with ex-staff and programme beneficiaries, I analyse the 
initial processes and contextual negotiations that took place at different levels of 
implementation. By recreating the RIU programme processes, the chapter sheds light 
on how interactions and learning were practically facilitated to transform an industry 
which was dominated by subsistence producers. 
Chapter 7: This chapter describes the RIU process of influencing innovation 
behaviours and structures in the industry under study. It explains how ideas and 
interventions gradually got shaped by what was happening on the ground. In the 
chapter, I explain the RIU’s complex process of stimulating interactions among 
actors and the process of building networks and relevant systems capacities to 
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innovate. I explain how actors were mobilised to analyse the system and visualize the 
envisaged network. I also clarify how commercialisation was chosen to drive 
processes and how producers were facilitated to internalise it. I then discuss the 
negotiations that took place to build trust before business interactions started and 
before the network emerged. I specifically make it clear that, before interactions 
could start the network was first sketched. 
In Chapter 8, I introduce the use of concepts of ‘exogenous shocks’ and ‘demand 
shocks’ in explaining the process of disrupting path dependency. I also use the 
concepts of ‘unlocking’ and ‘path creation’ to describe what RIU did to overcome 
the dominance of the traditional poultry production systems. Using empirical data, I 
explain how RIU acted as an exogenous shock to change the existed situation and 
pushed actors to initiate the process of unlocking or creating a new development 
path. I therefore describe how RIU facilitated internal processes towards re-
organisation. The main argument in the chapter is that, promoting innovation in an 
industry dominated by subsistence producers means unlocking it from path 
dependency, and from multiple ‘demand-and-supply deadlocks’. And to achieve that, 
a 'mental shift’ needs to be created in a significant number of actors, followed by 
inducing ‘system shocks’ sufficient to stimulate co-movements and multiple 
interactions. Then respond to ‘after-shock capacity problems’ as discussed in the 
next Chapter 9. 
Chapter 9 presents the empirical analysis of the RIU process of building innovation 
capacities after the increase in demand for inputs and services from rural producers. 
In this Chapter I explain how different problems emerged in different subsystems 
and how RIU supported actors to solve them. I specifically focus on analysing 
problems that emerged in chicks and feed supply, provision of extension services, in 
managing poultry diseases, building business skills, and in marketing and regulation. 
The discussion makes it clear that areas to intervene emerged as actors continued to 
interact and therefore they could not have been predicted. I also show how needs 
articulation and solutions seeking were continuous processes. This is because every 
growth achieved after innovating to solve a particular problem demanded new skills 
and capacities. In turn the demand for new skills created new problems, and so on. 
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The chapter also highlights how an innovation facilitator needs to work with 
heterogeneous actors, handle multiple processes, be flexible and be able to play 
different roles. 
Chapter 10, summarizes the findings, links them together and locates them in the 
wider academic discourse on promoting agricultural innovation in developing 
economies. It also addresses the practical and policy implications of the findings for 
international development in promoting rural development, agricultural development 
and poultry development for poverty reduction. Finally, it explains the limitations of 
this research and presents some suggestions for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Emerging issues and theoretical choices 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter establishes the link between RIU as the ‘case study’ and the analytical 
framework chosen for this research. Specifically, it elaborates the RIU claims 
regarding its processes, outcomes and impact and then identifies three study 
situations on which the analysis is based. By doing this, the chapter establishes a 
theoretical framework based on RIU as the case under study. It also describes the 
main actors who drove the RIU programme. 
RIU claims to have used the innovation systems perspective to build networks and 
promote learning, which transformed the industry from being dominated by 
subsistence-based backyard activities, into a commercially viable one. The industry 
now attracts more actors and investment (Mur & Nederlof, 2012; RIU, 2011a). The 
above claim is interesting because agriculture is known to be a complex socio-
economic system influenced by multitude of factors and circumstances and whose 
behaviour creatively evolves from complex interactions between that which is 
technological and that which is social, and together they relate to what is physical 
(i.e. rainfall, rivers, soil, air, etc.). This fact makes the behaviour of the sector 
dynamic and therefore indeterminate. On the other hand, innovation is also known to 
be a complex process involving multiple interactions (Kline, S. and Rosenberg, N 
(1986); Lundvall, 2007; Sunding & Zilberman, 2000). If the agricultural context is 
temporary and therefore unpredictable over time, and if innovation emerges from a 
complex web of interactions, then how does the human intention to initiate and 
manage innovation processes in order to achieve broad objectives like poverty 
reduction fit in? 
What emerges from the analysis of RIU interventions is that, despite their 
indeterminate and unpredictable nature, complex agricultural systems can be 
deliberately influenced to produce desired behaviours. There is space within complex 
systems through which human intent is embraced to become part of the complexity 
that forms system behaviours. This means that short-term human determinism is 
allowable when influencing complex systems, though only as one of many inputs and 
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possibilities that produce systems behaviours. The question is therefore, how does 
one identify this space and make the human intent ‘dominant’ so as to shape the 
ultimate behaviour towards a certain vision? 
In the case of RIU, the question is how did the programme manipulate processes 
until the commercialisation behaviour emerged as desired? RIU answers this 
question by posing a second claim that the programme facilitated producers to 
change their ‘expectations’ and their ‘relationship with poultry keeping’, then 
induced the system into an ‘input demand shock’, followed by adopting what they 
call a ‘bottleneck approach’ to articulate needs emerging from the shock and sought 
solutions to specifically build actors’ capacity to satisfy the new demand. And in the 
process of doing that, a new economic equilibrium was achieved and adapted by the 
system. The programme also claims to have used ‘business culture’ during 
commercialisation to shape most decisions made by all actors, including rural 
producers (For details on these claims see RIU, 2011a). 
Therefore, by analysing what RIU did and how the system responded, this study 
verifies the three implicit claims which are; (i) use of the innovation systems 
perspective to build networks and promote learning; (ii) following a three steps 
process, i.e. changing mentalities, inducing system shocks, and adopting a 
‘bottleneck approach’ to build capacities after the shocks; and (iii) use of ‘business’ 
(commercialisation) to shape decisions and processes. The analysis makes it clear 
that RIU influenced actors’ behaviours and processes as a system and not as separate 
individuals. RIU stimulated and facilitated multiple interactions to do business 
together and exchanged goods, technology, skills, knowledge, etc. (as a proxy for 
learning) among different actors including the rural poor. And consequently, new 
innovation behaviours and structures emerged. Therefore, RIU interventions 
involved a system, a commercialisation process and a facilitator. 
In order to link RIU as a case study with the main research questions, I have 
identified three study situations which emerge from the RIU experience, and used 
them to guide my choices in research design and theories. Those are; (i) the Tanzania 
rural poultry industry as the system which was influenced by RIU; and (ii) the 
‘commercialisation process’ as an iterative process of introducing new knowledge, 
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new ways of managing poultry farms, new inputs, new technologies, new 
innovations,  and mentalities, etc. in order to produce chickens for the market.  
According to RIU reports, the process was shaped and being shaped by ‘the context’ 
at which it occurred; and (iii) the RIU programme as a ‘a deliberate action’ set out to 
induce and promote innovation, and thus acted as a force arriving from outside to 
influence the industry. The RIU programme recruited an ‘innovation broker’ (a 
facilitator) to implement this deliberate action. 
2.2 Structure of the chapter 
The chapter is organised in seven sections. The next section (3) explains how the 
generally low innovation in the rural poultry industry acts as a lock-in. It elaborates 
how path dependency theory is used to analyse behaviours using the concepts of 
lock-in, organisational thinness and fragmentation. The section identifies three types 
of lock-in i.e. cognitive, structural (or resource) and political lock-in(s), and explains 
how they are analysed.  
Section four explains the commercialisation process which was facilitated by RIU to 
transform the rural poultry industry to be the ‘prime mover’ of processes. It presents 
the study’s assumptions that commercialisation triggered interactions between rural 
producers and other actors in the industry, by encouraging producers to produce for 
the market. It basically explains that commercialisation justified the demand for new 
knowledge and technologies at all levels, and consequently promoted innovation 
within the entire sector. It also explains how the AIS framework is used to analyse 
the commercialisation process from ‘network building’ and ‘business’ perspectives.  
Section five discusses how RIU is looked at by the study as a deliberate public action 
which influenced innovation behaviours in the industry under study. It then explains 
how the concept of ‘an innovation broker’ and ‘exogenous shocks’ are used to 
describe what RIU did. Then section six describes the main study actors while 
section seven draws conclusions from the chapter. 
2.3 Explaining low innovation in the rural poultry industry 
The first study situation is the Tanzania poultry industry with a particular focus on 
the rural poultry industry where small producers keep local or indigenous breeds of 
 38 
chicken. The Tanzania poultry industry is dominated by the traditional sector which 
contributes more than ninety per cent of the entire national flock (Msami, 2008a, 
2008b; United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). Therefore, the study looks at the nature 
of the industry, the behaviour of actors, and institutional and organisational 
arrangements that make the sector what it is. I specifically pay attention to the 
consistent nature of low innovation tendencies portrayed by most actors, and 
establish their causes. 
Understanding innovation behaviours and processes in subsistence agriculture is core 
to this study because according to FAO’s report14 of 2009, about 80 per cent of all 
farms in Africa are small farms of less than 2 hectares. Literature shows that by 
operating at subsistence levels, the agriculture sector does not experience 
economically significant innovation because existing technologies, practices and 
arrangements (both institutional and organisational) are often adapted to conditions 
of low production and marketing. As a result, and in the absence of rapid change of 
scale to trigger higher market demand, an endogenous alteration of current 
techniques and arrangements is neither desirable, nor feasible. This implies that the 
technical, organisational and institutional conditions embedded in subsistence 
agriculture are incapable of generating sufficient response to innovation triggers 
(Abele & Frohberg, 2003; Aliber & Hart, 2009; Kostov & Lingard, 2002; 
Takeshima, 2008). The main question remains as to what sustains the subsistence 
nature so strongly? And what can possibly alter the situation to create a new path?  
In my analysis I assume that nobody wants to be poor and therefore the choice to not 
produce for the market is the only rational choice available to subsistence producers. 
Otherwise they would have responded differently. Abele and Frohberg wrote: 
[‘..subsistence agriculture is applied because there are no 
alternatives (Abele & Frohberg, 2003; p.iv).] 
Therefore it is my argument that, as part of their livelihood strategies, poor 
subsistence producers may desire to commercialise their enterprises but from where 
they stand both as a group and as individuals, the transition seems too complex, 
                                                 
14 This was FAO’s report to the High-Level Expert Forum on How to Feed the World by 2050 held in Rome in October 2009 
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costly and unjustified. Linked to this argument, is my choice to use the ‘path 
dependency’ theory and the concepts of ‘lock-in’ to explain the observed prevalence 
and persistence of subsistence agricultural production in rural Africa, and of ‘path 
creation’ to explain how changes in rural agro-industries can possibly be 
approached.  
The path dependence theory provides a theoretical concept for analysing the 
competition between two paradigms and explains what makes one dominate over the 
other (Wolff & Recke, 2000). The theory also explains if dynamic increasing returns 
exist, a path once chosen will become entrenched (Colombelli & Von Tunzelmann, 
2010; David, 2000; Niosi, 2011; Ruttan, 1997). Thus building on the argument that 
there is a technological dimension of development paths (Dosi 1982) and 
organisational arrangements which tend to persist for a long time (Kogut 1991), I 
have used the theory to examine both organisational and technological reasons for 
the traditional (extensive) poultry production system to persist over 
commercialisation (semi-intensive or intensive system) despite the known benefits 
and superiority of the later in reducing poverty. 
According to Gerd Schienstock (2004), path dependence embodies a strong 
prescription about which direction of technological change should be pursued and 
which should be neglected (Schienstock, 2004). In addition, Hamalainen (in Ibid) 
introduces the idea of mental paradigms which are shared by most economic actors 
in a system and which create path dependence. Hamalainen argues that there tend to 
be internally consistent and shared ‘mental sets’ (emphasis reproduced) which result 
from prevailing norms, values and policies continuously reinforced by the positive 
experiences and feedback stemming from the evolutionary phases of technological, 
organisational and institutional development (Schienstock, 2004). Therefore, 
examining the presence of these mental sets provides an explanation of why certain 
development paths stick more than others. 
In the analysis, I specifically pay attention to the dual production systems found in 
the poultry industry in Tanzania, namely; (i) the intensive or (semi-intensive) 
commercial production system mostly found in urban areas and which is well 
integrated in the poultry input and output markets, and (ii) the extensive traditional 
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system which is predominantly rural and which is more socially embedded, and 
which has no links with input markets. I also consider the two systems to be 
technologies in the sense that each of them embodies a specific breed which is linked 
to specific management routines and technologies. For example, in the commercial 
system producers keep patented pure breeds of broilers and layers which are 
regarded as improved technologies resulted from systematic genetic selection and 
manipulation or different crossbreeds. In addition, the commercial system also uses a 
specific technology package of vaccines, feeds (sometimes fortified with enzymes, 
vitamins, minerals and other additives), industrially hatched chicks, biosafety 
measures and other management practices. Basically, I have treated the two poultry 
production systems as ‘composite technologies’ where multiple technologies are 
amalgamated and constructed to function as a package. Additionally, I have treated 
the two production systems as competing technologies in the context of poverty 
eradication, where the commercial system is argued to provide more benefits in 
terms of increasing opportunity for learning, productivity and income gains. 
Therefore, in order to explain why the traditional system persists in rural Tanzania 
(as a relatively inferior technology for reducing poverty in those areas), I use the 
concept of lock-in developed by Arthur (1989) which Castells described as the 
situation where; 
[… ‘an old technology, but also a traditional organization model locks 
a national economy into an inferior option of development and may in 
the long run result in a loss of competitiveness and the retarding of 
economic growth’ (Castells, 1997; cited in Schienstock, 2004; p.xx).] 
Literature, identifies three types of lock-in which I also explore in my analysis, 
namely; ‘Structural lock-in’ which exists when most resources are bound to a 
specific technology and existing organisational and institutional settings are tied to 
this technology, leaving no room for diversification and the development of new 
technological paths; ‘Political lock-in’ which exists when the dominating power 
structures have a vested interest in the dominant techno-organisational path and resist 
changes; and ‘Cognitive lock-in’ which exists if economic actors, continue to adhere 
to the existing development path, even if it can no longer ensure competitiveness and 
economic growth (Grabher, 1993; cited in Schienstock, 2004). 
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Therefore, using data from rural producers and from other secondary sources I 
examine and illustrate how several of the properties highlighted in the recent 
theoretical literature on technology choice - positive feedbacks, and self-reinforcing 
mechanisms can be used to explain the persistence of low innovation levels in 
subsistence-based agro industries. The analysis also highlights the importance of 
facilitating or inducing certain events to push the system in a particular direction and 
which is the focus of my next study situation discussed below. Therefore, by 
identifying the self-reinforcing mechanisms and factors possibly leading to the types 
of lock-in above, I am challenging policy makers to focus on unlocking African 
agriculture and create new technological and organisational paradigms.   
The decision to use the path dependence theory does not imply that it is the only 
theory which explains why subsistence production persists. Other theories like 
transaction cost theory have widely been used to explain the barriers to exit 
subsistence production (see Berkeley, Vakis, Sadoulet, & Janvry, 2003; Cadot, 
Dutoit, & Olarreaga, 2010; Henning & Henningsen, 2007; Pingali, Meijer, & 
Khwaja, 2001). Using the transaction cost theory, Wouter Zant (2012) introduces the 
concept of ‘subsistence trap’ which bore some similarities with the ‘lock-in’ concept 
but focusing on effects of costs and markets – i.e. on economic factors. Zant argues 
that high costs of both production and transaction, and high risks of output and input 
prices often make subsistence farming the optimal choice over others. He therefore 
looks at ‘the sector level trap’ where the widespread subsistence farming leads to low 
productivity and low growth in agriculture, which in return leads to economy 
stagnation (possibly second trapping) because of the large multiplier effects from 
agriculture to the remaining sectors of the economy (Zant, 2012). Basically, unlike 
the path dependency theory the transaction cost theory fails to capture factors beyond 
the market e.g. organisational, institutions or technological which reinforce 
subsistence tendencies, and which are important in my analysis. Moreover, by 
analysing the self-reinforcing feedback loops in a system the path dependence theory 
also allows for economic factors like transaction costs to be captured as well. 
Therefore, path dependence theory and the concept of lock-in are used to explain 
why the traditional system of producing poultry has persisted over commercialization 
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in rural Tanzania despite the growing market demand and existence of 
commercialisation knowledge, inputs and technologies needed to produce intensively 
(or semi-intensively). I also use the theory to explain why rural producers continue to 
use low poultry technologies to produce not for the market despite their significant 
desire to earn more income and reduce poverty. I have analysed existing self-
reinforcing mechanisms and factors leading to the types of lock-in mentioned above, 
and explain what ties the rural poultry industry to the observed low levels of 
innovation, and how to intervene. And by doing that, the analysis answers the first 
question posed to the RIU interventions and to the first two research questions on 
what constrains innovation in the rural poultry industry and why innovation is 
general low in the industry.   
2.4 Analysing commercialization as a ‘trigger’ of innovation 
The second study situation is the ‘commercialisation process’ which was facilitated 
and coordinated by the RIU Tanzania programme whose objective was to transform 
the indigenous chicken industry to be both commercially viable, and inclusive of 
small rural producers. The programme supposed that commercialisation of the rural 
poultry enterprises would justify and trigger demand for new knowledge and 
technologies at all levels, and consequently promote innovation within the entire 
sector. The target here was therefore, to make the industry which was dominated by 
subsistence activities attractive for investment, including investment in innovation. In 
this case, poverty was used as the opportunity to justify the business motive which 
became the point of departure towards commercialisation. Apparently, to rural 
producers, and to other actors who joined the programme, RIU was not about 
promoting innovation, but about improving incomes, and ‘business’ was their 
motivation. 
The programme used poverty as the entry point to convince rural poultry producers 
to commercialise their enterprises in order to gain economies of scale. Consequently 
their demand for new knowledge and innovation increased (RIU, 2011a). The study 
therefore looks at commercialisation as the ‘prime mover’15 to which different actors 
                                                 
15 The term ‘prime mover’ is used by Charles Dhanasai and Arvind Parkhe (2006) to describe the 
leading function of a hub firm in orchestrating innovation in networks  
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in the industry responded to in manners which caused complex shifts of different 
dimensions at different levels of the industry. It is also the force that held actors 
together as the system disconnected itself from the subsistence equilibriums and 
when it was on transit to the new path. This is explained in findings which 
demonstrate continuous moments of discrete and transient states being attained 
before the industry gets to selected equilibriums.  
I will therefore analyse the commercialisation process in two perspectives, i.e. from 
the ‘network building perspective’ and from the ‘business perspective’. The two 
perspectives emerge from the RIU’s decision to operate within a network of actors 
and use business as the driving force. This was like agglomerating small firms and 
actors to gain a cohesive ability needed to make the shift. And thus a significant 
number was needed, especially of producers. This got RIU involved in handling both 
technological and organisational issues, i.e. organising and coordinating actors as 
well as promoting use of new knowledge and technologies. Appropriately therefore, I 
have separated the ‘orchestration’ which is the continuous process of  coordinating, 
directing and managing members (structure) to interact and learn, from 
‘commercialisation’ which is what emerges after actors have interacted (with that 
which is social, economic, technological and environmental), to produce for the 
market (which becomes their new way of keeping and producing chickens). 
To analyse how RIU used commercialisation to build networks (i.e. to understand 
how interactions were practically promoted), I have used the Agricultural Innovation 
System (AIS) framework to analyse the role of ‘business’ as the motive, ‘culture’ (or 
‘way of doing things’) and ‘incentive’ towards shaping interactions in the industry. 
The understanding is that, in order to commercialise the industry, the first thing RIU 
did was to encourage producers to produce for the market. This turned rural poultry 
farms into ‘enterprises’ (or ‘firms’), and producers into ‘managers’. And from these 
changes, the following happened;  
One, as firms with business motives to produce and sell at a profit, rural farms 
became viable for partnerships with other actors in the industry. Apparently, these 
were already interacting with commercial producers in the input and output markets 
(i.e. in the commercial poultry production system). Therefore, when rural producers 
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decided to produce for the market they found reasons to interact with commercial 
input suppliers like feed and chick producers, etc. So, as discussed later, the decision 
to keep chickens as a ‘business’ moved rural producers into a new interaction space 
where it became possible for them to meet and be met by other actors who were 
essentially already operating from that space. This means producers were ‘new 
comers’ to the market where business is the language. So they needed RIU (the 
broker) as a mentor and interpreter. The key question here is whether it was possible 
to transform the rural poultry industry without moving rural producers out of their 
comfort zones into new places where naivety and vulnerability increased. From RIU 
experience, business16 was the new culture which producers had to learn before they 
could interact, and the resulting naivety and vulnerability is in fact what triggered 
learning and innovation. 
Two, as managers with profit motives, producers’ attention was directed towards 
regulating ‘stock flows’ and increasing efficiency to maximise gains. Specifically, it 
became imperative that: they determined the scale of production by buying chicks 
and not relying on natural breeding; they controlled losses (i.e. reduce deaths, theft, 
accidents, etc.) in order to ensure most birds survive to maturity; and they managed 
the flock properly especially through proper feeding and hygiene in order to gain the 
most value in terms of weight, size and volumes. And in order to achieve that, they 
needed new skills, tools, techniques and facilities. Thus, the business motive created 
a sense of ‘self-insufficiency’ in terms of skills, tools, technologies etc., which 
triggered the need to interact.  Therefore, RIU used business to justify the desire for 
technological and organisational changes especially among the economic actors. 
Hence, I use the situation to explain how business can promote learning and 
innovation in subsistence agriculture better than science. Actually, the study 
elaborates that ‘business’ is what was missing, to make producers interact with other 
actors in the industry.  
Understanding the relationship between RIU’s focus on building profitable poultry 
businesses and how other actors responded to the commercialisation process by 
                                                 
16 These producers are already producing other agricultural commodities for the market. Hence they 
are conversant with doing those particular businesses. However, they lack poultry business skills 
hence reinforcing the argument that every commodity operates in a different systems. 
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continuously increasing their demands for new knowledge and technologies is of 
great interest in this study. Therefore, I have analysed in detail how production 
scales, marketable volumes and the typology of actors contributed in building 
business partnerships which promoted learning and innovation. As a matter of fact, 
the analysis explains how economic changes can be deliberately promoted to trigger 
technological and organisational changes, with the intention to make subsistence 
producers experience higher levels of economic development. Therefore, I have 
specifically provided an explanation of how subsistence rural poultry producers 
responded to  the RIU facilitation process towards commercialization, which I 
achieve by assessing the extent to which producers’ demand for innovation shifted 
towards embracing new routines to meet their own goals of increasing income and 
tackling household poverty as a result of facilitation. This includes explaining the 
dynamics that took place within individual poultry producing households which 
resulted from the commercialization process. 
The information obtained from the above analysis is used to further explain how 
dynamics that took place with the poultry farms influenced processes and structures 
in the remainder parts of the industry (or value chain) to transform the entire sector. 
To some extent, the analysis investigates claims put forward by Pingali et al., (2001), 
that commercialisation of agricultural food systems may cause significant structural 
changes that may increase transaction costs and therefore reduce small farmers’ 
participation in the market. This study shows that structural changes resulting from 
commercialisation provided the opportunity to transform the poultry industry through 
rigorous competence building, including creation of support mechanisms and 
moderating corresponding organisational changes.  Thus the situation described by 
Pingali can be an opportunity if support mechanisms are also established to lower 
transaction costs and cushion risks. 
Therefore, using the innovation system frameworks and the innovation network 
concepts and theories, the study analyses the commercialisation process as an 
attempt to explain how innovation networks are built involving subsistence 
producers and how they are linked with the urban service providers and markets. The 
analysis provides the argument that it is not only about linking actors but rather about 
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building necessary capacities needed to make relevant partnerships possible. 
Furthermore, the study argues that apart from linking rural producers with different 
actors in the poultry value chain, the commercialisation process also involves linking 
actors with non-human ‘actants’ like chicks, inputs and systems, as well as linking 
different enterprises. The former embraces the ideas put forward by the ‘actor-
network theory and therefore helps to explain how commercialisation creates 
networks within networks. Finally, the study introduces the concept of ‘network 
sketching’ to explain how commercialisation of subsistence agriculture relies on pre-
negotiations among actors to build cognitive trust before actual interactions happen. 
The sketching is also done as mechanisms to manage uncertainties among actors 
before they commit resources towards the partnership. 
2.5 Describing RIU as an innovation ‘broker’ (facilitator) 
As the last study situation I loot at the RIU programme as a ‘deliberate public 
action’17 set out to induce and promote innovation in the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania. The action is publicly funded (which makes it ‘a public action’) and has 
both social and economic interests. At start the action is external to the indigenous 
poultry industry and assumes the power to transform the industry in question. 
Although started externally, the programme later on did temporarily put itself at the 
centre of the processes within the industry before exit. The point of analysis here is 
therefore its ‘self-proclaimed power’ and motive to influence the ‘other’.  
RIU is typical of most rural development programmes designed and implemented to 
bring about positive changes in specific target areas or industries. It had targets and a 
definite life span. It had a background of pre-constructed meanings and forms of 
what is expected to change. It had its own expectations and some sort of a ‘blueprint’ 
of how to achieve those expectations. RIU staff were expected to be skilled and 
expert in managing whatever the programme would have initiated. In addition, the 
programme had a legal backing and financial power which empowered staff to act, 
and which created the basis for actors to cooperate and even trust the programme.  
                                                 
17 By ‘Public action I mean collective, purposive manipulation of the public environment  
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What I mean here is, both the credibility of DFID (a known big donor) and Muvek (a 
locally registered implementing agency, with a network or relationships built on 
accumulated trust from years of working in the sector), coupled with the local 
knowledge and perceptions of a ‘donor-funded programme’ made the RIU 
programme worthy of response from actors in Tanzania. It is thus not just anybody 
who could initiate such a process involving multiple actors and get their response. In 
this study I have not gone deep into analysing RIU’s internal structures and 
characteristics as the actor, but limited myself to analysing the process (i.e. what was 
done/happened) and how the industry responded. However, for a detailed description 
of the RIU programme see (Norman; Clark, Frost, Maudlin, & Ward, 2013; Mur & 
Nederlof, 2012); or visit www.researchintouse.com. 
Cogently, by considering RIU to be a ‘deliberate action’ that initiated an innovation 
process involving multiple actors, I am logically thinking in systems. Therefore, I 
have grounded my analysis within the general Innovation Systems Theory and 
specifically in the Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) perspective which is 
known to provide a comprehensive view on actors and factors that co-determine 
innovation in agriculture (Klerkx et al., 2012; Spielman, 2005). Linked to that, I have 
therefore analysed the role played by RIU in the poultry industry in Tanzania  in the 
light of the innovation broker concept elaborated by Winch and Courtney (2007, 
p.751; cited in Klerkx, Hall, & Leeuwis, 2009, p.413), and which defines an 
innovation broker as an organisation acting as a member of a network of actors that 
is not focused on the implementation of innovations, but on enabling other 
organisations to innovate, and which performs this role as a core function.  
In addition to that, I have also analysed the RIU programme as an ‘exogenous 
shock’ which gave the system ‘a kick’ to end the current state of innovation ‘inertia’. 
My supposition here is that, without the arrival of RIU, the industry would have 
continued along the same path. This makes RIU interventions externally driven 
alterations described by Newey and Zahra, (2009; cited in Salamonsen, 2014, p.6) as 
external events with the potential to significantly influence the destiny of the firm. 
According to Salamonsen (2014; citing Grabher, 1993;  Narula, 2002,  and Doloreux 
and Dionne, 2008) exogenous shocks function as a powerful mean for reduction or 
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disruption of lock-in; and are even a requirement to shake the system free of its 
history (Vergne and Durand, 2010, p.752; in Ibid, p.6). 
Analysing RIU interventions in the perspective of an ‘innovation broker’ and of an 
‘exogenous shock’ requires a dynamic system analysis rather than a static one. 
According to Klerkx, Mierlo and Leeuwis (2012):  
[‘… a static analysis provides an infrastructural view of AIS which 
is ‘a mechanistic hard view whereby systems are assumed to exist 
independently from the observer and can be analysed, understood 
and engineered towards an unambiguous goal’ (p.463). 
However, in my perspective, the system and its boundaries seem to emerge and 
unfold as the broker functions, and as actors define and re-define their goals. 
Therefore, neither the system nor its boundaries and goals could have been pre-
determined by RIU from the start. This is because the process of inducing and 
brokering innovation is a continuous one, and which tends to be defined by emerging 
contexts. Features like boundaries, goals and the structure of the system itself tend to 
co-evolve, and hence allow the system to self-organise. Essentially, the dynamic 
analysis is more relevant for this study because it provides a process view of AIS, 
which allows me to see the ‘deliberate action’ in action. According to Klerkx and his 
colleagues (in their own words):  
 “…the dynamic analysis sees innovation systems as self-organizing 
growing networks of actors connected to the development of a certain 
novelty,… so it sees them as ‘systems in the making’….this view on 
agricultural innovation systems as self-organising entities with 
increasingly systemic properties bears some resemblance to work which 
does not explicitly use an innovation systems approach, but rather a 
system innovation approach to study (radical) agricultural innovation 
(Roep et. al. 2003; Knickel et al. 2009; Elzen et al. 2011; lamine 2011; 
Elzen et al. 2012...)” (Klerkx, Hall, & Leeuwis, 2009, p.465) 
In this study therefore, I have analysed the ‘innovation history or journey’ of the RIU 
programme in Tanzania to analyse the situated ‘deliberate action within the AIS 
framework. As one of the methods for researching AIS, and which shows affinity 
with the process view of AIS, innovation histories or journeys use timelines to record 
important events of an innovation processes and identify relationships and activities 
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defining the events, and those which influenced its outcome (Douthwaite and Ashby, 
2005; cited in (Klerkx, Laurens, Barbara van Mierlo, 2012; p.470). Therefore, by 
following and analysing the chronology of RIU interventions, which include 
decisions and activities, I established what RIU did, why, how, who was involved 
and what was the outcome. Then, as we will see later in the empirical chapters, I was 
able to plot these outcomes, describe the process and then elaborate on the 
consequent systems response.  
Therefore, by situating the interventions of the RIU Tanzania programme in the 
context of a deliberate action, and thus analysing what RIU did as the manifestation 
of the ‘action’, this study explains how a deliberate public action can induce an 
exogenous shock to build innovation networks that involve the rural poor, and which 
helps them to transform their subsistence enterprises into profitable businesses which 
are more open to innovation and to uses of new technologies.  The analysis also 
provides an opinion of  how public funds can be used to meet the social cost of 
sketching, knitting, incubating and building the basic ‘innovation-capacity’ through 
which the rural sector becomes viable for innovation partnerships and linkages. 
Specifically, analysing this study situation answers the second research question on 
RIU interventions which is to understand how the demand for innovation, investment 
and learning were promoted in the industry. This information helps build a response 
to the third research question by explaining how the public sector can deliberately 
influence innovation behaviours and structures to transform industries dominated by 
subsistence producers. 
2.6 Study characters: Who drove RIU? 
In this section I will describe the main RIU actors involved in shaping the 
commercialisation process, and who were therefore the main actors in the poultry 
network that emerged. The description provided here is mainly from the RIU 
literature and how they were described to me during the interview. The purpose of 
the description is mainly to clarify their position in the study as well as to shed light 
on their basic characteristics.  
But first, I describe the ‘rural’ context where RIU intervened as used in the study. 
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2.6.1 The subsistence rural poultry producers: ‘The producer’ 
These are the main focus of this study and are referred to in this thesis as ‘producers’. 
These are rural households keeping between one to three hundred poultry birds of 
local or cross breeds.  Most of these depend on farming activities for their 
livelihoods, mainly growing crops as their main agricultural activity, and livestock 
farming is a secondary activity.  
The interviewed producers came from Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Rufiji and Kibaha 
districts where the RIU project worked. Others came from two districts in Songea 
and Njombe where commercialisation had not yet started, but the same organisation 
was on the early stages of sensitizing communities to join a similar programme now 
funded by USDA. Songea and Njombe districts were used as a control group for the 
study for triangulation since most producers in the RIU target area had already 
commercialised or seen a neighbour who had commercialised, and which could have 
influenced how they responded. 
In the context of RIU, producers were also the main programme partners and focus.  
They were sensitized to change their poultry management system and produce more 
for the market. After they agreed, they acted as catalysts by sharing knowledge 
through talking to others, and by simply being observed by others.  To join the 
programme each producer had to build a shed (even using locally available 
materials), contribute 40% of the price of chicks, buy feeders and drinkers and live 
with an extension officer (household caretaker) for a period of one month and learn 
from him/her. By the end of RIU, five thousand producers had joined the programme 
in the Coast, Singida, Dodoma and Morogoro regions. These producers were 
expected to commercialise their poultry production.  
Focusing on the collective behaviour of producers and not as individuals 
In this study I have paid more attention to the collective behaviour of producers than 
them as individuals. However, this does not mean I am denying their heterogeneity; 
rather I just focus on what emerges as dominant behaviour among them as a group. 
The collective behaviour of rural poultry producers is important in my analysis 
because the power of smallholders to influence and be influenced emerges from their 
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dominance, mobilization and aggregation. What I imply here is that, like ants, small 
producers’ power and significance comes from their summative numbers. What 
draws attention to them is their dominance in the agriculture sectors of developing 
economies; their majority presence among the global poor; and their dominant 
presence in rural communities of Africa. Therefore, it is their dominance as a group 
that the development community identifies with and not as individuals.  
Second, given the size of their individual production, small producers gain 
economies of scale to influence the economic and political environment by 
aggregating their resources, demands and supplies. For example, it took a group of 
sixty farmers to get a contract to supply tomatoes in one supermarket in Kenya 
(FRDS, 2010), and eleven cooperative associations of more than 3,150 small dairy 
producers to justify establishment of a private dairy processing plant in Tanga 
Tanzania.18 
Additionally, agricultural researchers and development practitioners tend to analyse 
and target ‘smallholders’ (smallholder farmers) or ‘small producers’ as a group. 
Despite recognising their heterogeneity of the individual farming households, the 
development community is more concerned with what they are, do, and face 
collectively as a group. Their group identity is therefore constructed based on their 
size of production, resource allocation, farming techniques, practices, geographical 
location (i.e. remote or rural), and their circumstances. For example, literature 
describes smallholder farmers as vulnerable (to shocks like climate change), food 
insecure, risk-averse, uneducated and with less resources to invest which makes them 
use poor technologies (Ellis, 2005a; Mclntyre, Herren, Wakhungu, & Watson, 2009). 
Smallholders are also argued to have been marginalised both by markets and 
development policies and are therefore living in persistent poverty and chronic 
hunger (Dixon et al., 2004; Larson, Otsuka, Matsumoto, & Kilic, 2012; Lugalla, 
2012). The above characteristics have created a ‘victim-perspective’ of the 
smallholder who evokes pity, sympathy and morally-justified interventions. For 
example, the Africa’s Smallholder Farmers Group (ASFG) has called for official 
development aid for African agriculture, targeted at marginalised farmers to be 
                                                 
18 See www.tangafresh.com for details. 
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increased significantly to reverse the impact of years of under-investment (Asfg, 
2010:1). 
Other authors identify smallholders as a unique group that needs specific 
development approaches and support (Nederlof & Pyburn, 2012; Shepherd, 2006). 
For example, in the book ‘One finger cannot lift a rock’ which analyses experiences 
from nine innovation platforms in West Africa, Nederlof and Pyburn (2012) explain 
that small farmers in Africa face many challenges in building livelihood for 
themselves and their families, that they often lack opportunities for growth and 
expansion, and even when opportunities arise they are unable to take advantage of 
them. So ‘a concerted action’ is required where stakeholders come together to de-
constrain smallholders and enable them to capitalize on opportunities (Nederlof & 
Pyburn, 2012; p.vi). The book emphasises that smallholders face problems 
collectively, and even solutions to their problems need a collective action or a 
‘concerted effort’ to use their term (Ibid, p.iv).  
Situating the rural poultry producer (RPP) as an actor in the poultry network 
According to Scharpf, (1997: 52, in Bots, 2008, p.1), networks may have individual 
or composite actors. Scharpf defines a composite actor as “an aggregate of 
individuals, with capacity for intentional action at a level above the individuals 
involved”, for example, organizations. The author (Ibid, p.54) also defines a 
collective actor as a composite actor who is ‘dependent on and guided by the 
preferences of its members’, and a corporate actor as a composite actor that has ‘a 
high degree of autonomy from the ultimate beneficiaries of their action’. The 
activities of the corporate actor tend to be carried out by staff members whose own 
private preferences are supposed to be neutralized by employment contracts. 
Furthermore, the term actor may as well be considered for some analytic purposes to 
represent a group of unorganised individuals that share similar characteristics (Bots, 
2008, p.1). In all these definitions the actors are assumed to behave intentionally, and 
have cognitive and deliberate capabilities (Ibid).  
Therefore, in my analysis I have considered the SRPPs in two ways, first as a 
semiotic network actor representing heterogeneous individuals who share similar 
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characteristics but are not formally organised. That is, a group of rural households 
who keep chickens under a traditional system, and second, as an actor with powers 
accumulated from otherwise weak individuals, i.e. ‘like ants, the power of 
smallholders to innovate is in their numbers’. According to Aldrich and Whetten 
(1981; in Bolt, 2008) actors in a network are involved in a variety of relations which 
largely determine how they interact, and in turn these interactions create and sustain 
relation patterns. It is from this premise that I have chosen to reconstruct the ‘actor 
RPPs’ (representing the African ‘rural-poor-small producer/farmer/holder’) from 
being a ‘victim’ of market exclusion (or market failure), into a ‘maker of relationship 
choices’ in a network. That makes RPPs (as group) an actor with ‘inherent powers 
to choose’ and redefine relationships within the network.  
The above perspective enables me to identify smallholder interactions (as an 
innovation proxy) as outcomes of ‘relationship choices’ and not accidental 
occurrences which the actor has no control of. This is precisely what Scharfp 
assumes to be in an actor, i.e. ‘intent’ and ‘capabilities to be deliberate’ (Bots, 2008, 
p.1). Additionally, giving RPPs the power to intend and choose, coupled with the 
link I just established between ‘relationship choices’ and ‘innovation processes’ the 
analysis has provided the room for a ‘demand-led’ facilitation (See Figure 2-0, 
below). 
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Figure 2: Pillars of demand-led facilitation in subsistence-based industries 
 
This construction is important to this study because it makes RPPs actors with 
motives and purpose to drive the innovation process. Otherwise it would have to be 
driven by someone else. From this perspective, the RPPs will not be innovating just 
to fix problems, but to achieve a longer term purpose important to them, and from 
which they will have the basis to continue making choices around it. The perspective 
also allows them to be a dynamic actor in the innovation process instead of a passive 
one who functions by merely responding to external impulses resulting from a donor-
funded facilitation. In fact, looking at the RPPs as ‘makers of relationship choices’ 
permits my analysis to question their motives and expectations as they were made by 
them and not as mere circumstances, or as made by someone else. 
In addition, I considered the fact that smallholders in Africa have not changed their 
production systems despite 50 years of external support. My assumption here is that, 
what was promoted did not suit their circumstances, and for whatever reasons 
smallholders rejected or abandoned it once programmes ended. While we may say 
the programme failed, it is the smallholders who made the decision to ‘abandon’ 




(I.e. Interactions are 
not accidental 
choices) 
 (Scharfp, 1997) 
Actors with intent 
(I.e. Subsistence 
producers with intent 
and capabilities to be 
deliberate) 
(Bots, 2008) 
Demand-led innovation processes Space for a ‘demand-led’ facilitation 
Therefore: For a demand-led facilitation to occur there must be; (i) choices of 
whom to interact with; (ii) choices of how to interact; and (iii) presence of actors 
with intent and ability to interact 
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Therefore throughout the study, I have focused on the cumulative behaviour and 
abilities of producers rather than in their individual weak status. 
The concept of ‘rural’ as used by the study 
In this study I have chosen to use the terms ‘rural chicken’ and ‘rural poultry 
industry’ to refer to poultry birds (specifically chickens)  raised in rural areas and the 
entire process of producing, marketing and consuming them, while involving both 
rural and non-rural actors. According to business dictionary19, industry can be 
defined as “(i) the manufacturing or technically productive enterprises in a particular 
field, country, region, or economy viewed collectively, or one of these individually. 
A single industry is often named after its principal product, for example the auto 
industry; and (ii) any general business activity or commercial enterprise that can be 
isolated from others, such as the tourist industry or the entertainment industry.  
Therefore, in this study ‘rural poultry industry’ refers to keeping and marketing of 
chickens as a productive enterprise particularly in ‘rural areas’ and I have named it 
after the principle product which is chicken/poultry. I have also considered it isolated 
from the mainstream ‘poultry sector’ or ‘poultry industry’ which involves both urban 
and rural areas, as well as industrial poultry production. However, my definition of 
‘rural industry does not exclude forward and backwards linkages with the urban. 
Therefore the term rural poultry production includes all other terms like local, 
indigenous, village, backyard, and traditional chicken or poultry production. 
However, the term goes further to include the ‘rural-ness’ of the areas and its social 
inclinations beyond administrative and geographical demarcations like ‘villages’, as 
well settings beyond family and households. 
Furthermore, I have taken the idea of the rural to be that of social representation as 
put forward by Halfacree (1993, 1995; cited in, Pospěch, 2014; p.97) and which 
describes it as a cultural concept rather than a specific material location. This idea 
embraces both concepts of the rural idyll by Bell, 2006; and Short, 1996; (cited in 
Pospěch, 2014 Pg.97) and rural deprivation by Woodward, 1996 (also cited in 




Pospěch, 2014, Pg. 97). Both concepts rely heavily on the relationship between rural 
and urban, with rural being the opposite of the urban (Ibid). In that case I have 
embraced the assumption contained in this rural-urban relationship that the rural is an 
entity not yet conquered by modernity (Murdoch and Pratt, 1993, p. 417, cited in 
(Pospěch, 2014). Implying that knowledge, technology, infrastructure and culture 
(traits perceived to be necessary for modern technologies and innovation) are still 
missing in rural areas referred in this study. This means, the study considers the rural 
chicken industry in Tanzania to be operating in a social setting with little to 
minimum ‘modernity’. 
2.6.2 Input suppliers 
These are private businesses which manufacture, import, distribute or trade poultry 
inputs. In this study I have decided to focus on chicks and feeds only. From RIU 
literature there are three types of input suppliers, i.e. those who produce and sell 
wholesale and those who retail. In rural areas most input shops are at district 
headquarters selling all agricultural inputs for both crops and livestock. Therefore, 
most district input dealers sell agricultural inputs and implements, and their main 
business is mainly on crops and large animals like cattle, goats and pigs. Those in 
more urban areas also sell poultry inputs to commercial farmers who keep exotic 
breeds. 
Feed manufacturers 
RIU worked with five private feed manufacturers who produced three types of feeds, 
i.e. chick mash, growers mash, finisher and layers mash. None of them was 
producing breeder mash until RIU supported one of them to acquire the technical 
capacity to do so. Their role in the programme was to supply quality poultry feeds to 
producers and provide linkage with stockists (or agro-dealers) in the target districts. 
They also identified individuals to help them access producers at Ward and village 
levels. This aimed at bringing their service closer to producers and at reasonable cost.  
Before RIU they used to do business with urban commercial producers and none of 
them had worked with rural producers before. 
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RIU worked with the following feed manufacturers; (i) Farm Base/Farmer Center, 
Matocha feeds and Mkombozi Feeds based in Dar es Salaam Region (supplying the 
Coast Region); (ii) Calvin Animal Feeds and Mapusa Farm Care Ltd. based in 
Dodoma Region; (iii) Tanfeeds International Ltd., based in Morogoro Region; and 
(iv) VETA based in Singida Region. Their production capacity ranged between 1 to 
10 tons per day. 
Chicks suppliers 
These are private entrepreneurs who invested in hatcheries to produce chicks of 
indigenous crossbreeds. These are located in Dar es Salaam, Coast region, Dodoma 
and Iringa Regions. Their production capacity varies depending on the size of their 
incubators. However, the capacity ranges between 500 and 10,000 chicks per week. 
Five of these have contracted out-growers to produce fertilised eggs for them. Apart 
from producing chicks they also provide information and suggestions to the ministry 
and local government officials based on their experiences on managing indigenous 
Parent stock and hatching. They also advise producers on chick raring. 
RIU worked with fourteen chick producers whose production capacity grew from 
between 200-500 chicks per week to up to 10,000 chicks per week. The chick 
producers formed a Tanzania Poultry Breeders Association (TPBA) as a platform for 
policy dialogue and for collaboration with investors and national programmes. 
Agro-dealers (Stockists or District input Suppliers) 
These are private business selling veterinary drugs and distributing vaccines in rural 
areas. Most of them are veterinarians and few of them are livestock officers with 
animal health background. Often the shops belong to Local Government employees.  
Some of them also supply feeds, vaccines and drugs, and others supply drugs and 
vaccines only. Normally they supply vaccines against Gumboro, Newcastle Disease, 
and fowl pox only. They would usually buy or stock directly from manufacturers or 
from whole sellers importers. RIU worked with one agro-dealer in each district. 
Agro-dealers are also very important in transferring knowledge on how to administer 
vaccines, manage disease, feeding chicken and on general poultry husbandry. They 
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also post stickers and posters on their shops with different information on poultry.  
Some perform post-mortem on carcasses brought by producers from villages.  
Apparently, producers trust their advice more than they do with government 
extension staff. 
2.6.3 Other service providers 
These are both private and public service providers. In this study I have focused on 
three key services, i.e. extension services, veterinary drug supply (drugs and 
vaccines), veterinary services (disease diagnosis, laboratory analysis and 
prescription), and poultry business and entrepreneurship trainer. 
Extension service providers 
These live and provide extension services in the villages. RIU worked with two types 
of extension service providers as described below;  
 Household advisors (Caretakers) 
These are livestock trained officers (certificate holders). Their main role was to 
provide technical advice and training to farmers on chicks rearing, feeds preparation, 
vaccination handling and administration, and general poultry management. They also 
linked with drugs suppliers, veterinary officers and stockists to ensure that drugs and 
vaccines were available in the target villages. They normally attended to about 10 
households (for beginners) within a village for a period of 30 days, where they 
visited them every day. However, under the contract farming programme, caretakers 
stay with farmers for the whole production cycle of four months. RIU worked with 
forty of them and when RIU phased out they were employed by private commercial 
farms and hatcheries. As I will describe later, this was RIU’s innovation to make sure 
farmers learn chick rearing by doing (i.e., on-the-job). 
 Government extension staff 
These are Village Agricultural and Livestock Extension Officers (VALEO) or Ward 
Agricultural and Livestock Extension Officers (WALEO) employed by the Local 
Government Authority (LGA) to provide extension services at the village and Ward 
levels. In the programme, they provided caretaking services to producers in their 
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respective villages. Their role was basically the same as those of Caretakers above, 
and actually they were used instead of Caretakers in villages where they were 
available. RIU contracted and paid them some allowance to facilitate movements. 
Their responsibilities increased after Caretakers left on the 31st day. 
Veterinarians 
These are hardly found working in rural areas. Those present in villages are senior 
officer employed by LGAs or project/NGOs. Thus they usually have little time to 
attend to producers. In some areas there are private veterinarians working with drug 
suppliers who visit producers and train them as part of their company marketing 
strategy. In rural areas their services are mostly provided by extension staff and agro-
dealers. 
Vet drug suppliers (importers) 
These are private firms engaged in veterinary drugs and agro-chemicals business. 
They supply and provide technical advice on disease diagnosis and general poultry 
management. They conduct training and organise field meetings as part of their 
marketing strategy.  
The programme worked with two wholesale companies i.e. Farmer Centre Ltd. based 
in Dar es Salaam with a wide network of stockists in all regions in the country; and 
Bytrade Ltd.  who are also based in Dar es Salaam. Bytrade is an agent of several 
giant European agro-vet drugs manufacturing companies such as; Pfizer, Bayer, 
Invesa, etc. They also provide technical advice to hatchery owners on proper 
hatchery management. They train farmers on proper management of diseases, use of 
drugs and general poultry management. Both companies provided credit facilities to 
district input suppliers when demand increased.  
Vaccine suppliers (manufacturers and importers) 
The programme worked with the Animal Diseases Research Institute (ADRI) in Dar 
es Salaam. This is a government agency responsible for researching on animal 
diseases and advising on drugs and their use. They also supply vaccines to districts 
through the Veterinary Investigation Centres (VICs) and District Veterinary Offices 
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(DVO). Most of the vaccines are currently imported but a government plant to 
produce ND vaccines has been established.  However, there are private individuals 
who import and sell vaccines in the country.  
Usually RIU would pay the Agency, and they would dispatch the vaccines to the 
districts, where they will be collected by extension officers for distribution to 
producers. According to RIU, vaccines are best handled through the government 
channel for quality assurance and traceability in case of an outbreak. 
Local Government Authorities (LGAS) 
LGAs are very important actors since all producers come under their administration. 
They play a significant role in influencing policies and intervention in the rural 
poultry industry. They are also the custodians of the public extension services. They 
are responsible for order and regulations. In this study I have worked in six LGAs.  
Researchers 
Within the RIU intervention, research was utilised as a service needed at a particular 
time. Thus livestock researchers engaged with the programme just like other service 
providers, but paid by public funds. In most cases, RIU would cover their cost of 
attending meetings like all other invitees, but expected them to conduct research 
using public resources. This means, RIU did not fund any research, but facilitated 
processes to secure funds from the government. 
RIU worked mostly with the Sokoine University of Agriculture, the National 
Livestock Research Institute (NLRI), now Tanzania Livestock Research Institute 
(TALIRI), and the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) based in the Ministry of 
Livestock. Apparently, during the implementation of RIU, veterinary investigation 
(including poultry feed lab analyses) and other poultry research activities were both 
considered as ‘research services’. This means, regardless of processes and tools, 
what actors wanted from every actor were solutions. 
2.6.4 The innovation broker 
Muvek Development Solutions Limited (Muvek) is a private consulting company 
which was contracted to implement the RIU programme in Tanzania. Muvek 
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employed key staff to coordinate and oversee the implementation. During 
implantation the programme relied heavily on its local partner’s (i.e. Muvek’s) 
knowledge of the country, the agricultural sector, and most important, its reputation 
and network. Its ability to command respect and trust from different actors played a 
significant role in influencing and coordinating processes.  When RIU was about to 
end, Muvek established KukuDeal, a sister company to provide services to farmers 
on contract terms. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The chapter links the case study (i.e. RIU programme) with the study analysis. It 
presents three study situations identified from RIU claims and derives an analytical 
framework from them. RIU claims that; (i) the programme used the innovation 
systems perspective to build networks and promote learning; (ii) followed a three 
steps process, i.e. changing mentalities, inducing system shocks, and adopted a 
‘bottleneck approach’ to build capacities after the shocks; and (iii) used ‘business’ 
(commercialisation) to shape decisions and processes. The claims explain that 
despite their indeterminate and unpredictable nature, complex agricultural systems 
can be deliberately influenced to produce desired behaviours. Therefore three study 
situations emerge from the above claims. 
The first study situation is the consistent nature of low innovation tendencies 
observed in the rural poultry industry, which the study considers it to be a lock-in, 
caused by multitude of actors and factors. The chapter thus builds a case for use of 
the concept of ‘lock-in’ from ‘path dependency’ theory to explain the observed 
prevalence and persistence of the traditional poultry production system in rural 
Tanzania. The concept of ‘path creation’ is also used to explain how the industry can 
be unlocked. Basically, the chapter considers the two poultry production systems as 
competing systems and therefore suggests the use of path dependence theory to 
analyse the competition between them and explain what makes one to dominate. 
The chapter mentions three types of lock-in i.e. ‘structural lock-in’, ‘political lock-in’ 
and ‘cognitive lock-in’ used in the analysis. It also explains the use of ‘organisational 
thinness’ and ‘fragmentation’ concepts to explain the observed low number of actors 
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in the industry. Fragmentation is also used to explain why there are low interactions 
in the industry. The chapter also highlights that the transaction cost theory could also 
explain the observed lock-in, but unlike the path dependency theory the transaction 
cost theory fails to capture factors beyond the market. 
On the second study situation, the chapter proposes to analyse the commercialisation 
process in two perspectives i.e. from the ‘network building perspective’ and from the 
‘business perspective’. It clarifies that, the two perspectives emerge from the RIU’s 
decision to operate within a network of actors and use business as the driving force. 
The perspective also forced RIU to handle both technological and organisational 
issues. Therefore, using the AIS framework the study analyses the commercialisation 
process and explains how innovation networks that involve subsistence producers 
can be built, and link them with the urban-based supply systems and markets. On the 
last study situation, the chapter explains that the role played by RIU is better 
analysed in the light of the innovation broker concept elaborated in the AIS 
perspective which captures the role of an external facilitator to stimulate processes in 
a system. 
Lastly, the chapter describes five types of poultry actors who were instrumental in 
driving the RIU process and who are important in the study. Those are subsistence 
rural poultry producers, input suppliers, extension service providers, veterinarians, 
LGAs, Researchers and Muvek who was the innovation broker. The chapter makes it 
clear that the study pays more attention to the collective behaviour of subsistence 
producers than them as individuals. This does not imply denying their heterogeneity, 
but a focus on what emerges as a dominant behaviour among them as a heterogonous 
group. It is argued in the chapter that, the collective behaviour of subsistence 
producers is important in the analysis because their power to influence and be 
influenced emerges from their dominance, mobilization and aggregation. Therefore, 
their group identity is constructed based on their scale of production, resource 
allocation, farming techniques/practices, geographical location (i.e. remote or rural), 
and their circumstances. 
The chapter explains further that the analysis has considered the subsistence 
producers in two ways; first as a semiotic network actor representing heterogeneous 
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individuals who share similar characteristics but are not formally organised (i.e. a 
group of rural households who keep chicken under traditional system); and second, 
as an actor with powers accumulated from the otherwise weak individuals. The study 
has therefore reconstructed the semiotic network actors (i.e. the collective identity of 
subsistence producers) from being a ‘victim’ of market exclusion (or market failure), 
into a ‘maker of relationship choices’ in a network. That makes them (as group) an 
actor with ‘inherent powers’ to choose and redefine relationships within the network. 
The chapter argues that, this perspective enables research and development to view 
smallholder interactions (as an innovation proxy) as outcomes of ‘relationship 
choices’ and not accidental occurrences which the actor has no control of. 







Chapter 3 Research design and methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research design and methodology for the study. In chapter 
1, I explained the background and motivation of the research followed by research 
questions of the study. This chapter explains how these questions will be answered 
describing how I designed the research to conduct the empirical study, what choices I 
made in research strategy and method, and how I collected and analysed the data. I 
delineate the process of designing and conducting the research and justify my 
choices. Justification of those choices also includes reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research design. 
The next section introduces the ‘case study’ approach as the relevant research 
strategy for this research with regard to the nature of research questions and 
phenomena under study. The section also explains why rural poultry industry and the 
RIU programme were selected as the case study and what the implications of this 
choice are. It also describes the multiple data sources derived from the case study in 
relation to the main research questions. Section 3.3 explains the data collection 
methods for both primary and secondary data, as well as highlighting on data 
limitations. Section 3.4 discusses the validity and generalization of data from the 
case study followed by section 3.5 which explains the data analysis methods and 
processes used. The section elaborates how data were interpreted and constructed 
into meanings using the ‘Framework approach’. Lastly, section 3.6 summarises the 
chapter and concludes. 
3.2 Case study research strategy 
This research was inspired by the Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) research 
particularly the innovation broker concept (Geyskens, 2012; Klerkx et al., 2009a; 
Klerkx & Hall, 2009; Preissing, 2012) in building innovation networks. The AIS 
framework guided me to examine how innovative behaviours and structures in a 
subsistence based industry can be externally influenced towards meeting broad 
objectives like poverty reduction. So I decided to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
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recently implemented DFID-funded RIU programme to understand how it played 
such a role in Tanzania. Studying the RIU interventions helped me to investigate 
how a donor-funded programme could act as an innovation broker and facilitate 
processes that stimulate interactions and learning in an industry dominated by 
subsistence producers. I therefore examined the process of changing routines, 
building partnerships and building capacities to demand and utilise new knowledge 
as revealed by RIU’s history. Specifically, the analysis considered changes in 
innovation behaviours and the process of inducing those changes. Therefore, for the 
study to capture in-depth knowledge of those changes in behaviours and processes 
that caused them, and to capture the history of RIU interventions, I used a case study 
research strategy  with RIU as my case study. 
Literature explains that case study research strategy is useful in answering the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ questions (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009, 2014) particularly to relatively 
contemporary events when the phenomenon under study is not the subject of 
experimental control (Yin, 2014). It moves the analysis away from being variable-
centred to analysing causes and effects (Gerring, 2007; p.3) which is the interest of 
this research. More specifically, Yin (2003) distinguishes case study research as an 
empirical enquiry investigating: (i) a contemporary phenomenon when, (ii) the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear, and (iii) various data 
sources are used. In business studies, case study is also defined as a methodology 
that is used to explore a single phenomenon in a natural setting using a variety of 
methods to obtain in-depth knowledge (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
Therefore this strategy seems relevant to my study because the outcome of the RIU 
programme was a single phenomenon which occurred in natural settings. The 
strategy is also useful in answering the research questions in this thesis which include 
both how- and why-type questions. The questions are about a contemporary global 
development concern (i.e. how to increase agricultural performance in developing 
economies) and which happened coincidentally as RIU was being implemented. In 
other words, the outcomes of RIU programme are unique and unexpected, that it is 
only by examining its history will we know what actually happened and be able to 
replicate elsewhere.  Moreover, we are not able to control neatly all the contextual 
 67 
variables responsible for the transformation that happened. However, multiple data 
sources exist (process-tracking (historical), qualitative, and quantitative) which allow 
us to explore the important contextual factors and analyse their contribution in the 
observed outcomes and impacts. 
This case study has both explanatory and descriptive parts. In order to answer the 
first research question, I attempt to explain the innovation behaviours in rural poultry 
production which have historically remained very low. In fact, this is my ‘why’ type 
question where the aim is to explain what reinforces low innovation behaviours in 
the industry and what makes subsistence tendencies to persistor what makes it hard 
to switch to market-oriented production. This is explained using narratives from 
actors in the industry regarding perceptions on poultry production, sources of 
knowledge and flows, policy decisions and actions, resource allocation, attitudes 
towards rural poultry production, scientific findings and recommendations, etc. The 
descriptive elements of the case study include explanations of how interactions and 
learning can be stimulated in subsistence-based industries. The shifts in innovation 
behaviours are explained with reference to process and contextual factors such as 
scale of production, husbandry routines, input demand and usage, learning patterns, 
resource allocation decisions, and structural factors like links to inputs and output 
markets. In addition, I aim to explain producers’ innovation behaviours in terms of 
lock-in, organisational thinness and fragmentation, and liken it to RIU’s facilitation 
process towards unlocking and path creation. This means collecting data to explain 
the mechanisms established to initiate a mental shift, create demand for new 
knowledge, and build systems capacities to adapt to new equilibriums. 
In order to answer the research questions, a few research hypothesises were initially 
proposed according to the background information about subsistence production and 
theoretical and empirical literature. These were my first ‘guess’ about the reasonable 
answers to the research questions which guided the data collection and analysis 
stages. As discussed in chapter 2, I employed a number of theoretical concepts and 
frameworks from development, innovation, organisational and systems research to 
build a conceptual framework to guide the research. A conceptual framework is 
useful for delineating the main entity to be studied (Miles, 1994). However, the study 
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method may yet be rudimentary and may be refined and further developed alongside 
the empirical research. For example, it was after I collected most data, when I 
realised that the observed low innovation tendencies in the industry were better 
explained by path dependency theory (i.e. as a lock-in, organisational thinness and 
fragmentation). I therefore reviewed the theoretical framework retrospectively, 
which guided the collection of the remainder of the data needed to answer the first 
question. 
While the primary data source for this study is field interviews, RIU documents, 
database, website, publications and artefacts like video, voice records, etc. were very 
important sources of data to describe the ‘facilitation process’. The RIU datasets 
explain what was done, how it was done, why, who was involved (and why), and 
what was the outcome. On the other hand, field interviews provided information on 
perceptions about processes, interpretations of the actions and results, reasons for the 
actions (response) and underlying beliefs. Interviews were also used to triangulate 
information extracted from RIU documents, and to confirm my personal 
observations. This study shows how historical narratives of an implementation (or a 
programme) can be used as inputs to build new theoretical accounts. 
Although it may have been ideal to interview representative samples of different 
categories of actors involved in the programme such as, rural poultry producers, 
inputs and services suppliers, researchers, regulators, and end-consumers, this 
research has sought to focus on how producers were engaged and influenced. 
Therefore, a large sample of producers and only a few representatives from other 
categories of actors were interviewed. Other categories of actors were involved as 
they were found relevant based on the chronology of RIU events. This decision is 
due, in part, to the limited scope of time and space given to this doctoral research, 
which gave little scope to focus on changes within individual suppliers, consumers 
and other market actors. The main objective has therefore been to observe and 
examine how subsistence producers were influenced, how they responded, and how 
they influenced other actors to respond to them. But more importantly, I seek to 
explain how the ‘rural can be empowered to attract the urban’ and not the urban to be 
forced to trade with the rural. 
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3.2.1 Selecting the case study 
 As explained in chapter 1, this study emerged from the work of RIU programme. I 
coordinated the programme in Tanzania and saw how the rural poultry industry was 
transformed and behaviours of other actors towards the industry had also changed. 
So I wanted to take an outsider’s look to understand what actually happened. So I 
selected the case study because I saw a unique process which was worth examining 
and sharing. 
According to Gerring (2007) and Yin (2014), RIU is a critical case justifying this 
single case study (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2014). It is a critical case for the analysis of 
how a donor-funded programme can transform an industry dominated by subsistence 
producers because a glance at the drivers of change in the poultry industry in 
Tanzania where RIU intervened illustrates a transformation which was externally 
induced and facilitated. However this study allows rigorous examination of this raw 
idea with empirical evidence. In addition, the rural poultry industry exemplifies agro-
industries which have a long history of dominance of traditional low-input low 
output production systems in all developing economies. It is an industry known for 
its conservative behaviour towards technological change, where a rural household 
may choose to commercialise other livelihood activities but not poultry. Therefore, it 
provides a very relevant setting for the analysis of how subsistence tendencies can be 
upgraded towards a sector-wide growth. 
Given the limited time and space for this doctoral research and thesis, the single unit 
of study in such a depth and length should better serve the purpose of this research, 
bringing findings that contribute to knowledge and possible interventions in real-life 
complex situations. 
3.2.2 The multi-sited ethnography 
For analytical purposes, I divided the case into three domains according to the 
timeline of RIU and changes that occurred. The three domains are; before RIU 
(before 2009); during RIU (2009-2012); and after RIU (2012- to present). The stages 
reflect the situation and behaviours of the industry with and without influence from 
RIU. However, such a division is arbitrary because it is my own view of stages 
passed through by the industry. Thus the choice only reflects how I wanted to 
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organise my analysis by separating processes from how things were before and from 
how the industry turned out as a result of programme influence. Therefore, the shift 
(changes) is considered to have continued even after the programme ended. 
Analysing behaviours before RIU (i.e. before 2009) I had to interview a group of 
producers in areas where RIU did not intervene and commercialisation had therefore 
not taken place. This acted as control group and involved villages in Njombe and 
Ruvuma Regions about 900 km away from Pwani Region where RIU worked. Data 
from this area was reflecting current behaviours and I had the opportunity to observe 
and therefore apply ethnography research. Apart from the control group, I also 
interviewed producers from the RIU target areas in Coast Region. These had already 
commercialised, or observed their neighbours/relatives keeping chickens in a 
different way. So they relied on memory to recall the situation before RIU, i.e. they 
were narrating past situations. I also read secondary sources that described rural 
poultry production in Tanzania. 
When I was analysing the RIU process and behaviours between 2009 and 2012, I 
mostly used RIU documents, databases and other artefacts to understand what was 
done and motives of each process. I also interviewed ex-RIU staff, rural producers 
and other actors who engaged with the programme. And to analyse the situation after 
RIU I interviewed ex-RIU staff, Kukudeal20, producers in RIU target area, 
government officials and donor organisations who are now working in the area. This 
reveals ‘multi-sites’ as sources of data. It also reflects the ‘Tanzania rural poultry 
industry’ as sub-case within the main case-study. This means, in order to study the 
RIU programme I also had to study the rural poultry industry. The two could not be 
separated, and still be able to meet the objective of the study. 
The three domains discussed above show several sources of data, i.e. (i) control 
group interviews, (ii) participant observation in the control area, (iv) RIU target 
group interviews, (v) secondary data from RIU reports and datasets; (vi) interview 
with ex-RIU staff; (vii) interview with Kukudeal, government officials, donors and 
                                                 
20 Kukudeal is a company registered under Muvek Ltd-who implemented the RIU programme. 
Kukudeal runs a poultry contract farming programme with different producers in the country. Now 
they own the Kukaya eggs” brand marketing eggs produced by rural producers under contract 
farming. 
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actors who continue with processes after RIU.  These sources provided sufficient 
data to answer all the research questions presented in chapter 1.  Key actors were 
mapped from each area although that does not suggest clear-cut boundaries in their 
roles and interactions. The mapping helps clarify the sites at which data collection 
would occur. 
3.3 Data collection 
Supporting the use of case studies, scholars noted the importance and benefits of 
using multiple sources of evidence (Fletcher et al., 1997; Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009) 
because data triangulation enhances the validity of accounts of a particular 
phenomenon (Yin, 2009). Therefore, as explained in section 3.2 above, multiple 
sources of data were involved to bring valid accounts of how innovation was 
promoted in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. 
I combined the case study research with interpretive research strategy to help me 
understand behaviours from the actors’ points-of-view (Gerring, 2007). I therefore 
adopted qualitative methods involving close contact and interaction with participants 
in the study. In addition, data for this study were collected one year after the RIU 
programme was closed. Although most interviewed actors had a clear memory of the 
programme and its processes, I decided to also collect information from the 
programme archives and harmonise it with narrations from field interviews.  
3.3.1 Observation 
As a Tanzanian born and raised in rural areas, and who has worked with rural 
communities for 15 years, I can say I have been observing rural poultry producers all 
my life. Moreover, as the RIU country coordinator for four years (i.e. 2008-2012) I 
observed things unravelling. Furthermore, during data collection I observed actions 
and processes related to poultry: chickens roaming, traders moving house to house 
persuading to buy chickens, a child sending a cock to the village market, food 
vendors selling chicken meat, etc. Therefore, being in the field, provided the 
opportunity to interact with, and observe participants beyond the structured 
interviews. This added to the internal validity of the information collected from 
interviews.  
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Field observation allowed me to see things not discussed during interviews and to get 
the context to issues in the spirit of ethnography. When I visited  producers for 
interviews, I observed routines and spoke to members of the family. This provided a 
greater sense of the difference between producers who have commercialised and 
those who have not. For example, I could visibly contrast the two producers by 
looking at the number of chickens kept, types of sheds built, presence of fenced 
houses that restricted movements of chickens, supplementary feeds being prepared 
vs. birds just left to scavenge, etc. Being in the vicinity also influenced the type of 
questions I asked during interviews. 
3.3.2 In-depth interviews 
Literature explains that in-depth interviews are advantageous because they record 
more fully how subjects arrive at their opinions. They provide an opportunity to 
grasp the underlying mental processes that give rise to individual responses through 
witnessing outward manifestations like hesitations, stumbling, laughing, etc. as 
interviewees formulate their answers (Gerring, 2007; p.57). They also allow 
spontaneous probing for clarifications. Therefore, I have used about 110 days 
(approx. 4 months) to conduct 156 in-depth interviews (i.e. 143 individuals and 13 
groups). The maximum number of interviews I had per day was three. Interviews 
were not tape recorded after the first three participants expressed discomfort in being 
voice recorded. So I relied on my field notes which I compiled and typed daily. 
Table 3-0: Number by types of in-depth interviews held 
Category Location Individuals Groups When 





40 5 June – Aug 2013 
Producers  
(RIU target group) 
Pwani Region 85 7 Sept-Oct 2013 
Other actors21 
(Suppliers, LGA, etc.) 
Dar es Salaam, 
Pwani, Ruvuma 
& Njombe 
11 0 June - Nov 2013 
TOTAL 143 13  
Source: Study data, 2013 
                                                 
21 I interviewed extension workers, Agro-dealers and LGA staff between June and October when I 
was interviewing producers in their areas. The rest were interviewed in Dar es Salaam. 
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Individual interviews 
Field interviews were conducted to understand what happened and how the RIU 
programme was perceived and understood by different actors. Therefore as shown in 
Table 3-0 above, seven (two by phone) individual interviews were held with ex-RIU 
staff who worked with the programme. Then a group discussion was held with five 
of the seven interviewees (two could not attend) and agreed on key events and 
processes that took place. While in the group, the team also made a critical analysis 
of the process and gave insights of the complexities involved. I also interviewed 
eighty poultry producers, four champions and one opinion leader in groups of ten 
from eight programme areas. The areas were selected from the programme database 
based on different subjective criteria including overall performance, high or low 
community response, remoteness, presence of cultural factors that are linked with 
poverty, and high presence of women, youth, the elderly and people with disability 
as RIU target group, etc. As mentioned earlier these criteria are very subjective and 
were proposed and discussed with the RIU team. 
The 85 rural poultry producers interviewed came from seven different Districts. 
Forty of these came from four Districts in Pwani Region (i.e. Rufiji, Bagamoyo, 
Kibaha and Mkuranga) where RIU programme worked. The rest came from Songea 
Rural, Njombe Rural and Wanging’ombe Districts in Ruvuma and Njombe Regions 
where commercialisation had not taken place but a similar programme was just 
starting. The forty interviewees from the RIU programme area were selected by four 
District Champions who were asked to identify ten producers each. Out of the ten, 
two were whom they thought did very well in commercialising their poultry 
enterprises (Good performers), two were of average performance (Average 
performers), two who didn’t do well (Poor performers), two who started but quitted 
prematurely (Dropouts), and two who did not participate at all (Non participants). 
This distribution made a total of ten interviewees (five women) from each of the five 
categories. The selection was therefore very subjective as it relied on how 
Champions defined performance. However, I believe their judgement tends to be 
relevant for the study as it reflects how rural communities themselves perceive 
success. 
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The remaining forty interviewees were picked randomly in Songea, Njombe and 
Wanging’ombe Districts by the researcher during community meetings organised to 
sensitize rural households to join a programme similar to RIU. These meetings were 
organised by Muvek, the same agent who implemented the RIU programme in Pwani 
Region. So, while the previous forty interviewees in Pwani recalled how things were 
before RIU intervened, these forty gave accounts of their present situation as 
commercialisation initiatives had not yet taken place at the time of interviews. 
I also held individual interviews with three extension officers, one hatchery owner, a 
feed manufacturer, two district input shop owners (Agro-dealers), private 
veterinarian, one veterinary drugs company, two LGA staff and a Senior Officer 
from the Ministry of Livestock development and Fisheries. These gave information 
on the poultry supply chain situation in rural areas, before, during and after RIU.  
Focus group discussions 
After the individual interviews, and after I had gone through the data and did a bit of 
analysis, I went back to the RIU districts in Pwani region and conducted seven focus 
group discussions (FGDs) involving fifteen producers each. These meetings were 
organised at four district champions and three village champions’ homesteads, 
approximately a month after individual interviews were conducted. Participants in 
these discussions were randomly selected, and were Champions’ immediate 
neighbours regardless of whether they participated in RIU project or not. Each 
Champion had to list his or her neighbours to the fifteenth name and invite them for a 
meeting at her/his home on the next day. As an attempt to broaden variations in 
opinion, neighbours related to the Champion were excluded from the list.  
During these FGDs I asked almost the same questions as I did with the individual 
interviews but this time with a community perspective. For example, I asked why 
Rufiji people kept chicken, how Rufiji people feed their chickens and why? Etc. 
Therefore, my aim was to gain deeper insights of what is common in their goals, 
behaviours and routines as a society. It was also an opportunity to hear more answers 
from the same communities, and which were agreed by them in a group. In all the 
seven FGDs, not more than 4 participants (16%) had previously participated in the 
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individual interviews. I also used the discussion to confirm what RIU did, how the 
community responded, what had changed and how they perceived RIU and the 
processes.  
A group discussion was also held with four of the five ex-RIU staff (one could not 
attend) and agreed on key events and processes that took place. While in the group, 
the team also made a critical analysis of the process and gave insights of the 
complexities involved. I also presented my recall of the process as an ex-staff, and 
what I read from the report for them to discuss and comment. Finally, we agreed on 
the chronology of events and how they happened. 
About five group discussions of ten producers each were also conducted in Songea 
and Njombe districts to further understand poultry production behaviours in the 
control group. These were picked randomly from the attendance list of the meetings 
held previously. Their names were sent to their village leaders and were invited for a 
meeting on agreed dates. These were mixed groups of men, women, and youths. 
3.3.3 Data from RIU reports and datasets 
As a former team member, I had access to reports , minutes, proceedings, letters, 
emails, working documents (i.e. strategies, guidelines, term of references for 
different assignments, contracts, advertisements, etc.), publications, policy briefs, 
blogs, databases and programme diaries written monthly by individual team 
members and then compiled for submission to the programme headquarters in the 
UK. I read and analysed these documents in their sequence of events. Then 
information on what was done, why it was done, who were involved and why they 
were involved was extracted and put in a matrix to create a map of what RIU did in 
the poultry sector in Tanzania, including what happened as a result of the 
interventions. Each event was then discussed in detail with relevant interviewees. 
RIU had a rigorous documentation process and in Tanzania a communications officer 
was employed to document all events and processes and submitted to the RIU 
Management office in the UK. These documents were later uploaded to a ‘grapevine’ 
which is the overall (the global) RIU programme database. I have categorised the 
documents that I reviewed for Tanzania into seven categories, i.e. (i) framework 
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documents; (ii) progress reports, (iii) activity reports; (iv) innovation diaries and field 
notes, (v) study and consultancy reports; (vi) official communications and 
exchanges; and (vii) knowledge outputs and published materials. Table 3-1 below 
summarises the categories. 
Table 3-1: Summary of sources of data from RIU archives 
Category What it is 
Framework 
documents 
These are documents defining the programme’s overall strategy, 
approaches and other guiding principles. 
Progress 
reports 
Include reports prepared quarterly and annually by Muvek as the 
implementing agency and submitted to the RIU Management Team in the 
UK. They also include monthly reports submitted to Muvek by Household 
Caretakers who lived with farmers for 30 days and district champions who 
reported on the implementation progress at field level. Champions also 
submitted their reports to LGAs. 
Activity 
reports 
These were prepared for each activity as a record for what was done, who 
was involved, what happened, what was concluded or decided. Such reports 
include minutes from different meetings (e.g. between RIU and producers, 
RIU with hatchery owners, producers with hatchery owners, the Ministry 
with chick producers, etc.), workshop proceedings and staff field visit 
reports, etc. These reported on specific activities, i.e. describing what was 
done rather than progress. 
Innovation 
diaries 
These were written by individual RIU staff listing and briefly describing 
what they were doing. These were meant to capture all activities an 
innovation facilitator does to the smallest detail possible. These were 
different from activity reports as they included even the administrative tasks 
like writing letters, making telephone calls, organising a meeting venue, 
complaining about expired drugs to a supplier, attending a meeting, etc. 
These diaries were compiled monthly and submitted to the RIU 
management in UK. However, the idea of diaries started only in September 
2010 and was sustained to the end of the programme in June 2011. 




These were detailed reports prepared by consultants commissioned by RIU. 
Two main reports were found important for this study. The indigenous 
chicken subsector study which described the sector before RIU, and the 
farmer psychosocial study report which was commissioned to understand 
why some producers decided to quit after they tried to commercialise for a 
while. In my analysis I first looked at the reasons or circumstances that led 
to the commissioning of these studies, what came out and how the findings 




These include incoming and outgoing letters and emails between RIU and 
different actors including the ministry, input suppliers, champions, poultry 
producers etc. For example, RIU’s correspondence with the Ministry of 







These included analytical manuscripts, books, journal articles, video clips 
and other formal documents produced by the project. These provided 
analytical perspectives from third parties as well as those of RIU staff and 
target groups generated through an externally facilitated process. For 
example, the ‘RIU Institutional Case Stories’ booklet is an account of 
personal experiences of RIU staff, poultry service providers, and poultry 
producers of institutional changes that took place as a result of RIU 
interventions. These experiences were documented in a ‘write-shop’ 
facilitated by experts from KIT in The Netherlands. During the write-shop, 
information was peer reviewed and validated involving experts from 
outside RIU. These case stories were therefore very informative to me and I 
used the information to validate the account of the chronology of events 




These include video interviews recorded by journalists from outside 
Tanzania. They interviewed different people involved in the poultry 
industry who described what they do, what RIU did and their opinions. 
Going through the clips I leaned what RIU did, what actually happened, 
and how different actors view the changes. 
RIU website The global RIU programme had a rich website www.researchintouse.com 
and a web-based Tv and radio channel called ‘RIUtv’ where information on 
what was done, field experiences and general analyses of programme 
activities and outcomes could also be found. The website also has a link to 
key documents stored in the ‘grapevine’. 
Source: Study data, 2013 
3.3.4 Data limitations and challenges 
The ‘insider’ vs. ‘outsider’ problem 
As I explained before, during the time of this research, I had worked in the livestock 
sector in Tanzania for 15 years, out of which four years were focused on poultry 
alone. So I had a rich experience of how the industry operates and I also had access 
to inside information, and had almost the ethnographer’s experience of the issues. 
Furthermore, I coordinated the RIU programme and I also lived the experience of the 
programme processes and outcomes. I also had access to the field and all RIU data. 
This was both an advantage and a challenge. 
Literature argues that, when doing interpretive research, researchers are actually 
attempting the difficult task of accessing other people’s interpretations, filtering them 
through their own conceptual apparatus and feeding a version of events back to 
others (Walsham, 1995; p.77). And in doing that, they play either the role of an 
‘outside observer’, or that of the ‘involved researcher’ through participant 
observation or action research (Ibid). The author argues that from an interpretive 
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perspective neither of these roles should be viewed as that of an objective reporter, 
since the collection and analysis of data involves the researcher’s own subjectivity 
(p.77). Therefore, even by aiming to play the outside observer role, the researcher 
inevitably influences the interpretations of the people being researched, a process 
referred to by Giddens (1984) as the ‘double hermeneutic’. So even if researchers 
view themselves as outside observers, they are in some sense conducting action 
research by influencing what is happening in the domain of action (Walsham, 1995).  
According to Geoff Walsham, being an outsider has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The merit is that the researcher is seen as not having a direct personal 
stake in various interpretations and outcomes, and thus interviewees will be 
relatively frank in expressing their views, provided there is trust (Walsham, 1995). 
On the other hand, the disadvantages are that the outside researcher will not get a 
direct sense of the field organizations from the inside, and may sometimes be 
debarred from access to certain data and issues which are regarded as too 
confidential (Ibid). Therefore, in my case, I chose to conduct the analysis as an 
outsider but I was actually an insider with insight of internal processes and access to 
most documents and information. However, in order to minimize the risk of ‘self-
narration’ and ‘self-reporting’, I double-checked most data through rigorous 
triangulation and where relevant (e.g. when meeting with fellow ex-RIU staff) I 
presented my views and asked for comments. Nevertheless, I was able to identify 
most of the data which came from multiple sources, and there were no conflicts. 
Data was not gender disaggregated 
Literature shows that poultry production in rural areas is mainly a women’s activity 
(Kitalyi, 1998). Therefore any changes in the sector are likely to have significant 
gender implications. For example, there is a high risk of shifting gender roles as 
more women engage in poultry keeping and are able to earn a stable income. These 
women may face new and increased financial responsibilities previously covered by 
their male partners. Women and girls may also face increased workload as male 
household members leave all poultry-related tasks to women and girls.  
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Unfortunately, gender dimensions were not covered by this research and doing that 
could have properly provided interesting findings. For instance, analysing the RIU’s 
decision to recruit more women than men, and use the ‘household approach’ to 
encourage the entire household to engage in the enterprise, and therefore promoted 
equitable distribution of production roles and financial responsibilities could have 
generated useful information regarding facilitating gender sensitive innovation 
processes to achieve equitable growth.  
However, since the focus of the study was on innovation behaviours within the entire 
community, and since 65% of the interviewees were women, I have no doubt the 
findings generated by the study represent women’s views and situations. However, a 
deeper analysis regarding power shifts as poultry started to earn more income, issues 
of ownership and access to resources, as well as decision making powers and 
processes after more resources were allocated to the activity is valuable.  This could 
probably be an area for future research, i.e. to understand the position of women in 
such transformation, in terms of winners and losers. 
Data did not capture internal processes within RIU 
Data used in this research is limited to what RIU did, what happened, and how actors 
and the industry responded. It does not capture the dynamics within RIU 
management to correspond to what gave the programme the ability to do what it did. 
For example, it would have been interesting to show how planning, reporting, 
staffing and budgeting were done while taking such a flexible approach and still be 
able to satisfy the donor. However, given the scope and time of this PhD research, it 
was not possible to conduct an in-depth analysis of RIU as the broker and reveal the 
internal dynamics of being indeterminate and still be a successful donor programme. 
Did not capture potential effects of commercialising rural enterprises 
The study did not capture information on potential risks associated with 
commercialisations and the RIU interventions in general. RIU reports explain that 
commercialising rural poultry enterprises causes some unintended shifts which may 
not be desirable depending on how the society is organised around poultry business. 
Therefore, mechanisms to manage such shifts are important. However, RIU 
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forewarns that such problems only emerge subsequently and can therefore not be 
predetermined (RIU, 2011a). 
Examples of such risks include; 
 A shift in gender roles which could cause problems to women and girls as 
discussed above.  
 Movement of nutritious foods from rural to urban markets for economic 
gain, while depleting resources in rural areas.  
 Reduced effort on crop farming as more effort and resources are allocated to 
poultry production.  
 Causing negative implications be it social, economic or environmental. For 
example, there could be loss of jobs for some stakeholders in the value 
chains e.g. middlemen, traders; increase in grain prices as more producers 
use them to feed chicken, less social exchanges of chicken as gifts, etc.  
Therefore understanding such dynamics and how to address them is useful for future 
learning. 
3.4 Validity and generalization 
Generalisation through a case study has been debated. The method has often been 
criticised on the grounds of its weaknesses in generalisation to a larger population 
(Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009). However, other scholars have argued that the uniqueness 
of situations can offer the groundwork for logical inference or analytic generalisation 
(Donmoyer, 2009). Therefore, generalization from case studies is not expected to be 
‘statistical’, but more of an ‘analytical’ type (Yin, 2003). That is, results from a 
single case study produce theoretical propositions (p.21). Yin’s argument is extended 
into four types of generalization as follows: (i) the development of concepts; (ii) 
generation of theory; (iii) The drawing of specific implications; and (iv) the 
contribution of rich insight (Walsham, 1995; p.79). He built the categorization by 
citing Bhaskar (1979) who argues that unlike in natural sciences, social structures do 
not exist independently of the actions and conceptions of the human agents in them, 
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and the generative mechanisms of such structures are not space-time invariant. Thus 
the identified mechanisms should be viewed as ‘tendencies’ (rather than 
‘predictions’) which are valuable in explanations of past data but are not wholly 
predictable for future situations. They are valuable however, in the future in other 
organizations and contexts (p.79). 
Therefore, while behaviours in rural poultry industries are a typical and replicable 
sample of other rural poultry industries in developing countries to allow possible 
application of statistical generalization logic from sample to the population, the 
cognitive structures and the industry’s response to facilitation may not be similar. 
Moreover, the industry is not a typical of other subsistence-based industries, nor is 
the RIU work in the industry a typical of other rural development programmes. 
Nevertheless, I expect to draw some ‘analytical’ general lessons including concepts, 
implications, and insights which could be valuable in another context (domain of 
action), even in other research. That is, I expect under similar conditions, that a 
facilitation process similar to what RIU did will express similar impacts in other 
subsistence-based industries, and specifically in rural poultry industries in 
developing countries. Nonetheless, this is subject to empirical investigation. 
3.5 Data analysis 
In this section I will describe how I walked through the data and created categories 
without using a computer programme. My intention was to maintain ownership of 
every decision that I took to categorise, reject or interpret. Basically my approach 
was interpretive, and which I did in stages. The first task was to re-read the answers 
from my notes, and translated them into English from Swahili in their direct speech. 
This was done daily as interviews progressed. The average was between 1 to 2 
interpretations per day (i.e. a maximum of 2 interviews per day). So it took me about 
4 months to have the Swahili and English data files ready, including data from 
FDGs. 
However, as I was re-reading and translating the notes, I decided to use what I can 
call an ‘adding up method’. After I translated the first interviews, I created a matrix 
with each question separated. Then I kept on adding new responses coming from 
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new interviews from the same category and locality. So, when an interviewee 
produced a similar response as the one recorded earlier (like “I don’t have a chicken 
pen because they sleep in my kitchen”), I would not record it again in my English 
notes. However, I would still have it in my Swahili notes. I therefore separated the 
responses based on the category of respondents, and their locations. For example, I 
had a file for producers in District A, Producers in District B, etc.; and Extension 
officers District A, and District B etc. So the ‘adding up was done’ within the same 
participant’s category of the same locality. This ensured that socio-economic and 
other contextual uniqueness were preserved. This process also helped to reduce the 
volume of data in English files. I maintained the original data in the Swahili files for 
specific reference and for citations (quotes). 
I decided to use the ‘Framework approach’ (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) to analyse the 
data because it kept me closer to the data and it helped me generate ideas and 
conclusions as I did the analysis. It therefore fitted my requirements for an approach 
that allowed the data to speak for itself without making me lose the nuances within 
the data that, in the spirit of ethnography, I wanted to concentrate on during my 
discussion of the data. This approach, in taking a traditional, non-computerised 
approach to data analysis, and which requires immersion into the data and constant 
re-reading of the transcripts and field notes provided me with a way to gain this 
depth while at the same time logically sort the data into useful categories to make it 
more manageable. 
3.5.1 The ‘Framework’ approach 
While the Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) is the main theoretical framework in 
which the study is grounded, I used the ‘Framework’ approach (Ritchie & Spencer, 
1994) to analyse the data collected because it is systematic and has a well-defined 
procedure. It was also chosen, rather than the full, grounded approach as developed 
by (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), because this research is a form of action research for 
which the ‘Framework’ approach was specifically developed. Therefore, the AIS and 
Path-dependency theory were used to identify and organise themes and theoretical 
concepts which guided the analysis and not in data analysis. However, during data 
collection I used the AIS framework to conduct the innovation context analysis in 
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order to map existing actors in the system under study. This information was later 
used to analyse the organisational thinness and fragmentation in the poultry industry. 
The ‘Framework’ approach is a five-step process of data analysis. It begins with 
familiarisation with the data set followed by identification of a thematic framework 
(development of an initial coding system). Indexing is then done using the 
framework after which the data is charted by a process of abstraction and synthesis 
that leads to “[searches] for structure rather than a multiplicity of evidence” (Ritchie 
& Spencer, 1994; p.186). Finally, mapping and interpretation occurs. This method 
emphasises the interaction that occurs between the researcher and the data in order 
that the nuanced and complex nature of the data is emphasised (Spencer, Ritchie, 
Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). Therefore, no computer analysis of the data was done to 
avoid losing any contextual underpinnings of the findings. 
However, in order to capture the RIU process I merged all information from different 
sources and created a map of key events, decisions and actions. Then I explained the 
reasons for each one of them, who were involved and why, and what actually 
happened including outcomes. I thematically analysed to elaborate each event. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the research methods that I chose to use in order to answer 
the research questions outlined in Chapter One. I addressed different aspects of the 
research design through which the research questions are to be answered. I argued 
that a case study approach is the appropriate research strategy for this research, 
because it is focused on a specific event of a programme undertaken at specific time 
and place. In addition, the nature of research questions which are of a ‘why’ and 
‘how’ type suggests the case study as a suitable method. I have also outlined why I 
chose interpretive methods conducted in the spirit of ethnography. I have provided an 
overview of my multiple sources of data which were important for triangulation 
given my insider/outsider position in the study. I also described the process and 
‘Framework approach I used to analyse the data. I also provided an overview of 
some of the main methodological and practical limitations that I have had to 
overcome in conducting my research. 
 85 
Chapter 4 Rural poultry production in Tanzania 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on rural poultry industry in Tanzania and 
describes the industry’s value chain and its characteristics. The chapter makes it clear 
that the nature of the industry has been encouraging a shorter value chain where 
producers kept chickens just to meet social needs. The chapter also establishes the 
link that seems to exist between actors’ knowledge of the research findings on the 
low genetic potentials of the local breeds and policy decisions on how to support the 
industry. Furthermore, by discussing the dynamics of the industry before and after 
the Tanzanian independence in 1961, the chapter makes it clear that there has been a 
deliberate bias to maintain poultry production in rural areas under the traditional 
system, while promoting the commercial system in urban and peri-urban areas using 
exotic breeds. 
The chapter will therefore set the scene towards answering the first research question 
on why innovation is generally low in the industry by showing the existence of a dual 
production system where the traditional system is dominant in rural areas, and the 
commercial one is used mainly in urban and peri-urban. The chapter also provides 
background information of the industry where RIU intervened.  
The chapter is organised in eight sections. The next section gives a brief overview of 
the rural poultry value chain. Then section three describes the characteristics of the 
industry which is subsistence in nature and dominated by local breeds of chicken, 
raised under the traditional production system. In section four I explain the perceived 
weakness of the dominant breeds in the industry and the implications to behaviours 
in the industry. Then section five discusses the dynamics that took place in the 
poultry sector before and after the independence in 1961, including how the 
government introduced the commercial production system into the country. This 
section is followed by section seven where I briefly describe the different strategies 
which have been used by the public sector to develop the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania. The last section (8) summarises and concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 The industry value chain 
The Tanzania rural poultry industry value chain is short involving mainly production 
and marketing.  However, there are other functions like input production and supply 
which are handled mainly by actors living in urban areas including small rural 
townships. The functions are briefly discussed below.  
Production: This is where the largest group of actors are in the value chain. Their 
production is largely subsistence with 94% of the producer households keeping only 
a few chickens, between one and fifteen. To a small extent, medium scale production 
is emerging, especially around urban areas. Ministry of Livestock Development and 
Fisheries (MLDF) estimated that the entire chicken sector is growing at a rate of 
2.6%, a rate, which is nearly equal to the national population growth rate of 2.4% in 
2010 (Match Makers Associates, 2010). However, the traditional sector is the 
dominant one. 
Input supply: Since rural production is mainly traditional there are very few input 
suppliers (for feeds and day old chicks) linked to the industry. The existing feeds and 
chicks suppliers mainly operate in urban areas. The available chicken feeds are 
manufactured by medium scale animal feed processors.  
Drugs and vaccines supply: In Tanzania big private firms and their agents 
characterize the market for vaccines and veterinary drugs. Private companies (e.g. 
Farmers Center, By‐trade, Tan Vet etc) import drugs and vaccines from the 
Netherlands, Israel, Germany etc. Twelve vaccines, also available in the market are 
made in Tanzania. Many agro veterinary shops (stockists) based upcountry, work as 
agents of the importing companies. 
Market: The main markets for indigenous chicken are urban areas and in particular 
Dar es Salaam as well as Arusha, Mwanza and other regional towns. In towns, high 
and medium income household consumers purchase indigenous chickens. Indigenous 
chickens are also sold in restaurants as chicken soup or roasted chicken, but rarely 
consumed in big hotels. The end market price for indigenous chickens’ meat is 
almost double the price of exotic ones. Very little processing is done in urban areas 
where very rudimentary dressing is done. Dressing is offered by the retailers but 
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done at the cost of the customer. The farmer’s share of the end market price varies 
between 26% and 35%, which increases as the actor moves further upstream in the 
supply chain. As a result, up market traders in urban areas realize a bigger share of 
the end market price (Match Makers Associates, 2010). 
In rural areas there are no organised markets for chickens. Sales are ad hoc during 
regular markets where producers sell when in need of cash. However, traders have 
been moving around buying chickens at farm gate and transport them to urban 
markets. These traders usually go door to door, or visit village markets where they 
buy and keep them until they have sufficient number to transport (Match Makers 
Associates, 2010). Some of these traders go with merchandise and sell them in 
exchange for chicken.  
Eggs from indigenous chickens are often not sold but left to hatch or consumed by 
producer households. 
Other actors and functions: These include researchers, extension staff, regulators, 
NGOs and development programmes who are involved in providing services like 
training, extension, credit, community mobilization, etc.  These are mainly involved 
in providing services as mechanisms to support small producers to reduce mortality 
and earn a little more income. The initiatives are usually area specific and focusing 
on special groups like women, HIV/AIDS victims etc. 
4.3 Characteristics of the industry 
Literature shows that village chicken keeping in Tanzania has remained subsistent 
despite huge demand for chicken products and high poverty levels which signify 
higher needs for cash (Mack, Hoffmann, & Otte, 2013; Match Makers Associates, 
2010).  A significant body of poultry innovations to boost production also exists in 
the country, as well as political will to promote rural growth (RIU, 2011). 
Interestingly, rural producers have commercialised other farm enterprises within 
their domains but not poultry production. For example, a farmer will be producing 
tea or rice for the market, but keep 2 or 5 chickens at subsistence level, even when he 
sees numerous traders knocking on his door looking for chickens to buy. 
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Furthermore, little research has addressed the complexity of factors that determine 
and drive innovation processes in rural poultry settings specifically where indigenous 
breeds of chicken are involved. As a result, there is insufficient explanation as to 
why subsistence based chicken keeping, which operates under low innovation levels 
is still common in rural Africa (by almost 60%) despite the significant advancement 
in poultry science and technology in the world, and more so even after over 50 years 
of development interventions and research in rural poultry. Apart from poultry 
breeding, nutrition, health and economic studies, there is almost no research (at least 
that I am aware of) that goes beyond looking at the chicken and its needs (i.e. feeds, 
vaccines, drugs, shelter, etc.) and go deeper into the ‘poultry keeping situation’ and 
to provide an analysis of systems and social-cultural processes that govern creation, 
adoption, adaption and use of innovations in rural poultry production. 
Significant literature dwells around the scientific finding that ‘the genetic 
performance of indigenous breeds is very low’ and hence the consequent economic 
grouping of ‘industrial vs backyard chicken’ where the former is exclusively for the 
‘improved’ breeds considered to be high performers (Adedokun & Sonaiya, 2002; 
Dinka, Chala, Dawo, & Bekana, 2010; Grobbelaar, Sutherland, & Molalakgotla, 
2010; Mwacharo et al., 2011). Such literature treats rural poultry as being 
‘technologically-weak’ just because the breed involved is ‘not a high performer’. 
Seemingly, scientific conclusions and the sustainability question made innovation in 
the industry harder because research focused more on incremental innovation while 
the Government focused on improving the gene pool. The notion that local breeds 
were inappropriate for commercialisation also made adoption of innovations to 
improve productivity difficult. Researchers and development actors argued for 
maintaining the investment in the industry low (See FAO/IAEA, 2006; Otte, 2005; 
Sonaiya & Swan, 2004) mainly for two reasons: (i) rural producers are too poor to 
invest in commercial inputs; and (ii) even if they are assisted to invest, the genetics 
of the breed is not efficient enough to provide the right returns to investment. Hence 
it will be a loss to farmers and therefore unsustainable. In addition, others argued 
that, the low input output nature of the activity fits in well with the rural farming 
systems and does not put stress to the environment. According to FAO, commercial 
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inputs and technologies were inappropriate for village chicken production (E. 
Sonaiya & Swan, 2004). 
Generally, growth in the rural poultry industry is said to be limited  by poor 
knowledge of flock management especially by producers, limited usage and therefore 
limiting supply of inputs (especially day old chicks), limited business knowledge 
among producers because they don’t produce for the market, limited market access 
because of low and inconsistent volumes, poor market and handling infrastructure 
and limited sources of finance for investments in the subsector (Match Makers 
Associates, 2010). 
4.4 The perceived weakness of the breeds 
Five indigenous chicken ecotypes have been identified in Tanzania (Msoffe et al., 
2010) and which  are argued to differ in both productivity and disease resistance 
potential (FAO, 2008). Some of the ecotypes, like Kouchi are not indigenous but 
were introduced to the country and their hybrids have now been adapted and are 
widely reared in most parts of the country. Some hybrids like those of the Black 
Australorp, Hi sex, Bovan Brown and Rhode Island Red have also been introduced 
and adapted. NGO programmes and lately local government programmes (e.g. 
TASAF, ASDP and DADPs) have introduced and encouraged cross breeding as a 
way to improve quality of indigenous chicken breeds. In this study I am primarily 
concerned with indigenous breeds commonly known as ‘rural chicken’ or ‘village 
chicken’ and hybrids i.e. breeds kept under the traditional poultry production system 
(scavenging/extensive) or under the semi intensive management system, where 
supplementary feeding is sometimes done. The study is therefore not concerned with 
pure exotic breeds, which are often raised under intensive management. 
There is limited knowledge of which chicken ecotype should be promoted in 
Tanzania. Ministry of Livestock Development (MLDF) cited identification of 
genetically suitable chicken varieties as a key problem facing breeding in the 
industry. Also, introducing exotic species has been identified as a constraint in 
breeding because it leads to dilution and even loss of indigenous breeds. Initiatives at 
the Agriculture Research Institute (ARI) Naliendele and Mpwapwa are at an initial 
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phase, but have identified and collected indigenous chicken ecotypes with various 
desirable traits. To a large extent, physical attributes of chickens such as size and 
weight remains the most preferred criteria for identifying good breeders. 
Indigenous chickens are dual purpose breeds and unlike the exotic ones where layers 
and broilers are separate, they combine both laying and meat traits. Since egg laying 
capacity is negatively correlated to weight gaining for meat, some chick producers 
(hatchery owners) seem to be uncertain which breed to keep as a parent stock. This is 
very challenging because parents with high egg laying capacity produce chicks with 
the same quality but also with low weight gaining capacity. On the other hand, 
keeping parents with high weight gaining capacity will produce chicks that gain wait 
for the market and the chick producer will be getting very few eggs from a large 
parent stock for hatching. This increases hatchery production costs especially in 
feeding and caring for a large parents stock which produces very few eggs at a given 
time. In fact this is one of the areas where the cost of commercialising indigenous 
breeds is higher on the supply chain. 
Currently, the market for day old chicks and also for chicken meat accepts some 
degree for cross breeding, which provides a good bargain for actors in the rural 
poultry industry to model their businesses to respond to customers’ desire for 
chicken types with quick weight gain (as in exotic chicken) and which at the same 
time lay many eggs. Some hatchery owners have already adopted some degree of 
crossbreeding to increase production. So the trend now is hatcheries investing in 
producing dual purpose chicks (i.e. both for meat and eggs) which lay more eggs and 
at the same time gain market weight relatively quicker i.e. within four months. 
4.5 Dynamics before and after independence in 1961 
As explained in section 1.2, prior to independence in 1961, the poultry sector was 
entirely dominated by indigenous breeds of chickens kept in rural areas for social 
purposes. The Government started to regulate the sector in 1967 with a strong bias of 
promoting commercialization of pure exotic breeds (RIU, 2011a). The current policy 
is to develop a commercialised and competitive poultry subsector through 
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developing large scale and vertically integrated commercial farms that keep exotic 
breeds. 
After the Arusha Declaration22 in 1967, and in line with the socialism ideology and 
the national policy for self-reliance the government of Tanzania promoted 
commercial poultry production with a specific focus on improved breeds. The 
government approach was vertical integration and it therefore decided to establish 
the National Poultry Company (NAPOCO). As a government Parastatal NAPOCO 
was mandated to set up commercial poultry farms, breeder farms and import parent 
stock. The government also promoted commercial production of exotic and hybrid 
chicken in public schools (both primary and secondary), prisons and in agriculture 
training institutions. 
The decision to establish NAPOCO provided a strong financial base for the 
introduction of the commercial system in the country. This is contrary to how the 
traditional system started and which never received any attention even during the 
colonial times. Therefore, the government introduced a parallel production system 
which received more attention and resources from the government while neglecting 
the old traditional system. This sent the first signals that commercial poultry 
production entails powers, i.e., financial, political and a superior breed from the 
West. This understanding was reinforced when schools were involved in managing 
public-owned commercial poultry farms. 
After the successful introduction of public-owned commercial farms, the demand for 
commercial poultry inputs increased, especially feeds and the Tanzania Feeds 
Company (TAFCO) was established. This was also a government parastatal. Later in 
the 1970s the government embarked on a nation-wide campaign to promote 
consumption of eggs and poultry meat, particularly to women, children and sick 
people. This was after the successful performance of the commercial farms where 
production of eggs increased significantly. By then, rural people were using different 
                                                 
22 The Arusha Declaration and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party’s Policy on 
Socialism and Self Reliance (1967), referred to as the Arusha Declaration, is known as Tanzania’s 
most prominent political statement of African Socialism, ‘Ujamaa’, or brotherhood. The Arusha 
declaration is divided into five parts: The TANU “Creed”; The Policy of Socialism; The Policy of Self 
Reliance; the TANU Membership; and the Arusha Resolution. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arusha_Declaration for details. 
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means including setting taboos to minimize consumption of eggs which were very 
important for breeding in the traditional system. Therefore, the government 
campaign was important in changing deep rooted taboos to promote consumption of 
eggs. However, since the supply of eggs from public farms was limited, the triggered 
change in consumption patterns affected the traditional breeding system, as fewer 
eggs became available for breeding. 
In the mid-1980s NAPOCO collapsed and private small to medium-scale commercial 
producers of exotic and hybrid chickens in urban and semi-urban areas emerged. 
During this time, the emergence of private farms intensified importation of day old 
chicks from neighbouring countries including Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and 
Uganda, because until its collapse, NAPOCO was the only company importing 
parent stock and producing chicks. The government responded to the situation by 
encouraging private entrepreneurs to establish hatcheries to cater for the increased 
demand of day-old chicks. Only Inter-chick Company, Ruvu JKT and Kibaha 
Education Centre managed to establish large enough hatcheries. Yet still, these three 
hatcheries were unable to meet the demand for day old chicks. Hence importation 
continued. To date, there are nineteen large commercial producers of day old chicks 
(of improved breeds) on the Mainland Tanzania, some of which also keep parent 
stock and raise commercial layers and broilers (RIU, 2012). 
It is important to note that, during the NAPOCO era, the knowledge on how to raise 
chicks and manage a commercial poultry farm was disseminated by the government 
to the farms, including to those owned by schools and prisons. So it is fair to 
anticipate that the knowledge could be publically available. However, availability of 
veterinary services and drugs including vaccines was strictly controlled by the 
government through the Veterinary Investigation Centres (VICs) initially present in 
eight different zones. The government was importing and distributing vaccines and 
drugs. 
Ten years after the collapse of NAPOCO, the private sector managed to significantly 
increase the commercial production of broilers and layers. For example, between 
1995 and 2003 the number of layers increased sharply from 287,691 to 1,126,697, 
representing an annual growth rate of 18.6%, and that of broilers increased from 
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184,002 to 665,712 in 2003 during the same period, representing an annual growth 
rate of 15%. However, a much higher growth in layers of 26% per annum was 
experienced between 1995 and 1999 while broilers population grew at a rate of 30% 
per annum during the same period (RIU, 2012). 
The vacuum created by NAPOCO created a business opportunity to private 
producers and input suppliers. However, they did not enjoy the financial support 
NAPOCO had from the government. Consequently investment in input supply was 
scanty and small. Thus the country continued to rely on importation of vaccines 
through the government system, while government veterinarians got engaged in the 
private business of selling veterinary drugs. This situation was the same even in the 
production of other livestock like cattle, goats and pigs. As a result, the private sector 
businesses that emerged had very weak financial resource base, which ended up 
filling the gap left by NAPOCO by supplying poor quality inputs including 
counterfeit drugs. This necessitated the government to start regulating the sector. 
Nonetheless, the quality of poultry inputs continued to drop, thus pushing the 
production and supply of meat and eggs way below the demand. Consequently, in 
early 2000, complaints on producers’ involvement in unhealthy practices of raising 
exotic chickens including administration of high doses of antibiotics and growth 
hormones emerged. This caused a sharp decline in consumption of exotic chicken 
and eggs. 
4.6 Strategies and approaches for developing the industry 
According to RIU, the Tanzania livestock policy document only mentions the 
indigenous poultry sub-sector as one of the types of poultry farming systems 
practiced in Tanzania (although accounting for about 92% of the total poultry 
population in the country) but not as an important sub-sector that would receive 
government attention. The government focus has thus been on commercial poultry 
production which deals with exotic breeds only. Therefore the indigenous chicken 
industry has not been a priority industry and because of the perceived low genetic 
potential and the fact that it is mainly managed as a village backyard activity, the 
government’s strategy has been to upgrade the local breeds through distributing 
improved cocks to mate with local hens in the villages.  
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Currently, development of the poultry industry in Tanzania is based on a vertical 
integration strategy which is evident in large cities such as Dar es Salaam. In this 
system, large firms are involved in feed milling, day-old chicks production, broiler 
and egg production, marketing and processing. While this system has its benefits it is 
not beneficial for the majority of rural poultry producers who produce 79% of the 
chicken population in the country. The horizontal approach which is inclusive of 
more smallholder and medium-scale producers can create a more equitable growth of 
the sector as well as benefit the majority of the rural populations. 
Different approaches have been used to develop the rural chicken industry in 
Tanzania and Africa in general. What is common in all the approaches however, is 
the intention to increase productivity without increasing producers’ interactions with 
commercial input suppliers. Therefore the intention has always been to maintain the 
low-input usage. Below are some of the common approaches used.     
4.6.1 Improving the genetics 
As a strategy to address the acute animal protein shortage among the poor in rural 
parts of the world, genetic improvement of local chicken through cross breeding with 
improved commercial breeds has been suggested (Malago and Baitilwake, 2009), 
and used (Tiamiyu, 1999; Atteh, 1999; Fayeye, 2005). The strategy is meant to 
improve the productivity of local breeds of chicken in terms of egg traits, 
hatchability, growth performance, and live weight gain. This strategy is based on the 
arguments that the performance of local chickens vary considerably and no single 
ecotype meets the attributes of good egg traits, fertility, hatchability, survivability, 
high growth rate, heavy weight at slaughter and high egg production (Msoffe et al, 
(2001) and Fayeye, et al., (2005), in Malago and Baitilwake, (2009); p.25). So this 
strategy focuses on dealing with the biology of the chicken itself and therefore 
directing substantial research work into analysing, screening and comparing egg 
traits, fertility, hatchability, chick hatch weight, and chick survivability of 
experimental breeds. Most of these studies conclude that crossbred chickens have 
better performance than local breeds (Malago and Baitilwake, 2009). 
At farm level, producers selected cocks and kept them for breeding. Then later 
researchers distributed improved cocks through extension agents. However, 
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inbreeding occurred and producers came up with an exchange plan where they sold a 
cock to buy a cock from a faraway village. Apparently farmers sold more cocks and 
gave them away as gifts than hens. When the desire to sell more chicken to gain 
more income aroused, natural breeding was found to be too slow. Hence researchers 
trained farmers how to manage and synchronise breeding cycles using selected hens. 
Still there were less chicken in the market since mainly cocks and old hens were 
sold. Then small and low cost incubators were introduced in villages under a 
government programme with the aim of increasing rural household’s capacity to 
produce chicks. However, this programme was not very successful because 
availability and quality of breeding eggs were a problem. Thus, rural farmers 
continued to rely on natural breeding while controlling their rates of consumption, 
selling and other disposals like gifts.  
4.6.2 Controlling and managing diseases 
Controlling poultry diseases and especially the Newcastle Disease (ND) has been 
widely used as a strategy to improve village level chicken production both in 
Tanzania and in other rural communities (Dinka et al., 2010; Permin, Riise, & 
Kryger, 2004; Riise, Permin, & Kryger, 2005). The strategy is chosen because 
diseases and especially ND have been identified as the major health threats affecting 
chicken stock levels in rural SSA (Minga, Mtambo, & Katule, 2001). 
Disease exposure and transmission in rural chickens is unique among other poultry 
production systems because village chickens congregate during scavenging. This 
makes household level disease intervention strategies very difficult to apply (Msoffe 
et al., 2010; p.254). However, this co-mingling of flocks permitted by human 
community structures of African villages, and the social nature of these communities 
of acting collectively in different aspects of their lives provides an opportunity for 
collective actions by humans to prevent diseases (Mwaikusa 1994; and Krishna et al. 
1997, cited in Msoffe et al., 2010). Hence the widespread use of local community 
based rural vaccination programmes (Snyder 2002: cited in Msoffe et al., 2010). In 
these programmes the problem at hand is assumed to be two-fold; first, a lack of 
knowledge and awareness on how and what can treat the diseases; second, a lack of 
skills to utilize knowledge and technology involved; and third is lack of access to 
technologies and drugs to treat or control diseases.  
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In 2009, a social strategy was tested for implementing Newcastle disease (ND) 
vaccination and biosecurity improvements among free-ranging chicken at village 
level in Tanzania. The strategy involved training of local vaccinators, poultry 
keepers, and local government leaders on poultry health, management and marketing 
of village chickens with an emphasis on ND vaccination and improving biosecurity 
against avian influenza (AI) (Msoffe et al., 2010; p.253). 
4.6.3 Consumer preferences as innovation driver 
In early 2000 consumers became more health conscious and began to question 
production methods for exotic chickens. The perception that commercial chickens 
were raised using drugs and hormones with potential health hazards to consumers 
became widespread leading to a sudden fall in demand for exotic poultry products 
and a surge on the demand for indigenous chickens and eggs23. Market studies 
revealed that Tanzanian consumers had more trust in the way local chickens were 
raised, felt that the chickens had a better taste and texture than exotic breeds, and 
were therefore willing to pay more (Match Makers Associates, 2010). 
Consequently, the exotic layers’ annual population growth rate of 26% experienced 
between 1995 and 1999 declined to 11.7% over the period 1999 to 2003, while that 
of broilers dropped sharply from 30% to 2% over the period 1999 to 2003. To date, 
indigenous chickens remain the most consumed poultry type in rural areas. In 
addition, the relatively more health conscious and affluent consumers in urban areas 
continued to be a niche market for the indigenous chicken products (Ibid). 
Following this drastic change in the poultry market equation, some large-scale 
poultry producers responded by including indigenous chicken in their flocks. 
Consequently, out of a total of 456,638 chickens kept by large-scale farms in 
Tanzania mainland as of 1st October 2003, indigenous chickens were 22,423 while 
241,592 were exotic broilers and 312,043 were exotic layers. Meanwhile, the 
government’s response focused on improving the genetics of indigenous chickens 
through crossbreeding with improved cocks, rather than developing a comprehensive 
national strategy for commercial expansion of the indigenous poultry industry. The 
response was associated with a strongly held view among policy makers and 




scientists about the low genetic potential and productivity of indigenous chicken, 
even as studies continued to demonstrate that productivity of indigenous chickens 
can be significantly increased by improving nutrition, disease control, production 
methods for day-old chicks, and housing among other recommended poultry 
management practices (Minga et al., 1996; Msami, 2000; Mwalusanya, 2002). 
The initiative to improve the genetic potential of local chickens through 
crossbreeding with improved cocks has been widely promoted through Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs) under the Agriculture Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP) with funds from Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) and the 
Councils’ own sources through District Agriculture Development Plans (DADPs). 
However, its prospects for commercial success were significantly diminished by the 
long-term system challenges which have over the decades, impeded growth and 
development of the indigenous poultry industry. 
Overall, even though the government’s active participation has had some positive 
impact on growth and development of the poultry subsector, its failure to integrate 
the indigenous poultry industry in the mainstream of commercial expansion is a 
major missed opportunity to tap and harness the tremendous potential of the industry 
to contribute to poverty reduction and livelihood improvement especially in rural 
areas. 
A market study contracted by the RIU in May 2010 showed that the price of a mature 
local chicken in major urban centres such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Arusha 
ranged between Tsh.9,000 and Tsh.12,000, while that of the exotic chicken ranged 
between Tsh.5,000 and Tsh.6,000, making the local chickens a preserve for the 
affluent urban upper and middle classes. A bigger share of the urban market remains 
untapped due to undersupply of the local chickens and the high price which has 
locked out low-income earners in urban areas from enjoying a highly nutritious 
delicacy. Under-production of indigenous chickens is therefore, a missed opportunity 
to maximise on the existing market opportunities to increase incomes, reduce poverty 
and improve livelihood for the rural poor especially women and children. It is also a 
missed opportunity to contribute to overall growth and development of the national 
poultry subsector. 
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4.6.4 Improving the production systems to semi-intensive or intensive 
There are various models of the use of family poultry as a tool for development. 
Examples of traditional models tested over several years are the Smallholder Semi-
Scavenging Poultry Model in Bangladesh and the Projet pour le Développement 
d’Aviculture Villageois in Burkina Faso. An example of a small-scale intensive 
model is the Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees model, which has 
been tested for only a short period, and the Rakai Model implemented by Farm 
Africa in Uganda. 
The Rakai Chicken Model is a typical example of the recent move from linear to 
systems approaches in addressing constraints in rural chicken production. The Model 
was adapted from the famous Bangladesh model and used by Farm-Africa to 
improve indigenous chicken production in Rakai District in southwestern Uganda 
under the Maendeleo Agricultural Technology Fund (MATF)-supported project. The 
purpose of the Rakai Chicken programme was to improve household welfare by 
improving indigenous chicken production through programmed hatching and 
cockerel exchange. The chosen entry point was therefore to change existed breeding 
strategies followed by improved stock management, housing, feeding and health-care 
(Roothaert, Ssalongo, & Fulgensio, 2011). 
The Rakai Model combines two popular approaches used by Donors, NGOs and 
Governments to improve rural chicken production.  The first approach is to improve 
breeding through cockerel exchange where cocks of improved breeds are introduced 
in villages to mate with local hens. The goal of this approach is usually to improve 
the genetic make-up of indigenous breeds dominant in rural areas and which are 
argued to be of low productivity potentials. The second approach is to communicate 
improved poultry husbandry/management knowledge through training, extension 
visits, farmer field schools, and through media. The assumption guiding the second 
approach is, if farmers are made aware (both in theory and in practice) of better ways 
of managing and raising their chickens, they will adopt them. In both approaches, the 
starting point is supply of knowledge, skills and technology (e.g. technology like 
improved cocks, vaccines, etc.). Unfortunately, these approaches, and as 
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demonstrated by the Rakai programme have not shown the ability to trigger sector-
wide interactions to transform the industry beyond subsistence. 
Programmed hatching is a local technology involving synchronization of hatching by 
a group of local hens in order to produce relatively larger numbers of day-old chicks 
of exactly the same age. In this technology, no incubators are required and birds may 
hatch up to seven times a year compared to un-programmed birds. The technology is 
considered to be a fast and cheap way of increasing the number of chickens on a 
farm (Ibid) and as a better alternative to the use of incubators. Another approach is 
giving loans and subsidised to increase farmers’ access to poultry inputs. 
Technology dissemination is increased through organizing farmers in producer 
groups or associations. In these groups, individual farmers learn from each other, 
other knowledge providers use these structures as entry points to train and 
disseminate knowledge. Value addition and hands on experience in business and 
marketing skills are gained by farmers through these structures. 
Roothaert and his colleagues argue that the creation of real demand and use of a 
holistic approach to development are key factors for successful innovation 
facilitation in rural-based industries. By holistic they imply, balancing of attention to 
technological aspects, community-based approaches and ownership, and establishing 
links to other important actors in the poultry innovation system. The question 
however, is what determines the balance? In this study I argue that, the balance of 
attention to technological, organisational and socio-economic aspects of the 
innovation process, which defines successful innovation facilitation, is determined by 
how flexible innovation facilitators or brokers are in allowing their interventions to 
be shaped by the ever emerging context which also results from the interventions. 
This means allowing interventions and context to shape one another through a 
continuous process of seeking and utilizing solutions to meet expectations. 
4.7 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter shows that in the rural poultry value chain majority actors are producers. 
Most rural households keep a few birds under traditional system using very little 
external inputs. Therefore, input supply and supply of veterinary drugs is almost non-
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existent with vaccination done sporadically through public campaigns.  The chapter 
also explains that there are no organised poultry markets in rural areas as sales are ad 
hoc during regular village markets when producers are in need of cash. A few traders 
also move around, buying chickens at the farm gate, and transporting them to urban 
markets. The volumes are usually low and eggs are rarely traded as they are often left 
for breeding and for home consumption. 
The chapter also makes it clear that there is a relationship between the research 
findings regarding the breed and the observed dominance of the traditional 
production system in rural areas. It is explained that, local breeds have been 
promoted because they require very low investment and can withstand the harsh 
conditions in the field. So the traditional production system was perceived to be 
appropriate for the poor in rural areas. On the other hand, the commercial system 
started with the government support in urban areas, and used imported exotic breeds 
which are argued to have higher genetic potentials. Finally, it is made clear in the 
chapter that, strategies used to develop the rural poultry industry have been more 
incremental than radical with the government strongly desiring to improve the 
genetic make-up of the indigenous local flock through cross breeding with improved 
cocks. The chapter also highlights some recent initiatives to improve productivity in 
rural poultry farms through credit, vaccinations, organising producers, training on 
improved husbandry practices and even introducing supplementary feeding and 
vaccination against the Newcastle Disease. However, these strategies thrived to 
maintain the low innovation nature of the traditional production system. 
The next chapter will use concepts from the path dependency theory to analyse 
behaviours in the rural poultry industry and present findings from the field to explain 






Chapter 5 Analysing innovation in rural poultry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This is the first of the four empirical chapters in which I present my study 
findings. The chapter makes it clear that Path Dependency theory can explain the 
observed prevalence and persistence of subsistence agricultural production in 
rural Africa, and specifically in poultry production. As explained earlier in 
Chapter one (section 1.2), the theory is used to explain why a certain 
development path or trajectory is chosen and becomes entrenched to the level 
where it becomes hard for a new path to be opted for, even where the old path is 
considered less superior. 
In this chapter therefore, I explain why innovation is generally low in the 
traditional (extensive) poultry production system, and why the system is 
dominating the rural poultry industry in Tanzania despite the high market 
demand for poultry products and the desire to fight rural poverty. I later use the 
information to explain in the next chapters what RIU did to unlock the industry 
and initiate a new technological path. 
As described in Chapter 2, the traditional rural poultry industry in Tanzania 
produces 94% of the total poultry products produced in the country. It also 
satisfies over 94% and 60% of the current consumption for poultry products in 
rural and urban areas respectively. However, the current national production of 
poultry meat and eggs is way below the demand (including potential demand). 
Which prompts the question, ‘why do rural producers not utilize existing 
improved knowledge and technologies to commercialise and produce more to 
earn more’?  
In the traditional poultry production system, breeding is slow, mortality rates are 
high and time to maturity is very long and with very low weight gain even after 
eighteen months of age (Minga et al., 2001; Msoffe et al., 2010). This happens 
while technologies to control diseases, for ensuring proper nutrition and for 
producing quality chicks are available in Tanzania. In fact, these technologies 
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and practices are habitually adopted in the commercial (intensive or semi-
intensive) production systems practiced in urban and peri-urban areas. 
FAO categorised the traditional (village or back yard chicken) production in 
Tanzania as Sector four where there is minimal bio-security and birds and 
products are consumed locally. Apparently, this kind of categorization implies 
that in order to upgrade from traditional to commercial production in sectors 
three or two, rural producers need to make three major changes; i.e. (i) must 
produce for the market (change scale and therefore stop relying on natural 
breeding); (ii) feed either intensively or semi-intensively (change feeding 
strategy i.e. introduce supplementary feeding); and (iii) increase biosecurity 
(change diseases management and control strategy i.e. introduce spending on 
vaccines and disease management). Therefore, ‘breeding’, ‘feeding’, ‘disease 
control/management’ and ‘marketing’ are the strategic areas where technology 
and innovation define the difference between traditional and commercial poultry 
production systems. 
Building on the discussion above, the traditional poultry production system 
(extensive system) and the commercial poultry production (which could either 
be semi-intensive or intensive) can be regarded as two strategies within which 
there are embedded competing technologies and innovations (i.e. around 
breeding, feeding, diseases control/management, and marketing) to which 
sources and features of path dependence are inherent. Therefore, in this chapter I 
have analysed the two production systems as competing technological paths in 
an attempt to understand why the commercial production system which is known 
to generate more income is not adopted in rural areas. Apparently, the same rural 
producers have commercialised other agricultural enterprises. For example, most 
rural poultry producers also grow other crops like cotton, tea, coffee, pyrethrum, 
and sunflower etc. which they specifically produce for the market.  
In order to analyse the mechanisms behind the persistence of the inferior 
extensive poultry production system in rural Tanzania, I have used  three 
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particular concepts emerging from the path dependency literature24 namely; (i) 
general concept of ‘lock-in’ developed by Arthur (1989) which refers to 
situations or sequential patterns of activity and behaviour to form a fixed 
trajectory which becomes costly and difficult for actors to break free from 
(Salamonsen, 2014: p.5); (ii) organisational thinness which refers to scarcity of 
relevant actors with the ability to facilitate innovation;  and (iii) fragmentation 
which refers to situations where relevant actors exist but do not interact 
(Kaufmann & Wagner, 2005) due to either lack of trust (Iskasen, 2001) or they 
simply do not know each other (Ibid). Fragmentation can be mitigated by 
improving relational behaviours to facilitate actors engagement e.g. through 
meetings or any other exchanges to shape collective programmes (Salamonsen, 
2014). A detailed discussion of how I use the concepts in the analysis is 
presented in Chapter two (section 2.5.1). 
The chapter is organised in six sections. Section two will highlight the principles 
of path dependence by briefly introducing the concepts of lock-in, organisational 
thinness and fragmentation used by the study to explain why innovation is 
generally low in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. Then the third section 
uses data from the field to explain how the industry is experiencing the three 
types of lock-ins i.e. the cognitive, structural and political, followed by section 
four which describes the level and causes of organisational thinness and 
fragmentation in the industry. Lastly, section five presents summarises and 
conclusions. 
5.2 Principles of path dependence: A literature review 
5.2.1 ‘Lock-in’ 
In my analysis the concept of ‘lock-in’ is used to explain why the traditional 
extensive system is dominating the poultry production in Tanzania, and why 
rural producers are not switching to produce commercially under intensive or 
semi-intensive production systems. Analysing technological competition and 
lock-in is well developed both at theoretical and empirical levels. However, it is 
                                                 
24 The three concepts were also adopted by Krister Salamonsen (2014) to analyse the effects of 
exogenous shock on the development of a regional innovation network in nothern Norway. 
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often used to explain adoption in sectors of high technology but hardly applied 
in the field of agricultural development (Cowan & Gunby, 1996). Specifically, it 
has not been explored in poultry research. 
In agricultural research, path dependence and lock-in have been used to study 
adoption of pest control strategies (Cowan & Gunby, 1996; Ugaglia, Homme, & 
Filippi, 2011; Wolff & Recke, 2000) where chemical crop protection (CCP) and 
the integrated pest management (IPM) were treated as competing technologies. 
In their analysis, Wolf and Rekke (2002) used the theoretical framework of path 
dependence to examine how the CCP and IPM technologies developed and why 
one persists over the other. When studying pesticide control in tomato 
production in Ghana, the authors established that path dependence theory could 
predict that a shift from the inferior technology to the superior was actually 
impeded by the inferior technology itself. They also concluded that through 
examining feedback mechanisms, the theory leads to a satisfactory explanation 
of how systems develop. Essentially, Wolf and Rekke applied the theory beyond 
the present moment and examined implementation strategies which could break 
down the cycle of the self-reinforcing mechanisms towards the inferior 
technology (p.167-168). This means they used the theory to understand the 
present as well as to predict a future shift. 
On another study, Ugaglia, Del’homme and Fillipi (2011), used the same 
framework and the dynamic approach to analyse pesticide lock-in in vineyards in 
France. These authors analysed the technological change needed to escape lock-
in and to reduce pesticide use by considering innovation process both at farm 
and upstream levels (Ugaglia et al., 2011). Therefore, unlike in the Cowan and 
Gunby case, they considered grape growers as being locked-in the use of 
pesticide (i.e. pesticide lock-in) rather than on the use of a specific pest control 
technology or strategy (thus no competing pest control technologies were 
involved). However, the analysis in both case studies focused on understanding 
the main reasons and mechanisms that led to the lock-in (specifically what 
inhibits diffusion and learning), and later in determining how to escape the lock-
in. This study employs a similar focus in order to explain why rural producers 
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are not switching to relatively more productive poultry production systems and 
whether a deliberate unlocking is possible. 
Central to the idea of lock-in is that technology and technological systems follow 
specific paths that are difficult and costly to escape (Perkins, 2003; p.1). Thus 
lock-in hinders growth because actors become unable to change and adapt 
(Schienstock, 2004). Consequently, and if not intervened, such systems or 
technologies tend to persist for extended periods even when the need to shift 
arises, and a superior alternative exists (Perkins, 2003). Literature provides two 
overlapping explanations for the existence of lock-in, those are related to 
‘technological paradigms’ and to the ‘presence of increasing returns’ (Arthur, 
1989; Cowan & Gunby, 1996; David, 2000; Perkins, 2003; Salamonsen, 2014; 
Ugaglia et al., 2011; Wolff & Recke, 2000). 
Technological paradigms 
According to Perkins (2003), the nature of and direction of technological 
advances is strongly shaped by the ‘cognitive framework’ of actors referred to by 
Nelson and Winter (1977: cited in  Nelson & Winter, 1982) as technological 
regime, and as technological paradigms by Dosi (1982: cited in Dosi, 1993; Van 
den Belt & Rip, 1987) with both citing the existence of certain rules, heuristics 
or principles that define the boundaries of thought and actions of relevant actors 
(Perkins, 2003). Apparently these shared mental frames tend to direct technology 
performance towards the direction shaped by past achievements, ideas and 
knowledge. Hence there is a tendency to exclude possibilities and solutions that 
lie outside the dominant paradigm. This leads to incremental rather than radical 
technological change (Ibid).  
Therefore, explanations for the lock-in under the technological paradigm concept 
are mostly derived from ‘actors’ behaviour’ or the society, and not from the 
technologies in question. Thus, in my study I will analyse the behaviour, 
attitudes, perceptions and beliefs of producers and other actors to establish the 
shared mental frames which are reinforcing the adoption of the traditional 
poultry production over the commercial one. 
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Existence of increasing returns to adoption  
On increasing returns to adoption, and apparently with minimum reference to 
agricultural industries, literature explains that these are positive feedback 
mechanisms that make adopting a particular technology more attractive as more 
people adopt it (Allison & Hobbs, 2004; Arthur, 1989; David, 1994; Grabher, 
1993; Perkins, 2003). This means, in case of competing technologies, the one 
that has a secured lead persists. According to Perkins (2003) this situation arises 
because early adoption can generate a snowballing effect whereby the preferred 
technology benefits from greater improvements than its competitors (p.2). 
Literature also shows that, this process can lock a society into an inferior design 
and cause a market failure (Arthur, 1989; Cowan & Gunby, 1996; David, 2000; 
Perkins, 2003). Such a situation is argued to result from uncertainty and 
ignorance about qualities and properties of various options. Thus a technology 
that would have been superior if given equivalent learning gets locked out 
(Perkins, 2003). Examples of such situations includes the QWERTY keyboard 
over Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (David, 1985), light water nuclear reactors 
over heavy water ones (Cowan, 1990), and the VHS video cassette recorder 
standard over Betamax (Arthur, 1990) (all examples are cited in Perkins, 2003; 
p.2). 
Literature presents four classes of increasing returns argued to cause a lock-in. 
Those are; (i) scale economies which is the reduction in unit cost of a product or 
service as output rises; (ii) learning economies, where the cost and performance 
improvements are reduced as individuals and organisations learn from 
experience and repetition how to use the technology more effectively and 
efficiently; (iii) adaptive expectations, whereby increased adoption reduces 
uncertainty about the performance, reliability and durability of technology 
commonly used; and (iv) network externalities which are external benefits 
gained by users as more users use the same technology. Basically, network 
externalities result from technological interdependencies where increase in 
network size attracts more potential users, which leads to positive feedback 
effect (Ibid).  
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Therefore, analysing increasing returns to adoption means looking at features 
embedded in the competing technologies which tend to attract or block adoption. 
This means analysing features of the traditional and commercial poultry 
production systems, then establish what is attracting rural producers more to the 
traditional over the commercial system. 
Types of lock-ins 
Three types of lock-in, i.e. structural lock-in, political lock-in, and cognitive 
lock-in are explained by Grabher (1993) and explored in this study as follows:   
‘Structural lock-in’ exists when most resources are bound to a specific 
technology and existing organisational and institutional settings are tied to this 
technology, leaving no room for diversification and the development of new 
technological paths. Rural household allocate resources to other livelihood 
activities but not in poultry. Likewise, public organisations and donor funded 
projects invest in promoting traditional poultry keeping, while private sector 
operations like those of banks, input suppliers, insurance, etc., are designed to 
work only with urbanised commercial producers. This means these resources do 
not support rural producers to switch from the traditional production system. 
‘Political lock-in’ exists when dominating power structures have a vested 
interest in the dominant techno-organisational path and resist changes. In this 
case, the government bias towards promoting commercial poultry production 
through vertical integration, and mostly in urban and peri-urban is analysed and 
explained. I will also explore the influence of research in creating a policy lock-
in as they promote non-use of commercial inputs in village chicken production 
arguing that it is ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unsustainable’. This acts like an external 
force that ensures the traditional system is safeguarded in rural areas.  
Lastly is ‘cognitive lock-in’, which exists if economic actors, because of earlier 
success, continue to adhere to the existing development path, even if it can no 
longer ensure global competitiveness and economic growth. Literature explains 
that an industry is bound to exhibit path dependence if information stickiness 
occurs. This happens particularly when information sharing and knowledge 
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development is frequent among actors through localised linkages (Hassink and 
Shin, 2005; cited in Salamonsen, 2014). In addition, the same can happen if 
actors are bounded by common beliefs, norms and values, and then suffer from a 
lack of external orientation (Ibid). Strong ties among actors and many years of 
specialization and investment towards predictable market structures also lead to 
collective rigidity and inflexibility (Grabher, 1993). Thus to change the situation 
such industries have to face externally driven alterations, like exogenous shocks 
which are events with the potential to significantly influence the destiny of the 
industry (Newey & Zahra, 2009: p.83). I discuss such shocks in Chapter seven. 
As earlier described in Chapter two (Section 2.5.1), I consider the dominance of 
the traditional poultry production system in rural Tanzania to be a ‘lock-in’ and 
which is the explanation for the observed generally low innovation in the 
industry. So, I analyse actors’ behaviours (mental frames) and presence of 
increasing returns in order to establish mechanisms for the lock-in. I then explain 
how information about the mechanisms helps to predict and promote a shift out 
of the lock-in. Essentially, the chapter describes how the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania is locked-in; identifies the mechanisms for the lock-in; and uses the 
information to establish areas targeted by RIU towards the unlocking. 
5.2.2 ‘Organisational thinness’ and ‘fragmentation’ 
The analysis in this chapter is specifically built on, and adapts the argument that 
‘smaller peripheral regions often suffer from the absence of relevant actors with 
resources and capabilities to stimulate growth patterns’ (Salamonsen, 2014). The 
question answered in this chapter is ‘why relevant actors especially from the 
poultry supply chains with such capability for growth are missing in the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania’? 
According to Isaksen (2001; cited in Salamonsen, 2014), organisational thinness 
stems from deficiencies such as lack of decision-making powers, financial 
resources, or from policy orientation. And that, creating such missing resources 
is achieved by stimulating actors to establish extra-linkages in the region. 
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I argue that organisational thinness in rural poultry industry in Tanzania stems 
from having a ‘large number of rural producers’ who are ‘self-sufficient’ in 
terms of inputs sourcing and product consumption. Being self-sufficient makes 
rural enterprises less attractive to external actors because the two do not 
complement each other. When the majority of producers in a particular area are 
not using external inputs or services like vaccines, feeds, and drugs etc., then it is 
unprofitable for other organisations to do business or provide such services in 
that area. Therefore, even when a few producers decide to switch and use 
external inputs, it becomes too costly for them to access such inputs. Hence the 
rational option becomes not to switch. Different factors reinforce input self-
sufficiency tendencies among rural producers, which in fact discourage (block) 
them from introducing resources from outside. These can be classified as 
economic, social and political factors. 
Additionally and linked to the above point, literature reports the role of high 
transaction costs in hindering interactions and therefore causing organisational 
thinness in subsistence-based industries (Pingali et al., 2005; Vakis et al., 2003; 
Zant, 2012). This implies that, in the absence of mechanisms to cushion or lower 
transaction costs, organisational thinness occurs. Poor producers who are 
disorganised, and who are not supported to lower individual transaction costs, 
specifically by taking advantage of their aggregate volumes (of demand and 
supply) are not attractive for business partnerships with other actors. This is to 
argue that organisational thinness in rural areas is also caused by lack of scale 
which causes high transaction costs. Overall, low business volumes (i.e. of 
demand for inputs and services, and of final outputs) makes other actors less 
interested in investing to trade (interact) with rural poultry producers. 
5.2.3 Fragmentation 
Fragmentation occurs where relevant actors exist but do not interact (Kaufmann 
& Wagner, 2005) due to either lack of trust (Iskasen, 2001) or they simply do not 
know each other (Ibid). Such fragmentation is related to actors’ relational 
behaviours. Therefore in this study, These issues are related to; geographical 
distances (i.e. rural vs. urban); knowledge about existence of services or goods 
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provided by other actors; and knowledge of need, use and value of such 
goods/services. There is a ‘lack of affinity’ between or among actors’ when 
producers do not utilise inputs or services provided by other enterprises (actors). 
And the need for them to interact diminishes. For example, if a producer relies 
on natural breeding (hence does not buy chicks), the need to interact with 
hatchery owners is basically non-existent. And this fragmentation persists until 
the breeding strategy changes.  
The next sections present findings to explain why innovation is low in the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania. They describe how the industry is experiencing a 
lock-in, which makes it difficult (costly) for actors to change and adapt more 
profitable production systems. It also describes the organisational thinness and 
fragmentation which currently inhibit diffusion and learning in the industry.  
5.3 Explaining the rural poultry industry’s lock-in 
The section uses primary data from field interviews and secondary data from 
RIU and government reports to explain path dependency in the rural poultry 
industry in Tanzania. It explains why the observed persistence of the traditional 
poultry production system is a lock-in, and the mechanisms behind it. This 
analysis is a necessary step towards understanding how the RIU unlocking 
process proceeded towards a new development path. 
In the analysis I consider innovation processes both ‘at farm’ and at ‘upstream’ 
levels in the industry (Possas, Salles-Filho, & Da Silveira, 1996). This includes 
analysing producers’ behaviours, routines, beliefs, etc. as well as those of other 
actors in the industry including input suppliers, extension service providers, 
regulators and marketers. As I explained in the previous section, my analysis 
focuses on factors related to ‘technological paradigms’ (i.e. existing cognitive 
framework or shared mental frames shaping the observed technological 
performance of the industry) and to the presence of ‘increasing returns to 
adoption’ (i.e. feedback mechanisms that make adopting the extensive 
traditional poultry production system more attractive). 
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However, the reasons for the lock-in are interrelated, and it is impractical to 
separate explanations related to shared mental frames from those related to 
increasing returns (and even in-between the different types of increasing 
returns). Therefore, I will present my findings based on different types of lock-in 
described in section 5.2 above. 
5.3.1 Cognitive lock-in: Analysing production behaviours 
Keeping chicken in rural Tanzania is guided by deep rooted social norms and 
tendencies established for generations. How rural producers relate with their 
poultry enterprises, the purpose of keeping the chickens, their expectations and 
their management routines, are all socially determined and reinforced. This 
situation disfavours commercially oriented production. In addition, these 
tendencies are hard to change especially at an individual level. 
Keeping local breeds is a social choice  
During interviews producers proved to be conversant with raising local chickens 
extensively but not keeping other breeds or using other systems. For example 
one producer said: 
[“I also heard that these local chickens cannot be kept for business 
but there are other types which grow faster and lay more eggs. But 
they are ‘foreign (European)’ and are very delicate that you have to 
care for them like babies. [Interview with Producer, June, 2013]”. 
And another lady said: 
 “I don’t keep ‘foreign (European)’ chickens because I know nothing 
about them (Laughs). I don’t even know if I can raise them properly. 
I don’t have the money needed. I hear they are very delicate.  Those 
are for town people.” [Interview with Producer, June, 2013].” 
Those two quotes reveal assumptions about exotic breeds and commercial 
production systems. My observation is that the context does not provide rural 
producers with realistic choices for accessing and affording other breeds besides 
what they have now. This is partly due to societal perceptions (including those of 
politicians, researchers and development actors which I will elaborate later) 
around cost, and levels of organisational and technical requirements associated 
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with optional breeds. Consequently, a strong tie has been created between living 
in rural areas and keeping local breeds of chicken with the argument that keeping 
local breeds requires very low investment hence appropriate for the poor.  
Uncertainty and ignorance about qualities and properties of improved breeds and 
commercial production systems make it more convenient for rural producers to 
keep local breeds under extensive system than otherwise. This supports Perkins’ 
argument that uncertainty and ignorance about qualities and properties of various 
options locks a society into an inferior design, and a technology that would have 
been superior if given equivalent learning gets locked out (Perkins, 2003; p.2). 
The question is therefore, why are rural producers not equally exposed to other 
options for them to choose from? 
Producers mentioned during interviews that they started keeping chickens as a 
tradition. They felt compelled to keep chickens as part of what responsible 
families do. So they could feed their families, feed visitors and use the little 
income from it to fulfil other social obligations. To them, the decision to keep 
chickens was more socially than economically driven. See Table 5-0 below.  
Table 5-0: Selected quotes from interviews regarding the purpose of keeping chicken 
The purpose for keeping chicken is social: 
Mainly for feeding visitors 
“They were mainly for feeding visitors. Visitors would eat the whole chicken, or take home to 
eat. Sometimes we would give it live for the visitor to take it home. When my father was 
happy he would slaughter one and we would eat, mostly during Christmas or Easter, or during 
other celebrations. We ate eggs as they were laid. We never sold eggs.” (Female producer). 
For food and emergence cash 
“Keeping chickens for sale is not my main goal. The main purpose is to have them for food 
and for quick cash to solve emergencies like illnesses, school fees, travels in case we are 
bereaved, or give gifts, etc. So I keep them not as a main source of cash. (Male producer). 
As a source of quick cash 
“For me keeping chickens is mainly for quick cash, like when my wife was sick I sold 3 
cocks. It is also for feeding special visitors like in-laws. People you really want to impress. 
Also when a sick child needs a special diet-like soup, give a gift, or during celebrations like 
baptism, or pay government fines, etc.” (Male producer). 
 
“…when you need quick cash it is easier to sell a chicken than a goat.” (Male producer). 
For home consumption 
I keep chickens only for food. Having chickens helps when I have nothing else to cook, and 
for visitors.” (Female producer). 
 
Source: Study data, 2013 
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Additionally, a lady producer in Songea said during the interview: 
 [“I found chickens at home when I was born. They were there 
and we grew up keeping them. And when I got married I just 
continued” (Interview with Producer, August 2013)]. 
Therefore, to this lady, the decision to keep chickens was more for social 
conformity than for economic gains. She made the decision believing she had the 
ability to raise the chickens in the same way her parents did. So she felt 
confident and competent enough to manage and meet the expectations she set for 
the activity in manners that she knew from her growing up. Arguably, her 
expectations happened to be properly linked to the level of skills and resources 
disposable to her. So, it is possible to argue that keeping chickens in rural areas 
is perceived to be technologically simple, affordable and manageable because it 
is socially designed and therefore expected of most members in the society. 
Meaning that, what is socially expected from most members of the society (like 
feeding visitors with chicken), is more likely to be technologically simple so it 
could be afforded by many if not all. This makes adopting the traditional way of 
keeping chickens easier and more natural to most rural dwellers than adopting an 
alternative production system. 
All interviewed producers reported that they started with not more than two 
chickens which they got from relatives, friends or neighbours. They received 
these first chickens as gifts or loans to be paid later after hatching. So they all 
started with what was available within their close social networks. These 
producers could not buy the first chicken(s) from the market for several reasons. 
But the most important one was unavailability of good hens. One interviewee 
said: 
[“I could not buy chickens to start keeping them because it is very 
expensive to buy a good hen. Those you find in the market are old 
and which don’t lay enough eggs anymore. People don’t sell good 
hens. We also don’t sell chicks. We mostly sell or slaughter cocks 
and old hens. Very few people give out hens, even as gifts” 
(Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
This means the best available source of the first chickens is from close relatives 
and friends. And from this source the number of birds to be obtained is not 
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determined by the recipient. The source of foundation stock is therefore social 
and it supports producers to keep few birds and to rely on natural breeding. 
The above situation makes the choice of breed (which could also be considered a 
technology) more community-determined than individually. Which means 
making individual choices is much harder in rural areas and any proposals to 
change routines and processes have to involve more than an individual. This 
implies that, changing a technological path involves changing the society and not 
individuals. 
Each rural family is expected to produce most of its own food to feed the family 
throughout the year, hence the general tendency to have staple crops grown by 
every family in villages. In addition, rural families are expected to feed their 
guests well with special diets and slaughtering is considered an honour. Giving 
gifts to in-laws, visitors, new born babies, and during ceremonies, etc. is also 
paramount. Therefore, households are forced to keep chickens to meet such 
obligations, and it is naturally easier for them to adopt the extensive production 
system which is relatively affordable. 
Unlike producing crops like maize, rice, etc., poultry production has no seasons, 
hence producers are not expected to have planted by a certain time, e.g. before 
the first rains, or cultivate before the rains start etc. Consequently, there is no 
motivation to seek information on when to control breeding etc. In this case 
chickens are left to their own cycles. As one producer said: 
[“We always know the chicken will grow up one day. We 
just watch the size. We don’t even know how old they are. 
We are just watchful of their size and weight” (Interview 
with Producer, August 2013)]. 
So there is no seasonality or time pressure to look for an early maturing breed, 
etc. This means, practices embedded in the traditional system are also 
responsible for promoting low innovation tendencies. 
Some producers mentioned to be keen on the physical size especially of cocks. 
They select big cocks and keep them for breeding purposes. Others are keen on 
colour because some traditional healers specifically ask for certain colours. 
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Traditional healers sometimes prescribe the type of chicken they want. These 
could be in terms of sex (i.e. either a cock or a hen), age (e.g. a hen which laid 
only once), or in terms of colour preferably white, red and black. The colour 
preference is argued to have made producers focus on cocks believing that a 
black cock will always give a black chick etc. The preference for colour 
reinforces the interest to keep local breeds where colour variation is possible. 
Keeping chicken is communal rather than individual 
While individual producers own the chickens, and take the responsibility to 
shelter and make decisions to dispose them, it is evident that the main goal for 
keeping them is more communally determined than individually. See Table 5-1 
below. 
As mentioned earlier, households are socially expected to feed certain visitors 
with chickens and give gifts as a gesture of solidarity and respect. The shame of 
not being able to meet those social obligations like slaughtering at least a 
chicken for visitors especially in-laws is considered too gross to bear. So every 
family tries to meet them. Like one lady said during the interview: 
[“You will be labelled selfish, disrespectful and unkind. 
People would talk negatively about you” (Interview with 
producer, June 2013)]. 
Apparently, no interviewee mentioned eating chicken regularly in their families. 
Producer families would eat chicken when they have absolutely nothing else to 
cook, when a chicken looks sick, during religious holidays like Christmas, 
Easter, Eid etc., or when the head of the family occasionally decides to do so. 
This is also confirmed by the small number of chickens usually kept, and the 
finding that rural families would rarely buy a chicken just for the family to eat. 
Therefore buying chickens is mainly for feeding visitors and for special 
occasions. 
Some producers consider chickens as assets that one can easily liquidate to 
respond to emergencies. This is because it is easier to sell a chicken than a goat 
or cattle in rural areas. However, some interviewees said they find it better to sell 
grains like maize than chicken because chickens take longer to mature than 
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maize. Therefore, the role of chickens as a source of quick cash is variable and it 
is not necessarily the main purpose of keeping chickens in rural Tanzania. As 
one interviewee said: 
[“I only sell my chickens when I have a pressing problem and I 
have nothing else to sell. You know, I always have very few, and 
it will take a year to get another mature chicken. So you don’t 
just sell them. At least with maize, selling a bit still leaves you 
with a lot to eat and sell” (Interview with producer, July 2013)]. 
Table 5-1: Rural poultry keeping is a tradition not business: Selected quotes from interviews 
Keeping chicken is part of life 
 
“I have been keeping chickens all my life, since when I was a child. Here you grow up 
seeing chickens every day and in every home. You go to your grandmother you find some, 
you go to your uncles, you find them, and even when you go to your neighbours or to village 
leaders’ houses. Etc. Chickens were in every home when I was growing up, and are still are.  
I don’t think there was family not keeping chickens. If anyone from here tells you he started 
keeping chickens only as a grown up, he would be lying.” (Male producer) 
 
“I always have one or 2 chickens in my house. They are just there. It’s one of those things 
that you can’t miss in most houses here, like a knife or lamp. Even my parents kept chickens. 
Everybody keeps chickens here. If you don’t find one, then probably they all died or sold but 
soon they will be replaced.” (Male producer). 
 
“My parents kept chickens as a tradition. Keeping one or two chickens was a tradition just 
like growing pumpkins and other vegetables for family food. During colonial times chickens 
were used to pay taxes, or give gifts. They were also used in traditional healing.” (Male 
producer). 
 
“I found chickens at home when I was born. They were there and we grew up keeping them, 
and when I got married I just continued.” (Female producer). 
 
Source: Study data, 2013 
Interviewed producers in Songea district said that selling chickens is a recent 
phenomenon in their areas because traditionally they were only distributed as 
gifts. Therefore, they see chickens as a commodity less integrated in their cash 
economy. After all, sales are irregular because households do not know when 
(which season) chickens will be sold, and buyers are sporadic and not 
necessarily known. One producer said: 
[“When you want to buy a chicken you have to ask around for someone to 
sell one to you. You even have to persuade if you know there is a mature 
chicken in the house. Alternatively, you have to go to the market and find 
out if anybody has brought one for sale. Likewise, when you want to sell a 
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chicken you have to go around looking for buyers. You carry a cock to the 
market not knowing if it will be bought. So selling chickens is not regular 
because there are no seasons and nobody plans ahead. Traders from all over 
the country know when maize is harvested and they come to buy during that 
time. But with chickens they just come once in a while, trying one house to 
the other. So you see, buyers are not sure and farmers are not sure. 
Sometimes we just decide in the morning to sell a particular chicken, or 
after a buyer comes looking for one to buy. It is not like maize or beans 
where we all know the seasons” (Interview with Producer, August 2013)]. 
This narration explains that selling chickens in the study areas is irregular and 
decisions to sell are made either when there is a persuading buyer or a seller 
moving around. In most cases, both the persuading buyer and the persuading 
seller are motivated by pressing social needs. In some cases chickens are given 
out as in-kind payments. For example, in Mtwango, Gumbiro and Madaba wards 
in Songea District, chickens are still exchanged with goods and services. In these 
areas, traders would carry merchandise like plastic kitchenware and sell door to 
door in exchange for crops like maize or chickens. Some producers mentioned 
offering chickens to traditional healers to get a remedy. Therefore, the market for 
mature chickens in the study area is more socially developed, and specifically 
designed to absorb low and irregular volumes.  
[“I only sell to passers-by. There are people who move around 
asking for chickens to buy. I also go to food vendors who would 
always buy chickens to cook. Getting someone to buy your 
chicken is not difficult at all. Especially if they know you have a 
problem to solve, like illness. A friend may refuse to lend you 
money but he would buy your chicken if you have one 
(Laugh!).You are better off with a chicken than without.” 
(Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
The market structure is thus closed with interactions limited to those who can 
move around in the areas persuading buyers and producers. These interactions 
are also motivated by ‘pressing needs’ and not by structured economic 
expectations. Pricing mechanisms are also socially determined, hence less 
motivating to profit oriented production where costs of production have to be 
fully recovered with a margin. One producer said;  
“Selling price is known by everybody. We all know when a 
chicken is due for sell and weight variations are small. Even if 
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you have a very big cock, which everybody can see it is big- its 
price is also known… But if it is small and you still want to sell 
it because you have problems, and the person buying it knows 
s/he has to keep it for a while before s/he can sell or slaughter 
it, then you two start bargaining. But even at that, the price 
range is known. Traders from town have set this price range 
and we are using it” (Interview with Producer, August 2013)]. 
This means efforts to increase marketed volumes at producer level also require 
changing existing market structures. This is because existing market structure 
reinforces sporadic production where the cost of keeping chicken does not 
increase with time. Meaning, delaying selling does not add cost to the producer 
(e.g. as cost of feeding or labour). 
Therefore, from the fact that every family is expected by the society to keep 
chickens, the society has put in place affordable mechanisms for accessing the 
first chicken and for transferring husbandry skills. Consequently, selling 
chickens is not a priority, and thus not commercially driven. By being socially 
driven, keeping chickens is simplified and generalised to ensure everybody 
affords to keep chickens. As a result even some resources are communally 
shared. For example, feeding by scavenging allows chickens to feed anywhere in 
the neighbourhood, and natural breeding allows sharing of cocks. As one 
interviewee said: 
[“You don’t have to own a cock. When hens move around they 
meet cocks. You may not even know the owner. But you are 
sure the hen will meet a cock somewhere (Laugh)” (Interview 
with Producer, July 2013)].  
In addition to communal feeding and breeding, the community also ensures 
perpetuation of the activity through generations. This is achieved by ensuring 
that brides and grooms get at least a hen to start their own flock when married. 
This sense of communal responsibility also ensures that basic husbandry skills 
are transferred across generations. 
The traditional poultry system fits well with existing social frameworks that 
shape expectations and choices around chicken keeping in Tanzanian rural 
societies. Such frameworks demand affordability, simplicity and easy 
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transferability of knowledge (skills), possibly explaining why investment has 
remained low in this system. The implication is that introducing economic goals 
into the system, even at an individual level confronts the described social 
system. Specifically, it changes the expectations and purpose for keeping 
chicken, as well as shifting some management roles like feeding and breeding to 
individual producers. Such shifts require reorganisation of the society as a 
whole, as well as increasing individual capacity to take over new responsibilities 
that come with the change. In principal, it is currently difficult for an individual 
to shift into a different production system. 
The decision making process vs. self-sufficiency 
During interviews it was evident that producers are continuously making 
decisions like in any other livelihood activity. However, the study found that, 
since keeping chickens is more social (a tradition) and therefore considered 
obligatory, the capacity to manage the activity is assumed to be present in every 
household. As said before, chickens are kept first for social purposes and second 
for business when necessary. Thus it is not produced for the market as doing so 
means changing breeding and feeding strategies. Particularly, findings show that 
rural producers do not think of the market when starting the activity. They also 
do not consider the activity when making decisions regarding household 
resource allocation. Therefore, poultry is not a priority during household 
resource allocation, especially when allocating land, labour and capital. 
All interviewees mentioned that the first decision made regarding poultry, was to 
keep chickens. To some this decision was made by parents and relatives who 
gave them hens as a wedding gift, and all they had to do was to keep them. 
Reasons for keeping chickens are obvious, therefore for those who did not 
receive hens as wedding gifts the next decision to make was on where to get the 
first chicken(s). This includes knowing how to get it and how many to start with.  
All interviewees knew they would raise the chickens traditionally just as their 
parents did. Therefore, in this case the context of keeping chickens including the 
purpose, the source of the first chickens and the method of keeping them are all 
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socially determined, and thus accessible by and affordable to all. This implies 
that basic thoughts and ideas around poultry keeping are commonly shared. 
Learning from individual narratives, rural producers perceive themselves as 
making the decision to keep chickens for social purposes. However, they also 
admit to feeling obliged to do so. Apparently, the socially-oriented way of 
making decisions makes rural producers relate with chickens in ways that only 
fit with the social nature of their expectations. For example, most producers do 
not have to allocate specific resources for the activity. They would let it share the 
family house at night e.g. in a store or kitchen, then let it fend for itself during 
the day. In this case, chickens are expected to gain weight, produce eggs and 
hatch chicks at their own pace. This means producers do not fix targets regarding 
time to maturity, weight gain or number of eggs and number of chicks to be 
produced. Therefore, in this relationship producers assume no powers to control 
or influence how the chicken feeds and produces. 
Individual producers decide when to sell, slaughter or give away as gifts for 
many social reasons. In addition, the environment may interfere with the life of 
the chicken by not providing enough feed where the chicken is scavenging or by 
interfering with chickens’ health through diseases, predation or accidents. 
Therefore, the relationship between man and chicken is influenced by what is 
social (society, economic and political etc.) and that which is ecological 
(environment). Apparently, these are the two main areas where men can innovate 
to increase efficiency in order to meet human expectations.  
For example, a producer may decide to build a shed to protect it from predators, 
or vaccinate it against diseases like Newcastle. He may also decide to 
supplement its feeding if scavenging seems insufficient. Thus the environment 
may trigger producers to innovate to counter negative effects. In addition, 
producers may also decide not to give out chickens as gifts, or not to feed them 
to visitors, so as to have more for sale. In this case the decision is meant to 
counter the effects of ‘the social’ on the flock size. The producer may also 
decide not to eat chickens or sell eggs and allow them to hatch instead. He may 
as well decide to keep (or not to keep) a rooster, and choose the type/breed, etc. 
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What is common in all these decisions is the human interest to regulate stocks 
i.e., to manage outflows and inflows which form a very important part of human 
expectations. According to Donella Meadows, analysing how humans regulate 
stocks is very important in systems analysis (Meadows, 2008). From the 
analysis, study data makes it clear that, innovation in traditional poultry system 
is low because producers are not keen to ‘regulate stock flows’ through choosing 
the size of the starting flock, managing feeding, breeding,  sales and through 
reducing mortalities and other losses. 
Basically, it is the producer’s decision to regulate stocks that determines how he 
interacts in the system. It defines how he should interact, and with whom. The 
decision to interact creates needs for knowledge, skills, market, and technology 
like vaccines, feeds, drugs, etc. In addition, the decision to interact, which comes 
after a need has been perceived, is made after the producer has acknowledged a 
gap, or a sense of being ‘self-insufficient’ in meeting a particular need. For 
example, one interviewee explained that if he happens to know a plant which can 
cure certain poultry diseases, he would not seek a veterinarian or a drug seller. 
Rather he would use the plant to solve the problem. But if he does not think he 
knows the solution he would search for it elsewhere. To most rural poultry 
producers the process of seeking solutions involves an inward search before 
searching outward (see Figure 5-0 below). So they mostly rely on knowledge 
already gained and entrenched within families. 
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Figure 5-1: Outward vs. inward solution seeking process 
 
The above process shows the search for solutions stays inward unless ‘self-
insufficiency’ (or lack of capacity) is perceived by the producer. During 
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are offered freely as gifts or as part of a programme. Because in this case they 
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or if they do but choose not to look for solutions (either inward or outward), then 
learning hardly takes place. 
Therefore, it is the desire to regulate stock (i.e. want to increase the number of 
chicks, number of cocks, number of hens, buy, sell, give as gifts, reduce deaths, 
accidents etc.) that triggers and justifies learning. Hence, since rural producers 
are currently not regulating stocks, they don’t perceive problems that trigger 
outward search for solutions. Hence innovation is generally low. In fact, what is 
of interest here is how this tendency is shared by most rural producers. 
Another finding linked to the above, is the observation that producers and other 
actors perceive local breeds of chicken as breeds that survive and produce in 
harsh conditions hence they don’t need inputs and other cash investment. They 
also believe that the nature of these breeds makes keeping them very simple and 
no significant knowledge or skills are needed. Consequently, the thinking has 
created habits that simplify poultry production and therefore make it attractive to 
most households as it frees resources to be used in other activities. Moreover, the 
belief influences behaviours of all other actors in the industry towards producers 
who keep these breeds. For example, from the understanding that the breed can 
withstand harsh conditions and has high resistance to diseases, etc., development 
actors concluded that it can survive and produce even with very minimal 
external support, making it ‘suitable’ and ‘appropriate’ for the resource poor and 
the marginalised. One producer said: 
[“Everybody is keeping chickens like this, except for those 
keeping European chickens in town. I hear they build houses and 
feed them all the time-the chickens don’t walk, they just wait for 
food. I also heard they grow very fast, lay many eggs, eat a lot, 
fall sick easily… so you need a lot of money to feed and treat 
them. I hear they give a lot of money but you need large capital to 
keep them… (Laughs)…those are kept by rich people....not us 
poor people in villages” (Interview with Producer, August 2013)]. 
This means rural producers are aware of different management routines, but not 
meant for the local breeds. They also understand that keeping exotic breeds need 
capital investment but not when keeping the local ones. The above quote also 
reveals producers’ understanding that local breeds are for the poor people, and 
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that all poor people keep chicken in the same way. In addition, another producer 
mentioned that local breeds are not for business. He said: 
 [“I also heard that these local chickens cannot be kept for business 
but there are other types which grow faster and lay more eggs, but 
they are ‘European’ and are very delicate that you have to keep 
them like babies.” (Interview with Producer, July 2013)]. 
This describes a perception that keeping chickens for business means adopting 
other breeds which are difficult to manage and are too demanding in terms of 
resources. Consequently, and as confirmed by the interview statement below, the 
perception discourages the shift to commercial production. It is also perceived to 
be suitable only to rich-urban producers. The producer said: 
[“I don’t keep ‘European’ chickens because I know nothing 
about them (Laughs). I don’t even know if I can raise them 
properly. I don’t have the money needed. I hear they are 
very delicate.  Those are for town people.” (Interview with 
producer, June 2013)] 
However, it does not mean these producers are not used to producing improved 
varieties. Findings show that same producers have adopted improved varieties 
and techniques to produce other crops like maize, sunflower, rice, and even 
keeping improved dairy cows. As one producer mentioned, she interacts more 
with the extension worker regarding crop production but not on poultry because 
she grows improved varieties. She said: 
[“I only call the extension worker to help me on crops, 
especially maize because of the improved seeds that I 
use” (Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
Explanations to why rural producers are not keeping other breeds of chickens are 
beyond individual willingness or abilities to adopt improved technologies. The 
explanations can also not be generalised to include all agricultural activities 
managed in those villages because same producers have adopted improved crop 
varieties. It is the existing perceptions (mental frameworks) related to the nature 
of the breed, the social role of chicken, low priority in resource allocation and 
the thinking that rural people should keep local breeds for social gains and not 
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for business. These perceptions reinforce the traditional system and thus making 
commercialisation difficult. 
5.3.2 Structural lock-in: Analysing resource allocation 
Clearly, poultry keeping is not a priority activity in rural Tanzania. It is treated 
as a women’s activity and therefore less economically important. During 
interviews, producers identified themselves as ‘wakulima’ meaning farmers in 
English. Literature uses the term ‘farmer’ to mean both crop producers and 
livestock keepers. However, study interviewees specifically identified 
themselves as ‘crop farmers’ and not livestock keepers or producers. This means 
their main occupation is to produce crops and not livestock. Then all other 
activities are considered secondary and only meant to supplement and fill in food 
and income gaps. As one producer said: 
[“I am a farmer. I have three acres of maize and one for rice. 
Those are the main crops I grow. I also keep goats as a side 
activity, and now I have five that I breed and sell when I need 
money to buy seeds and fertilizers, or even pay labourers 
especially during planting and weeding. I also use the money 
to hire tractors to plough. I just keep few chickens for my 
visitors” (Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
This kind of specialization has implications on how household resources like 
land, cash and labour are allocated. This can be read from this statement;  
[“I have two acres of maize, half of rice and another half of 
sunflower. I also keep a cow, three goats, three dogs and 
eleven chickens. But I only have one hen with ten chicks 
(Laughs!). I invest mostly in maize, rice, sunflower and to 
produce milk” (Interviews with Producer, July 2013)].   
All interviewees did not identify themselves as poultry producers but rather as 
crop producers. Some even went further and identified themselves as maize 
farmers, or sunflower producers etc. Findings also show a consistent bias on how 
resources are allocated, especially land and cash, in favour of the priority 
commodity. So, since keeping chickens is more socially driven, and not a 
priority activity, households tend to allocate less resources (See Table 5-2 
below). This means attempts to push for more resources to be allocated for 
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poultry innovation must either introduce a new source of such resources or 
facilitate reorganization of existing household priorities to allow a reallocation of 
resources, which is in principle a very complex process. Basically, in order to 
adopt a more resource-intensive poultry production system, the household 
farming system needs to reorganise to give priority to poultry production. 
Table 5-2: Household resource allocation in poultry: Selected interview quotes 
We don’t allocate cash resources: 
No cost on feeding 
“We don’t feed local chickens. They feed themselves. When I was a kid chickens used to 
sleep in the kitchen just to protect them, and in the morning we would open the door for 
them to come out, and they would wonder around (‘zurura’) fending for themselves. But 
once in a while when washing dishes we would normally throw leftovers to them. You know 
in villages we wash dishes in the morning because we don’t have lights at night. So when 
you wake up the first thing you do in the morning is to soak all dirty dishes and we let 
chickens pick on them… for anything. Sometimes my mother would ask us kids to pour 
water on a broken pot for the chickens.” (Female producer) 
 
No housing 
“I have not built a chicken coop. At night they stay in my store….where I keep hoes and 
stuff.” (Female producer). 
 
Some resources are communally shared 
“When I started my parents gave me two hens. I used other people’s cocks… (Laugh!).., you 
know when they move around looking for food they meet cocks. In villages we share cocks. 
(Female producer). 
 
The decision not to invest influences the decision on scale 
(i.e. how many chickens to keep). “I don’t expect to keep more than 10 because my kitchen 
is very small. (Female producer). 
 
Inability to buy foundation stock 
“I could not buy the first flock because we all start with hens (and not cocks), and it is not 
easy to get good hens in the market. Nobody sells a good hen unless he/she is in serious debt 
or need for cash. We don’t start with chicks because they die easily and it is not easy to raise 
them without their mother. And you can’t start with cocks because you won’t get chicks. 
Even your very good friend will not give you a hen just like that, but they can lend one to 
you and you keep it until it hatches and you pay him back with some chicks as a token. If the 
hen dies, they understand, but that will make people afraid of lending their hens to you. So 
when you borrow one, you really look after it.” (Male producer). 
 
Source: Study data, 2013 
Production scale vs. choice of production system 
Study findings reveal generally low production scales of between 1 and 10 
chickens. Such scales directly affect the rate of innovation in the industry 
because by keeping few birds, producers don’t find it justified to invest in sheds, 
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inputs, or in disease control strategies like vaccinations. Hence there is no 
demand for such inputs to trigger supply. On the other hand, producers also do 
not see the need in investing more resources while they cannot determine the 
scale (because they rely on natural breeding). Therefore, this implies a positive 
correlation between scale of production and rate of innovation. The implication 
here is therefore that, any decision to increase innovation in poultry production 
requires an expansion in scale, and which also means stop relying on natural 
breeding. Apparently, it is also very costly and difficult for an individual 
producer to stimulate and access a reliable source of chicks and stop relying on 
natural breeding. 
The study establishes different factors both internal and external to producers 
behind the dominating low poultry production scale in the study area. One of 
those factors is lack of exposure to someone keeping larger flocks in the villages 
for producers to ‘see and learn’ from. For example, one producer said:  
[“I would say it’s because we don’t know how to keep a 
large flock, we don’t know how to protect them from 
diseases. We have never done it before and we have not 
seen anybody doing it in our villages. If I did, I would 
have copied.” (Interview with Producer, August 2013).] 
This means, like in most cases, rural producers are used to ‘act after seeing’. 
Therefore, the consistent absence of commercialised household poultry 
enterprises around them blocked the opportunity for ‘potential switchers’ to 
observe and opt or experiment to change. I therefore argue that existing 
deliberate initiatives by researchers, government and NGOs which avoid 
exposing rural producers to commercial input systems are reinforcing the 
traditional poultry production system which promotes subsistence production. 
Apparently, such initiatives are built on beliefs that rural producers are better off 
small or subsisting (for whatever reasons). As a matter of fact, such initiatives 
deny rural producers the opportunity to see and learn about new scales of 
production, to later allow them make own choices. This means such public 
actors are actually locking rural areas to extensive subsistence production. 
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Other factors observed to sustain the keeping of small flocks in rural areas 
include; absence of reliable sources of good hens in the market as foundation 
stock; lack of chick-rearing skills; high disease risks and lack of disease 
management and control knowledge; and the perceptions that local breeds are 
not meant to be raised differently (i.e. commercially) just like a lady producer 
said:  
[“…. I am also not sure about buying chicks because how do 
you keep them? Unless you also buy a few hens to help chicks 
feed. On the other hand, if they die of ND it becomes a bigger 
loss especially after spending so much money to buy them. 
Honestly, keeping many chickens is just not easy here.….I also 
heard that these local chickens cannot be kept for business but 
there are other types which grow faster and lay more eggs. But 
they are ‘European’ (meant foreign) and are very delicate that 
you have to keep them like babies.” (Interview with Producer, 
July 2013)]. 
Therefore, even where there is a desire to keep more chickens, the insecurity 
about performance of the available breed, coupled with producers’ perceived 
inability to rare chicks or keep larger flocks, discourage them from increasing 
the scale. One lady producer mentioned during the interview that:  
[“I really want to keep more chickens, but I need to know 
how best to keep them. How to deal with Newcastle 
(Kideri) because I don’t want to invest while knowing they 
will all die during the Newcastle season. I also want to 
know how to make chicks survive because many do not 
survive. They die one by one every day as they move 
around with their mothers. Some are eaten by mongoose, 
dogs and snakes” (Interview with Producer, June 2013).]  
Findings also show that ‘diversification tendencies’ among subsistence 
producers force them to manage many enterprises with limited resources. As a 
result some commodities like poultry get less attention and often the little 
resources available within households get spread very thinly to levels 
insufficient to afford significant innovation in particular enterprises. For 
example, producers mentioned handling up to twelve commodities all at 
subsistence scales. And focus group discussions further revealed that most 
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households do not have enough labour and capital to manage all activities 
efficiently. Therefore, activities are prioritised based on; amount of land owned; 
whether it is a traditional crop or not (apparently all producers tend to produce 
what is traditionally common in the area, e.g. maize, rice, fish, etc.); weather 
(seasons); family needs (e.g. the family must produce their staple food); political 
prescriptions (e.g. newly introduced or cash crop, etc.); and sometimes 
availability of market (e.g. presence of a private or public buyer, etc.). 
Furthermore, the study observed most producers in particular villages making 
similar choices of what to produce. As a result the majority end up producing 
similar commodities in the same way. This situation makes individual switching 
very difficult (costly) as the structure of rural supply chains is often biased 
against what the minority are producing. For example, since poultry keeping is 
traditionally not a priority activity in the study villages, existing input shops do 
not stock vaccines or poultry feeds. Thus any individual who wants to buy them 
has to travel to the district headquarters about 70 to 150kms away. Extensive 
diversification is also reduces the possibility of releasing resources from other 
priorities should one decide to produce poultry commercially. This is because 
poultry is currently not a priority activity and only a few chickens are raised 
under extensive systems regardless of the resources one has. Therefore, the more 
producers diversify to other commodities, the less important poultry becomes, 
and thus less probable switching to larger scales or commercial production 
becomes. 
As they seek to diversify rural households tend to produce small amounts of 
many things. This pushes production scales and marketable margins further 
down, hence keeping producers into perpetual low incomes. Therefore, while 
diversification is intended to increase food security, or cushion poor producers 
from shocks, in rural areas where incomes are already too low, it also sustains 
poverty especially by discouraging growth. In addition, since most rural 
households keep chickens under the scavenging system, there is fear that 
keeping more chickens is not possible because there is insufficient scavenging 
base to support a larger flock. As one producer argued: 
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[“I also don’t think it is possible to keep many of these 
local chickens. What will they eat? If everybody keeps 
40, and we all let them out what will they eat?” 
(Interview with Producer, June 2013).] 
Therefore, the predominance of the traditional system is actually limiting 
expansion of scale in the study areas because of; (i) reliance on natural breeding-
hence producers cannot decide on the foundation stock and it also takes long to 
re-establish the lost flock; (ii) low utilization and therefore low demand/transfer 
of knowledge regarding disease management, chick raring and feeding-hence 
producers have uncertainties regarding management of larger flocks; (iii) 
producers’ previous negative experiences of losses due to ND which makes 
producers perceive high risks in keeping many birds; and  existing mistrusts on 
quality of vaccines and of other drugs offered under government campaigns, as 
one interviewee mentioned in the quote below: 
[“After I heard about vaccines I wanted to try and keep 
chickens again this year, but I am still not sure if the next 
batch will survive. I really need to be sure before I start 
investing again. However, I know I will still keep a few for 
home consumption and if possible keep more for sale” 
(Interview with Producer, July 2013).] 
Additionally, producers mentioned clearly that selling chickens and eggs is not a 
problem because there are aware that many buyers do not get enough to buy. 
Apparently, this understanding of existing high demand seems not to trigger any 
change in scale, neither positive nor negative. And it contradicts the popular 
assumption that market demand triggers increase in production. See the 
interview quote below: 
 [“The reason for keeping few chickens is definitely not lack 
of market (Laugh!), because we are so used to complaining 
about the market. People like chicken meat and can eat it 
every day. All celebrations have chicken in the menu. 
Traders are here every day looking for chicken. Believe me 
we all know that there is a huge market, but we just can’t 
keep more chicken” (Interview with Producer, June 2013).] 
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What data explains in this section is that the extensive poultry production system 
promotes low production scales in rural areas because of its nature especially its 
reliance on natural breeding. However, the predominance of low poultry 
production scales, which is caused by the society’s general under prioritization 
of poultry keeping as a livelihood, is also promoting the extensive production 
system because of its low demand for production resources. Therefore, low 
production scale and traditional production system are reinforcing each other. 
Thus any change in scale to start producing for the market requires a change in 
the production system, and vice versa. 
5.3.3 Political-lock in: Analysing dominant powers 
The poultry industry’s innovation space is dominated by public actors who try to 
incrementally improve on indigenous social knowledge and organisation. Those 
are public extension staff, NGOs and donor-funded development projects, and 
are the industry’s main sources of new knowledge and innovations. Apparently, 
these actors tend to deliberately avoid promoting radical shifts including linking 
producers with commercial actors i.e. they discourage the use of commercial 
inputs. Therefore, since they are the main players with resources, their bias 
towards promoting the extensive production system makes the shift to 
commercial production difficult. 
According to a study commissioned by RIU in 2010, NGOs were found to 
develop the industry as a safety net for the vulnerable, i.e., to act as a cheap 
source of animal protein and an affordable income generating activity for women 
and other vulnerable groups. Consequently, they promoted use of simple 
breeding technologies like use of kerosene incubators, application of 
synchronised breeding strategies etc., which happened neither to fit well with 
existing social patterns within the traditional poultry system where breeding has 
to be natural and therefore a shared responsibility, nor with the commercial 
systems where use of commercial inputs including buying chicks from a 
specialised hatchery is essential  (Match Makers Associates, 2010). 
The focus of the Government of Tanzania has been to promote research and 
activities to improve the genetic make -up of the local flock through cross 
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breeding even without facilitating efficient production of chicks. They also 
carried out vaccination campaigns against the Newcastle Disease (ND), and 
supported extension workers to train producers on improve husbandry practices 
specifically to control spreading of the avian flue disease, e.g. by setting by-laws 
to reduce animal loitering including promoting feed supplementation knowledge, 
etc. All these initiatives were incremental in nature and since they do not 
challenge existing dominant mental frameworks, they reinforced the traditional 
production system. 
5.4 Explaining organisational thinness and fragmentation 
in the industry  
This section analyses the institutional infrastructure responsible for stimulating 
innovation among poultry producers in the study area. The study looks at the 
presence, type and capability (including resource, technical and technological 
capabilities) of NGOs, private firms, research institutions and other public 
organs which interact with rural producers to share knowledge, provide skills, 
services and promote technologies. I then analyse levels of interactions between 
rural producers and these institutions. However, the study does not analyse the 
linkages across these institutions. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the study defines organisational thinness as ‘scarcity 
of relevant actors’ (key organisations, firms and institutions) which possess 
resources to facilitate innovation activities (Todtling and Trippl, 2005; cited in 
Salamonsen, 2014; p.4) and fragmentation as situation where ‘relevant firms 
exists but not interact’ (Kaufmann and Wegner, 2005; cited in Salamonsen, 
2014; p.5). I have thus looked specifically at the level of interactions between 
organisations and rural producers and explained the predicted organisational 
thinness and fragmentation, and how the situation promotes low innovation by 
locking-in rural producers into the traditional poultry production system. 
It is clear that organisational thinness and fragmentation are very high in the 
study areas because rural poultry enterprises are subsistence in nature and thus 
have low affinity for what is offered by other actors in the industry. Therefore, 
the producers’ tendency to use as little resources as possible isolates them from 
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other firms that innovate to produce inputs and services for the industry. It is also 
clear from the data that, public actors like LGAs, NGOs, and researchers are 
promoting the traditional production system which blocks other actors 
(specifically those who are commercially oriented) from working with rural 
producers. So, in addition to the general absence of basic innovation 
infrastructure like roads, electricity, and running water, etc., establishment of 
new firms in rural areas is hindered by the continuing emphasis on subsistence 
poultry production where use of external inputs and services is discouraged, and 
therefore very limited. 
5.4.1 Analysing the innovation context to identify actors  
In order to analyse the organisational thinness and fragmentation, I conducted 
the innovation context analysis using the agricultural innovation system (AIS) 
framework to identify and map existing actors in the system under study. 
Although the Innovation Systems Approach has often been analysed at a national 
level to describe the ‘National Innovation System’, the approach is thought to be 
equally valid at a regional level or at a community level (Klerkx, Laurens; Barbara, 
van Mierlo; Cees, 2012)  or even as it affects specific groups – such as ‘poor women 
farmers’(Whiteside, 2008). The analysis can also be focussed at a particular sector 
or even narrowed down to a specific crop, or to a specific value chain 
(Anandajayasekeram, Puskur, & Zerfu, 2009). Therefore, in this study I have used 
the AIS framework to analyse the innovation context both at industry level (i.e. 
poultry) and at community level in Ruvuma and Pwani Regions in Tanzania. 
Literature portrays the absence of an agreed list of questions to answer or tools 
to use to conduct an “innovation system diagnosis” (Anandajayasekeram et al., 
2009; Anandajayasekeram, 2011; Klerkx, Laurens; Barbara, van Mierlo; Cees, 
2012). And as Prof. Norman Clark describes in his report to NEPAD, there is no 
template, and that inductive methods are useful. He writes:  
[“…. understanding the complexity of science policy issues 
cannot easily be demonstrated from 'first principles'. There is no 
ideal template or cookbook set of recipes. In most cases examined 
what seems to be much more effective is to proceed inductively. 
Here the use of illustrative case study material has proved to be 
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quite successful because good analyses contain so much “tacit 
knowledge”.] 
Therefore, I decided to use ‘functional analysis” as a diagnostic tool. The 
functional analysis process, which is also recommended by Martin Whiteside (2008, 
p.5) borrows on the checklist used in World Bank case studies (World Bank, 
2006), identifies all functions perceived to be necessary if a system or a value 
chain is to be complete and efficient, then followed by mapping of existing 
actors to establish who is doing what, and where gaps exist. As Whiteside (2008) 
guides: 
[“One insight is that some form of “map” needs to be developed that 
lists the various “actors” (individuals and organisations) that currently 
exist and are likely to be required for successful innovation to take 
place within a country, region or sector. Such a map might usefully be 
guided by putting names and organisations into a ‘framework’ 
diagram…. It is important that these system diagnoses provide an “over 
view” of the whole system (or sub-system) rather than focus on one 
small part (or domain) of it. Different levels of detail are appropriate at 
different stages (Whiteside, 2008; p.5)”.] 
Therefore, it is from these maps that I was able to establish the thickness and 
engagement of organisations within the rural poultry industry in the study area of 
Ruvuma and Pwani Regions. Specifically, I have used the list of functions which 
RIU actors came up with in their first planning meeting when they analysed the 
poultry system in September 2009 (RIU meeting report of 2009, p.24 has 
details). Table 5-3 below presents the list of functions and the corresponding 
actors from the RIU report. 
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- Management of breeder stock 
- Production and distribution of chicks 
- Quality control 
- Research institutions, 
- Breeder farms, 
- Hatcheries, 
Quality feeds   
 
- Feed manufacturing, 
- Distribution and marketing 
- Quality control 
- Feed companies, 
- Input shops, 




- Drug manufacturing (or importation), 
- Distribution and selling, 
- Disease diagnosis and treatment, 
- Laboratory services 
- Veterinary drug companies, 
- Stockists/input shops, 
- Veterinarians + clinics 
- Vet. Investigation centres, 
Extension 
services 
- Train and employ extension agents, 
- Provide advice on poultry husbandry  
- Livestock Training Institutes, 




- Buying and selling of birds and eggs, 
- Value addition (e.g. slaughtering, 
packaging, branding etc.) 
- Provide market information, 
- Traders, large scale buyers, 
- Producer associations, 




- Transport inputs and products, 
- Ensure roads are passable from poultry 
farms to  markets throughout the year, 
- Logistics /transporters, 
- Cargo business owners, 
- Government /LGAs 
Construction 
services 
- Selling building materials like cement, 
nails, sheet, timber, etc. 
- Building poultry sheds, 
- Hardware businesses, 
- Artisans, 
- Carpenters etc. 
Equipment  
 
- Manufacturing and selling of different 
poultry equipment for breeding, 
feeding, transportation, processing, etc.  
- Different industries, 




- Reliable supply of utilities i.e. water 
and electricity throughout the year 





- Strengthening stakeholder 
organisations, 
- Training on business, advocacy, etc. 
- Financial services, Insurance, etc. 
- NGOs and Private trainers, 
- Financial institutions, 
- Insurance companies, etc. 
Regulatory 
services 
- Ensure quality of inputs and services, 
- Regulate standards and measurements, 
- Monitoring, disease surveillance  
- Etc. 
- Public authorities i.e. 
Government 
Source: Secondary data from RIU report, 2009; p.24 
Generally the AIS framework identifies five categories of organisations or 
institutions whose interactions are responsible for innovation processes in 
agricultural systems (Anandajayasekeram, 2011; Spielman, 2005). The 
categories are as shown in Figure 5-2 below.  
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The main categories or domains of the AIS are: the (i) Research domain; (ii) 
Intermediary domain; (iii) Enterprise domain, and Demand domain; and 
(iv)Demand domain.  These are further discussed below. 
Literature explains that the central insight of the innovation systems framework 
is to analyse partnerships and linkages in their historical and contemporary 
context. This is because context greatly defines the opportunities and necessities 
for innovation (Riikka; Rajalahti et al., 2008). It also identifies four main 
elements of the analytical framework to include; (i) Key actors, the roles they 
Demand Domain 
 • Consumers of food and food products in rural and urban areas  
• Consumers of industrial raw materials  
• International commodity markets 
 • Policy-making process and agencies 
Education and Research 
Domain 
Mainly producing codified 
knowledge  




• Universities and 
technical collages 
• Private research 
foundations 
Sometimes producing 
codified knowledge  





• Extension services 
• Consultants 
• Private companies 
and other 
entrepreneurs 
• Farmer and trade 
associations 
• Donors 
Support Structures  
• Banking and financial system 
 • Transport and marketing infrastructure 
 • Professional networks, including trade and farmer associations 
 • Education system 
Enterprise Domain 
 Users of codified 
knowledge, producers 
of mainly tacit 
knowledge 
• Farmers 
• Commodity traders 
• Input supply agents 
• Companies and 





Source:  Adapted from Arnold and Bell 2001: 292. Cited in (Rajalahti, Janssen, and 
Pehu 2008, p.4) 
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play, and the activities in which they are involved, with an emphasis on the 
diversity of public and private sector actors and on the appropriateness of their 
roles; (ii) Attitudes and practices of the main actors, with an emphasis on ways 
of working, views on collaboration, traditional roles, potential inefficiencies, 
patterns of trust, risk taking, and the existence of a culture of innovation; (iii) 
The effects and characteristics of patterns of interaction, with an emphasis on 
formal and informal networks, links, and partnerships, inclusion of the poor, and 
the existence and functions of potential (sector) coordination and stakeholder 
bodies (Ibid, p.6). 
Below is my analysis of the five domains in which I have attempted to establish 
the kind of organisations that exist, their types, roles, attitudes and linkages, in 
relation to rural producers’ routines and practices. Basically, the discussion 
reveals that the public sector is actually reinforcing the dominance of the 
traditional poultry production system in rural areas. And by doing so, they hinder 
emergence and engagement of private organisations who have the potential to 
stimulate innovation in the industry. 
Research domain 
This domain includes suppliers of formal knowledge like universities, research 
institutions, and other training institutions, etc. In Tanzania livestock Research is 
coordinated by the Directorate of Research, Training and Extension of the 
Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries (MLDF). However, most 
research is conducted under the Tanzania Livestock Research Institute (TALIRI) 
which is an independent organ directly answerable to the Minister. TALIRI 
operates in seven zones, and conducts research based on priorities in the zones. 
The two study regions i.e. Ruvuma and Pwani belong to the Southern (i.e. 
TALIRI Uyole) and Eastern (i.e. TALIRI Tanga) zones respectively. 
Reports from the National Livestock Research Institute (NLRI), now TALIRI, 
show poultry research receiving less attention (i.e. funding) within the livestock 
research institutions in the country if compared to beef and dairy. For example, 
the NLRI report of 2006/2007 shows only 10.3% of the research activities and 
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projects in that period being specific for poultry, refer Table 5-4 below (NLRI, 
2009). This implies that, while research organisations are present, and mandated 
to work in the study areas, they seem to have little interest and capacity 
(especially in terms of funding) on poultry. However, whenever poultry research 
was done, they used participatory approaches with on farm experiments which 
involved farmers in setting experiments and in evaluating results. Unfortunately, 
none of the interviewees including discussions in the FGDs mentioned to have 
been involved in such experiments. Additionally, all 62 producers interviewed in 
this study were not aware, or informed of any poultry research organisation. This 
means even the zone offices are not known to them. 
Another type of organisation under this domain is those involved in livestock 
training. In Tanzania livestock training is coordinated by the Ministry of 
livestock through ten livestock training agencies (LITA), the Vocational 
Education and Training Authority (VETA), and higher learning institutions like 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Open University of Tanzania 
(OUT). These institutions cater for the entire country and conduct research based 
on institutional priorities earmarked for funding. Often, they conduct studies and 





Table 5-4: Livestock research activities within NLRI between 2006 and 2007 
 




Type of activity/project specific to poultry 
Dairy Cattle  8 0 NONE 
Beef Cattle  7 0 NONE 




7 0 NONE 
Small Ruminants  11 0  NONE 
Non and Pseudo 
Ruminants 
8 8 i. Collection of important qualitative 
information on different indigenous 
poultry, pigs, rabbits and guinea pigs. 
ii. Identifying production ability and 
physical characteristics of each breed 
/type under different management 
systems 
iii. Improvement of feeding and housing 
system of non and pseudo ruminants, 
iv. Improve and promote disease control 
methods to non-ruminants, 
v. Develop cost effective feed packages 
using locally available feed materials, 
vi. Studying the performance traits of 
crossbreeds including fertility & carcass 
quality for commercial marketing. 
vii. Promotion Artificial Insemination (AI) 
technique for poultry improvement. 
viii. Development and Promote of Dual 
purpose Tanzania chicken. 
Socio-Economics and 
Innovation systems  





10   
NONE 
Animal Health 6 2 1. Control & treatment of animal diseases such 
as Newcastle disease and respiratory 
diseases of poultry; Ecto & endo parasites, 
2. Collection and documentation of indigenous 




20 2 i. Characterization and performance 
evaluation of local chicken in semi-arid 
Central Tanzania for improvement of village 
chicken. 
ii. Feeding & Management Strategies for Rural 
Poultry Production in Central Tanzania 
Total 97 10  
% of Total  10.3%  
 
Source: Tanzania National Livestock Institute Report, (NLRI, 2009) 
 
 141 
Out of the ten LITAs, two are within the two study areas i.e. LITA Madaba in 
Songea District, and LITA Morogoro in Morogoro Region. However, LITA 
Morogoro is located about 170 km from the Coast (Pwani) region where the 
study was conducted. Basically, LITA trains both at Diploma and Certificate 
levels and enrols students from all over the country. These agencies also conduct 
short courses if paid by NGOs or donor programmes to train farmers or 
extension workers. Apparently all these LITAs have been promoting the 
traditional system and not commercialisation. As regards to vocational training 
institutes, some offer poultry courses to youths who want to either employ 
themselves, or get qualifications to join LITAs. In the study area, there is Kibaha 
Education Centre located in the urban part of the Coast Region offering a 
certificate course in Poultry Management. However, it has no outreach 
programmes to rural areas.  
Therefore, regarding this domain, it is arguable that while research and training 
organisations are present in the study area, they are not directly engaged with 
rural producers in manners that could stimulate innovation and encourage them 
to opt out of the traditional system. The focus of these organisations has been to 
improve the traditional routines in rural areas, while separately developing 
commercial production system for the urban.  
Intermediary domain 
These are bridging institutions (individuals and organisations) assisting in 
articulation of needs for new knowledge by users and for outlining new 
knowledge available from different sources. These include extension agents, 
NGOs, schools, churches, prisons etc., Infomediaries (like Press, radio, TV, 
internet, mobile phone etc.), Private sector (input suppliers etc.), Producers and 
sectoral /commodity coordinating organisations, and informal knowledge 
transfer systems. 
The study reveals that extension workers employed by Local Government 
Authorities (LGAs) are the most frequent actors involved in receiving and 
disseminating poultry information in rural Tanzania. These would often work 
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with NGOs and development programmes to advise rural producers. For the past 
50 years, NGOs and LGAs have disseminated information that reinforces 
existing traditional routines and which is against commercialisation. As one 
producer said:  
[“Basically we all keep chickens in the same way here. Local 
chickens are kept in the same way. However, some buy maize 
bran and build sheds for them. Even the district officers have 
advised us to do that. But first we need to know how to stop 
chicken from dying” [Interview with Producer, June 2013]. 
The quote above shows that everyone knows how to keep chicken (i.e. 
traditionally), and what the extension officer advices is just minor improvements 
on existing routines like building a chicken pen and supplementing feeding with 
maize bran. Another interviewee described extension officers as incompetent 
and unreliable sources of knowledge. The producer said: 
[“I did not ask the extension officer anything because he lives 
here, he sees us every day struggling with ND, but he is not doing 
anything.  He even saw how my 25 chickens died… but what did 
he do? Nothing! I know he would have just said exactly what the 
radio said.. (He smiles). After all the disease kills their (extension 
staff’s) chickens too.” [Interview with Producer, June 2013]. 
The quote above can be interpreted as a state of ‘inertia’ within the extension 
system, where the information disseminated is perceived not to be new, and not 
useful in relation to current problems. Thus the producer might imply in his 
quote above that, ‘what the extension staff knows, is what farmers also know’. 
And as another producer elaborated, some of extension advice fails because it 
involves buying certain inputs or drugs which are not available in the villages, or 
are not known to producers. Like a woman in Songea mentioned in the 
interview: 
[“…As I said, I tried to keep many chickens but they all died. I 
needed to be sure of ‘Kideri’ (ND) vaccine. I needed training. I 
wanted to know how I could protect chicks. But I did not know 
where to buy what they were telling us to use (i.e. vaccines).” 
(Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
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What is revealed here is a disconnect between extension advice and access to 
materials needed to implement the advice. This means, intermediary 
organisations may fail if other actors like input suppliers are not available to 
provide the needed services. It means that presence of intermediary organisations 
and their effectiveness depend on existence and functioning of actors in other 
domains. For example, it is not effective to promote use of vaccines if there are 
no suppliers, or producers cannot afford, etc. A woman producer said: 
[“…It depends on the advice and if I can afford it. You know, 
some advice like what I heard from the radio about building a 
good shed, are not easy unless you have many chickens. And 
most advice needs money which I don’t have. So I only do what 
I can.” (Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
Therefore, emergence of organisations in this domain is largely shaped and 
stimulated by the level of engagements in the research, enterprise and demand 
domains. And this explains why, LGAs, NGOs, and other public initiatives have 
a tendency to provide extension services together with materials or products 
needed, i.e. support extension workers to intervene both in intermediary and 
enterprise domains.  
As for media organisations, these are generally present in the study area 
especially radio and occasionally printed materials are circulated by NGOs and 
projects. Interviews reveal that some producers listen to programmes on radio 
but for different reasons they do not follow the advice. The most frequently 
mentioned reason was the general perception that the information provided does 
not fit with their production systems, including flock size and routines. This is 
revealed in the quote below:  
[“I have also listened to a radio programme on improved chicken 
raring. Sometimes I follow the advice that I hear, and sometimes I 
don’t. For example, I listen to a radio programme called ‘Mkulima wa 
kisasa’ (i.e. A Modern farmer in English). They teach how to feed 
chickens. They also say we should keep chicken as a business. But I 
could not implement any of the advices. I had no means to do so.  I 
also read a newsletter called ‘A Modern Farmer’-quite often, and it 
talks about the same things. But I can’t do what they say. I don’t even 
know where to start.” (Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
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The quote confirms that, the relevancy of intermediary organisations is 
established by existence and engagements of organisations in the enterprise 
domain. This makes the enterprise domain important in determining innovation 
in the rural poultry industry. Otherwise the public sector (i.e. extension, NGOs 
and Programmes) continues to dominate the industry’s innovation space. 
From the discussion above, the study concludes that intermediary organisations 
are very few in the industry, and are dominated by public actors (including 
NGOs, projects, and churches) who promote low innovation tendencies. Private 
organisations, including media houses and input suppliers (who disseminate 
information about new products and their uses) are not encouraged to enter the 
space because the dominant production system does not make their role relevant. 
Poverty and lack of electricity in rural areas make use of tools like TV, and radio 
very limited. Moreover, use of ICT-based services to disseminate agricultural 
information is more prominent in other commodities but not in poultry. 
Apparently, most infomediaries are located in relatively more urbanised areas 
(i.e. in district headquarters).  
Enterprise and Demand domain 
This domain includes agricultural value-chain actors and organizations that use 
new formal knowledge in the production of goods and services for end users. For 
example, producers (subsistence, small, medium, large), farmer organisations, 
and companies, etc. 
The functional analysis conducted by RIU in 2009, identified producers (both as 
individual households and as organisations), chicks producers (including out-
growers producing and selling fertilised eggs), feed manufacturers, veterinary 
drugs dealers, vaccines suppliers, agro-dealers (or stockists), traders, food 
vendors (including hotels and restaurants) and final consumers as the key poultry 
value chain actors. Among all these, only traders and food vendors had direct 
links with rural producers. The rest were mainly located in urban areas (district 
headquarters) and mostly working with urban commercial producers who raised 
exotic breeds. This happened because rural producers were not using commercial 
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inputs. Exceptionally, ND vaccines would occasionally be available to rural 
producers through government campaigns or under specific arrangements with 
an NGO or a project. And in such cases extension staff would get the vaccines 
from the government (i.e. from the Veterinary Investigation Centres (VICs) 
located in district headquarters). As a result, none of the interviewed producers 
mentioned having a direct link with a vaccine supplier, or a stockist. Vaccines 
for other diseases beyond ND were not accessible (not known) at all. 
As regards to chicks, rural producers rely on natural breeding and often start 
with a mature hen. Thus they do not buy chicks from a specialised chick 
producer. The situation is the same with feeds and veterinary drugs. Therefore, 
since rural producers do not supplement feeding with commercial feeds, or treat 
their birds, no suppliers have been encouraged to establish such businesses in 
rural areas. The quote below explains how rural producers deal with poultry 
diseases without using formal veterinary drugs: 
[“Elders knew these herbs and we used to look for them. But 
these were mainly for protection and not used when a chicken is 
already too sick. A sick chicken is usually slaughtered before it is 
too late.” (Interview with Producers, June 2013)]. 
A few respondents mentioned recently starting to buy maize bran from maize 
millers located in rural areas, but other interviewees said most maize bran in 
their villages is used to feed pigs and produce local brew. See the interview 
quote below: 
[“I get the maize bran from the miller. I ask for it when I go to 
mill my maize for flour. Usually people do not ask for it, and 
the owner of the miller would sell it to people who keep pigs. 
But I ask for mine and for those of my friends. I also buy once 
in a while, but it is expensive, because of the pigs.” [Interview 
with Producers, June 2013]. 
Therefore, poultry producers are not the target clients for maize bran produced in 
the villages. Moreover, maize bran is just a by-product of another business 
which is not directly invested for poultry. 
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Inputs suppliers are almost non-existent in the study area because the traditional 
poultry production which uses very little external inputs is dominant. However, 
there are few stockists located in some rural trading centres selling crop inputs 
like seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, etc., and who have the potential to become 
suppliers of poultry inputs if there is demand. In such areas, the problem is 
therefore fragmentation rather than absence of actors or organisation. This 
argument is confirmed by the interview quote below: 
[“I don’t know any poultry input supplier. But I know there is a 
shop selling fertilizers, seeds and other inputs for crops. Not for 
chickens. In fact nobody sells chicken feeds…. maybe maize 
bran from the miller.” (Interview with Producer, June 2013)]. 
Regarding marketing actors, results show that rural producers have direct 
contacts with traders who move from door to door as their main buyer. These 
traders also attend village markets to buy live mature chickens. However, no 
such traders were found buying eggs probably because most eggs are consumed 
within households or are left to hatch.  As one interviewee said; 
[“I don’t have problems in selling chickens. Buyers would usually 
come to my house and buy. They come every time. They always 
move around looking for chickens to buy. Personally, I have never 
gone around looking for buyers, even when I have problems. They 
always pass by my house. They somehow know who has chickens. 
Some move with merchandise like plastic basins, buckets, plates 
and kitchen utensils and we exchange with chickens….. I usually 
sell cocks and keep hens for hatching and for laying eggs…. But 
people don’t sell eggs because eggs are future hens and for the 
family to eat.” (Interview with Producer, July 2013)]. 
Very few organisations were found in the study area producing goods and 
services needed in poultry production. The present few are not engaging with 
rural producers because dominant production routines do not require such 
services (or inputs). Both concepts of organisational thinness and fragmentation 
are therefore valid in relation to the enterprise domain. 
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The support structures 
These include structures like banks, insurance companies, transporters, etc. 
These are not yet well developed to specifically service the poultry industry in 
general. Some are improvised to serve commercial production, poultry input 
supply and value addition. For example, banks give loans to large and medium 
scale commercial farms and use buildings or machinery as equity. They also give 
loans to veterinary drugs and hatchery businesses because it is possible to 
analyse cash flow as well as use equipment as collateral. The banking system 
only works with parts of the industry that fit with existing banking structures and 
policies. Unfortunately, this does not include the current poultry production 
system found in rural areas.  
The demand domain 
This refers to the “final users” or beneficiaries of new knowledge like final 
product consumers or industries that use poultry products as raw materials. From 
the functional analysis conducted by RIU in 2009,  and from the sub-sector study 
of 2010, it is clear that the main products from the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania are live mature birds and a few eggs that enter the rural and urban 
markets mainly through individual traders (Match Makers Associates, 2010). 
Therefore, buyers are mostly individuals who buy and sell to others, e.g. traders 
buying from villages and sell to food vendors, restaurants or to other traders in 
urban markets.  
Meat and eggs produced in rural areas are preferred by final consumers for their 
taste which they associate with the way chickens are raised under the traditional 
system. They support slow growth and zero use of commercial inputs, and are 
thus ready to pay a premium price. However, these are very few buyers who 
have income to spend on poultry products. The majority of Tanzanians have low 
incomes and spending on poultry products is considered a luxury. Therefore, 
they tend to consume cheaper poultry products, which often come from 
commercial farms. 
 148 
Additionally, commercial consumers like the confectionery industry, hotels and 
other food chains prefer products from commercial farms because their prices 
are relatively lower, and have consistent quality and quantity. Furthermore,  
some food vendors claim that cooking exotic chicken is faster and a lot cheaper 
because it uses less fuel and reduces customer waiting time significantly (i.e. 
indigenous chickens have tougher meat thus take longer to cook). Despite their 
preferred taste, products from rural producers have not entered the formal food 
business because they fail to meet certain basic standards. For example, eggs 
from the traditional flock are found too small for the bakery business, and are 
also found unsuitable to supermarkets because they are usually fertilised and 
therefore have a shorter shelf life. This makes them too costly to store, and too 
unreliable in terms of setting expiry dates. One butcher said: 
[“I don’t stock local chicken meat because it changes colour 
when frozen. Hence customers want them live, and I can’t keep 
them live here. I also don’t sell local eggs because I can’t tell 
when they will go bad.” (Interview with a Butcher, July 2013)].  
Therefore, existing structures and systems for meat and egg business are biased 
towards exotic breeds raised in commercial farms. Furthermore, such systems or 
actors are more likely to operate in urban settings because they need amenities 
like electricity, good roads, etc., and which are rarely present in rural areas. 
Keeping local breeds of chicken (i.e. the size of eggs and weight of chickens are 
irregular) under the traditional system (i.e. where eggs are fertilised, tradable 
volumes are small and irregular, etc.) disconnects rural poultry producers from 
formal marketing structures which connect most producers and the final 
consumer.  
5.5 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter makes it clear that Path Dependency theory can explain the 
observed prevalence and persistence of subsistence agricultural production in 
rural Africa, and specifically in poultry production. Using the concepts of lock-
in, organisational thinness and fragmentation, the chapter explains why the 
traditional (extensive) poultry production system where innovation is generally 
low is dominating the rural poultry industry in Tanzania despite the high market 
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demand for poultry products and the strong public desire to fight poverty which 
is currently high in rural Tanzania. It also uses the theory and the concepts to 
explain why innovation is generally low in rural poultry production where the 
traditional production system is dominating. 
The chapter departs from the observation that commercial poultry production 
system is currently adopted in urban and peri-urban areas but not in rural areas. 
This happens even when rural producers dominate the country’s poultry sector, 
and where the government’s interest is to increase rural incomes and domestic 
production in order to reduce imports. Therefore, the chapter makes it clear that, 
understanding what limits commercial production of chicken among rural 
producers in Tanzania, and who are increasingly commercialising other 
agricultural enterprises, is very important for policy and practice.  
In the analysis, the study establishes that the rural poultry industry in Tanzania is 
experiencing a lock-in, where the traditional poultry production system is 
reinforced by both public and private actors. That the innovation space is 
dominated by public actors who promote low innovation, by excluding 
producers from interacting with commercially oriented actors. They achieve that 
by promoting ‘input-self-sufficiency’ and ‘enterprise diversification’ where rural 
producers are encouraged and supported to manage many enterprises while using 
only locally available resources. Apparently, rural producers have limited 
resources and spreading them thinly to many resources lowers investment in 
certain enterprises like poultry and renders them less important. Consequently, 
these enterprises become closed and with less affinity to other enterprises in the 
industry as they end up not utilising external resources or inputs. 
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Chapter 6 Initiating the unlocking process: How 
RIU ‘took off’ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in this chapter describes how RIU began to unlock the 
Tanzanian rural poultry industry from the path-dependent situation established in 
Chapter five. It therefore looks at RIU as an external actor which deliberately 
facilitated processes to create new thinking among producers, and to promote 
interactions among different actors. These processes stimulated investment and 
therefore reduced the organisational thinness and fragmentation that existed. Using 
data from RIU reports and interviews with ex-staff and programme beneficiaries, I 
have analysed initial processes and contextual negotiations that took place at 
different levels of implementation. Specifically, and by recreating the RIU 
programme processes, the chapter sheds light on how interactions and learning were 
practically facilitated, brokered or promoted to transform an industry which was 
dominated by subsistence producers. 
The analysis that follows focuses on interpreting how the programme unfolded to 
overcome internal and external challenges facing development programmes which 
typically operate within predefined frameworks and structures. It then describes how 
the programme changed and later managed to be flexible and operate from the 
context. The intention is therefore to explain how such flexibility emerges from a 
pre-determined development programme to suit the innovation process which is 
known to be complex, non-linear and context specific. It also reveals how a system 
perspective can be put to practice in setting development programmes. 
The chapter is organised in six sections with the first three elaborating the origins 
and founding themes of the RIU programme. They describe how traditional and rigid 
programme frameworks were dealt with to create space for context specific 
decisions. Then in section four, the study explains how the programme negotiated the 
implementation space to merge programme interests and those of actors and 
beneficiaries in the industry. In section five, I have explained how RIU explored the 
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local context by first creating a common understanding of what is to be achieved. 
RIU began by addressing a socio-cultural problem identified by actors, then turned 
this problem into an innovation challenge. A functional analysis was conducted and 
guided actors to visualise the envisaged system needed to meet the innovation 
challenge. Section six summarises the chapter and draws some conclusions. 
6.2 Origins and founding themes of RIU 
RIU evolved out of a problem felt by DFID as a funder rather than an opportunity to 
be explored. DFID wanted to understand why its previous 10 year investment in 
agricultural research did not generate the expected results of increasing agricultural 
productivity and therefore reduce poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and in Latin 
America. The implication was therefore that DFID had specific expectations as final 
deliverables which influenced how the programme was planned. 
DFID launched the RIU programme specifically to support the adoption of the 
previous research outcomes in Africa and Asia and maximise their poverty reduction 
potential, and at the same time generate lessons on how best to put research outputs 
into use for future planning. In other words RIU was supposed to continue from 
where research stopped and learn how best to complete the linear process of 
development starting from research. 
The programme decided to develop approaches towards facilitating innovation for 
development which led to the establishment of Country Programmes (CPs) including 
Tanzania. However, nobody knew exactly what that implied in practical terms. A 
review of RIU literature shows that choosing innovation system thinking to guide the 
RIU implementation created challenges to the planning process because very little 
had gone beyond the conceptual levels into developing clear tools and frameworks 
for implementation; and the thinking was still new in agriculture development; hence 
there were too many ideas floating around and with very few experts on the subject.  
Most RIU target countries had a difficult start with many organisations and 
consultants involved in designing the programme implementation strategies. This led 
to a long inception period of receiving mixed messages and over-elaboration of the 
approach. While this happened with the good intention of bringing methodological 
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clarity to the teams, it was simply a manifestation of the deep desire to be in control 
of processes and eventualities and therefore being able to justify value for money. It 
was also reflecting the professional battle regarding the role of research, public and 
private sector in putting research outputs into use as a consequence of the 
conditioned linear thinking and inability to visualise actors and processes from a 
seamless web perspective. 
6.3 Coping with deterministic frameworks 
Most development planning approaches are grounded on the ability to make 
presuppositions about the true nature of its ‘objects of intervention” and therefore 
tend to be deterministic about what can be done to influence or model them. This 
overlooks the fact that these ‘objects’ are actually embedded in contexts which are 
temporary in nature, and with evolving internal structures (Norman Clark, 2010). In 
many cases such determinisms has led to execution of costly counterproductive 
programmes (Clarke & Ramalingam, 2006; Ramalingam, Jones, Reba, & Young, 
2009). 
Therefore, even before the actual implementation started on the ground, RIU was 
already navigating through a complex system of DFID structures and policies; of 
development funding frameworks engrained in the ability to clearly demonstrate 
deliverables against the expected value for money even before funds could flow; and 
a complex web of professional empires and traditions. Usually, development 
programmes would reduce this complexity by risking everything else and work to fit 
in specific prescriptions provided as guidelines. The initial RIU design followed the 
same path until three years later when the mid-term review25 (MTR) observed that 
too much expert-planning and decision making at higher level limited 
implementation at country level. The MTR   therefore recommended for more 
powers and autonomy to be shifted to the country teams and allow them decide what 
to do (See (See Norman Clark, Frost, Maudlin, & Ward, 2013; p.35). This shift of 
power is elaborated further in coming sections. 
                                                 
25 The RIU Mid-term Review (MTR) was conducted in November 2008, but its final 
recommendations were reviewed in January 2009, and that is when they were implemented followed 
by a Technical Review in June 2009.  
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In principle, RIU made the decision to establish Country Programmes (CPs) to focus 
on facilitating innovation for development based on the premise that promoting 
innovation required interventions that strengthened innovation capacity, which in 
turn required strengthening links and interactions between and among different 
actors involved in agricultural innovation. According to RIU reports, it was at this 
point when the idea of establishing innovation platforms (IPs) emerged and later 
adopted. RIU defines an IP as a network of partners working on a common theme 
and using research knowledge in ways it has not been used before to generate 
improved goods and services for the benefit of the poor. The IPs therefore involve 
the concept or system of working together as a group focusing in specific area of 
opportunity so as to address major challenges that affect the system (for more 
information on IPs and RIU IPs in other countries see; Mur & Nederlof, 2012; S 
Nederlof & Pyburn, 2012; Suzanne Nederlof, Wongtschowski, & Lee, 2011; 
Ngwenya & Hagmann, 2011).  
RIU idea was for the country programmes to identify themes or commodities then 
facilitate processes of bringing together different stakeholders to find innovative 
solutions for the challenges or bottlenecks preventing the system from functioning 
efficiently. The assumption here was that innovation and learning would take place 
as stakeholders interacted to solve challenges. At this point the overall RIU 
programme had a detailed log frame which specified programme objectives, 
processes, expected results, assumptions, indicators and inputs.  
After the decision on approaches to be used in Country Programmes was made, a 
series of other decisions on which countries, strategies and plans followed. Initially, 
RIU wanted to work in 10-15 countries previously covered by the RNRRS 
programme, with at least three countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
However, it was later decided to work only in six countries in Africa, which were 
later selected based on different criteria such as land-locked versus coastal, post-
conflict versus stable governance and geographic divisions. Hence Malawi, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Tanzania and Zambia were selected. The objective of these 
country programmes was stipulated in the overall RIU log frame as ‘to facilitate 
agricultural innovation in such a way as to contribute to the ultimate goal of 
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transforming smallholder farming and associate value chains into viable and 
sustainable enterprises’. This shows that the RIU focus on ‘the enterprise domain’ 
of the Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) was explicit from the start.   
After the countries were selected, consultants were hired to conduct country 
assessment and use the results to develop country strategy documents. Therefore 
each country started the programme with the overall RIU log frame and specific 
country strategy document established. Reports show that the programme did not 
start in all the six countries at the same time, rather they were rolled in one after the 
other starting with Rwanda in late 2007, followed by Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania and finally Zambia in mid-2008. This study focuses only on what took 
place in the Tanzania country programme. 
6.4 Negotiating the implementation space 
As in most development programmes, RIU managers had to properly answer the 
‘when’ (defining the implementation time frame), ‘where’ (choosing the 
geographical location and coverage), ‘who’ (selecting staff team and the target 
group), ‘what’ (deciding on issues, systems, commodities, industries or sectors to 
work with) and ‘how’ (choosing approaches, strategies and even process) questions 
before any implementation could start. This initial planning process was very critical 
because it is usually from planning that funders and programme managers agree on 
what is to be expected as value for money and as proof of expertise respectively. 
Therefore, this study is particularly interested on how RIU arrived at these decisions 
including finding out who made them, and how far the planning went to predict and 
therefore prescribe future implementations. 
As a result of the programme’s struggle to fit into development planning standards 
and formats, the programme in Tanzania started with strategies and an operational 
framework defined and therefore prescribed by higher authorities. Below are some of 
the prescriptions:  
6.4.1 The time frame was defined: Timing innovation process? 
RIU documents show that this was a five-year action research programme running 
from July 2006 to June 2011. However, there was a room for extension depending on 
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circumstances, and a one-year extension to June 2012 is reported, though involving 
only selected activities. Therefore, although a five-year time frame seems to be 
preferred by many development programmes, it is clearly not a period long enough 
to have system changes and wide impact results delivered both at the same time. 
However, programmes need to have a beginning and an end, and the question is 
therefore how to make time frames and unpredictability co-exist and still be able to 
promise and achieve realistic results.  
The RIU experience clearly suggests that since we can’t do away with time frames, 
then maybe we should consider inventing new targets of achievements and leave 
impact indicators as eventualities and not the end targets that drive implementation. 
This is to learn to accept the fact that ‘we don’t need to see millions of litres flowing 
in the tap before we know that the water system is in place. Rather, even a few drops 
flowing from the tap, can explain that the plumbing system is working.’ This means 
putting ambitious impact targets creates a competition between focusing on 
achieving systemic changes and impact targets, which may be counterproductive.   
6.4.2 Geographical location is defined: Innovation has boundaries? 
The RIU programme in Tanzania was first implemented in the Eastern Zone of 
Tanzania involving four Regions i.e. Morogoro, Pwani (Coast), Tanga and Dar es 
Salaam. This was called a pilot zone with the intention for up-scaling to other zones. 
In order to select the pilot zone, a Tanzanian consultant was contracted to carry out a 
desk study based on criteria26 developed by RIU headquarters in UK. The consultant 
assessed both the agro-ecological zones (AEZ) and general zones as defined by the 
government. The assessment involved assigning subjective scores to each criteria as 
judged relevant for each zone then used final results to select the pilot zone. The desk 
study recommended that RIU uses the general zones to set up its programme but 
address priorities based on AEZ characteristics of that particular zone.  
Therefore, the Eastern Zone was selected because of the following reasons: (i) the 
zone covered all characteristics found in the 7 agro-ecological Zones (AEZ) making 
                                                 
26 (i) number of RNRRS outputs considered relevant; (ii) number of poor people; (iii) economic growth potential; 
(iv) market linkages; (v) perceived innovativeness of local population; (vi) capacity of the zonal research stations; 
(vii) accessibility to major markets; (viii) number of development initiatives and intermediaries in a single agro-
ecological zone; (ix) Accessibility to capital; and (x) Potential local partner to help manage the Fund 
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most of the RNRRS outputs relevant; (ii) It scored high against most of the criteria 
for selection; (iii) It had a good number of intermediaries that could work with the 
programme; (iv) It’s central location was found to ease the anticipated roll over and 
up-scaling of the programme to other zones; and (v) Its proximity and accessibility to 
the business city Dar es Salaam was found very important in linking up with policy 
dialogue during the pilot where learning and setting the stage for working in other 
zones was crucial. 
6.4.3 The target group is stipulated: Specifically focusing on the poor 
RIU targeted rural households who depend on renewable natural resources for their 
livelihoods. This is linked to objectives of the RNRRS that led to the design of RIU. 
So whatever the programme did had to involve and benefit rural households. 
This decision is explicit in RIU documents and also in their approaches. Throughout 
the programme, small agricultural producers were ‘the end’ and all other actors were 
involved as ‘the means’. In my opinion, it was important that this kind of ‘targeting’ 
was done because unless they are deliberately put at the centre of processes, small 
producers and the poor can easily be side-lined and be excluded from mainstreams.  
Therefore, RIU has shown that when promoting innovation among the poor, every 
strategy must revolve around empowering them, otherwise they remain the weakest 
link of the system and may even get expelled. For example, RIU made sure that input 
supply was organised to suit rural producers’ circumstances including packaging 
(into smaller quantities), transporting in bulk, bundling orders etc., just to make them 
attractive for doing business. RIU also created special mechanisms to help them 
experiment with new inputs through subsidies. So, RIU did all these, because they 
had producers as the end and not as the means. However, targeting has its limitations 
in terms of who in the end participates in the process because the final decision on 
which actors stay in the system is not known until the decision is actually made.  
Hence, even with targeting the poor, some degree of flexibility is necessary. 
6.4.4 Implementation approaches were drawn up: Predetermination 
The initial strategy for RIU was to enhance demand for and use of research outputs, 
new knowledge and technologies by supporting activities focused on improving the 
functioning of agricultural innovation systems. The Tanzania Strategy which was 
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drawn prior to commencement of activities in Tanzania categorises the work into 
four main thrusts as follows:  (i) Putting research outputs into use through the 
Demand Lead Innovation Process (DLIP); (ii) Improving communication and 
marketing of agricultural related information; (iii) Developing institutional 
arrangements and capacity to enhance innovation systems; and (iv) Monitoring and 
learning. 
Through its implementation, the programme was expected to deliver the following 
outputs; (a) Functional Innovation platforms working to arrive at solutions to systems 
constraints and to exploit innovation opportunities; (b) Poverty reducing innovations 
targeting the poor, women and marginalised households generated and used; (c) One 
or more information markets that can effectively link knowledge providers and 
knowledge users; (d) Policy Processes enabled by research into use experiences and 
lessons; and (e) Lessons on approaches for enhancing demand for research outputs 
using challenge funds documented and disseminated. 
The use of Innovation Platforms (IPs) as the implementation approach was also 
decided. The programme was expected to establish platforms around themes or 
commodities and facilitate actors to solve system blockages by using knew 
knowledge and innovations. It was expected that through such platforms creative 
solutions (based on research outputs, knowledge or technologies) could be sought, 
produced and utilised to solve system challenges. 
RIU reports show that while the main theme of promoting innovation was 
maintained, the programme team in Tanzania did not make implementation decisions 
based on what was written in the programme documents. The team focused on 
commercialisation and in doing so new knowledge and technologies were demanded 
and used. However, the platform approach was later dropped and instead, they 
focused on building networks based on what was emerging. 
6.4.5 The local team was recruited with predetermined skills 
Prior to operation, two organisations were contracted to manage RIU activities in 
Tanzania. Muvek Development Solutions Ltd. (Muvek), a private consulting 
company was put in charge of overall implementation including overseeing 
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coordination, facilitation, communication, and monitoring and learning activities of 
the programme. The programme was therefore managed by an in-country team 
consisting of the Country Coordinator (CC), National Process Facilitator (NPF), 
National Monitoring and Learning Coordinator (NMLC), and Fund Manager (FM). 
In this case, the management of the Challenge Fund was assigned to another 
organisation called Economic Development Initiatives (EDI-Ltd.). 
These staff needed different skills at different times. The team also had the option to 
outsource and seek advice externally. The implementation process involved multiple 
processes and no specific knowledge could initially be lined up for the task. 
However, the ability to articulate needs, facilitate, coordinate and search for 
knowledge and solutions.  
The RIU staff seem to have played more of managerial and coordination roles than 
providing technical expertise on poultry, etc. One RIU staff member said during the 
interview: 
[“WE were like a CEO of a big conglomerate trying to make sure 
every firm or department works efficiently.” (Interview with ex-RIU 
staff, May 2013)] 
6.5 Exploring the local context 
RIU worked in the Coast Region also known as Pwani Region. The region is one of 
the 26 regions of Tanzania. It borders Tanga, Lindi, Morogoro and Dar es Salaam 
regions in the North, South, West and East respectively, and the Indian Ocean also 
on the East. The region has six districts and seven Municipal Councils, and RIU 
worked in all of them expect in Mafia Island which was excluded due to its logistical 
challenges. The main livelihood activities in all these districts is sea fishing and crop 
farming specifically cassava (major staple crop), cashew nuts (major cash crop), 
maize, rice, sweet potatoes, sunflower, sesame, palms, and fruits (mainly mangoes, 
citrus fruits, pineapples and water melons). Other activities include livestock keeping 
(i.e. local breeds of cattle, goats, and sheep), local chicken keeping, bee keeping, and 
forestry i.e. mangroves. Apparently, Coast is considered one of the poorest regions in 
the country despite its proximity to the business city of Dar es Salaam and to its vast 
agricultural potential due to high soil fertility and bimodal rainfalls. 
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6.5.1 Collective identification of programme focus and entry points 
When rolling out the programme, RIU organised a national stakeholders’ workshop 
to discuss the new programme and seek their advice on where RIU should focus on. 
The idea was to have the RIU programme introduced to stakeholders and then make 
a collective decision on which commodities or issues to work on and therefore build 
Innovation Platforms around them. In essence, RIU wanted to be demand driven and 
as Knickel, Tisenkopfs, & Peter (2009, p.10) say, they wanted to valorise emerging 
niches from below. At that time, it was already decided by the ‘Global RIU (G-RIU) 
programme’27 to build Innovation Platforms (IPs) as the approach to implement the 
Country programmes. The G-RIU hired a consultant to introduce the innovation 
platform approach to the six country teams and also do the actual facilitation process 
to establish the IPs. This means the IPs approach was new to the RIU teams and they 
had to learn by doing, also implying that the team didn’t have to technically master 
everything as outsourcing was possible when needed.  
Participants for the first stakeholder workshop were mainly identified by the RIU 
team. They used their experience and networks to identify and invite individuals they 
thought would give meaningful contribution. However, they also looked at the list of 
people previously interviewed during the country assessment exercise commissioned 
by the G-RIU. One staff mentioned during the interview that: 
 [‘..all we did was to make sure we get representatives from agribusiness, 
NGOs, Extension, Training, Research, Livestock, crop, Ministry, Famers, 
Farmer groups, etc. and the names just came from on top of our heads. We 
just made sure that the person would be ready to come and would give 
good contribution.” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013)]  
Another interviewee said: 
[“..by then Muvek was not a big name that senior people would 
recognise and  respond to. But fortunately we used our 
Coordinator’s network and invited those senior people who 
                                                 
27 For purposes of clarity the study has divided the RIU programme into the ‘Global RIU programme, Country 
Programmes and RIU Tanzania programme’. While the Country Programme (CP) collectively refers to the RIU 
activities in six African countries i.e. Malawi, Zambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Tanzania, the RIU 
Tanzania programme (RIU-T) specifically refers to activities in Tanzania. The ‘Global RIU programme refers to the 
entire programme (i.e. including the six Country Programmes in Africa, the Best Bets Programme also in Africa, 
Asia programmes, the Research Team in Rome and the Management Team in the UK).  
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respected her and therefore attended.” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, 
May 2013)] 
This means the team just started interacting with the people they knew and add in 
others as they were needed. 
This meeting was facilitated by the IP expert who wanted the meeting to identify 
commodities, opportunities or issues that the programme could focus on and decide 
which systems RIU was to build or strengthen. However, reading from the 
proceedings of this meeting, stakeholders were not discussing ‘systems’ as such, 
rather they were looking at which ‘value chains’ needed innovations and which 
‘problems’ needed solutions. Finally, and contrary to RIU’s expectations, the 
national level stakeholders did not come up with any list but rather asked RIU to 
fund consultative visits to the Local Authorities first. Therefore RIU team together 
with six stakeholders appointed from the meeting were asked to visit the four 
administrative Regional offices falling within the RIU’s target area (i.e. Tanga, 
Morogoro, Coast/Pwani and Dar es Salaam) and identify key regional priorities listed 
in their plans28 and report back to the same group. The intention here was for RIU to 
learn from the Regional offices where such prioritization was done annually, as well 
as to align RIU’s work with local and national priorities. The team was then asked to 
report back to the same national level stakeholders for final decisions.  
While other regions produced a list of priorities, the Coast Regional Authorities had 
just one item on the list-‘tackling laziness’. They described this problem as the root 
cause of all other problems as it was prevalent and deep-rooted in culture, attitudes 
and in the general social fabric of the Coastal community. According to RIU reports, 
the attitude was argued to be limiting involvement in both educational and economic 
activities while proliferating in the younger generation. RIU also came across 
numerous technical reports, political speeches, and oral presentations from 
experienced development actors who previously worked in Coast Region clearly 
raising the concern that the attitude and entrepreneurship capacities among the 
people in the Coast Region were too low to trigger, support or sustain any rural 
                                                 
28 In Tanzania Regional Plans are developed through a consultative process from villages using a 
national planning approach called O&OD (Opportunities and Obstacles Development) Approach. 
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development initiative in the region. This understanding was also shared by local 
community leaders and the community in general. Thus it was understandable that 
RIU was consistently asked to tackle what was called ‘uvivu’ in Swahili or ‘laissez-
faire’ attitude argued to persist among the ‘Coast people’ (i.e. ‘watu wa Pwani’ in 
Swahili) during that time. At this point the RIU management had prepared to start an 
innovation process from such a social problem.  It was not even RNRRS related. 
6.5.2 Creating an ‘innovation challenge’  
In order to know what to do next, RIU facilitated another stakeholders meeting at 
national level to discuss priorities from the regions and out of them select 6 for 
implementation. The plan was to establish an innovation platform (IP) around each 
of the selected priority. It was fortunate that the programme was not specific on the 
type of issues to focus on as platform themes (although the spirit of the RNRRS was 
alive in the background reminding that whatever RIU did had to be linked to research 
outputs and to renewable natural resources) because it allowed itself to adapt to 
context. However, the management in UK had defined an innovation platform as a 
network of partners working on a common theme, which could be an opportunity or 
a challenge affecting a system. Therefore after thorough discussions the national 
level stakeholders in Tanzania selected ‘dairy’ as the theme for Tanga region; ‘agro-
mechanization’ and ‘post-harvest management’ in maize and rice production for 
Morogoro region; and ‘entrepreneurship for Coast region. This study and therefore in 
the sections that follow, focuses on the entrepreneurship platform which was first 
implemented in the Coast region and later out-scaled to other regions. 
What is of interest here is how the problem of ‘laziness’ was translated into ‘low 
entrepreneurship capacity’ problem, and later linked to poultry. The meeting 
identified anti-business mind-set, extensive laziness and harmful traditions and 
beliefs as major causes of the observed prevalent low entrepreneurship zeal and 
consequently poverty. Interestingly, technological problems were not raised at this 
point but came out much later only at implementation stage. Moreover, what this 
community interpreted as problems were not even directly related to agriculture and 
therefore none of the perceived ready-to-use RNRRS outputs could be targeted at 
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that point. Rather what was perceived to limit innovation in the Coast region was 
considered intrinsic to the actors themselves.  
The meeting arrived at the term ‘entrepreneurship’ after they linked laziness with 
poverty. The argument was that poor people are almost compelled to work hard in 
order to survive and if they don’t then there must be reasons beyond their individual 
means. During the interview one producer said: 
 [“we just didn’t know what else to do. We have been fishing and 
farming all our lives and are still poor… I think we gave up 
trying.” (Interview with a Producer, September 2013)].  
This implied the community had adapted to that level of productivity. So RIU was 
asked to design interventions to change mind-set and build entrepreneurship 
capacity. According to the meeting decision, Coast people needed to go through at 
least one business cycle aided then be left to learn on their own. The belief was, once 
they go through the process, they would gain new skills and taste the benefits of hard 
work. Then they would want to continue and work even harder, because nobody 
wants to be poor. RIU was also advised to focus on youths who were considered 
ambitious and with a higher possibility for change but they had neither land nor 
capital. 
RIU was asked to focus on building entrepreneurship capacities for income 
generation and enterprise development which implied using business as the driver of 
implementation. It also set precedence for putting rural communities (producers) at 
the centre of the platform and of RIU interventions in general. This meant the 
systems to be worked with had to revolve around rural producers. With that in mind, 
two key concerns were raised and which needed attention when strategizing. First, 
the Coast people were not motivated enough to engage and invest in long-term 
agribusiness activities. Hence RIU had to choose commodities or activities which 
required little investment and which had a short business cycle. Second, Coast people 
had low capacity to engage and benefit from development interventions, so RIU 
strategies had to include persuasion and capacity building techniques.  
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As a response to the two concerns above, keeping indigenous breeds of chicken (or 
local chicken) was chosen over other livelihood activities based on several reasons. 
Local chicken enterprise was found appropriate because every household was 
already keeping some chicken and everybody could manage it. The enterprise also 
required very little land and capital and thus even the very poor could afford to. In 
addition, the market for local chicken and eggs was also understood to be large as 
urban consumers were already paying a premium price to buy them.  More 
importantly, the business has a short production cycle (between 4 to 6 months) with 
profits realised soon enough to inspire an emerging entrepreneur. The activity also 
had a potential to impact on many people and therefore satisfied DFID’s quest for 
widespread impact, which was a big plus to RIU. 
The meeting also developed ‘an innovation challenge’ for the platform. According to 
RIU, an innovation challenge defines clearly the scope and focus of what should be 
done i.e. how to eradicate the perceived problem. These actors were asked to define 
the system purpose. When developing the innovation challenge, participants used 
information from the previous discussions regarding entrepreneurship and what 
should be achieved. Therefore, information on challenges, opportunities, desires and 
intentions that came out during the previous meetings were used to coin the system 
purpose. The innovation challenge for the entrepreneurship platform therefore read, 
“How to develop agribusiness entrepreneurship capacity among the youth for 
sustainable income generation and enterprise development in Coast Region”.  
From that statement, RIU was not set out to develop the poultry industry but rather to 
use poultry to build capacities. This meant that poultry and its technologies were 
only means to the end, and that the capacity to make things work was in the people. 
The statement also specified the target group to be youths and women, however, as 
we will find out later this was not the case as processes dictated differently. 
6.5.3 Interpreting context and conducting a functional analysis 
Before launching platform activities RIU needed to understand the socio-cultural and 
economic dynamics of the Coast Region in more depth. Hence the team organised a 
small brainstorming meeting involving 6 farmers, 2 representatives from NGOs 
working in the region, 1 staff from the Coast Regional office, and 2 representatives 
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from each of the 5 districts in the Region. Representatives from the Local Authorities 
were responsible for either livestock development or community development.  
The brainstorming meeting was part of a stakeholder consultative process to identify 
opportunities and bottlenecks in developing agri-business entrepreneurship capacity 
in the Coast Region. The information from the meeting was later used to suggest 
strategic areas to be focused on and the geographical coverage within the Region. 
The meeting also identified functions required to meet the innovation challenge and 
listed actors who were already performing the functions in the target areas. The listed 
actors were the first to be contacted during the stakeholder mapping exercise that 
followed.  
Understanding the context 
Participants had to build a common understanding of the context in which RIU was 
to operate. Therefore they were asked to respond to the following question: 
[“Various technical reports, and oral presentations from experienced 
development actors who have worked in Coast Region and numerous 
political speeches have clearly raised the concern that the current attitude 
and entrepreneurship capacities among the people in the Coast Region are 
very low to levels that may not be able to trigger support or sustain any rural 
development initiative in the region. With regard to the above explanation, 
answer the following questions; (i) What causes this situation? What makes 
people in the Coast less motivated to engage and excel in income generating 
activities, particularly in agribusiness unlike what is observed in other parts 
of the country? (ii) What are the key challenges if someone is to change the 
situation? (iii) What are the opportunities for changing the situation? (iv) 
What are the possible constrains towards such a change? How and who can 
deal or manage such constrains? (v) What is the role of technology in 
effecting such a change?” (RIU Meeting Report, 2009: p.9).] 
By asking these questions, RIU seized the opportunity to build a common perception 
of the problem with the community (represented by farmers), local leadership 
(represented by district staff), development practitioners (represented by NGOs), and 
the Central government represented by the office of the Regional Commissioner.  
This process also helped in creating a common position towards the implementation 
vision and strategies. The programme managed to make key actors see the problem 
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in the same way, as much as it could. Table 6-0 below lists the causes of low 
motivation for engaging in agribusiness activities as perceived by actors. 
Table 6-0: Causes of low motivation for engaging in agribusiness activities 
Cause Explanation 
1. Low levels 
of education 
at all levels  
Limiting their capacity to understanding, interpret and make use of 





Placing more emphasis on traditional practices rather than on 
development practices. For example, parents would rather marry off 
their daughters than taking them for further education. 
 A larger part of their extra time is also being spent on traditional 
activities (like seasonal dances, rituals, etc.) than on income generating 
and developmental activities.  
 They also have strong superstitious beliefs making them fear of being 
bewitched once they have attained higher economic levels. 




The long term dependence on crops like cashew nuts, coconuts, 
mangoes etc. has created a sense and culture of not doing any other 
agricultural or business activity during the un-productive seasons. They 
just wait to harvest. 
4. Extensive 
laziness  
Coast people do not like manual labour especially farming. They simply 
don’t work on their own without being pushed. Also there are 
perceptions that hard work is only for people from other regions. 




Most people in Coast region (apart from a small number of youths) have 
never travelled outside their homes. This limits their knowledge of other 
places as well as activities and opportunities that may be available 
outside their areas. This limits their overall ability to learn and adopt 
best practices from other regions in the country.  
6. Lack of 
capital  
I.e. in form of land and finances to carryout sustainable agribusiness 
activities, this is true especially for the youth, who are ambitious, have 
experienced some form of exposure outside their areas, and understand 
the need for economic development.  
7. Bi-annual 
rain season 
Although this is an opportunity, it is being misused by Coast people. For 
example most farmers may not plant during the first rains knowing that 
they have the second rain season to do so, this reduces their 
productivity. 
8. Gender roles 
and division 
of labour 
Culturally, division of labour in the Coast community is highly gender 
based. Men mostly do small scale fishing, younger females do domestic 
chores at home and older females engage in both domestic and 
sometimes agricultural activities. This is unlike other regions where 
both men and women fully engage in agricultural or business activities.  
9. Short term 
planning 
Majority Coast people are satisfied with the little they earn, and mostly 
it is hand to mouth. There is no culture for long term production and 
planning, hence the production is in small scale and un-sustainable. 
10. Urban 
migration 
(esp. of the 
youth) 
A significant manpower is lost through urban migration. The productive 
population i.e. youths travel to cities e.g. Dar es Salaam during working 
hours to search for labour that will provide immediate cash. As a result 
most of the productive force is being unutilised. 
Source: Analysed from RIU Meeting Report of 2009 
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From the above list, it was evident that RIU was faced by behavioural challenges 
more than technological. This added to the complexity of deciding what to do, how 
to do it and what to achieve given the duration of time available for the project. 
Actors were also asked to identify opportunities for improving the situation (see 
Table 6-1 below). 
Table 6-1: Opportunities for changing the above situation as mentioned by actors  
Opportunity Explanation 
1. Conducive climate for 
agricultural activities 
Availability of fertile land as an immediate resource, 
and biannual rainfall 
2. Proximity to the Dar es 
Salaam market 
Which is very close to their production areas, and has a 
huge population. 
3. Availability of labour and 
human resource  
Especially youths 
4. Presence of Natural resources  The regions is endowed with forests, ocean, and water 
sources i.e. rivers that can be used to facilitate several 
economic activities including, fishing, tourism, travel, 
and irrigation. 
5. Presence of government 
ministries and departments, 
development organisations 
both local and international 
With headquarters in Dar es Salaam which is a short 
distance from the Coast region. These also work on 
different development projects which can be integrated 
with other projects and activities in Coast Region. 
6. Presence of Research Centres Both for crops and livestock 
7. Presence of local and 
international experts 
Enhancing availability of expertise in different 
activities. 
8. Presence of activities and 
projects that can deliver 
results and investment returns 
in a short time 
example fishing, fruits and vegetable farming, tourism, 
poultry farming etc. 
9. Presence of technologies to 
simplify work and increase 
efficiency 
Most of the crops grown in the region have been widely 
researched and technologies tested in the field 
10. Conducive policy  The decentralisation policy  and a peaceful political 
environment 
11. Presence of cash crops doing 
well in the region 
Cash crops which are in high demand in the national 
and international markets e.g. cashew, coconut and 
mangoes 
12. Functional infrastructure 
systems 
The region has good roads (tarmac), presence of the 
harbour, and airport. 
13. Multi-cultural society People in Coast region are receptive to immigrants and 
people from other parts of Tanzania, and are willing to 
engage and work with them in many ways. 
14. High poverty which should compel people to work even harder and 
achieve more 
Source: Analysed from RIU Meeting Report of 2009 
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The discussion on opportunities indicated that innovation in the Coast region did not 
have to necessarily start from technology nor research. 
System Structure and functions 
According to RIU, the functional analysis identifies all what needs to be done to 
make the system work efficiently. Therefore, these actors were asked to sketch the 
ideal system to solve the challenge, which was now the system purpose. 
When listing functions needed to achieve that purpose, and therefore sketch the ideal 
system, participants used mostly their personal understanding on how the system 
should look like. So professional knowledge blended into personal views was used to 
visualise and sketch the ideal system, which to them it was more about visualizing 
the poultry value chain. The anticipation was that, if the system is assembled that 
way, and if it works efficiently, then the innovation challenge would be conquered. 
At this point RIU staff was not thinking about technologies and research outputs. 
Rather, they were focused on assembling actors and analysing the system. In other 
words they were establishing an innovation platform. The RIU role was therefore 
facilitation although to other actors it still looked like a normal project with funds 
and the power to decide everything. 
When conducting a ‘functional analysis’ based on the above innovation challenge, 
the group started from listing what is needed to make an efficient and profitable 
poultry industry and worked in retrospect how to achieve them. They basically 
visualised roles to be played in an ideal industry (system). In this case participants 
started by simulating the perceived ideal poultry value chain and listed functions 
deemed necessary in each component (see Table 6-2 below). Hence they divided the 
industry into production and marketing components and analysed routines, inputs 
and services needed. As they did this they happened to arrive at three supply chains 
i.e. the input supply chain (for chicks, feeds, vaccine and veterinary drugs), the 
service supply chains (for extension, business training/services, finance, 
transportation, regulation, and research) and the technology and equipment supply 
chain (see figure 1 below). As argued by Norman Clark, they ended up dividing the 
industry into a socio-economic system and a knowledge system (Norman Clark, 
2010). 
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Table 6-2: Functions and type of actors identified to meet the innovation challenge 
Function component Sub-functions Actors 
Production - Keeping chicken - Producers 
Quality Breed: Availability of 
quality poultry breeds including 
their production, distribution and 
rearing 
- Research  
- Keeping improved cocks 
- Extension Services 
- Research institutions; Breeders 
- Extension workers 
- Local Authorities 
Quality feeds: Adequate 
production, and distribution of 
high quality & affordable poultry 
feeds 
- Research 
- Feed manufacturing (Wholesale) 
- Distributors (retail) 
- Research institutions 
- Private feed producers 
- District level input sellers 
Control of Diseases: Reliable and 
timely supply of appropriate and 
affordable vaccination and 
treatment methods  and 
mobilisation of poultry farmers 
and communities to adopt 
preventive  measures 
- Research; Vaccine/ drugs 
production and/or importation 
- Retailing; Vaccination 
- Veterinary services + laboratory 
services; Extension Services  
- Research institutions;  
- Drug companies; Drug 
importers 
- Vet shops; Local input shops 
- Central Animal Laboratory 
- Veterinary investigation Centre 
(VICs); Extension staff + LAs 
Reliable chicken housing: 
Access to building materials and 
poultry equipment like feeders, 
drinkers, etc. 
- Design and Building Knowledge 
and Techniques:  
- Selling building equipment  
- Extension workers (LA) 
- Local (District level) hardware 
stores; Local artisans and 
contractors 
Access to Markets: Reliable 
information about markets, 
searching and linking possible 
markets with poultry farmers 
 
 





- Transportation  
- Hotels, Supermarkets, Local 
restaurants, food joints; 
Individual consumers; Food 
and drug authority  
- Food and health inspectors 
- Packing material producers and 
sellers; Transporters-buses, 
trucks. 
Advisory services: Provision of 
competent advisory services on 
modern poultry farming 
techniques 
- Research:  
- Extension services 
- Training in poultry 
- Government extension 
- NGOs, Individual farmers, 
- Media e.g. radio 
Transportation: Provision of 
reliable transport facilities, and 
reliable infrastructure, from 
poultry farms to  markets 
throughout the year 





Equipment and technology: 
Availability of appropriate 






- Production and importation of 
equipment for breeding 
(Incubators), feeding and  for 
carrying and transporting eggs, 
chicks and mature chicken, 
- Procurement of processing and 
value addition technology 
- Quality assurance 
- Manufacturers, 
- Importers, 
- Local dealers 
- Hatchery owners 
- Local handicrafts, 
- District input shops 
- Quality regulators 
 
Farmer mobilization: Formation 
and strengthening of poultry 
farmer groups and associations, 
forming linkages, 
advocacy/sensitization, and 






- Local Authorities, 
- Community Officers, 
- NGOs, 
Utilities: Availability of reliable 
supply of utilities i.e. water & 




- Water Supply company 
- Power supply companies 
- Local Authorities 
Entrepreneurship /business 
skills:  
Provision of appropriate 
- Developing modules 
- Training, 
- Producing and printing  
- NGOs, 
- Local Authorities 
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entrepreneurship and business 
skills to poultry farmers 
Processing: Slaughtering, 
plucking and packaging 
- Slaughter houses/slabs, 
- Packaging, Regulation 
- Processors 
- Regulators 
Consumption/ use of by-
products: Consumption of eggs, 
meat, live chicken, feathers, 
manure etc. 
- Eating eggs and meat 
- Using manure  
- Consumers, 
- Gardeners,  
- Retailers 
Financing - Providing loans 
- Providing grants 
- Banks, NGOs, Savings & 
Credit associations 
/cooperatives 
Source: Analysed from RIU Meeting Report of 2009 
Apparently, the above analysis was not specific to indigenous breeds, which implies 
that the group perceived the basic functions of an efficient poultry industry as breed 
insensitive. 
After the functional analysis, the next step was to identify relevant actors to work 
with. 
Mapping actors: Starting with whoever is there 
After the functional analysis exercise RIU hired two consultants to map actors in 
Coast Region and in Dar es Salaam City based on the identified functions. Dar es 
Salaam actors were also mapped because of the city’s economic dynamics and its 
proximity to the Coast region. Such actors were expected to be influencing the input 
and service markets, as well as the product markets because some of them could be 
providing services to the Coast region from the city. Geographical boundary was 
therefore flattened accepting that actors are not necessarily defined by their 
geographical locations. This exercise was random and identified actors based on 
asking who knew who, where. Thus one actor interviewed would mention another 
actor(s) he/she happened to know, and so on.  
In this assignment, consultants were asked to identify actors, visit them to see what 
they do, assess capacities (both full and operational), identify structural gaps i.e. 
functions with no actors performing them and possible reasons, and then get actors’ 
contacts and invite them for a meeting. This exercise took about 30 days to 
accomplish identifying 25 actors who were invited for the first brainstorming 
meeting which shaped processes that established the Entrepreneurship platform. In 
this meeting producer households were represented by farmers proposed by District 
Authorities who used their own criteria to select them. 
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According to the meeting report, the twenty five actors were; six farmers from five 
districts; two small scale hatchery owners producing chicks of indigenous breeds; 
five district level agricultural input shop owners; six representatives from Local 
Government Authorities (responsible for livestock); one large scale poultry inputs 
(feeds, drugs, vaccines, equipment etc.) manufacturer/importer and wholesaler; two 
representatives from organisations supporting rural producer groups; one 
representative from an organisation supporting development of small industries in 
one of the districts and therefore supporting fabrication of farm implements and 
equipment like low cost incubators, feeders, drinkers etc.; one business trainer; and a 
representative from Regional Authorities responsible for livestock regulatory and 
coordination functions at the regional level.  
In principle, RIU did not influence the process of selecting initial actors to work 
with. When asked during the interview why they did not work more carefully to 
make sure only the right actors are selected to work with, their response was: 
[“It does not matter where or with whom you start, because 
things get reorganised somehow as you go along. After all, 
how would you tell who is the right one and who is not before 
you even start?” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013).] 
While some might argue that some important actors like researchers, financial 
institutions and national level regulators from the Ministry were initially excluded, or  
that some of those present were less relevant at start, RIU staff explain in the 
interviews that at this point the intention was not to be exhaustive (or precise) on 
whom to work with. As it was mentioned earlier in the chapter, the process itself 
selects which actors to exclude and include. 
Negotiating for space in the local context 
It is worth noting that during these discussions RIU was not a passive actor which 
could not defend own interests. In particular, the RIU’s decision to work in the Coast 
Region and to use the innovation approach for 3 years was non-negotiable. Actors 
had to therefore plan and make decisions within those limits. The meeting 
proceedings also show that participants in the meeting were clearly informed that the 
RIU programme had to be implemented in such a way that it had a high likelihood of 
impacting on the lives of many poor people; it addressed the needs and limitations of 
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the vulnerable groups e.g. women, youths etc.; it stimulated the use of research 
outputs; and it built sustainable systems that could continue even after the 
programme phases out. These RIU positions are not found to be limiting actors’ 
interpretations of the context and definition of processes, at least not from what is 
presented in the content of what transpired during the two initial meetings. 
Moreover, RIU accepted change to its budget and funded the consultative visits to 
four Regions to identify priorities as a suggestion from actors. This activity was not 
in the budget but it was found useful and RIU paid for it. This means RIU allowed 
part of its implementation plan to be shaped by the stakeholders and therefore sought 
to become one with its environment and therefore create a shared goal with its 
context. 
Therefore, programme interests were continually negotiated throughout the 
discussions. For example, proceedings show that cassava, mangoes and beekeeping 
were also among the activities initially considered for the entrepreneurship platform. 
However, RIU argued against mangoes and other fruits as they required a lot of time 
and long term investments which was beyond the capacity of RIU and timeframe. 
The RIU team also argued further that benefits from such products would be limited 
to a few people while RIU was looking for impact at scale. Cassava was also taken 
out of the list to avoid duplicating other projects in the same target areas. So RIU 
wanted to safeguard its identity and avoid clashing with other development projects. 
6.6 Summary and conclusions 
The chapter describes the initial process of a programme which sought to understand 
how innovation could be promoted in poor economies by actually doing the 
promotion. It describes how RIU, balanced the ‘motives’ of the funder (DFID) and 
the ‘unpredictable choices’ from the context. In fact, it is this process of striking the 
balance between meeting expectations set by development actors, and those set by 
the society where the programme intervenes that defines effective innovation 
facilitation or brokering. Often, development actors have ‘motives and powers’ (both 
technical and financial)’ to influence and direct innovation, while on the other hand 
the target community has ‘texture and intrinsic powers’ (in terms of culture, 
knowledge, beliefs, skills, resources, etc.) which determine how the context will 
respond and emerge as a response to the programme influence. Apparently, both 
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‘powers’ play very important roles in initiating and shaping innovation processes 
needed to transform an industry dominated by subsistence producers. Both centres of 
power are necessary if transformation is to happen. Only a proper balance is needed 
to allow co-evolution of innovative processes. 
The chapter also describes how ‘innovation system thinking’ was practically used to 
guide programme implementation. It elaborates how RIU mobilised stakeholders and 
facilitated them to collectively identify the main problem and thereafter developed a 
strategy to address it. From this experience, the study confirms that knowledge and 
innovation can as well emerge from the society/users and not necessarily from 
research or experts. Therefore, RIU did not rely on a ready-made plan, but rather 
used local knowledge to conduct self-assessment, then sought solutions. 
Although stakeholder mobilisation is a popular practice in participatory planning, it 
does not always lead to identifying an innovation system, or an innovation challenge. 
Therefore, what is unique to RIU is how dialogues were used to identify and interpret 
a socio-cultural problem into an innovation challenge. And from the challenge a 
functional analysis was conducted to guide the establishment of a network or system 
to work on, or start with. Thus, by knowing which problem to solve, and agreeing 
what functions are needed to solve the problem, the type of relevant actors needed to 
build the system and work together to make the system running was known. 
Additionally, the analysis shows that, an innovation process can start with whoever is 
available, as long as relevant actors are supported to join in as needed. 
The chapter also makes it clear that stakeholders in the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania did not think in terms of which technology was needed. Rather they 
articulated problems more socially than technologically. To them the problem was 
‘laziness’ and not lack of technologies. And after further analysis they established 
that in order to solve that major social problem, addressing system failures was likely 
to be more effective than focusing on technology failures. And that is exactly what 
the programme did. Therefore, this is an example of an innovation process which 
started from a social problem, that later attracted new knowledge and technologies as 
solutions. Thus, the innovation system was connected to address a social quest.  
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Another important conclusion from the chapter is that planning to deliberately 
facilitate an innovation process means letting go of the well-established desire and 
culture to be in control of processes and eventualities, which are basically linked to 
the need to justify value for money. The facilitation also means flattening of 
professional demarcations so as to allow engagement of multiple actors in visualizing 
and managing processes. For example, RIU facilitated meetings involving different 
actors like researchers, government staff, private sector, and producers to meet and 
think collectively how to solve one problem. Therefore, the programme was able to 
visualise all actors and processes from a seamless web perspective. 
The chapter argues that RIU was faced by more behavioural challenges than 
technological. This added to the complexity of deciding what to do, how to do it and 
what to achieve given the time frame provided. In principle, RIU was not set out to 
develop the poultry industry but rather to use poultry to build people/actors’ 
capacities. This meant that poultry and its technologies were only means to the end, 
and that the capacity to make things work was in the people.  
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Chapter 7 Sketching networks to build trust 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues from where Chapter six ended. It describes the RIU process 
of influencing innovation behaviours and structures in the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania. The chapter explains how ideas and interventions gradually got shaped by 
what was happening on the ground. The chapter investigates the complex process of 
stimulating interactions among poor actors and the process of building networks and 
relevant systems capacities to innovate, as argued to have been adopted by RIU. 
The chapter is organised into four sections. Section two describes how RIU 
facilitated processes to analyse the poultry industry and understand it as a system. It 
explains how the system was assembled by bringing relevant actors together to 
brainstorm and agree on the problems to be solved. It explains how RIU built a 
common understanding of the industry as a system among different actors, and how 
stakeholders conducted a system analysis to identify systemic problems. The section 
presents these as very important processes which brought cohesion among different 
actors who had different interests and capacities. 
The third section explains how early trust was built among actors. It describes 
different processes which RIU facilitated in order to overcome different barriers at 
different levels. These included personal, cultural, organisational and even political 
barriers towards commercialisation of rural poultry enterprises. The section also 
describes how actors went through various negotiation processes before they could 
decide to engage and interact with each other. The sections ends by establishing the 
importance of creating a mental sketch of the envisaged network before actual 
interactions start. It also explains how important it was for RIU to meet the cost of 
sketching this network as no private sector would bear it. The study described it as 
the ‘social cost’ of building the basic infrastructure for interactions to be practicable. 
Finally, the fourth section summarises and concludes the chapter.  
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7.2 Understanding the system and creating a shared vision 
7.2.1 Mobilizing actors: Building a common understanding 
In April 2009 RIU organised the first meeting involving 25 actors. These actors were 
identified during a stakeholder mapping exercise based on pre-identified functions 
listed by national level poultry stakeholders and experts. This was the beginning of 
RIU facilitation to promote innovation in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. 
The objectives of this meeting were: first, to let actors meet for the first time and 
know each other face to face, and know the range of functions performed by others 
in the same industry; second, to build a common understanding on the concept of 
innovation platform, i.e. how it works and what actors should aim to achieve 
together; third, to conduct a system analysis and identify bottlenecks and challenges 
preventing the industry from performing well, and also proposing solutions to 
overcome the identified challenges; fourth, to come up with clear strategies and 
commitment to overcome the main innovation challenge identified by the national 
level stakeholders i.e. “How to develop agribusiness entrepreneurship capacity 
among the youth for sustainable income generation and enterprise development in 
Coast Region”; and fifth, to agree on how to continue interacting as a platform.  
According to interviews with ex-RIU team, this meeting was facilitated with the 
understanding that these actors would continue to operate as a platform and remain 
responsible for a continuous process of identifying problems, seeking solutions and 
utilizing proposed solutions. The anticipation was, as guided by the platform 
concept, that these actors would form institutionsformal or informalwhich will 
guide the industry even after RIU’s exist. However, due to different dynamics 
discussed in later sections, things changed and the platform idea was later 
abandoned. 
In this meeting RIU sought to create a common goal with the actors and thus 
negotiate to harmonise its interests with those of the actors. While the invited actors 
got the opportunity to understand the nature and interests of the RIU programme, the 
programme also understood the system, individual actors and their interests. In 
addition, actors also understood each other and compared their individual interests 
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with those of others. At this meeting RIU secured its position within the system and 
gained the initial trust from actors because, as actors continued to analyse the system 
through explaining what is happening, challenges and opportunities, RIU understood 
the context and therefore was able to visualise its role regarding where to intervene 
and how. Therefore, RIU as a programme was relying on the cognition of the actors 
present in the meeting, and that of its staff to define what RIU should do. As actors 
were defining their positions in the system, RIU was also defining its own.  It would 
have been counterproductive if RIU had opted to come with a blueprint on what to 
do. 
According to the interviewed actors who attended this meeting, the discussions and 
arguments raised in this first meeting had a significant effect on how they later 
decided to act and interact with other actors. One participant, a representative of 
poultry producers, said clearly that other actors made her understand how her 
behaviour made them decide not to interact with her. On the other hand, other actors, 
specifically the input and service providers, compared the meeting with a market 
exhibition where they displayed their products to rural poultry producers and RIU, 
who was then supposed to help in making input deals possible. It is important to note 
that, the actors in the supply side of the industry were already interacting and doing 
business with other poultry producers in urban and peri-urban areas, so all they 
wanted was to extend their client base to include rural producers. All suppliers 
believed to have the capacity needed to interact with rural producers. To them the 
only problem was insufficient demand and logistics surrounding rural transactions, 
meaning that producers were the main problem. But as described in later sections, 
this understanding was later proved to be wrong. 
7.2.2 Beyond meeting face-to-face 
As mentioned earlier, twenty-five actors attended the first platform meeting with 
most of them meeting for the first time. They started by knowing and learning about 
each other as persons and what they do. The meeting process required that actors sit 
at a table with people they did not know well and find out from each other in 15 
minutes, who they are, what they do and what they are really proud of in their 
personal and professional life. Then every actor kept on moving until he/she had met 
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all the 24 actors and had a personal chat. From this interaction actors were expected 
to have an idea of who is present in the room and type of work they do. During the 
interview one farmer said: 
[“I was surprised to know that there is someone making a 
living just from producing and selling chicks.” (Interview 
with a Producer, September 2013)]. 
This farmer did not know that if such a specialisation existed. Some service 
providers mentioned learning about business opportunities by hearing what others 
were doing. Therefore, the face to face meeting initiated a learning process and from 
which information was processed at personal level and facilitated future decisions. 
However, meeting face to face alone was not enough to change individual routines 
because at this point, any changes at individual level depended on a relative change 
on another actor’s level. Therefore, if RIU had ended its work by just facilitating 
face-to-face interactions, innovation would not have happened because what 
hindered their interactions was beyond not knowing each other and knowing each 
other’s existence. 
7.2.3 Systems analysis: What bottlenecks? 
In order to know where to intervene, actors were asked to analyse each function and 
identify key problems they perceived to be limiting growth in the rural poultry 
industry, and propose solutions. Data presented in Table 7-1 below show that during 
the analysis, actors perceived the system to have more organisational (59%) and 
knowledge (about 30%) challenges than technological and research29 related (see 
Figure 7-0 below). This is supported by the fact that poultry research is generally 
known to be well developed with numerous technologies available worldwide. 
However, these are not accessible to rural producers and have not been adapted to 
suit their contexts. Moreover, technologies such as those related to breeding, feeding, 
processing etc. were already present in Tanzania and used by commercialised actors 
(Msami, 2008a). The meeting therefore implied that, adoption and adaptation of such 
                                                 
29 Note that research here is looked at as a service to be demanded and provided to the industry and 
not as “the” source of technology or knowledge. In this case technology and knowledge are 
considered to have their own sources and research could just be one of them. 
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technologies were largely limited by organisational issues and lack of knowledge 
(see Table 7-0). 
  
The analysis also shows that some problems had more than one solution, i.e. they 
proposed 76 solutions to solve 61 challenges. Meaning that, a problem could be 
technical but in need of organisational and knowledge solutions as well. The fact that 
 
 
Figure 7-0: Analysis of system challenges done by stakeholders 
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a problem can have multiple solutions from multiple sources creates the possibility 
for complex multiple interactions in a system.   
Table 7-0: Frequency of systems bottlenecks and their solutions by categories 
  Knowledge Technology Organisational Research Policy Total 
Gap Sol Gap Sol Gap Sol Gap Sol Gap Sol Gap Sol 
Breeding 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 6 
Feeds 2 3 1 0 3 4 0 0 1 1 7 8 
Disease 
control 
4 4 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 7 6 
Extension 0 1 0 0 5 1 1 1 1 2 7 5 
Markets 3 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 1 1 4 5 
Equipment 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Farmer  
groups 
1 1 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 4 6 
Utilities 0 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 9 
Business 
skills 
0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Processing 1 3 1 2 3 4 0 0 0 0 5 9 
Use of by 
products 
1 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Financial 
services 
0 1 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 1 4 6 
Total  14 24 3 6 36 39 2 1 6 6 61 76 










    
76 
Source: Analysis of secondary data from RIU Reports, 2014  
 
Knowing the problems identified by actors and their potential solutions was not 
enough for RIU to know what to do. Gaps and solutions listed were beyond 
individual efforts and therefore needed collective actions to solve. For example, 
improving availability and quality of breeds or a strengthening of the extension 
system required different levels of interventions and actors and not just from 
individuals. However, all actors had to act in one way or the other to create this 
collective effort - and the question was how.  
So the next step was to find out why actors already performing those functions did 
not solve the problems to improve the situation. For example, why didn’t chick 
producers improve the breed quality? Or why didn’t feed manufacturers solve the 
quality and availability problems? The one clear answer that cut across all functions 
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was a perceived lack of ‘incentives’ to do so. Solving these problems required 
investment in terms of time, labour and financial capital which was not justified by 
expected returns. According to these actors, the level of demand and engagement, 
especially from rural producers was too low to justify any investment to increase 
quality or quantity. Government representatives also argued that the number of 
chickens kept in the villages – which was between 5 and 20 per household, was too 
small to trigger regulations or budget prioritization. Likewise, district level input 
suppliers mentioned that they did not stock poultry inputs in their shops because 
there was no demand. Therefore, demand was expected to pull supply and supply 
would pull knowledge, technology, policy, research and reorganization. 
Then the next question was why there was no demand from producers? Producers in 
the meeting raised the following arguments; First, they did not know if they could 
use any of the poultry inputs and services in raising local chickens. What they knew 
was that indigenous breeds of chicken were free range and did not need any extra 
feeding, or special shelter, not even vaccines and drugs. This is how it is done in the 
villages, and inputs and technologies were for improved breeds (i.e., kuku wa kisasa 
in Swahili); Second, the number of chickens kept did not justify building a shed or 
buying inputs. Five chickens could just squat in the kitchen at night and go out in the 
morning. Likewise, why buy vaccines and drugs just for 10 chickens? Third, the cost 
of inputs and other services was too high for them to afford. Therefore, the main 
problems were around knowledge, production scale and affordability. 
In raising the concerns above, producers argued that if extension service providers 
would have provided the information about the possibility of using the inputs to gain 
more income, and if input suppliers would have made them available at affordable 
prices, they would have considered increasing their production scale and produce 
more for the market. 
The conclusion was therefore that, the system was facing a ‘demand and supply 
deadlock’. This implied that both ‘supply-push’ and ‘demand-pull’ strategies were 
needed to unlock it. Basically, this realisation shifted the attention of RIU and other 
actors towards the economic angles of the problem at hand. And the question was 
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how could actors on the demand side, and those on the supply side interact? And 
where could their interaction space be? 
7.2.4 Discovering the ‘my business doesn’t know you’ effect  
As actors continued to interact and discuss what was limiting growth in the rural 
poultry industry, it became clear that the rural poultry production space was 
disconnected from the market where most other actors operated. Thus producers 
became outliers in the system separated from the critical ‘interaction possibility 
space’ mainly by how they managed their enterprises and even more so by their 
physical distance. By not producing for the market, and by operating in remote areas, 
the rural chicken producers made themselves unattractive for partnerships with other 
actors in the system, including the government. This came out clearly as producers 
mentioned to have no reasons to interact with input suppliers because they did not 
need their products. Similarly, input suppliers expressed no desire to interact with 
rural producers because there was insufficient demand to trigger business ties. At this 
point the situation was clear that unless their enterprises were also in synchrony, 
knowing each other as persons was not going to change anything.  
Clearly, all poultry inputs suppliers present in the meeting were already interacting 
with poultry producers at the input markets, where they exchanged commercial 
inputs. Therefore, for the rural producers to also interact with these suppliers, they 
too had to find their way to the input market. It occurred that both sides needed a 
common space where the interaction would be governed by common and mutually 
accepted rules, and the market was the best place because the ‘individual production 
space’ was found too private for such a interaction.  
The above discussion indicates that linking actors in a system also involves linking 
what they do. That is, finding overlaps between actors’ preoccupations and establish 
relationships between them. In addition, the overlaps must be perceived by actors 
involved.  Therefore, in order for actors in a system to interact, their businesses need 
to have the affinity for each other, and which should exist both at purpose and 
operational levels. Therefore, all enterprises in the industry had to be synchronised 
into one big orchestra, which though encompassing many and different instruments, 
had to stay in tune with each other. Like musicians and their instruments in an 
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orchestra, these actors’ saw the need for their enterprises to ‘need’ each other in 
order to accomplish what they do as an industry. This was paramount because it is 
through the negotiations to satisfy such needs that interactions become economical. 
In fact, creating and consciously perceiving these overlaps were very important steps 
in establishing reasons for interactions. 
The argument here is that, within a socio-economic system there are two 
interdependent levels of interactions i.e. the ‘human-agent interactions’ and the 
‘enterprise-agent interactions’. Analysing the poultry industry case, shows that the 
human-agency interactions are needed to channel information and interpret it into 
choices and decisions. While the enterprise-agency is needed to give purpose to the 
interactions and produce value. For example, what is going on within a given poultry 
enterprise defines needs and subsequently defines the type of interactions needed to 
satisfy those needs. So the enterprise produces a need and the human-agency uses the 
information to make decisions on the type of interactions, select which supplier and 
then do the actual interaction with the counterpart human-agency (who will again 
interact with his enterprise) to satisfy the need (See Figure 7-1 below).  
Without the enterprise, the human-agent would not have decided first to interact with 
any suppliers, and the agent would not have known which supplier (for chick or feed) 
to interact with. Once the decision to interact has been made, the human-agent will 
do the actual interaction and get the input, then the enterprise will utilise the input 
and give value to the interaction by producing output. Moreover, if the enterprise 
fails to produce value from the inputs (i.e. from what was gained from the 
interaction) the human-agent will use the information as a feedback to make another 
decision-either to change the supplier or change the product of the interactions (i.e. 
by a different brand of the same type of input etc.). For example, if producer 
administers a drug and the chick does not respond positively, then he would consider 
buying another brand or even changing supplier.  
From poultry actors’ perspective, ‘interaction CD’ did not exist because 
‘enterprise-agency A’ was not producing for the market, hence did not need outputs 
from ‘enterprise-agency B’. Consequently, ‘Interaction AB’ became redundant. 
I.e. both the chick supplier and the producer did not find the reason to interact with 
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each other because the producer was relaying on natural breeding. Likewise,  
‘interaction CD’ did not exist because what was shaping ‘Interaction AC’ had 
nothing in common with what was shaping ‘Interaction BD’, i.e. the later was 
market driven, while the former was not. 
 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2015 
Therefore, in order to create a meaningful interaction, all interactions (i.e. AC, BD, 
CD and AB) must exist. This means adjusting the purpose and routines within 
‘enterprise-agency A’ to be market driven and therefore be in tune with 
‘enterprise-agency B’. The adjustments are expected to consequently change 
‘Interaction AC’ and synchronise it with ‘Interaction BD’. Once ‘Interactions AC 
and BD’ are both market orientated, then ‘Interaction AB’ will exist to sustain 
Interaction CD’ which is key in driving the system. 
It was also reasoned that once the purpose of ‘enterprise-agency A’ changes for the 
market, more interactions with other enterprise-agencies will be justified, and 
learning and innovation will be necessary. The workshop participants’ assumption 
was, once enterprise-agencies (e.g. a poultry farm and a hatchery) interact, the need 
for new routines emerges and learning and innovation take place. Furthermore, as 

















Interaction AC Interaction BD 
Interaction AB 
Figure7-1: Illustrating the interdependence between ‘human’ and ‘enterprise-agencies’ 
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Therefore, the entry point was to make farmers produce for the market. Hence 
decision was made to commercialise their poultry enterprises so that they demanded 
more inputs. The increased demand for inputs was expected to trigger demand for 
new knowledge on how to utilise/administer them, and consequently trigger 
competition and investment to increase quality and quantity of inputs and services. 
At this point, the supply chain was assumed to be sufficiently capable of responding 
to demand. However, this was later proved wrong as explained later in the thesis.  
Therefore, all enterprises in the industry had to be synchronised to need each other 
(i.e. have ‘affinity’ for other enterprises). Which means, what was going on in the 
farms, had to be linked to what was going on in the actors’ units, e.g. hatcheries, feed 
plants, input shops, etc., And specifically, producers had to find their way to the 
input and output markets and create a significant presence. This meant a significant 
number of producers was needed to create significant volumes of both demand and 
supply. 
7.2.5 Visualizing sub-systems to identify initial entry points 
In the process of developing strategies to promote producers’ interactions within the 
industry, the workshop divided the industry into three main subsystems, namely (i) 
the production subsystem where rural producers keep chicken to maturity until they 
are consumed or disposed through selling or as gifts; (ii) the input subsystems 
where chicks, feeds, vaccines, drugs and other equipment are manufactured, 
imported and distributed; and (ii) the product market subsystem where poultry 
products are sold or consumed. Other functions/services like extension, training and 
regulation were put in all the three subsystems (See Figure 7-2 below).  
Although it is not clear from RIU reports why such categorization was done, 
interviews with RIU staff show that actors analysed the functions in terms of supply 
and value chains. Then judged which parts of these two chains were critical and 
relevant for improving producers’ present situation. So they first looked at 
producers’ situation and reasoned they needed to start interacting with input markets 
in order to interact with all supply chains. This meant producing for the market. 
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Therefore, the meeting considered markets as interaction hubs where producers and 
suppliers could meet. They divided the input markets further into feed, chick, 
vaccine, and drug markets. According to them, these markets were organised and 
therefore behaved differently, hence producers were also expected to interact with 
them differently. This suggests that actors recognised the ‘input markets’ as not 
necessarily governed by the same conditions or rules. Further subdivision of the 
input market into individual inputs markets was done to create even smaller 
subsystems, i.e. for chicks, feeds, vaccines and drugs supply. See figure 7-2 below. 
 
 
Source: Field Data Analysis, 2015 
Knowledge 
(How to administer) 
Knowledge 
(How to rear chicken) 
Knowledge 






























Figure7-2: Sub-systems identified during the first stakeholder’s meeting  
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As discussed in the previous sections, the main challenge for the platform was to 
address the perceived problem of “laziness” by building entrepreneurship capacity 
and zeal. Therefore, supporting rural producers to produce for the market could not 
be more relevant to RIU. In this case, platform members had figured out that 
producing for the market would mean creating income expectations and therefore 
make producers learn and work hard.  
Then the next question was, ‘why were producers not in the market?’ 
7.2.6 Why are interactions currently low?  
When discussing system challenges all other actors were discussed as individuals 
who could interact in the system and make significant changes. However, rural 
producers were discussed as a group whose collective behaviour had influenced the 
way other actors interacted with them. For example, having 100 producers keeping  
two chickens under traditional system made input suppliers not attracted to open 
input shops in their villages. Furthermore, opening an input shop in a village 
wouldn’t have necessarily influenced how producers kept chicken in the villages.  
Thus during the analysis, most actors, and especially poultry inputs suppliers and 
services providers expected producers to visibly demand their services. This meant 
changing the way producers kept chicken in such a manner that they start to use 
inputs. Therefore, making rural chicken enterprises demand inputs was mentioned to 
be the only way interactions between rural producers and input markets would 
increase. This meant making the enterprises need services from the markets. 
A platform meeting report of 2009 shows actors concluding that relying on natural 
breeding made producers unable to decide on the scale of production, hence they 
were forced to keep very few birds. This gave no reasons to expand beyond the 
traditional system. The same meeting argued that producers were too poor to afford 
inputs even if they wanted to expand. Thus, poverty was concluded to be both a 
cause and effect of low innovation in the industry. 
Input suppliers and other service providers argued that producers were too poor and 
too scattered in remote areas to do business with. Thus the cost of doing business 
with them was too high. Their behaviour was influencing the behaviour of other 
actors negatively. It was concluded that other actors in the industry could not 
 188 
influence the behaviour of the producers by just adjusting their own routines, because 
a significant change involving a significant number of producers, all changing at the 
same time was necessary. 
Therefore, a ‘supply-demand deadlock’ was identified as the main problem. This was 
concluded because of the following; there were actors already engaged in poultry 
activities; technologies and skills were floating around (some already used by other 
poultry producers in the country); poverty was there to be eradicated as a motive, 
and market for local chicken was there to the extent that consumers were already 
paying a premium price to buy local chicken meat and eggs. So the question was 
why wasn’t the sector growing? Suppliers complained of lack of demand for poultry 
inputs and services from rural producers while rural producers complained of lack of 
knowledge and capacity to use poultry inputs in keeping local chickens.  
7.2.7 Selecting Commercialisation as the driving theme 
After the discussions in the meetings, each actor was expected to make significant 
adjustments in their routines. Resources had to be reallocated and new habits and 
processes had to be adopted. For rural producers, the proposed change required them 
to take new risks including reorganising their labour and resources. They also needed 
to influence each other and gain the size and volumes needed to attract other actors 
into associating with them. They also had a lot to learn to be able to gain the 
anticipated income. More importantly, there needed to be ‘trust’ that once they 
decide to take the risks on their part, other actors would not let them down. 
So RIU facilitated process to stimulate producers’ desire to explore new ways of 
doing things. RIU explained to producers the kind of changes required at production 
level, including in routines, attitude, skills, organisational, resource allocation, etc. 
Producers were also told how such changes would stimulate changes in the 
remainder parts of the system. According to RIU, this discussion was meant to 
prepare them for changes, some of which were unknown to RIU as well.  
Additionally, before other actors like chick producers and input suppliers could 
reorganise their enterprises to fit in the requirements of doing business with rural 
producers, they needed the assurance that the quantities demanded would be 
sufficient and sustainable to justify the changes. They also wanted to be assured of 
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producers’ ability to pay. Indirectly, they also wanted to be sure that rural producers 
would be able to effectively use their products and therefore find them useful and 
ensuring their continuous use. This means suppliers wanted to know how farmers 
would be supported to be able to utilise their goods and services. 
Therefore both sides needed to negotiate before they could actually change. 
7.3 Quantifying uncertainties and building early trust 
The desire to quantify uncertainties associated with the proposed shifts was 
expressed by actors who required new investments or reallocation of resources in 
changing routines. This necessitated the programme to facilitate prior negotiations 
before any transactions or physical change in enterprise routines started. In doing this 
RIU found itself sketching the envisaged network by facilitating prior negotiations 
between and among actors. It turned out that this sketching process made actors gain 
some degree of trust and confidence on corresponding actors’ behaviour regarding 
the anticipated changes. It is from this sketch that actors were able to visualise the 
collective move of changing routines towards a common goal. It gave actors the 
opportunity to ensure all relevant actors needed to complete the chain are lined up 
and the necessary arrangements have been set.  
The sketching process made sure that basic capacities and structures needed for each 
actor to respond to changes made by others were in place. This was very important 
because no actor wanted to change routines without being sure that others would 
respond effectively. For example, poultry producers did not want to build new sheds 
and find no chicks or vaccines to buy, and hatchery owners did not want to invest in 
producing more chicks only to find very few producers ready to buy a few chicks. So 
the first key actors, i.e., producers, chick suppliers and input suppliers, whose 
changes in routines involved cash investment, wanted to be sure of other actors’ 
ability to respond to the expected changes. 
Sketching the network also had a cost which was fully paid by RIU. RIU organised 
meetings, visits, telephone calls and other logistical costs to facilitate dialogues 
between or among parties. The network had to be sketched in a timely manner, and 
relevant actors had to be ready for the anticipated changes. This included knowing 
how they were going to achieve what was expected. Although the sketching was only 
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conceptual, the decisions made out of the negotiations were very important towards 
the achievement of the activities that followed. 
The RIU reports show different levels of interactions made to sketch the envisaged 
network. Those are; (i) interactions to internalise the commercialisation idea; (ii) 
interactions to overcome personal and socio-cultural barriers; (iii) interactions to 
ground the programme with local politics (i.e. seeking local political approval); and 
(iv) interactions to negotiate access to poultry inputs and services. As it will be 
described below, different actors interacted in different meetings aiming to build a 
common understanding, manage fears, and getting everyone ready for change. 
7.3.1 Internalisation of the proposed commercialisation idea 
RIU organised twenty village meetings (i.e. five in each programme district) 
involving rural producers, RIU team members, poultry input suppliers, and other 
professionals. The objective of these meetings was to elaborate to producers what 
commercialisation meant, what it would entail and what are the benefits. The 
meetings allowed producers to ask questions and express fears. 
In these meetings major changes in the way producers kept chickens were discussed 
in detail.  Reading from proceedings of these meetings, it is actually at this point 
when farmers started to get a glimpse of the magnitude of changes they had to make. 
They were informed about new routines associated with commercialising including 
the need to use different inputs and technologies. Specifically, they were informed of 
the need to start buying day-old chicks from hatcheries, keeping chicks warm and 
feeding them with special feeds until they are two months old when they would be 
able to go out and fend for themselves. They also learnt that they had to build sheds 
to protect chickens from predators as they would now be too many to share the main 
house with the family. They were also told of the need to control diseases though 
vaccination, proper nutrition and even treat them with drugs when they fall sick. This 
meant learning how to care for day-old chicks, feed, vaccinate and even detect 
disease symptoms; and that by doing so chicken mortalities would decrease and they 
would mature after 3 to 4 months instead of 18 months. 
During these meetings producers had the opportunity to understand how their 
behaviour influenced those of other actors, and that all had to change if they were to 
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meet their shared and separate goals. Therefore, as producers interacted to 
understand commercialisation they also initiated a learning process towards changing 
their behaviours and consequently changing the dynamics of the entire 
industry/system.  
Other actors present in the meetings also understood the potentials and possibilities 
of doing business with rural producers. Actors like input suppliers told producers 
what they needed in order to do business with them. It was during these meetings 
that producers understood why they needed inputs and why the right volumes had to 
be consistently demanded if someone had to make them available in their vicinity. 
It is important to note that during these meetings producers were cognitively freed 
from fears and perceptions of limitations related to their subsistence nature. Rather 
they were facilitated to understand the shift and define the best way to engage and 
make the shift. What I am highlighting here is the tendency to pre-determine what 
the poor can or cannot do without giving them the opportunity to experiment beyond 
their current limits. Consequently, the possibility of creating mechanisms to support 
them to experiment other paths is largely overlooked and denied. So my argument 
here is that, what development actors perceive to be appropriate for the poor should 
not be the verdict. Rather, they should allow the poor to make choices and define 
their own development paths. This includes exposing them to options and providing 
support to experiment until they choose their best position.  
Using perceptions on ‘poverty status’ or ‘vulnerability levels’ to benchmark types of 
technology or innovations to be introduced to a certain community in the name of 
seeking what is ‘appropriate’ for them is actually a form of discrimination because it 
underrates  the cognitive ability of the poor to choose and adapt technologies for 
their suitability. For example, the current penetration and usage of mobile phones in 
poor communities was unexpected because the initial thinking was the technology 
was too expensive and required skills and infrastructure not available in those 
communities (May Julian, Waema Timothy M., 2014; p.4-6). Sadly, there was too 
much focus on what was lacking i.e. poverty, high illiteracy levels, lack of electricity 
and skills to maintain and repair than on the abilities within these people to shape and 
adapt. Therefore, what the RIU experience elaborates here is the possibility of 
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focusing on creating a mental shift towards setting new expectations, rather than 
being fixated on existing limitations; then later facilitate processes to innovate 
around the limitations.  
7.3.2 Overcoming personal and socio-cultural barriers 
After the village meetings, producers were given 90 days (approximately 3 months) 
to decide whether they wanted to join the programme or not. According to RIU staff, 
each producer had an opportunity to join the programme. The only selection criteria 
were commitment to build a simple shed using locally available materials, and to 
commit to the programme. It happened that producers maintained discussions among 
themselves and within their families which according to one interviewee (Interview 
21) helped them make the final decisions. 
These interactions among producers were triggered by the need for individual 
producers to overcome personal barriers and make the decision to raise chickens 
differently. According to interviewed producers, being new to the idea, they had to 
go through a negotiation process with themselves, their families and with the rest of 
the community. Apparently, three issues were mentioned during group interviews as 
the main concerns which occupied these negotiations. First was whether they would 
manage to raise so many chickens (personal ability doubts). Second was if there 
would not be problems with resource allocations at household level as time 
progresses (resource capacities). Lastly, was whether raising local chickens 
differently would produce results claimed by RIU and poultry input suppliers. 
This process took producers a long time as they had a lot to deal with. During the 
interview it came out clearly that some farmers were quicker to decide than others 
depending on different factors, both personal and cultural. It appeared that, although 
most of them wanted to gain more income and get out of poverty, they did not 
believe keeping chicken could achieve that. This feeling was founded on socio-
cultural and widely promoted scientific findings regarding the productivity and value 
of the indigenous breeds of chicken.  For many years, science has argued that local 
chickens have low genetic potentials hence are not suited for commercialisation. 
Apparently, those who were quick to decide took the responsibility of encouraging 
others because other actors, especially input suppliers had indicated the need for a 
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significant volume of demand before they could respond and supply. Consequently, 
RIU set a minimum of 25 households per village before the programme could work 
in a particular area. This need for volumes and specific numbers of producers 
intensified the farmer to farmer interactions which resulted into continuous 
interpretations of concepts and ideas into their own (local) language and meanings. 
Interviews reveal that producers who did not believe in commercialisation interacted 
within the community more intensely than they did before with some trying to learn 
and others trying to convince others out of the programme. These opposed ideologies 
led into building alliances among those who opposed commercialisation and those 
willing to try. The opposing side argued from the perspectives of what they have 
heard before about the poor performance of local chickens as well as from the past 
experiences of failed poultry development programmes. Therefore, to them the 
proposed transformation was too radical to be possible. Like one producer said: 
[“It was just another programme that comes and goes.” 
(Interview with Producer, September 2013)]. 
 They also found the proposed new ways of keeping chicken very demanding and 
therefore increasing household workload. The workload issue was important because 
the community used to let chickens fend for themselves and not feeding or fetching 
water for them. Therefore, the ability to allocate household labour and financial 
resources for the new poultry enterprise was very critical during the decision making 
process. However, as Mama Maimuna Mkongea said: 
[“The more we argued among ourselves, the more we understood 
how lazy we were, and kept on advising each other on why we 
had to change…” (Interview with Producer, September 2013)]. 
From the discussion above three areas of fear emerged, and those were, one, 
reliability of the programme (‘it’s just another programme”… “They are lying, 
there is no way of getting so many chicks of local breeds”), two, individual 
producer’s capacity (“..can we keep so many chickens? … it’s a lot of work..”), and 
three, the performance of the local chicken breed (“.. these local chickens can’t be 
commercialised”). As we will come to learn later, building producers’ confidence in 
these three areas was very important before they could start keeping chicken as a 
business.  
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7.3.3 Grounding processes with local politics 
RIU documents and interviews clearly show the importance of local politics in the 
programme activities. As a result, names of representatives from all Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs) where the programme worked are found in all 
proceedings of stakeholders’ meetings. According to RIU staff, LGAs were very 
important stakeholders who had to understand and share the new vision together with 
other actors. They were involved from the very beginning as custodians of the 
society’s order and norms. LGAs were also the employers of the government 
extension workers whom the programme had to work with. Therefore, before actual 
implementations started, they too had to be in harmony with the new vision. 
After the initial stakeholder meetings in which two staff from each LGA attended, 
and which elected the district champions, one would have expected LGAs to have 
had a clear understanding of the intentions of the programme. However, they were 
yet to know their roles and further dialogue was necessary (Interview 30). Therefore 
further meetings between Champions and LGAs through the Departments for 
Agriculture and Livestock were organised. During these meetings, Champions 
represented their fellow producers to introduce the programme to the District Office 
and explained what they wanted to do and achieve as producers. The LGA explained 
what they expected in terms of communication and reporting. The LGA wanted 
monthly reports from champions through the Ward Extension Officers (WEO). The 
Rufiji district Champion, described this meeting as an obligation to inform and report 
formally to the authorities rather than a negotiation between producers and LGAs. 
She said: 
[ “… I was just reporting to them so they would not complain in the 
future that RIU just came here and worked with farmers without 
informing them” (Interview with Producer, September 2013)].  
Therefore, unlike other actors, producers did not see LGAs as actors to directly 
transact with but as routine authority figures. After these meetings, District Livestock 
Officers (DLO) (or District Agriculture and Livestock officers (DALDO)30 
                                                 
30 Some Districts have only one person in charge of both Agriculture and Livestock i.e. DALDO, 
while some have two individuals one for Livestock (DLO) and another for Agriculture (DALDO). 
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depending on who was there) and District Veterinary Officers (DVO) officially 
became the link between the programme and LGAs. 
7.3.4 Business negotiations and action planning 
RIU reports show initial contacts between poultry producers and input suppliers. The 
first contact was during the stakeholders meeting where all actors identified during 
the stakeholder mapping exercise (discussed in section 7.3.4 above) were invited. 
During the meeting each stakeholder described his or her involvement in the poultry 
industry which gave producers the opportunity to learn the existence of specialization 
in supplying poultry inputs as a business. The Rufiji Champion said; 
[“It was during these introductions that I realised there were people 
who produced just indigenous chicks as a business. I didn’t know 
that before” (Interview with Producer, September 2013).] 
Therefore, these initial interactions helped producers to learn about existence of 
inputs suppliers from whom they could buy inputs on one hand, and helped suppliers 
to show case their capacity to supply different inputs and services to producers.  
About ten inputs suppliers are reported to have attended the first stakeholders 
meeting. One of them was a company called Farmers Centre Ltd. (see also Section 
1.3.2) involved in providing a wide range of services to both crop and livestock 
producers. Farmers Centre manufactures, imports, sells, and distributes feeds, 
vaccines, drugs, farm implements and even provides advisory services to farmers all 
over the country. The company sells to regional, district and other local input shops 
at wholesale and do retail sells to individual customers who visit their shop in Dar es 
Salaam. At the time of the meeting, the company was already working with small 
crop farmers through local input shops in remote parts of the country. So this was 
another opportunity for the company to expand its client base. Other suppliers 
attending the meeting were two chick producers specialized in producing chicks from 
crossbreeds of indigenous chickens. One of them was a public institution called Ruvu 
JKT (A National Service Camp) who had been in the chicks business for over ten 
years but mainly with urban and peri-urban commercial poultry keepers as their main 
clients. Another chick supplier present was a private entrepreneur going by the 
business name ‘Kalambo Metals’ who also fabricated simple incubators for sell. 
Kalambo Metals claimed to have a machine capacity to produce about 60,000 chicks 
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per week. Both suppliers claimed to be producing at below capacity because there 
was no demand. 
RIU also invited district input suppliers who were expected to sell inputs to farmers. 
These suppliers were already selling agricultural inputs and selected livestock inputs, 
mainly for cattle, goats and pigs. With an exception of those from peri urban areas, 
most of them did not stock poultry inputs. Although some of these shop owners 
reported stocking maize bran which can be fed to chickens, they did not target 
poultry but pigs and dairy cows. When asked why they did not stock poultry inputs, 
the answer was because rural poultry producers did not use inputs. Hence the 
problem was lack of demand and not shop’s capacity to stock and supply. 
After the first meeting, three input suppliers, i.e. Farmers Centre, Kalambo Metals, 
and respective district input shop owner (of respective districts) attended village 
meetings (described in section 7.5.1 above) organised and chaired by District 
Champions. These meetings were meant to sensitize farmers to commercialise their 
chicken enterprises. These meetings were also attended by Ward and Village 
Extension Officers (WALEO and VALEO respectively) who presented an overview 
of basic poultry husbandry routines expected once producers decide to 
commercialise. The new husbandry routines include buying chicks, feeds for chick 
(chick mash), vaccines, and other drugs. The reasons why each input was needed 
were explained and farmers had the opportunity to ask questions. Input suppliers 
responded as relevant. In addition, extension officers already known to the villagers 
also explained their roles and how they would support them as part of their job. 
During all these meetings producers remained the focus. All other actors were treated 
as means to helping farmers commercialise their poultry enterprises. RIU and other 
actors were made to believe that lack of effective demand was the only reason why 
producers and other actors were not transacting. Consequently, significant effort was 
put in articulating and stimulating demand from producers. Apparently, input 
suppliers made it clear that for them to do business with rural producers there had to 
be a significant number of producers keeping a significant number of chickens. This 
was meant to reduce transaction costs and RIU had to make sure a sufficient number 
of producers was mobilized to join the programme. 
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RIU innovation diaries show that it was after these initial interactions that the actual 
sketching of the network began. 
7.3.5 Meeting the cost of sketching anticipated networks 
As explained at the beginning of section 6.4, actors who had to invest or make major 
changes in their routines needed some kind of prior assurance. This required 
negotiations among and between actors before individual actors could make any 
adjustments. This process of facilitating negotiations and agreeing on tentative action 
plans is what is referred to in this study as ‘sketching the anticipated network’. 
According to RIU, three major negotiations took place i.e. regarding chick supply, 
input supply (feeds, drugs and vaccines) and provision of extension services. These 
involved producers, Kalambo Metals (chicks), Farmers Centre Ltd. (inputs), and 
Local Government Authorities (extension). These negotiations are discussed further. 
Linking producers with Kalambo Metals (Chicks supplier) 
Kalambo Metals is a small private enterprise owned by two brothers. During 
stakeholder mapping conducted by RIU, their owners said the business had capacity 
to produce up to 60,000 chicks per week if assured of demand. RIU took the 
entrepreneurs’ word and therefore did not assess to confirm this capacity. 
The chick producers were very specific that they would only supply if assured of 
producers’ ability to pay 600 Tshs per chick (about US$ 0.5), to collect chicks right 
from the hatchery, and keep on buying chicks every week. The negotiation report 
expresses Mr. Kalambo’s doubt on producers’ ability to pay 60,000 Tshs (US$50) to 
buy 100 chicks and still be able to pay for other inputs like vaccines, feeds and 
essential drugs. In principle, Mr. Kalambo wanted to know if farmers would be 
assisted to be eligible for a business partnership. On the other hand, farmers wanted 
to know how the quality of chicks would be assured.  
According to RIU staff, the typical role of RIU here would be to organise the 
meeting and facilitate the negotiation process with the assumption that the two 
parties would reach an agreement. However, since poor producers were involved, 
RIU had the responsibility of innovating to compensate for the weaknesses of the 
poor producers’ position. Otherwise the supplier would see no justification to 
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transact with them. Consequently, RIU had to negotiate with producers on what they 
could afford and how RIU was to help. The meeting report says: 
[“After negotiations, farmers agreed to pay 15,000 Tshs. and 
RIU agreed to top up the balance of 45,000Tshs. This loan 
was to be recovered from producers once they have sold the 
mature chickens after 4 months.” (RIU, 2009; p.8)] 
By doing this RIU was playing the role of a lending institution. The RIU coordinator 
writes in her report that: 
[“This decision was necessary and had to be spontaneous. Without 
providing this support commercialisation would not have started as 
no bank would have provided such a loan to such poor farmers. It 
was a risk that the programme had to take.” (RIU, 2010; p.5).] 
The next concern was how producers would pay for the chicks. The chick producer 
wanted the easiest and the cheapest way to collect payments from producers who 
were many and spread out in different remote villages. Producers had to innovate and 
agree on how best they could collect payments from farmers and pay for each order. 
Such a collective payment had never been required from these producers before 
(Interview 21). Moreover, they had to have all producers paying at the same time. 
According to the Bagamoyo Champion, this was a big challenge and they had to rely 
on RIU whom they considered to be neutral and was trusted (Interview 12). 
Therefore, producers recommended setting paying 15,000 Tshs as one of the criteria 
for joining the programme and for receiving chicks. The plan thus became that 
Champions collect money from producers and submit to RIU. Then RIU adds the 
balance and pays the chick producer. This was very convenient to the chick producer. 
However, another concern emerged on what would happen if chicks are hatched and 
farmers have not paid? RIU accepted to continue paying the chick producer and take 
the responsibility of collecting money from producers. The programme officer said: 
[“We had to do this to allow things to happen for actors to see and 
take over at a later stage.” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013).]  
By accepting this role, RIU was absorbing administrative costs related to chicks 
transactions. Then transport issues also needed solution. In this case, producers 
agreed to order collectively and share the cost. This meant hiring transport and 
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distributing the cost to producers whose chicks have been procured. After agreeing 
on payment and transport modalities, producers wanted to know how the quality of 
chicks would be assured. Regarding this RIU agreed to arrange for government 
inspection of the hatchery as per regulations and also promised a regular vaccination 
certification by District Authorities before transporting chicks to the villages.  This 
meant indirectly adding the Central Government and the LGA into the transaction. 
Linking producers with District input suppliers 
Producers needed a close source of inputs and district level input shops were the best 
available option. These were identified during the mapping exercises and they also 
attended all initial meetings. However, a special meeting was needed between 
farmers and the dealers to negotiate the anticipated partnership.  Thus RIU organised 
five district meetings, and the situation was different in each of them. 
A unique negotiation experience is reported in Rufiji district, which was the first to 
be organised. The dealer in Rufiji was also a government extension worker whom 
producers knew well. His shop was known for selling other livestock (mainly cattle) 
and crop inputs. He also sold poultry inputs to a few commercial chicken producers 
who raised improved breeds of chicken in the township. During the meeting, he 
wanted to know how producers would pay for the inputs. His doubts were confirmed 
by producers who then asked RIU to help. According to RIU staff, giving loans was 
not in the programme’s plan. One officer said: 
[“The programme was expected to ‘promote’, ‘facilitate’ and 
‘build capacities’. These words were everywhere in the 
programme documents but their exact meaning was unclear. But 
nobody thought giving loans was part of it. After all there was no 
such a budget line” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013)].  
In the end, RIU agreed to give input loans to producers and an ‘input voucher 
system’ was later established. Again RIU had to complement producers’ capacity if 
processes were to start. Apparently, their proof of faith in the process also reinforced 
the faith of other actors. For example, the Rufiji district Champion said; 
[“When RIU accepted to give us input loans, they proved to us 
that they truly believed keeping chickens was profitable. 
Otherwise how would they have accepted?” (Interview with 
Producer, September 2013)]. 
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 So RIU confirmed to the dealer that there would be a significant number of 
producers supported by the programme to buy inputs from his shop. 
The next challenge arose when the dealer requested for extra capital to stock the 
inputs. He explained that, what the programme was doing was to stimulate many 
producers at the same time. This meant high volumes of each input would be needed 
at the same time. One producer said during the interviews that: 
[“We understood the dealer because he had to buy many doses of 
vaccines, many bags of feeds, and many drugs at the same time. 
While before he just bought a little of everything and replenished 
as they were sold.” (Interview with Producer, October 2013)].  
This meant the programme was putting extra pressure on the dealer’s capital. 
At this point, producers wanted to be sure of inputs supply before they decided to 
receive chicks. RIU had also the commitment to see the process through. Therefore, 
RIU discussed with the dealer and asked him to explore other options for getting the 
extra capital. RIU progress report of March 2010, reports that the dealer negotiated 
for a credit facility with Farmer’s Centre (an input wholesaler who also attended the 
initial programme meetings), who accepted to sell inputs on credit under RIU’s 
guarantee in case the dealer fails to do so. Eventually, and after several meetings 
and discussions, RIU agreed to guarantee the dealer but also demanded to control the 
repayment of the loan. So RIU came up with the ‘input voucher’ idea where farmers 
were given vouchers for buying feeds, vaccines and essential drugs. Then every 
month the dealer submitted used vouchers to RIU for payment, and deductions were 
made to pay the wholesaler. RIU staff learnt the input voucher idea from the National 
Agricultural Input Voucher system (NAIVS) programme which subsidized fertilizer 
and other agricultural inputs purchased by smallholder farmers in Tanzania 
(Hepelwa, Selejio, & Mduma, 2013). 
RIU also agreed to be facilitating regular checks on the quality of inputs through 
relevant government regulatory authorities. However, producers were also asked to 
bear quality risks as they do with other products they buy in the market, like soap or 
cooking oil (Interview, 32). 
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The interviews with RIU staff explain that a number of lessons were picked from the 
Rufiji negotiations and were used in the remaining negotiations, i.e. in Mkuranga, 
Kibaha, Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts. Dealers in Mkuranga and Bagamoyo 
were also government extension workers who had been in the business for a while. 
But it happened that, although these remaining four district input dealers were also 
procuring most of the inputs from Farmers Centre, they did not ask for a guarantee 
from RIU. However, the input voucher system was recommended to all dealers and 
agreed to claim payments from RIU after they submitted used vouchers. RIU decided 
to adopt the voucher system across all district as a tool for ensuring every producer 
gets the right inputs, and quantities. 
Linking producers with extension service providers 
From the first stakeholder meeting, producers were very explicit on their lack of trust 
on the government extension workers. Who were very few and ineffective (RIU 
Report, 2009). According to RIU staff, the need for a functional extension delivery 
system became even more important to producers after their negotiations with chicks 
and input suppliers. The fact that they had loans to pay back to RIU made them very 
keen to get quality services (Interview, 32). This is also linked to their initial fears 
expressed during the producer to producer interactions described in sections 6.3.3 
and 6.3.2. According to the Kibaha Champion (Interview,16), their main worry was 
on raising so many day-old chicks without the mother hen. They had neither done it 
before, nor seen anyone doing it. 
Thus, although the Local Government Authorities had extension workers placed in 
all Wards, and some in villages, RIU had to consider producers’ concerns on the 
quality of services provided. Producers were already interacting with them and they 
were dissatisfied. So a new solution was needed, and two options were explored, 
namely the ‘Chicks Camps Approach’ and the ‘Household Caretakers Approach’ 
(mostly known as ‘Caretakers’) as elaborated below. 
a) The Chick Camps 
At this point, RIU’s question was how best to impart knowledge (RIU, 2009). The 
common approaches in use were ‘a one off training on poultry management’ and 
‘Farmer Field Schools’ (FFS). Apparently, some of the producers had previously 
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attended poultry training sessions organised by NGOs, donor programmes and the 
local government. But they did not find them useful (Interview, 32). Therefore RIU 
wanted producers to ‘learn by doing’ and experiencing rather than sitting and 
listening. So an adapted version of FFS was chosen and establishing chick camps in 
Wards was proposed. The plan was to put all chicks meant for producers of particular 
villages in one camp and raise them together for 30 days. The camps would be 
supervised by trained professionals paid by RIU who would train farmers on daily 
basis on improved poultry management and husbandry. The camps would be well 
equipped with locally available equipment and producers were expected to visit them 
as often as they could especially during vaccination days, in order to learn and 
practice. The RIU programme officer said: 
[‘This would have been like having an experienced large producer 
raising the chicks to one month old. Then later hand them over to 
farmers when it is less risky to keep them. It was also a kind of a 
farmer field school.” (Interview with ex-RIU Staff, May 2013)].  
RIU also imagined these centres to grow into poultry information hubs (RIU, 2009). 
This idea was well received and agreed by producers and Local Authorities, and a 
hunt for such places started in every village (Interview 32). For example, in one of 
her progress reports, the Rufiji Champion reports that Folk Development Centre 
(FDC) which is a public institution for community development, and which had 
abandoned chicken sheds had been identified as the area for establishing the chick 
camp in Rufiji. The centre was later visited by RIU staff and negotiation started 
between producers and the government. 
However, as searching for suitable sites for the camps progressed producers also kept 
discussing the idea amongst themselves. Specifically on how best they could learn to 
raise chicks. One producer explained during interviews: 
[“..in those days we knew we needed to get it right once and for 
all. Because you can’t be looking for someone to teach you 
every time you buy chicks. So we spent a lot of time discussing 
about it....” (Interview with Producer, September, 2013)].  
Therefore, producers in Rufiji raised the following concerns regarding the proposed 
chick camps; (i) How to help those who failed to visit the camps, (ii) How to 
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distribute chicks after 30 days when they are already of different sizes, weight and 
sex (note cocks fetched better price than hens); (iii) How to distribute loss if some 
chicks die at the camp (note all producers would have paid for 100 chicks); and (iv) 
how to deal with complaints in the future on low weight gain and diseases as 
producers could easily blame it on the earlier feeding and vaccinations. So, from the 
above concerns, they recommended to raise chicks individually from day one and 
take full responsibility of the chicks and inputs loan. They also wanted to learn by 
doing in their own environment. So the chick camp idea was abandoned and RIU 
was back to square one. 
b) Household Caretakers (Caretakers) 
After the idea to establish chick camps was abandoned, RIU and producers 
unanimously agreed that producers would learn better if assisted to raise day-old 
chicks themselves and be allowed to go through the daily processes while in their 
homes. This was also found appropriate for the circumstances of women, the elderly 
and those with disability (RIU, 2009). However, achieving this seemed very costly 
and there were not enough extension workers. 
As RIU searched for solutions the Country Coordinator came up with the idea of 
using graduates from livestock colleges who were no longer employed by the 
government. By then about seventeen institutions were offering certificate courses 
related to poultry (livestock) and about 280 certificate holders were produced 
annually. Moreover, the government who was the main employer had stopped 
employing certificate holders as extension workers. The private sector was also not 
employing them (RIU, 2009). So RIU thought that using them would showcase these 
graduates to NGOs and private poultry farms. However, the question to RIU was 
how to identify and get them. 
So RIU contacted the nearest college and learned about their curriculum, then asked 
for their graduates’ contacts. During interviews the ex-RIU programme officer said: 
[“The first contact we made spread the news and within a week we had 
more than we needed.” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013)].  
These were then called for a meeting where they negotiated with producers 
(represented by District Champions). RIU also invited a poultry researcher from 
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Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), a veterinary drug seller and a senior 
officer from the Ministry of Livestock to present and facilitate discussions on; basic 
poultry management especially on disease management and control; current 
treatment drug lines and their administration; and on key policies and regulations.  
Their role was established and the programme called them ‘household advisors’ or 
‘Caretakers’. Producers agreed to host them in their homes and feed them for 30 
days. RIU agreed to enter into contract with them and pay a monthly allowance of 
250,000Tshs (about US$200). The contract also covered transport and medical costs. 
Producers also proposed that one caretaker could live in one house and care for a 
maximum of nine close neighbours. So he/she would visit ten producers daily and 
provide hands-on training for a month. Every visit was recorded and signed by the 
producer. 
After negotiations an action plan was drawn up. Contract terms were written and 
Champions introduced them to their respective Local Government Authorities by 
submitting their certificates, terms of reference and a list of where each would work. 
According to RIU staff, introducing caretakers in villages brought conflicts in some 
districts, as a power struggle between public extension and the programme-led 
private extension (Interview, 32). In addition to recruiting Caretakers, RIU also 
compiled simple poultry management guides, vaccination schedule and feed ration 
charts to compliment and assist Caretakers in training producers.   
The Caretakers arrived three days before chicks arrived and prepared the family to 
receive them. Preparations included inspecting and fumigating the shed, preparing 
feeders and drinkers, preparing brooders and sources of heat like charcoal, kerosene 
lamps etc. As explained by producers during focus group discussions, the presence of 
caretakers in those two days made producers confident. They also found going 
through the guides with Caretakers easier and more effective than attending training 
in a class (Interview, 40). Thus learning was more personalised and easier. 
The negotiations presented above show how RIU was continuously learning and 
adapting as solutions were very context specific. RIU decisions seem spontaneous, 
context specific and relied on reasoning and wisdom backed up by experience and 
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both technical and non-technical knowledge. Below (Figure 7-3) is a diagrammatical 
presentation of the sketched network. 
Figure 7-3: The initial sketch of the rural poultry network 
 
7.4 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter explains that RIU had to first mobilise relevant actors, who made initial 
plans. So based on the functional analysis results, stakeholders were mapped to know 
who was performing which function and where. The analysis also identified gaps. 
The actors identified during the mapping formed the group of people who established 
the network. With RIU support, the group designed and initiated processes.  
The chapter further explains that engaged producers had never met before, and were 
even not aware of some of the functions like hatchery businesses, etc. It is explained 
that the first meeting made actors interact but it was still not sufficient to make them 
engage beyond meeting face to face. This is because barriers still existed which had 
to be understood and removed before any meaningful interaction became possible. 
Initial processes focused on creating a ‘mental readiness’ through facilitating 
dialogues to build common understanding regarding what needed to change. 
RIU contracts extension workers to 
live with farmers for 30 days i.e. 
until chicks are 1 month old  
RIU provides ToRs , transport and 
fees.  One extension worker works 
with 10 farmers 
RIU provides loan to farmers to buy 
feeds enough for 2 months, vaccines, 
vitamins and other essential drugs 
through a coupon system 
RIU gives a guarantee and pays for 
the first consignment of wholesale 
inputs and recover when coupons 
from farmers are submitted for 
claims.  
RIU provides loan to farmers to buy chicks 
RIU assures the hatchery owner by 
mobilising and collecting money from 
farmers and pay him on their behalf 
RIU collects and transports chicks to villages 
at farmers’ cost 
RIU works with the government to ensure 























The chapter points out that for a programme like RIU to engage properly with the 
context, it has to negotiate and harmonise programme interests with those of the 
actors. This means facilitating actors to understand each other, programme interests 
and the industry (system) they operate in. The programme needs to understand the 
actors, their interests and the system. This builds a common ground in terms of 
vision and knowing where to intervene in the system. RIU as a programme relied 
both on the actors and that of its staff to define what RIU should do. This elaborates 
the importance of facilitating processes through which both the RIU and actors used 
to define their positions in the system. This challenges the use of programme 
blueprints to guide an intervention. 
In order to create its plan, RIU conducted a system analysis and allowed actors to 
identify bottlenecks blocking the industry performance. The analysis revealed that 
rural producers were disconnected from other actors because they were not using 
commercial inputs and services. Therefore if producers were to interact with actors 
like input suppliers, they had to produce for the market and ‘use’ commercial inputs 
and services. Most problems identified by stakeholders were social and 
organisational and very few were technological. This was probably because most 
poultry technologies were available in the country and adopted in commercial farms. 
The chapter also argues that within a socio-economic system there are two 
interdependent levels of interactions i.e. the ‘human-agent interactions’ and the 
‘enterprise-agent interactions’ which are necessary for innovation to happen. Farms 
operate as ‘mutual constituencies’ of humans and agricultural commodities 
(produced as sources of livelihood). For example, poultry keeping is a mutual 
constituency involving the producer and the chicken, and the two relate through 
different husbandry practices. The way the producer (i.e. the human agency) relates 
with other human agencies like chick producers, drug suppliers etc., is influenced by 
how the poultry enterprise as a constituency relates to the corresponding enterprises 
(or constituencies) like hatcheries, drug businesses etc. If the two enterprises are not 
related, or have no affinity for each other, then interactions at human level are 
ineffective unless they interact to create the missing ‘affinity’. 
The next chapter explains how RIU triggered interactions among different actors. 
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Chapter 8 Inducing shocks to trigger interactions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes major triggers that RIU pulled to initiate practical changes in 
the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. The analysis looks at the programme as an 
external force that challenged the status quo and facilitated internal processes 
towards re-organisation. The main argument emerging from the chapter is that, 
promoting innovation in an industry dominated by subsistence producers means 
unlocking it from path dependency, and from multiple ‘demand-and-supply 
deadlocks’ like those presented in chapters four and six of this thesis. To achieve 
this, a 'mental shift’ needs to be created in a significant number of actors, followed 
by ‘system shocks’ sufficient to stimulate co-movements and multiple 
interactionsthen concentrate in solving ‘after-shock capacity problems’ (discussed 
in next Chapter 9). 
Therefore, using field data, and mostly from RIU reports and database, the chapter 
explains that after rural producers were sensitized and accepted keeping chickens 
commercially, a ‘mental (or cognitive) shift’ occurred and opened room for 
negotiations towards interactions with other actors in the industry. At this point 
sensitized producers were ready to use commercial inputs, change husbandry 
practices and use poultry technologies like vaccines, etc. However, practical 
exchanges could yet happen as producers only became mentally ready, while actual 
interactions were subject to other practicalities. Gerd Schienstock (2004) calls this 
‘mental readiness’ a very important step towards creation of  a new development 
path, because it makes actors ready to reorganise.  
After the mental readiness, RIU facilitated ‘negotiations’ among different actors 
which led to ‘sketching of the envisaged networks’ (a process also referred to by 
Gerd Schienstock as ‘visualization of the new path’). During these processes actors 
clarified and managed uncertainties before they could start exchanging goods and 
knowledge (i.e. start transacting). After they accepted to commercialise, producers 
worked with other actors and planned how they would transact. This visualisation 
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process ‘built trust’ among actors and highlighted where support (external help) was 
needed. At this point, the role of RIU shifted from only facilitating and organising 
meetings (negotiations), to also filling capacity gaps and cushioning risks to ensure 
rural producers could actually transact. For example when producers could not pay 
the entire cost of a hundred chicks at the beginning, RIU agreed to provide a 60% 
interest free loan. Likewise, when the district supplier could not stock all inputs, RIU 
provided a guarantee facility for him to take a loan from wholesale suppliers, etc. 
Therefore, pre-planning (visualisation) was done to ensure mechanisms to support 
and cushion weaker actors were in place and were therefore accepted (qualified) for 
business partnerships. However, even after these negotiations, actual interactions 
could not yet happen. At least not until RIU injected money into the system and 
supported a significant number of producers to practically order significant volumes 
of different poultry inputs. These were large orders made at once and sent significant 
‘signals’ to the markets. According to RIU (RIU, 2011a, 2011b), these orders 
overwhelmed the poultry supply system and induced it into an ‘input demand shock’. 
Data show that it is actually this shock that triggered re-organisation and multiple 
processes which led to innovation especially in the upstream part of the value chain. 
As I previously explained in Chapter one, the study uses AIS as the main analytical 
framework where heterogeneous actors are argued to interact and co-determine 
innovation. The emphasis is therefore on the AIS’s focus beyond agricultural 
research and extension systems (Klerkx, Laurens, Barbara van Mierlo, 2012: p.457 
and 463) and which recognizes existence of other sources of knowledge, and triggers 
of interactions and learning. This chapter analyses RIU processes at the innovation 
network (system) level and identifies triggers of interactions and innovation that 
came from outside research. It then establishes how such triggers stimulated demand 
for new knowledge and technologies, and ultimately led to the formation of a poultry 
network which never existed before. 
I have used the concepts of ‘exogenous shocks’ and ‘lock-in’ used in path 
dependency literature to explain how RIU unlocked the rural poultry industry in 
Tanzania from three types of lock-ins namely, the resource lock-in, political lock-in 
and cognitive lock-in (Perkins, 2003; Salamonsen, 2014; Ugaglia et al., 2011). I have 
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also used the concept of ‘organisational thinness’ to explain how RIU acted as an 
exogenous shock to increase the number and type of actors engaging with rural 
poultry producers (i.e. reduced organisational thinness). 
In cases of path dependence or lock-in, an exogenous disruption (particularly in the 
form of ‘a demand shock’) may trigger movements towards a new path. And 
particularly in this study, the force is explained as an ‘input demand shock’ which 
was created by RIU through mobilizing and supporting a significant number of poor 
producers to demand significant volumes of different inputs at the same time. The 
chapter also makes it clear that, by inducing the shock, co-movements were triggered 
within the system as multiple actors tried to respond to the overwhelming demand. 
And as they did so, different capacity gaps were revealed, and in filling those gaps, a 
specific service and input delivery model to work with rural producers emerged. 
The study shows that RIU as a programme and in its entirety acted as an exogenous 
shock to the poultry industry in Tanzania. Its presence and engagement in the 
industry disrupted the status quo by causing mental shifts, bringing new investments, 
causing re-organisations and changes in routines and use of technology. However, 
this chapter also pays a particular attention to the ‘input demand shock’ which was 
induced when RIU injected financial resources into the system and changed the 
position of rural producers in the market. This new position which was caused by the 
new financial capacity of a significant number of producers, made them visible and 
attractive for business partnerships. It then attracted more actors (individuals and 
organisations) who increased investment in innovation. 
The chapter is organised in seven sections, section two reviews the concepts of 
exogenous shocks, organisational thinness and fragmentation. Section three explains 
how RIU acted as an exogenous shock by changing producers’ breeding strategies 
and supporting them to focus on regulating stocks. These changes increased 
producers’ demand for new knowledge and innovation. The section also explains 
how new sources of knowledge and definite business cycles were introduced by RIU. 
In section four I describe how the demand shock was induced and how the system 
responded. Then section five describes the process of unlocking the poultry industry 
from the entrenched traditional production system into becoming commercially-
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oriented by specifically discussing the unlocking of three types of lock-in, i.e. 
cognitive, political and resource lock-ins. Section six presents a discussion on 
industry level transformation that took place as a result of the shock, and how up-
scaling was done. Then I close the chapter with section seven by summarizing and 
concluding the chapter.  
8.2 Exogenous shocks and organisational thinness 
As explained in Chapter 1, exogenous shocks are externally driven alterations 
described by (Newey & Zahra, 2009) Newey and Zahra, (2009; cited in Salamonsen, 
2014, p.6) as external events with the potential to significantly influence the destiny 
of the firm. Salamonsen (2014; citing Grabher, 1993;  Narula, 2002,  and Doloreux 
and Dionne, 2008) explains that exogenous shocks function as a powerful means for 
reduction or disruption of lock-in, and are even a requirement to shake the system 
free of its history (Vergne and Durand, 2010, p.752; in Ibid, p.6). 
Studies on exogenous shocks are more popular in business studies commonly used to 
explain causes and characteristics of business cycles. The leading theories include 
the real business cycle (RBC) theory which assumes that economic fluctuations arise 
from exogenous shocks and that the economic system is otherwise stable; and the 
endogenous business cycle (EBC) theory, which proposes that economic fluctuations 
are due to intrinsic processes that endogenously destabilize the economic system 
(Ghil, 2007). The two theories analyse the shock to capture its effect towards 
creating fluctuations and thus new business cycles, with the intention to capture and 
describe a system’s vulnerability to shocks including natural disasters and 
macroeconomic policies in reproducing realistic business cycles (Ghil, 2007: p.15). 
Unfortunately, the two theories do not capture structural changes (i.e. change in 
interactions) or technological shifts beyond market responses. 
Therefore, I have drawn on studies from the evolutionary aspects of regional 
innovation systems (RIS) to show that RIU programme acted as an exogenous shock 
to reduce organisational thinness, fragmentation and lock-in in the target industry. 
Although literature views RIS as ‘a territory less than its sovereign state possessing 
distinctive supra-local administrative, cultural, political, or economic power and 
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cohesiveness, differentiating it from its state and other regions’ (Cooke et al., 1998, 
p.1573 cited in Salamonsen, 2014: p.1), a description which the poultry network I 
work on does not quite fit, I still found  the ‘rural-ness’ and the ‘periphery-ness’ of 
the poultry network that emerged out of RIU interventions linking well with the 
geographical localization emphasized in RIS literature. RIS is a localised network 
which has its unique sets of traditions, competencies and institutional composition 
and infrastructure facilitating innovation among producers and other actors in a 
region (Asheim, Coenen, Moodysson, & Vang, 2005). 
My analysis is specifically built on, and adapting the basic argument for RIS that 
‘smaller peripheral regions often suffer from the absence of relevant actors with 
resources and capabilities to stimulate growth patterns’ (Salamonsen, 2014), and thus 
explain that a donor-funded programme can actually act as an exogenous shock to 
stimulate the emergence of a rural innovation network.  
Henceforth, the sections below illustrate how RIU created and moderated an 
exogenous shock to reduce organisational thinness, fragmentation and lock-in 
observed in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. 
8.3 Explaining RIU as the ‘exogenous shock’ 
This section explains how RIU created the situation that functioned as a shock to 
alter existed routines, linkages, norms, attitudes, etc., which in the end forced the 
entire system to reorganise. At first producers were encouraged to produce for the 
market so they could gain more income. In turn it created an opportunity for input 
suppliers31 to gain new clients and do more business. Additionally, product market 
actors and consumers saw the opportunity to get more reliable supply of quality 
products.  On the other hand, extension workers saw this as an extra workload but 
also an opportunity to be useful to the community. And to the Local Authorities this 
was an opportunity for their communities to gain better incomes and therefore a new 
source of income from local tax. By supporting producers to produce for the market 
RIU created opportunities for other actors in the industry. In fact, RIU reports the 
                                                 
31 In this case input suppliers include those involved in the business of supplying (i.e. producing, 
manufacturing, importing and selling-both whole sale and retail) chicks, feeds, vaccines and 
veterinary drugs. In this case therefore even chicks and drugs are treated as inputs  
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four actors listed above (i.e. producers, input suppliers, product market actors, 
extension providers and government) as major categories of actors involved in 
steering the commercialisation process. 
The study also makes it clear that, when a significant number of rural producers 
decided to produce for the market (i.e. when they decided to change their production 
scale), they became ‘self-insufficient’ and therefore sent significant signals to other 
sub-systems in the form of demands, which triggered various kinds of responses. 
What mattered was the ‘significance’ (or ‘magnitude’) of the ‘noises’ (Lorenzoni, 
2009) coming from rural producers to the market. I first explain the key changes that 
enabled a significant number of producers to change their production behaviours and 
to generate the significant demand. I then explain how the system responded to this 
new demand, and how the response triggered industry-wide innovation.  
The key changes that took place are analysed and discussed below. 
8.3.1 Changing the breeding strategy: Fixing negative feedback loops  
As explained in previous chapters, producers had to start producing for the market 
and this led to significant changes in how they managed their enterprises. According 
to RIU reports, the most important change was to stop relying on natural breeding 
and start buying chicks at the beginning of every production cycle. This removed a 
negative (closed) feedback loop which caused inefficiencies and unreliability in 
poultry farm stocks. A closed loop is referred to as a system where part of the output, 
or information about it is fed back to the input so that the system’s output can affect 
its input or some of its operating characteristics (Meadows, 2008).  
Findings show that in the traditional poultry production system, where breeding is 
natural, mature hens are also the main source of new chicks to the farm. This means 
in every business cycle, part of the stock (i.e. mature chickens) which is ready to be 
sold is foregone as a breeder stock. Therefore, without an alternative source of 
chicks, attempts to commercialise rural poultry simply means introducing a 




Figure 8-0: Competing stocks goals in a poultry farm where breeding is natural 
 
Therefore RIU introduced buying chicks into rural farms, which made producers 
self-insufficient in chicks supply. This justified a link with a new actor as a source of 
chicks. Moreover, buying chicks also introduced specialization in breeding where 
intensification through innovation became possible. Furthermore, buying chicks gave 
producers the ability to determine their scales of production, sourcing quality breeds 
of chicks, and making volumes of their end products more predictable; a trait needed 
when partnering with end market actors. Therefore, by simply introducing the habit 
of buying chicks, rural poultry farms became attractive for partnership with breeder 
farms, hatcheries and formal poultry product market. 
However, relying on outside sources for chicks introduced a new investment cost to 
rural farms as well as creating dependency on other actors for quality and price. This 
meant subjecting producers to effects of fluctuations and instabilities in ‘distant 
enterprises’ (i.e. enterprises that they have no direct control of). But nevertheless, it 
also meant linking producers to benefits resulting from growth experienced by other 
actors. For example, when research came up with a better crossbreed of indigenous 
chickens, rural producers were able to access it through the breeders, etc.  
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Literature presents an alternative option to what RIU did, where a group of rural 
producers could have been empowered to produce chicks as it is the case with the 
Bangladesh poultry model (Fakhrul Islam & Jabbar, 2005) and the Rakai chicken 
model (Roothaert et al., 2011) where associations of rural poultry breeders were 
established. In these two models rural producers are deliberately blocked from 
interacting with actors outside their communities and specifically from commercially 
oriented actors in urban areas. While the intention might be to lower transaction costs 
and even protect vulnerable producers from external shocks, the approach limits 
interactions and cross learning between rural and urban. It also promotes self-
sufficiency within the same community with limited resources which in turn limits 
growth and innovation towards specialised breeding. It also relies on infrastructural 
capacity already existing in the villages. For example, since target villages in the 
Rakai programme (Roothaert et al., 2011) had no electricity, only incubation 
technologies that did not require electricity were possible. But in the RIU target areas 
lack of electricity did not determine the type of incubation explored. The programme 
used hatcheries in urban areas to supply rural areas instead. Furthermore, RIU 
promoted specialisation which gives more room for innovation.  
RIU facilitation acted as an exogenous shock which pushed many producers to keep 
more chickens for the market, and relied on a new source of chicks which is more 
specialised. The push also introduced the element of cash investment at the 
beginning of every cycle by buying chicks, and thus created demand for chicks. 
8.3.2 Supporting actors to focus on regulating stock flows 
According to systems thinking literature, the behaviour of a system is determined by 
its flows (Meadows, 2008: p.18). Therefore, by analysing stocks (which are the 
elements of a system which can be seen, felt, counted or measured at any given time) 
we can understand the behaviour of a particular system and even work to influence it 
(Ibid). This is argued to be possible because stocks represent the accumulation of 
materials or information built up over time within the system. And from path 
dependency theory, such accumulated information has the potential to engrain a 
specific innovation trajectory and make it stick for long.  
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According to Meadows (2008; p.22) stocks can be increased by either decreasing its 
outflow rates or increasing its inflow rates. Therefore when regulating flows towards 
achieving a stock-goal, the level of stocks will rise if only the sum of all inflows 
exceeds the sum of all outflows; fall if the sum of all outflows exceeds the sum of all 
inflows; and stay at equilibrium level (i.e. not change) if the sum of all outflows 
equals that of inflows. This means humans can control stocks through manipulating 
flows. And that is where innovation emerges. On the other hand, if they lack the 
power or reasons to manipulate stocks, then they do not innovate. 
Human goals for keeping chickens are embedded on stock levels in terms of volumes 
produced, sold, or lost, etc., and that strategies to manipulate such stocks are 
implemented through managing their flows. Therefore, my assumption here is that, 
the reasons for and triggers of interactions, learning and therefore innovation in the 
system (industry) are directly linked to the behaviour of the industry as it responds to 
the manipulation of stocks through its flows (both out and in flows). 
The figure below (Figure 8-1), highlights that, if for whatever reasons the number of 
chickens entering the system either as mature birds or chicks is smaller than those 
dying or disposed for different reasons, then the farm stock can easily get depleted. 
Because most rural producers rely on natural breeding as a source of new chicks to 
replenish the stock (Dinka, Chala, Dawo, & Bekana, 2010; Msoffe et al., 2010; Riise, 
Permin, & Kryger, 2005), they are not directly in control of their major source of 
inflow as they do not know how many eggs a hen will lay. Studies also show high 
mortality rates in village flocks specifically due to Newcastle infections. Particularly, 
chick mortality is reported to be very high. For example, FAO reports chick mortality 
rate of up to 80% in Tanzania.  
RIU encouraged and supported actors to focus on monitoring and regulating stocks 
which triggered changes in routines. Consequently demand for new knowledge and 
technologies to reduce mortalities and to ensure proper nutrition for efficient weight 
gain and heath was stimulated. RIU reports state that when producers focused on 
regulating stocks, their demand for vaccines, veterinary drugs, feeds, and general 
knowledge on improved husbandry increased significantly. In this way they became 
viable for partnerships with other actors in the industry.  
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8.3.3 Introducing new sources and flows of knowledge 
According to RIU reports (RIU, 2011b), producers were linked to a resident 
household advisor to train them on basic poultry husbandry for the first 30 days. The 
household advisors (Caretakers) trained producers while practicing in their farms. 
This is in line with the argument that the benefits of adoption increases with the 
experienced gained through learning by doing (Arthur, 1989; Wolff & Recke, 2000). 
The intensive knowledge provided at the onset, and to many producers at the same, 
played a very important role in giving commercialisation a lead over the traditional 
system (Wolff & Recke, 2000) 
According to RIU reports, producers were also provided with books (pictorial), hand 
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by the advisors. The whole household was able to read the guides together with the 
advisor to help educate the entire family. This meant all producing households who 
worked with RIU had their attitudes and skills changed. This contributes to 
disseminating new knowledge to a significant number of producers as the previous 
knowledge was deeply socially entrenched. This new knowledge was then easily 
passed-on through the same social channels. 
In addition, input suppliers also became a new source of knowledge to producers. 
They gave advice as they sold inputs. For example, in one of RIU’s video clip, a 
district stockist who is also a veterinarian is seen examining a carcass brought by one 
of RIU farmers. And she gives advice and a prescription. Producers also mentioned 
during group interviews that seeking information from input suppliers had become 
common. Drug manufacturers and wholesale suppliers also display product posters 
and leaflets in rural input shops, which provide information on diseases and drug 
administration.   
8.3.4 Introduced definite poultry business cycles in rural farms 
Besides changing the breeding strategy, RIU introduced technologies and practices to 
reduce stock losses and produce what the market wants. Specifically, RIU introduced 
clear business cycles where producers managed batches of equal age. Thus, unlike 
managing a flock with mixed categories and ages, producers were able to feed them 
properly and plan their disposal. One producer who worked with RIU said during 
interviews: 
[“Now when I buy chicks, I know how to feed and when to vaccinate 
them as chicks. And when they grow up, I change the feeding ration 
and vaccination doses. This is easier because they are many and are 
of same age. And when they are ready for sale, I have many of them 
to sell at once.” (Interview with Producer, October 2013)]. 
RIU introduced an ‘all-in-all-out’ strategy where batches of chicks were procured, 
raised to maturity and sold all at once. This strategy gave producers the opportunity 
to earn a lump sum of money which allowed them to plan future expenses better. It 
also made it possible to link producers with buyers because unlike before, it was now 
possible to predict volumes and time to maturity. Furthermore, buying and marketing 
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of poultry products from rural areas became profitable and better organised 
especially when production cycles of a significant number of producers was 
synchronised.  
Four key changes that led to creation of a significant demand for poultry inputs from 
rural producers, and which made them attractive for market linkages are; (i) 
producers stopped relying on natural breeding and started buying chicks from a new 
source (i.e. from a specialised breeder); (ii) producers actively focused on regulating 
stocks rather than letting them increase and decrease naturally (e.g. controlling time 
to maturity by controlling weight gain through feeding, reducing mortality rates 
through vaccination, controlling sales by determining scale i.e. choosing how many 
chicks to buy, etc.); (iii) RIU introduced new sources of poultry husbandry 
knowledge and producers accepted to utilise them (e.g. use of household advisers, 
meeting with input suppliers, distribution of printed materials, private veterinarian 
visits,  field extension meetings, field visits to hatcheries, etc.; (iv) Introduction of 
definite business cycles i.e. raising batches of 100 or 200 birds after every four to 
five months. Previously they had no clear batches and each bird matured at its own 
time/pace. The definite cycles created continuity and regularity in sending input 
demand signals.  
8.4 Explaining the input demand shock 
This section departs from the understanding that before the coming of RIU, the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania was facing a ‘demand and supply deadlock’ (Refer 
Section 7.2.6 of this thesis) where for several decades, rural poultry producers have 
been unable to produce significant volumes due to lack of relevant skills for modern 
poultry management and limited access to essential inputs especially day old chicks, 
quality feeds and vaccines. Agribusiness suppliers, private veterinarians and 
marketing agents have not been keen to extend their businesses to rural areas mainly 
because of low demand for input supplies and services. This resulted in the observed 
‘chicken and egg’ dilemma where producers required sufficient poultry inputs to be 
able to increase production scales, while agribusiness suppliers required assurance of 
sufficient demand before they could invest to serve such producers. It is the failure to 
unlock this deadlock that has been a major barrier to commercial expansion of the 
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rural poultry industry in Tanzania. This section explains how RIU induced a ‘demand 
shock’ as a mechanism to unlock a ‘demand and supply deadlock’ in the rural poultry 
industry in Tanzania. More importantly, it describes the role of a public funded 
programme in achieving that. 
Chapter six explained that rural producers were sensitised to raise more chickens for 
the market. They agreed to start with 100 birds so they could experiment and learn 
before adopting bigger scales. As a matter of fact, this change is almost twenty fold 
(i.e. from the average of five chickens kept before) and it thus created a significant 
demand for inputs and management skills by almost 100 per cent increase. For 
example, with the new scale, producers needed day old chicks, new husbandry skills, 
veterinary services, and inputs like feeds, drugs, vaccines etc. Apparently most of 
these were new and not accessible in rural areas but were available elsewhere in the 
country. This means traditional sources like relatives, neighbours, and even village 
extension workers could not provide what was demanded after the change in scale. 
Therefore, the new scale made rural producers and their networks ‘self-insufficient’ 
in poultry knowledge and inputs, and so they needed new sources. 
When producers were ready to keep 100 chickens, they built sheds using locally 
available materials and paid 15,000/- TShs (about US$ 10) upfront as a 40% down 
payment for the 100 chicks. Then RIU covered the remaining 60% which producers 
had to pay after they sold chickens (RIU, 2011; p.12). During interviews RIU staff 
mentioned that it was very important for RIU to take care of producers’ purchasing 
power by providing soft loans in order to encourage work in rural areas. RIU also 
wanted producers to have the opportunity to experiment with the new scale. 
Moreover there was no existing financial institution which was ready to finance such 
producers (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013).  
RIU reports indicate that apart from the 60% contribution to the cost of 100 chicks, 
RIU also provided a soft loan of other basic inputs like feeds, vaccines and veterinary 
drugs (Ibid). The total loan value depended on local prices which included transport 
and local suppliers’ margins. As a result, each district had different input prices and 
therefore a different total loan value. However, the average value in all districts was 
between US$165 and 216 (RIU Annual Report, 2009/2010). See Table 8-0 below. 
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Table 8-0: Variation in cost incurred per producer by districts (in TZS) 
 
District Rufiji Bagamoyo Mkuranga Kibaha  Kisarawe 
Distance from32 
Dar (km) 
138.4 65.6 65.9 64.9 95.7 
Chicks 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 
Feeds (in Kg) 78,000.00 81,000.00 17,000.00 84,000.00 90,000.00 
Vaccines doses 16,000.00 19,000.00 22,100.00 20,000.00 18,000.00 
Drugs 14,000.00 25,000.00 60,000.00 13,000.00 22,500.00 
Caretaker 40,000.00 55,000.00 26,000.00 30,000.00 75,000.00 
Drinkers/Feeders 26,000.00 19,000.00 20,000.00 22,000.00 24,000.00 
Visit hatcheries 13,765.00 11,260,00 11,400.00 11,920.00 - 
Printed guides 14,900.00 14,900.00 14,900.00 14,900.00 14,900.00 
TOTAL 302,665.00 313,900.00 271,400.00 295,820.00 344,400.00 
TOTAL (USD) 189.20 196.20 169.60 164.90 215.25 
 Source: Analysed from RIU Database, 2013 
Therefore, when producers were ready, their sheds were inspected and the paid the 
40% down payment to champions. And when about 100 producers were ready (i.e. at 
least 2533 in a village), chicks and input orders were pressed.  This implied random 
orders being pressed from different districts whenever about 100 producers were 
ready to receive chicks. Table 8-2 below shows volume of inputs demanded within 
the first three months of sensitization, and which overwhelmed the supply system. 













(in 500g packets) 
Rufiji 92 9,200 13,800 368 368 
Bagamoyo 184 18,400 27,600 736 736 
Kibaha 322 32,200 48,300 1,288 1,288 
Mkuranga 595 59,500 89,250 2,380 2,380 
Kisarawe 274 27,400 41,100 1,096 1,096 
TOTAL 1467 146,700 220,050 5,868 5,868 
Source: Analysed from RIU Database, 2013 
Findings show that it was immediately after making the first orders when RIU 
realised that suppliers had no capacity to satisfy that kind of demand (RIU, 2011a).  
Suppliers were struggling to satisfy the demand and it affected quality. 
                                                 
32 This is the distance from Dar es Salaam where wholesale is done to the district capital where district 
input dealers are based. However producers were living deeper into the villages and they had to come 
to these district centers to buy inputs. Some Ward level input dealers emerged and opened shops in 
more remote villages. 
33 The minimum number was chosen to minimize transport and distribution costs. 
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Unfortunately, the demand could not be spread out to a longer period because a 
significant number of producers was needed to transform the industry. Therefore, 
RIU opted to expand supply and not to regulate demand. Apparently, the suppliers 
had never been subjected to producing such volumes before. So, the opportunity to 
experience challenges associated with producing such volumes had not been 
provided. So the demand shock created the opportunity for capacity building by 
making the supply system reveal its weaknesses. Clearly, without the shock the input 
supply system would have continued in the same way. And suppliers wouldn’t have 
known what to change. Therefore, the overwhelming demand from rural producers 
revealed capacity gaps in the supply systems, which led to multiple process of 
strengthening the system. Furthermore, RIU’s presence created a room for 
experimentation when the system was reorganizing. 
Basically, the role of RIU was twofold; one, to induce the shock and two, to support 
the system to respond and adapt. This means, public resources were used to stimulate 
demand for inputs from a significant number of poor producers, and which was 
enough to create a shock, and later build system capacities as actors were adapting to 
the new equilibrium. Up until this point, RIU work was more organisational than 
technological with most challenges faced in chick supply then followed by feeds and 
vaccine supply. In fact introducing these three inputs in the rural poultry production 
system was the biggest shock to the system.  
Although RIU generally acted as an exogenous shock to the entire poultry industry in 
Tanzania by disrupting the status quo, this section pays specific attention to the 
‘input demand shock’ which was induced when RIU supported a significant number 
of producers to order inputs. This financial support changed the position of rural 
producers in the market and made them viable for business partnerships. 
The next section explains how RIU acted as an exogenous shock and how 
organisational thinness and fragmentations were reduced. 
8.5 Unlocking the industry and path creation 
As earlier described in Chapter two and four, I consider the dominance of the 
traditional extensive poultry production system observed in rural Tanzania to be a 
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lock-in. And that makes understanding the reasons and mechanisms for the lock-in 
essential in predicting and promoting a shift in the industry. The previous chapter 
explains how the industry is locked-in and why. I have built on those findings and 
further used a dynamic approach (Dosi, 1993) to analyse technological changes that 
created the shift towards adopting more productive technologies and management 
practices. And to achieve that, I have analysed innovation both at farm level and in 
other parts of the industry (Possas et al., 1996).  
Since traditional poultry production system limits opportunities for learning and 
growth, facilitating a shift towards a new system requires engaging with producers’ 
psychology (Ward, Minja, Blackie, & Edwards-Jones, 2007) so as to create a mental 
shift towards embracing new practices that attract partnerships with others. This 
means encouraging them to start producing for the market where other actors will be 
involved. The next step is to create practical mechanisms that support multiple actors 
to engage and work with each other.  
According to literature, ‘path creation’ is a means to escape lock-in where a new 
path is left to gradually emerge side by side with the old path by building on inherent 
resource bases (Schienstock, 2004). This means that old trajectories don’t have to be 
fully abandoned for a new path to be adapted. But actors can use previous knowledge 
while adding new technologies to create a new path, which Simmie (2012: cited in 
Salamonsen, 2014) describes as ‘layering’. Literature also suggests diversification or 
upgrading as potential means for restructuring (Ibid).  
What RIU data presents in the chapter is a facilitation process which involves 
combining tacit knowledge (skills) and mechanisms emerging from external support,  
to curb rural producers’ vulnerability and as elaborated by Ugaglia and her 
colleagues (Ugaglia et al., 2011), such mechanisms generate ‘switching costs’ and 
‘lower payoffs’ in farms. This is to argue that existing knowledge can be backed up 
with an external capacity (e.g. from a programme like RIU) to fill in any capacity 
gaps required to overcome path dependency. A new path gradually emerges without 
first abandoning the previous production system completely.  
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8.5.1 Unlocking the cognitive lock-in:  
Agriculture is perceived by many in Africa as the occupation of the poor - the career 
of those without other options; the life choice of the failed. Villagers watch others 
with their children in good schools, owning transport and houses. Farming is 
associated with poverty and few feel pride in the profession of agriculture. In 
Covey’s (1990) framework, producers have a dependent mind-set. They feel 
dependent upon others, problems are not their fault, and they cannot afford to take 
risks. This may well be related to the long term and continuing decline in the 
environmental and economic conditions in agriculture, and the perceived low status 
of producers in their local society and in the wider world (as exemplified by years of 
being looked down on and told what to do by researchers and extension workers). 
This is exacerbated by the fact that too much of the outside advice they have been 
given to improve their productivity has, in fact, been dreadful. This has left these 
producers highly dependent upon local technologies which have not been adapted to 
rapidly changing circumstances, innovation is stifled and best practice fails to spread.  
RIU programme adopted a ‘business unusual’ approach, which focused on working 
with producers to enable them to find their own solutions and build their business. 
The emphasis went beyond improving poultry production to making individuals (and 
the community) believe they could do the kind of activities and business the educated 
and urban people do. It made them believe that they could use technologies and 
knowledge to make money differently from how they were used to, that they could 
do different things and that they are capable of learning and using new knowledge. 
The emphasis in the implementation was on three areas; (i) building pride and 
confidence in rural producers’ ability to learn and enter into partnerships with urban 
dealers; (ii) engaging the community into the habit of seeking and using new 
knowledge to improve incomes; and (iii) linking the act of setting new expectations 
and learning to solve every problem without focusing on individual economic 
weaknesses, but seeking to know how they can partner or interact with others to gain 
new skills and abilities. 
Producers mentioned the value of the self-belief planted by the programme that 
despite being poor and illiterate, they could still keep as many chickens as they 
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wanted only if they were ready to try and learn. This is what gave them the first push 
and the confidence kept growing as they raised the first batch of 100 chicks under the 
constant support of the household caretakers who lived with them for the first thirty 
days. A lady said: 
[“Having the caretaker around was like when I had my first baby and my 
mother was around. I knew she was watching and nothing would go 
wrong. And after I raised the first child, I have the skills to raise as many 
children as I want on my own. The same is with chicks. I just need space 
and resources to do it.” (Interview with Producer, June 2013).] 
 Therefore, after the first thirty days, producers became relatively more confident 
because they had gone through the process of raising chicks themselves, a stage 
which they feared most. 
The initial sensitization and negotiation processes helped producers to gain 
confidence that they could keep chickens commercially even before experiencing 
actual processes. Then, the RIU support during the experimentation phase, coupled 
by the actual process of learning by doing made the mental shift permanent. One 
farmer said: 
[“Even if I don’t keep chickens now with RIU, I will never 
keep one or ten chickens anymore. I have kept up to 200 
chickens I can therefore keep even 1000. I already have the 
knowledge and a proof in my heart, that I once did it.” 
(Interview with Producer, August 2013)]. 
Encouraged by their experience of raising 100 chicks producers started to actively 
seek quality services from the LGA and from the input suppliers. They also became 
keen on vaccination dates and quality. Some also started to look for private 
veterinarians. 
Cultural changes 
The most important cultural change is the integration of business principles and 
culture in the indigenous poultry industry. Programme actors were driven by 
business motives and principles as they demanded, supplied and utilized new 
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knowledge and technologies. The following are the key changes which were driven 
by business motives: 
Stop relying on natural breeding and social sources of foundation stock 
Rural poultry producers decided to keep more chickens so they could sell more and 
get more income. And to keep more chickens they had to introduce buying of chicks 
in their production system because business wanted them to produce predictable and 
consistently significant volumes. So they have to decide how many birds they wanted 
to keep and be able to sell them in batches to meet market conditions which want 
reliable and regular volumes.  
Start controlling losses and reducing 
In addition to buying chicks, they also had to reduce flock losses. This included 
learning to control mortalities due to predation, diseases and even accidents. This 
was also necessary if they wanted to have predictable volumes at maturity and gain 
more income. After all they also had a loan to pay. So they introduced themselves to 
the culture of building chicken sheds to protect them from predators and searching 
for skills and innovations to control and manage diseases. They therefore introduced 
vaccination and supplementary feeding to avoid nutritional disorders. Supplementary 
feeding was also necessary because relying on 100% scavenging was no longer 
possible given the increased number of chickens vis a viz the available scavenging 
feed base. 
Reduce time to maturity and gain higher product market value 
Apart from reducing nutritional related problems, new feeding strategies were also 
introduced to ensure chickens gain weight (i.e. above 1.5kg) in the shortest possible 
time i.e. within three to four months as opposed to previous eighteen to twenty 
months. This meant lowering management costs and risks, as staying with chickens 
for longer costs more especially on feeding, and the risk of losses e.g. due to theft, 
diseases or predation also increases. Previously weight did not matter as any mature 
chicken would be bought at a negotiable price. Thus weight was only estimated and 
used to determine price, now when they are actually weighed. 
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The reduced time to maturity also allowed producers to have three production cycles 
in a year (i.e. of 4 months each) unlike in the past when they had long and unclear 
cycles. Basically, producers needed skills, technology and organisational processes 
to have predictable volumes in order to access the market which was mostly in the 
urban areas where there was competition from other commercial farms. Importantly, 
they had to be able to predict the quantities and when the chickens will mature, and 
then be able to negotiate and develop marketing partnerships. They had to be 
attractive for such partnerships by being aware and abiding to certain business 
principles and culture. 
RIU used the bottle neck approach to solve every challenge as they occurred in the 
entire system. This was done by (i) identifying key actors and existing problems in 
the entire value chain, (iii) Coordinate the solutions seeking process. 
8.5.2 Unlocking the resource lock-in 
RIU provided soft loans and facilitated the process of purchasing and importing large 
incubators for hatchery incubators. Chick producers were supported to invest quicker 
than they would have otherwise done as they would have to wait and speculate to see 
the reliability of producers’ demand.  Under normal circumstance no investor would 
have invested so much before the demand stabilises. With producers being new in 
the business their demand was unstable and unreliable, thus it would have taken time 
to trigger such a huge investment. Producers’ demand would also not have stabilised 
if they did not have reliable supply of chicks to experiment with. Thus this was an 
example of a chicken and egg situation blocking investment in the industry and 
which justify public intervention. 
RIU also provided in-kind soft loans to producers to procure chicks and basic inputs. 
This was a smart subsidy which was necessary to facilitate the transformation. 
Producers needed a new source of capital because they were not used to allocating 
financial resources to the activity. Therefore, for them to change and experiment with 
the new scales and technologies like vaccines and commercial feeding, they needed 
an external source of funds. Unfortunately, given their context, no financial 
institution was structured to fund them. This is because of how the service industry is 
structured and how it operates in Tanzania with biases against small producers. For 
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that matter, RIU had to innovate and fill in the gap to facilitate producers’ transition 
towards becoming commercialised and possibly become attractive for partnership 
with financial institutions at a later stage.  
Later, producers got financial support from Kukudeal by integrating them in a 
contract farming scheme where producers kept even more chicken (i.e. from 100 to 
200 and up to 300) and received input support, extension services and market. They 
paid the loan after they sold chickens upon maturity. 
8.5.3 Policy influence (policy-lock in) 
Theodosius Kaijage34 explains that the scale and sector-wide coverage of RIU’s 
approach attracted the attention of policy makers unlike any initiative before. These 
policy makers then gained the ability to influence the Government of Tanzania to 
include indigenous chicken in the development agenda. Previously the government 
was biased towards exotic chickens, and had thus invested extensively in hybrid 
chicken R&D and the recommended husbandry practices and disease control 
innovations were not made easily available to indigenous chicken producers. Thus 
there was a policy bias on research, policy and practice. Knowledge was not 
disseminated to indigenous producers (RIU, 2011: p.8). 
RIU used a three-pronged approach to commercialise the industry; (i) convinced 
producers to increase individual production scales, which then justified (ii) increased 
use of new knowledge and technologies among producers, and which stimulated (iii) 
increased investment in inputs and services provision systems. As a result, the 
government now regulates the industry for the operations of hatcheries and breeder 
flocks to minimize spread of poultry diseases and to ensure a smooth transition of the 
entire industry. The programme also provided the necessary evidence and 
justification for the government to develop and enforce regulations for 
                                                 
34 Theodosius Kaijage is a Principal Livestock Research officer of the Ministry of Livestock 
Development and Fisheries in Tanzania. He wrote his analysis of RIU program in a case story titled 
‘New Dynamics in Policy Making are Paving the Way Towards Commercialization of Indigenous 
Chickens in Tanzania’. This is one of 12 case stories written by different RIU Partners in a write-shop 
facilitated by Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) in April, 2011. The cases were printed in December 2011 
under the title ‘RIU Case Stories on Institutional Change’ and can be accessed at 
http://www.researchintouse.com/resources/riu040412-tz-case-stories-book-mail.pdf 
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manufacturing of poultry feed, traceability and animal welfare. Therefore, RIU  has 
challenged the thinking that indigenous poultry could not be commercialised and fit 
the traceability criteria. I discuss this further in chapter 9. 
8.5.4 Reducing organisational thinness 
Before RIU the rural poultry industry mostly involved producers, public extension 
staff, a few chicken traders, research, and government (both central and local). Once 
in a while the government would conduct vaccination campaigns using its extension 
system and NGOs (or projects) would implement poultry development interventions 
in selected villages. These actors performed only a few functions and learning was 
limited. At the start RIU had to work with only a few actors who steered initial 
processes until it was viable for other actors to come in. New actors came in as new 
roles emerged – for example, household advisors (Caretakers) were brought on board 
after the need for an intensive on job training on chick raring was felt by producers. 
Other new actors joined in to perform old roles as demand increased-for example 
new chick producers came on board as more chicks were demanded.   
RIU reports show that the programme facilitated processes to adjust farm operations 
and later supported a significant number of rural producers to demand inputs and 
services produced by other organisations. In turn, this increased the number of actors 
and roles played in rural areas significantly. Consequently, organisational thinness 
was reduced.  
Before rural producers could interact with other actors, farm operations had to 
change in manners that needed inputs produced and supplied by other actors. When 
more producers used different inputs like feeds, vaccines, etc., knowledge to use 
these inputs was also needed. Thus relevant service providers emerged to provide 
such services in rural areas. As more inputs were being produced and supplied, 
intermediary services to transport and distribute inputs became necessary. This 
created a room for new actors (organisations) to emerge and provided services in 
new locations. This means that unless a significant number of rural farms are 
reorganised and capacitated to rely on other enterprises for inputs, services and 
knowledge, organisational thinness in rural areas cannot be reduced. The reasons for 
actors to interact must be embedded within the enterprises or farms. 
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Another approach discussed in this chapter is linked to the role of high transaction 
costs argued in the literature as one of the factors that hinders interactions and 
therefore causes organisational thinness (see Section 2.5.1). In the analysis I have 
looked at how RIU created mechanisms that cushioned (or lowered) transaction costs 
and thus made it easy for rural producers to interact with the market, and became 
attractive for partnerships with other market actors. When poor producers are 
innovatively organised and supported to lower individual transaction costs, 
specifically by taking advantage of their aggregate volumes (of demand and supply) 
they become attractive for partnership with other actors. This in turn creates 
opportunity for cross-learning and exchanging through business interactions. This 
approach has been widely reported in literature where bulking (of farm produce or 
input orders) is done though different mechanisms for accessing the markets like 
creation of marketing associations, marketing boards, contract farming, out-grower 
schemes, etc. (Ekboir, 2012; Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin, & Minten, 2005; FAO, 
2009; S Nederlof & Pyburn, 2012; Suzanne Nederlof et al., 2011; Shepherd, 2006; 
Zant, 2012).  
Under these mechanisms aggregation is done to gain economies of scale and 
therefore lower transaction costs. Changes in producers’ behaviour, specifically in 
relation to how they managed their enterprises, increased business volumes, which in 
turn triggered government interest to regulate the industry. This expanded the 
number and type of public organisations working in the industry. For example, the 
Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) had to come in to regulate drug supplies 
in rural areas, the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) joined the network to 
manage new diseases which emerged in rural areas as more chickens survived the 
Newcastle disease35, and the Veterinary Investigation Centres (VICs) at different 
levels were later involved to manage the supply of non-thermal stable vaccines from 
the main supplier to the remote areas, etc. Increasing business volumes attracted 
regulators and quality control organisations to join rural networks, a demonstrable 
effect of the RIU intervention. 
                                                 
35 RIU reports show that more diseases were isolated in the villages as more chickens survived the 
Newcastle epidemics. Basically the diseases like fowl pox and typhoid were previously there but the 
incidences had no economic significance justifying government intervention. 
 230 
As more rural producers commercialised their farms, and as more private actors 
came on board in the upstream part of the industry, more engagement with the 
government was needed to create a favourable environment for investment. This also 
included the need to interact with the government for policy lobbying, example on 
tax issues and even in controlling poultry imports. This prompted the need for actors 
to create formal and informal stakeholder organisations as platforms for policy 
dialogue and negotiations. Having more actors and increased number, type and a size 
of transactions created the need for creating formal organisations for engaging with 
the government. This also reduced organisational thinness in the industry. 
RIU initiatives increased the number of actors in the rural poultry value chain. For 
example, with the new breeding strategies where producers buy chicks, more actors 
emerged to produce fertilised eggs for the hatcheries, to run hatcheries, breeder farms 
and to distribute chicks. In addition, the change in production scale motivated 
producers to use commercial inputs, and since their demand was significant they 
motivated poultry input manufacturers and suppliers (distributors) to work in rural 
areas. The initiative made rural producers attractive for partnerships with often 
urban-based input supply actors. The programme also introduced a new cadre of 
poultry education (extension) providers who are certificate holders trained in 
livestock but are usually not employed to work with producers. Using them 
showcased their abilities and how they could be used by the government to fill in 
gaps where there is a shortage of extension staff. They can also be used by NGOs 
and donor funded programmes to help producers learn by doing. Some of these 
advisors are now employed by commercial poultry producers who keep improved 
breeds in urban areas. These commercial farm owners were not used to employing 
workers formally trained in livestock husbandry, and some say it is because they did 
not know such a cadre existed (personal comm.).  
The increase in actors and its vigorous commercialisation persuaded the government 
to motivate and engage stakeholders to form associations to formally engage with the 
government to resolve challenges facing the poultry subsector. For example the 
Tanzania Poultry Breeders Association (TPBA) was formed with initiatives from 
indigenous chicken breeders who wanted to influence the new hatchery regulations 
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which were biased in favour of breeders who raised improved breeds. The 
Government was also stimulated to consider the development of a National Strategic 
Plan specifically for developing the indigenous chickens industry. 
Since the RIU programme began, the network of partnerships and linkages has 
demonstrably increased to include more actors who exchange knowledge in the form 
of information, skills, goods like chicks, vaccines, inputs and services such as 
extension, veterinary, laboratory investigation and business training. 
8.6 Up-scaling and industry level transformation 
Key policy makers and policy influencing groups in agriculture and livestock sectors 
include the Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries; the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives; the Parliament; and the National Livestock Research 
Institute. The programme organised field visits, round table meetings and submitted 
progress reports to policy makers at different levels to engage them and inform them 
of programme activities.  
The programme has previously engaged with the Ministry of Livestock Development 
and Fisheries to work on waivers for import tax for breeding machinery. Breeding 
machinery was not included in the list of exempted agricultural inputs as required in 
the current procedures. This matter was first communicated to the Ministry’s 
representatives through a roundtable briefing meeting on the programme’s activities 
in the poultry sub-sector. The Ministry followed up with relevant government 
department and within a few months, the parliament passed a ruling to exempt 
import tax for incubators and other hatching machinery.   
The ministry has also worked with the programme to introduce RIU supported 
hatcheries and producers to the new Animal Diseases Regulation for Hatcheries and 
Breeder Farms. The ministry was prompt to respond to the request by the 
programme. However, none of the stakeholders’ comments could be used to amend 
the regulation. The ministry’s poultry division is currently collaborating with RIU 
supported hatcheries in the process of enforcing the new regulation. The increased 
number of stakeholders in the poultry sub-sector as well as increased production 
scales has made it necessary for the government to closely enforce relevant 
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regulations for disease control. Meanwhile, local chicken breeders and hatcheries are 
in the final stages of creating their formal association. It is anticipated that as the 
sector expands, breeders and other stakeholders would need a formal organisation 
that can dialogue with the government on policy and practice matters.  
Being aware that the poultry sector is now a promising economic sector and the 
challenges it faces, the government is in the process of developing quality standards 
and regulations for manufacturing poultry feeds, traceability and animal welfare. The 
government also considers the development of a National Strategic Plan specifically 
for development of the local chicken sector which will replicate the approach 
employed by RIU to other areas in the country. 
At the district, ward and village level, the government extension workers are more 
engaged in providing advisory services for poultry keepers. This is influenced by the 
increased numbers of poultry in their areas as well as the growth of producers from 
small (between 1-100 chickens) to medium scale (between 150-500 chickens). 
Before the RIU intervention more focus was given to provision of advice for large 
stock keepers (cattle, goats, and sheep) and crop producers.  
In research practice, the programme’s efforts to lobby and push for a national 
perspective towards characterisation of indigenous chicken breeds, resulted into 
development of a proposal to carry out a study to characterise indigenous chicken 
breeds. The proposal was developed by the National Livestock Research Institute 
(NLRI) and has already been submitted to the Tanzania Commission for Science and 
Technology (COSTECH) for funding. The institute plans to breed and select the best 
indigenous chicken breeds which can be promoted for commercial production (eggs 
and meat) and promote their availability and multiplication through establishment of 
parent and grandparent stock farms. RIU through MUVEK was listed as one of the 
major collaborators in utilising the results of this study through the production 
system it has created (i.e. producers, egg producers, parent and grandparent stock 
farms and hatcheries).  
Training institutions are also responding to the growth in the subsector. The Open 
University of Tanzania has introduced a Diploma course in poultry to cater for the 
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increased needs in the subsector. An organisation such as the Tanzania Social Action 
Fund (TASAF) has adopted RIU’s scale i.e. distributing a larger number of chickens 
– up to 100 to producers. The Fund hasn’t however gone beyond to broker or provide 
other services for producers as it was done by RIU. 
8.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter investigated the major tools that RIU used to initiate practical changes 
in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania. The chapter equates the programme to an 
external force that challenged the status quo and later facilitated internal processes 
towards re-organisation. The chapter explains that from the outset, RIU acted as an 
‘exogenous force’ that ‘pushed’ actors in the industry to think and act differently. Its 
presence and engagement in the industry disrupted what was going on and caused 
mental shifts, brought new investments, caused re-organisations and changes in 
routines and use of technology. 
As an exogenous shock, RIU promoted new tendencies that encouraged use of new 
knowledge and adoption of improved husbandry practices. Specifically it stimulated 
producers to keep more chickens and consequently increased their demands for skills 
and inputs. Rural producers were introduced to buying chicks from specialised 
hatcheries and encouraged them to focus on regulating their stocks and stock flows in 
order to maximise gains. This also triggered changes in management routines and 
consequently stimulated multiple interactions with different suppliers of knowledge, 
technologies, services and inputs. Basically, by encouraging all actors to focus on 
stock flows, RIU stimulated both organisational and technological innovations. The 
chapter therefore argues that, by focusing on regulating stocks, rural producers 
became viable for partnerships with other actors in the industry. And this reduced 
organisational thinness and fragmentation previously experienced in the industry. 
Specifically, the chapter establishes that commercialisation created a significant 
demand for poultry inputs and services which attracted suppliers to do business with 
rural producers. However, the demand from rural producers was overwhelming and a 
need for new capacities to supply emerged. It is the process of responding to the 
emerging capacity needs that triggered innovation in the supply system. Innovation 
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in poultry production was triggered when producers commercialised and demanded 
new skills, inputs, services and technologies. In the supply system, innovation was 
triggered by the overwhelming demand from rural producers and which forced the 
system to reorganise. 
The main argument emerging from the chapter is that, promoting innovation in an 
industry dominated by subsistence producers means unlocking it from path 
dependency, and from ‘demand-and-supply deadlocks’. It is clear from the chapter 
that, after the 'mental shift’ occurred, RIU supported many producers to demand and 
procure larger volumes of inputs. The chapter explains that these orders re-define 
producers’ position in the market and more actors were attracted to do business with 
them. 
It is explained further that, in cases of path dependence or lock-in, an exogenous 
disruption (e.g. in form of ‘a demand shock’) may trigger movements towards a new 
path. The shock triggers co-movements within the system as multiple actors respond 
to the new demand from a large group of producers. However the shock also 
revealed multiple capacity gaps which required strengthening before a new 
equilibrium was obtained. 
I discuss how RIU built capacities after the shock in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 9 Building capacities after the ‘shock’ 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the discussions in chapter eight. It analyses what happened 
after the system was induced into a ‘demand shock’ when RIU supported a large 
number of producers to order and procure different inputs. This chapter would show 
that, after the demand shock, different problems emerged randomly and there was no 
single approach that could solve all of them. So RIU staff revised the programme 
strategy from focusing on developing an ‘innovation platform’ to solving problems 
as they emerged. They called this approach a ‘bottleneck approach’(RIU, 2011a).  
With this approach, RIU supported relevant actors to engage in even smaller groups 
to address problems in different subsystems. Basically, the shock made it necessary 
for RIU to support multiple meetings and processes to solve multiple problems in 
production, input supply and marketing. Therefore, RIU had to work with multiple 
actors, using multiple strategies to solve multiple problems which led to growth in 
the industry. The demand shock created co-movements in the industry and gradually 
shifted RIU’s focus from mainly empowering small producers to developing the 
entire subsector. Therefore, regardless of where the programme started, the entire 
industry got involved. This emphasizes the point that subsistence producers cannot 
be developed in isolation. 
In the chapter I will explain how different problems emerged in different subsystems 
and how RIU supported actors to solve them. Specifically, I have analysed problems 
that emerged in chicks and feed supply, provision of extension services, managing 
poultry diseases, building business skills, in marketing and regulation. The 
discussion makes it clear that intervention areas emerged as actors continued to 
interact. This means they could not have been pre-determined. It also explains that 
need articulation and solution seeking were continuous processes that led to 
innovation. The chapter also highlights that innovation facilitators need to be ready 
to work with different actors, handle multiple processes, be flexible and ready to play 
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different roles. They should also have access to flexible resources, and more 
importantly, stay at the centre of all processes to ensure all relevant roles are played. 
The chapter is organised in ten sections. The next section explains how the shock 
caused problems in chicks supply and how RIU worked with different actors, old and 
new to solve the problems of volumes, quality and price of chicks. Section three 
describes the challenges that faced the feed supply system and how they were 
addressed. This included engaging with actors beyond the poultry industry. Then, 
problems which faced the extension and the veterinary systems particularly on 
managing diseases are presented in sections four and five, respectively. Then in 
section six I have explained how RIU built producers’ business and entrepreneurship 
capacity after they were found to miss the skills and thus failed to manage their new 
enterprises appropriately. Section nine explains how contract farming emerged to 
improve producers’ access to capital. Regulatory challenges are analysed in section 
nine, where I also discuss how RIU approached them. Section ten draws conclusions 
from the chapter. 
9.2 Solving the chick supply paradox 
RIU reports explain that when the first order to supply 20,000 day old chicks was 
made the supplier could not satisfy it. He only managed to produce 2000 chicks 
which is only 10% of what was needed (RIU, 2011a, 2011b). The report explains 
further that, when the situation was analysed, it became clear that there were serious 
capacity problems beyond that particular supplier that needed long-term solutions. 
Consequently, RIU’s focus shifted from supporting an individual supplier into 
developing a chick supply system (RIU, 2011b). 
Solving the chick supply problem was not straight forward because commercial 
breeding for indigenous chickens was almost non-existent in Tanzania. All 
commercial poultry breeding farms produced exotic chicks (Match Makers 
Associates, 2010; RIU, 2011a). As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, the government of 
Tanzania supported establishment of commercial hatcheries to produce exotic chicks. 
The government also distributed improved cocks to cross breed with indigenous hens 
through natural mating. Some projects like the Swiss funded Rural livelihood 
 237 
Development Programme (RLDP) implemented in central and Northern Western 
Tanzania promoted synchronised natural breeding where eggs are manually collected 
and given to selected hens to hatch (Match Makers Associates, 2010). This model 
was adapted by RLDP from the famous Bangladesh model (Fakhrul Islam & Jabbar, 
2005) and which they now call the Bariadi Model36.  
Another strategy which was adopted later in the mid-2000s introduced artificial 
incubation in selected rural areas, but at very small scale. The strategy was 
championed by the World Bank-funded Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) who 
promoted use of small kerosene incubators. So TASAF distributed kerosene 
incubators to poultry producer groups in the villages and members were asked to 
collect eggs from their farms and incubate them collectively. Therefore, no 
commercial hatcheries were supported to produce indigenous chicks.  
Studies show that both the synchronised breeding which used selected hens to hatch 
eggs collected from the same flock (i.e. foregone for consumption or sales), and the 
use of kerosene incubators (an initiative which failed) could not bring significant 
changes to the rural poultry production system (Match Makers Associates, 2010; 
RIU, 2011a). In my opinion, the two approaches failed because; first, both strategies 
relied on the same family flocks (which were small) as sources of fertilised eggs. 
And as I elaborated in Chapter 5, natural breeding sends negative feedbacks to the 
farm because part of the output becomes responsible for the continuation of the 
enterprise. As a result, any decision to increase the number of breeder hens, means 
forgoing direct gains from sales or consumption. In fact it creates two competing 
goals in the system, i.e. the goal to expand the enterprise, and the goal to dispose and 
earn income. Second, both approaches did not create new partnerships to channel-in 
new skills, investment, or exchanges of any form. In fact, both strategies relied on 
local resources and capacities which were already very limited. 
Commercial production of indigenous chicks was underdeveloped in Tanzania. 
Particularly, the production of fertilised eggs which could be incubated and hatched 
was a big problem. During that time some traders used to import crossbreed chicks 
                                                 
36 This is a name after the first district RLDC worked in Shinyanga Tanzania. 
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from Zambia and Malawi and sold them to urban and peri-urban commercial 
producers. Clearly, producing sufficient volumes of quality indigenous chicks was a 
challenge because procedures for establishing indigenous parent stocks were unclear. 
Most breeders raised chicks from their own hatches as parent stock. However, RIU 
anticipated that, with the new demand for indigenous chicks it should have been 
relatively easier to attract new actors and convince them to invest in the business. So 
the first task was to attract new actors.  
9.2.1 Expanding the supplier base: Looking for new actors 
When it was clear that the selected chick supplier could not meet the demand, RIU 
made a public call and invited new actors. About twenty five people responded and 
all were invited for a meeting. This meeting revealed individuals who owned small 
incubators and produced indigenous chicks for their own purpose. They kept small 
parent stocks and had basic hatchery management skills. So RIU decided to 
capitalise on, and supported them to expand. This means some capacity already 
existed and what the programme did was to build on it. According to RIU staff, at 
this point the programme was more concerned with getting the needed quantities, and 
thus paid less attention to quality. In fact, the idea was to gradually develop the 
supply system from whatever level it was.  
Apparently, the pressure to supply chicks was higher during that time because many 
producers were already sensitized and had invested their scarce resources to build 
sheds. As a matter of fact, getting the chick supply operational was very crucial and 
without it the whole programme would have failed (Interview with RIU staff, June 
2013). So, no screening was done before the meeting, and as the RIU programme 
officer explained, they had no criteria for pre-assessment. Seemingly, they thought 
the best way was to meet and talk to them in a group (i.e. have an open dialogue). 
After all, RIU staff and champions (producers’ representatives) already knew what 
was needed (Interview with RIU staff, May 2013). This explains that, when 
developing systems in industries dominated by subsistence actors, one has to start 
with whomever and whatever capacity is available because there is not much to 
choose from.  
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The meeting report shows the main agenda was to: explain what RIU was doing and 
the emerging demand for chicks; establish the capacity to produce chicks present in 
that meeting; identify challenges and their solutions; and negotiate price and other 
business arrangements. Therefore new negotiations regarding chick supply took 
place, and this time different suppliers proposed different prices. This prompted the 
meeting to calculate costs and established the price at TZS 1000 (approximately US$ 
0.63) per chick. Other logistics were also discussed and a livestock researcher from 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) discussed breeder stock management, 
hatchery management and hygiene (in order to avoid spreading diseases). He also 
elaborated on the performance of different indigenous chicken breeds.  
By the end of the meeting thirteen suppliers agreed to join the programme under the 
agreed price, but on condition that RIU coordinated orders and payments. This was 
concluded after suppliers made it clear that contacting individual farmers located in 
different villages would be very costly and impractical. This was also necessary to 
producers because suppliers were also many, produced different volumes of chicks at 
different times and places, and were therefore difficult to coordinate from villages. In 
fact, this added a new role to RIU (RIU, 2011b). Therefore, the meeting identified 
new actors and then set ‘rules of engagement’. This shows that negotiations among 
actors is a continuous process, especially where new actor are involved. 
Actually, the number of hatcheries that produce chicks of indigenous breeds has 
increased from fourteen in 2011 to twenty six in 2015. This is according to the 
country profile data of 201537.  
9.2.2 Stimulating new investment 
Finally RIU worked with thirteen hatcheries where eleven existed prior to RIU and 
two were newly created in Dodoma and Iringa regions (i.e. about 502.3 and 502.2 
km respectively from the business capital Dar es Salaam) to facilitate programme up-
scaling. The initial capacity of the eleven hatcheries was between 500 and 2000 
chicks per week, making a total average capacity of about 4,500 chicks per week 
(RIU Annual Report, 2009/2010) which was way below the anticipated demand from 




the growing number of producers recruited for the programme. Moreover, the supply 
was inconsistent and unreliable.  
So even with the larger number of suppliers, the volumes supplied were still low and 
unreliable. It later became clear that more machine capacity was needed as well as a 
larger and reliable source of fertilised eggs. This meant procuring bigger incubators 
and establishing bigger parent stock farms. Therefore, RIU selected five hatcheries 
and supported them financially to expand. These were selected because owners were 
ready to invest and expand. After negotiations, RIU provided matching funds to 
purchase larger and technologically advanced hatchery equipment each with a 
capacity to produce up to 10,000 chicks per week (these were procured by RIU from 
China). Part of RIU funds were also used to purchase parent stock and expand farm 
infrastructure (RIU, 2011b). The remaining eight hatcheries received smaller loans to 
expand their parent stock or procure hatching eggs. The new investment in hatcheries 
took long to mature (about six months later) because of delays in importation and 
clearing of equipment from China. The parent stock also needed about six months to 
mature and start laying eggs. 
Apparently, RIU had initially explored possibilities of getting loans from banks but 
all fourteen hatcheries did not qualify. So RIU had to provide the needed financial 
support because sufficient chick supply was key to the programme to work. This 
reveals that building innovation networks in subsistence-based industries requires 
less bureaucratic funding. It is also evident that some capacity must exist to keep 
processes going while waiting for new investment to mature..  
The study establishes that promoting innovation in subsistence based industries 
involves addressing multiple capacity gaps which tend to reinforce each other, and 
which require spontaneous investment decisions made with less bureaucracy. This is 
to call also for innovation facilitators with access to flexible funding. 
9.2.3 Managing production delays 
While waiting for the investment into chick supply mature, RIU had to ensure actors’ 
enthusiasm, especially from producers is maintained. So RIU organised field visits of 
358 producers to the hatcheries to help them understand the challenges of raising 
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parent stock and what it takes to establish and run a hatchery. This created a bond 
between producers and hatchery owners after they understood processes of 
producing chicks, including selection, care and storage of hatching eggs; parent stock 
care; types of indigenous chicken; and even production costs. What emerged from 
the visits was that producers understood how hatcheries are managed and thus 
necessary for tolerance and patience in times of production delays. Additionally, 
some had time to interact with workers in the breeder farms and confirmed the 
usefulness of the new management routines recommended to them. Thus producers 
used the visit to learn and clear any remaining doubts about new husbandry practices. 
One producer in Kibaha said: 
[“When I went for that exchange visit, I asked the workers 
how they feed, vaccinate and keep chicks warm. I was happy 
to know that I am taught what I can do even with a larger 
flock.” (Interview with Producer, October 2013)].  
Field activities were reorganised to allow a slower distribution of chicks depending 
on the supply from the old machines and parent stock. Delays in chick supply had 
negative impacts to the programme. For example, reports show that some producers 
who had built sheds and were ready to receive chicks lost interest in keeping 
chickens commercially. The situation was worse for those who borrowed money to 
build sheds expecting to pay back within four months. The RIU experience shows 
that when strengthening system capacities, delays happen. Therefore, creating an 
environment where parties understand each other’s operations makes negotiations for 
managing such delays more effective. However, the facilitator needs to have 
resources to continue encouraging actors during delays, so as to maintain the energy 
and momentum for change. 
9.2.4 Solving the chick quality crisis 
As the demand for chicks increased, the quality of chicks kept dropping. This was 
mostly caused by the poor quality of fertilised eggs. In fact, as chick producers 
waited for their new parent stock to mature, they continued sourcing fertilised eggs 
from different and unregulated sources. Consequently, they produced diseased chicks 
which caused high mortality rates in rural farms, i.e. from only two per cent to thirty 
per cent in two months (RIU Annual Report 2009/2010). So, RIU requested the 
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Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) of the Ministry of Livestock Development and 
Fisheries (MLDF) to visit producers and hatcheries and investigate the problem. The 
CVL mission report shows that most of the problems were related to hatchery 
management and less with producers’ management practices.  
Furthermore, the mission established that problems in the hatchery were linked to the 
sources of fertilised eggs including the breeder stock. Therefore, RIU recruited a 
consultant to train hatchery owners and staff on hatchery and breeder stock 
management. The consultant was asked to stay in one hatchery for a week and 
observe all processes and train all workers on job. The consultant report shows a high 
cooperation from hatcheries probably because the training was timely and the losses 
experienced by owners were visible given the ready market for chicks available to 
them. It is also reported that hatchery owners accepted to change routines and adopt 
new ones. They agreed to incur costs of buying equipment and chemicals to maintain 
high hygiene levels. Some hatcheries had to get rid of the entire parent stock and 
start afresh with clean sources (Hatchery management training report, 2010). 
During interviews with RIU staff, it was clarified that RIU had decided to recruit the 
consultant instead of letting hatcheries handle it individually because the programme 
wanted to ensure all hatcheries are trained and motivated to change routines. It was 
also meant to ensure consistency in the skills imparted: If they had let hatcheries look 
for advice individually, it might have been difficult to ensure all hatcheries have 
learnt all the basics. So RIU prepared the consultant’s terms of reference in 
collaboration with hatchery owners and CVL staff. The consultancy report was also 
shared in a meeting to ensure clarity and adherence to what was recommended. This 
reflects a need for ensuring consistency in type of knowledge shared to create 
common values and understanding. So basically, RIU played the role of information 
disseminator, ensuring that basic knowledge is accessed by all relevant actors at the 
right time in order to instil common values. What emerges here is a process of 
synchronising a group of actors within a subsystem to function as a unit. 
9.2.5 Linking hatcheries with the Government for regulation 
The need to regulate hatcheries for biosecurity, biosafety, price and general quality 
of chicks including their genetics was evident. So the programme consulted the 
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National Livestock Research Institute (now TALIRI), and The Ministry of Livestock 
through the CVL and asked them to advise the fourteen hatcheries’ on disease 
management and efficient breeding. This was meant to enhance the hatcheries 
capacity to comply with government regulations and be able to compete in the 
industry. RIU also organised field visits to all hatcheries by representatives from the 
ministry of livestock. RIU report (Annual Report, 2009/2010) describes this visit as 
part of initiatives to directly link the Ministry with hatcheries, as well as to showcase 
the emerging changes in the industry. Apparently, this initiative created a strong 
bond between the ministry and hatcheries, who are now engaging through the 
Tanzania Poultry Breeders Association (TPBA) which was created under RIU’s 
facilitation. 
RIU reports show that, after the field visits, a meeting involving breeders, hatchery 
owners, livestock researchers, representatives of rural poultry producers and 
government officials from the Ministry of livestock was organised to discuss the 
newly enacted Hatchery Regulations of the Animal Disease Act. In this meeting 
various gaps were identified and discussed. Specifically, it became clear that the 
Regulations were biased against indigenous breeds including cross breeds. Therefore, 
the meeting proposed some amendments which were later incorporated.  
Therefore, it is evident that commercialising rural poultry production created demand 
for chicks which triggered innovation in hatcheries and breeder farms. Particularly, 
hatchery management skills and techniques were adopted to increase efficiency in 
invested in machines with larger hatching capacity and of improved and automated 
technology. In addition, an out-grower scheme emerged where hatchery owners 
contracted small and medium-scale farms to produce fertilised eggs.  Furthermore, 
quality regulation became necessary and hatcheries that produced indigenous breeds 
were formally introduced to the government for regulation. After they were formally 
recognised, relevant regulations were amended accordingly to accommodate them. 
RIU identified more hatcheries as implementation continued. So the chick supply 
problem created a business opportunity for new actors (suppliers) to work with rural 
producers. It also created new learning opportunities for chick suppliers and poultry 
producers to interact with a livestock researcher. Additionally, it was an opportunity 
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for urban chick suppliers and rural producers to negotiate and agree how to do 
business together, i.e. setting norms and rules of engagement. 
9.3 The feed supply crisis 
Initially, RIU supported district input suppliers to buy larger stocks of feeds to 
supply rural farmers. The programme stood as a guarantor for the district suppliers 
(agro-dealers) to collect goods on credit from feed manufacturers. Financial 
assistance (loan) was also provided to the district supplier in Coast region and 
enabled him to increase his stocks based on the new demand. Therefore, in all 
districts farmers were introduced and linked to district agro-dealers, who were linked 
to feed manufacturers.  
9.3.1 Addressing trust issues 
Plans to introduce feeds supply systems through local agro-dealers up to ward level 
did not succeed. This was due to infrastructure problems which drove feed prices up, 
and the difficulties in controlling the quality of feeds during distribution. For 
example, it happened that feeds were tampered with along the distribution line by 
being mixed with maize or rice bran, or other materials. This reduced nutritional 
value and in some cases weight was also reduced and producers ended up paying 
more for less. These problems were beyond RIU and producers’ control, so direct 
feed delivery from manufacturers to producers at ward level began. This removed the 
district agro-dealers in the RIU feed supply chain.  
According, RIU field notes, the decision to by-pass the district agro-dealer was first 
reached in Rufiji District after producers refused to work with him. It happened that 
there was no one to replace him. So RIU took the responsibility of linking the feed 
manufacture to supply directly to producers. This change pushed producers to 
mobilise themselves and organise deliveries. They identified Ward leaders who 
coordinated orders and other logistics. The approach was later adopted in other 
districts, and was used to deliver chicks, vaccines and services. Apparently, this was 
the beginning of formation of producer groups specifically for service and input 
procurement. 
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9.3.2 Local feed resources were not enough 
Reports show that the initial plan was to introduce industrial feeds during the first 
two months only, then let chicks out to free-range. In that regard, producers were 
expected to compound feeds from locally available resources and feed for the next 
two months to maturity. This was specifically meant to lower production costs during 
the producers’ experimentation period. Producers were therefore trained to produce 
alternative feeds including how to breed termites and maggots as cheap sources of 
protein. Basically, what is observed here is a process where an old strategy is not 
fully abandoned, but new knowledge and routines are gradually added towards a new 
strategy. In this particular case, new and old feeding strategies are initially allowed to 
co-exist before producers choose to abandon them completely. This initial co-
existence of old and new trajectories is also discussed in Gerd Schienstock (2004). 
As the number of producers and the number of chickens kept per household 
increased, it became difficult for individuals to produce sufficient feeds. In fact, it is 
reported that producers’ capacity to collect essential ingredients for feed production 
as well as balancing feed formulas declined. This led to significant low growth and 
reduced weight gain rates. So RIU identified two private feed manufacturers and 
engaged them with poultry feed professionals from research and the ministry to 
produce cheap but balanced feeds that could be used by rural producers. A special 
‘concentrate’ high in proteins and minerals was then produced for feeding ‘growers’ 
of local breeds. The concentrate is usually mixed with maize bran and other scratch 
grains before it is fed to chickens. A similar product is also used in Kenya (called 
kienyeji38 mash) as a special feed for local chickens. 
Efforts were also made to produce cheap industrial feeds should rural producers 
choose or be forced to use exclusively industrial feeds (e.g. in case of bad grain 
harvests). The efforts to introduce new cheap feeds through supporting selected feed 
producers reduced the price from Tsh 25,000 to Tsh 18,500 (i.e. from US$15 to 12) 
per 50kg bag of feed. This allowed more producers to afford commercial feeds and 
permitted them to concentrate on rearing chickens than spending their limited time 
and financial resources on compounding own feeds. The availability of cheap feeds 
                                                 
38 ‘Kienyeji’ means ‘local’ in Swahili 
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provided producers with alternative feeding options, i.e. to industrial feeds as 
supplements or as the only strategy. In fact, the introduction of commercial feeds 
initiated a move towards specialization where producers gradually got relieved of 
performing certain functions like chick production (breeding) and feed production 
and began to rely on other actors who specialise on performing them. 
With time, the few selected feed manufacturers who specialised in producing 
‘concentrates’ for local chickens could not meet the demand. So RIU encouraged 
more feed manufacturers to use the formula and produce specifically for the rural 
market. Consequently, the demand from rural producers attracted more actors to do 
business with them. Apparently, the growing demand and the growing number of 
feed suppliers brought new challenges regarding both quality and quantity.  
9.3.3 Addressing feed scarcity, price escalation and deteriorating 
quality  
As more producers raised more chickens, availability, quality and affordability of 
poultry feeds became a major challenge. Fluctuations in feed prices affected 
producers’ production costs. Feed prices increased during the dry seasons due to 
scarcity of major feed ingredients which lowered quality. In some cases it created 
delays in feed manufacturing and delivery. Such delays interfered with distribution 
schedules to producers where feeds were sometimes delivered late causing 
frustration among producers. On the other hand, delays made it very costly and thus 
discouraging for suppliers to work in remote areas. The programme continued to 
identify and work with more manufacturers and in some cases loans were provided to 
boost their operational capital used to purchase and store ingredients like maize, 
sunflower seed cakes, fish meal, soybean, etc. 
RIU reports show that, even with above efforts, the problem escalated and feeds 
became scarce, prices went high and quality went down. So RIU issued a public call 
to identify more feed manufacturers and distributors. A national meeting was held 
involving thirty feed manufacturers and distributors, five representatives from the 
Ministry of Livestock Development, and seven from research institutions. These met 
to identify challenges and propose solutions to ensure availability and accessibility of 
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quality and affordable poultry feeds in the country. It appeared that the entire poultry 
sector including the commercial industry was facing the problem. 
With the increased demand for feeds, some manufactures used new knowledge and 
technologies in formulations to increase nutritional value and storability. This 
includes use of acidifiers for controlling salmonella, and use of enzymes and 
premixes to increase digestibility and access to nutritional elements of the feeds. 
Furthermore, and for the first time, feed manufacturers in Tanzania started to use 
alternative feed ingredients such as soya to replace fish meal. They also began to 
produce special ‘breeder’s mash’, which is now being used in parent stock farms of 
indigenous chicken. About 10 of them have installed machines that produce pelleted 
feeds, something they did not do before. 
9.3.4 Developing the feed industry: Linking with other sectors 
During the second year of RIU, the feed scarcity problem escalated and almost 
threatened the programme. At that point, the demand for feeds, which came from 
both rural and urban producers overwhelmed suppliers and the industry was on the 
verge of collapsing. So RIU commissioned a quick study to understand the situation. 
Results showed that existing arrangements and capacities in the feed sector included 
for; (i) production of grains (like millet, sorghum and maize), soybean and oil seeds 
(like cotton, sunflower, etc.); (iii) post- harvest handling; (iii) compounding 
technology that ensure production of quality products (e.g. producing pellets vs. 
mash); and (iv) for regulations to ensure quality control. This did not guarantee 
safety and profitability of investment in feed manufacturing and distribution. 
Therefore, the poultry feed sector was mostly affected by weaknesses in other 
industries (sectors) beyond poultry.  
It became clear that the scarcity and high prices of feeds resulted from a shortage of 
major feed ingredients such as maize and fish meal due to competition with human 
food needs. It should be noted that maize (corn) is a major ingredient in poultry feed 
and at the same time a staple food to most Tanzanians. Therefore, inconsistencies in 
production and supply of maize seriously affects poultry feed production. It was also 
learned that feed manufacturers lacked the financial capacity to procure ingredients 
in bulk during the harvest and store them throughout the year. As a result, they were 
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buying small amounts throughout the year which subjected them to price increase 
during off season. In addition, use of fishmeal as source of animal protein in the 
formula also made feed prices and quality very unreliable. Lastly, feed producers use 
very poor compounding technologies in terms of machinery, formulation, quality 
testing, weighing (measurements), storage or ingredients (i.e. controlling moisture, 
etc.) and even packaging and distribution.  
Therefore, there was a need to: mobilize relevant actors and facilitate processes to 
trigger development in the maize value chain; introduce soybeans in the feed 
formulations which includes developing the soybean value chain; support feed 
manufacturers to access proper feed compounding technology including soybean 
extruding and pelleting technologies; support access to feed formulation knowledge 
for nutritious and disease free products; build financial capacity to enable feed 
manufacturers to procure ingredients in bulk when prices are low; build storage 
capacity; and strengthen marketing and regulatory capacity. 
As a facilitator, RIU organised high level meetings involving the government, 
research, development partners and the private sector. RIU also sent a notice in the 
media to attract investment in the feed industry. The major breakthrough happened in 
2012 when USDA approved funds to develop the soybean value chain, and when the 
government approved yellow corn in the country which is expected to be cultivated 
specifically for livestock feed. These initiatives are still going on and through the 
Tanzania Association of Feed Manufactures (TAFMA) public and private sector 
actors are experimenting with different solutions to develop the feed industry. 
Currently production volumes and quality of poultry feeds have significantly 
increased, but prices are still high. According to an interview with a feed 
manufacturer, availability of maize, soybean and fishmeal is still problematic and 
costly. Transportation cost and unreliability of power also affect production. 
9.3.5 Seeking solutions from research 
RIU facilitated processes involving research to come up with alternative ingredients 
in order to reduce competition between human food and poultry feed production. 
Specifically, RIU organised a meeting involving 30 participants representing 
research institutions, academic institutions, government ministries, the Commission 
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for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and private sector actors such as input 
manufacturers and importers, seed agencies, breeder farmers and hatchery owners. 
The explored use of alternative ingredients like sorghum, pearl millet, etc., to replace 
maize, and use of soybean to replace fishmeal in feed formulation. The focus was to 
increase production of selected alternative ingredients. 
Afterwards, RIU piloted a contract farming model for sorghum production with a 
feed manufacturer called TanFeeds Company limited. However, serious challenges 
were faced especially regarding availability and quality of seeds, pest infestation and 
post-harvest losses. Therefore, RIU provided feedback to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security (MAFSC) and requested that they continued as RIU was ending. 
Unfortunately, no follow up was done (Interviews with ex-RIU staff, May 2013). 
During the time of writing this thesis, a number of initiatives were on the ground to 
develop the feed value chains. Both public and private investment has been increased 
especially in building national feed testing capacity supported by the US Grain 
Council under the Food for Progress initiative (see http://grains.org/worldwide-
offices/tanzania), developing the soybean value chain done the by the Catholic Relief 
Services-fund by USDA (visit http://tanzania.usembassy.gov/pr_12032013.html for 
details). 
9.4 Solving the extension service problems 
As discussed in section 7.3.5, when RIU started all producers expressed lack of 
experience in raising day-old chicks. At the same time the extension services in 
Coast region were generally poor and the number of extension workers in the 
districts was not enough to deal with the increased demand for advisory services. 
This required the programme to look for alternative ways of providing advisory 
services to producers. Conventional training methods through theory classes and 
farmer field schools were found appropriate neither in meeting the knowledge 
demands nor fitting into the different learning capacities of rural producers, 
especially to women who had heavy workload.  
Therefore, RIU contemplated different approaches and finally decided to use 
‘caretakers’ or ‘household advisers’ who are certificate level graduates trained in 
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poultry husbandry. From their training background, caretakers have relatively more 
hands-on experience in poultry management but are not immediately integrated into 
the government extension system because they do not meet the minimum 
requirement i.e. a Diploma. The use of caretakers enabled RIU to: (i) reach out to 
more poultry producers; (ii) train them for a longer period of time; and (iii) satisfy 
their demand for basic knowledge and capacity enhancement needed to keep 
chickens commercially. 
The programme therefore used caretakers to provide intensive on-job training (i.e. 
for 30 days) to a significant number of households which facilitated the 
entrenchment of the new poultry husbandry knowledge into the social knowledge 
channels such as relatives and neighbours. Producers regarded the transfer of 
knowledge through caretakers informal and easier because they lived together and 
performed the routines together. This helped the families to internalise the new 
knowledge almost in the same manner as they previously learned how to keep 
chickens traditionally. One lady producer said: 
[“Having the caretaker in my house felt like we were raising 
the chicks together. I observed, asked questions, practiced, and 
listened to her. Learning was easy. I did not expect to raise so 
many chicks. But now I know and it is not easy to forget what 
I have learnt.” (Interview with Producer, September 2013)]. 
This way of learning (i.e. learning by doing or on-the job) is argued to be 
participative and it allows a rapid accumulation of knowledge towards creation of 
new routines (Cowan & Gunby, 1996). It also intensifies the new knowledge which 
is regarded as important for other (new) processes to occur (Perkins, 2003; Wolff & 
Recke, 2000). In RIU experience, it was necessary that all producers knew how to 
rear chicks if interventions in other parts of the value chain were to happen. So, 
intensive learning was needed at the beginning, and RIU made it happen by 
facilitating it and meeting the cost. 
When RIU realised that there was a limit to how the programme could influence the 
public extension system, it created a temporary system (i.e. of using caretakers) to 
run parallel to the government one. The expectation was, once producers have 
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commercialised and grown in numbers, they would put pressure and change the 
government extension system, or create a good market for private extension system. 
What actually happened is that producers enriched their tacit knowledge, and 
supplemented it by paying for private advisory services. Therefore, RIU presents 
another role of innovation facilitators, which is to create temporary structures and 
mechanisms needed to anchor processes (or provide services) before sustainable 
structures (or mechanisms) emerge. 
9.5 Poultry diseases challenge 
In 2011 the number of producers recruited by the programme in the Coast Region 
reached 3600. These kept about 760,000 birds in total. RIU progress report explains 
that, during this time most producers were in their second cycle of batches of 
between 200 and 300 birds. So they had sufficient basic knowledge and experience 
in flock management. However, in this same period the number of disease incidences 
escalated sharply. RIU reports a mortality rate of up to 100% in some farms. These 
were vaccinated birds and were three months old and almost ready for the market. 
The problem was first observed in Rufiji District and later spread to the remaining 
three districts. Since hatcheries were properly regulated for hygiene standards, the 
breeder flock was regularly screened for diseases, and a comprehensive vaccination 
programme was done on all the farms in the villages, RIU had to seek advice from 
the Ministry of Livestock. 
RIU contacted the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) who conducted a detailed 
analysis of the situation. Their findings showed mixed sources of infections 
including hatcheries, feeds and general poor husbandry practices at farm level. The 
team also isolated strains which were previously not common in rural areas. Those 
included diseases like Escherichia coli (E.coli), Salmonellosis, Paratyphoid, Fowl 
Cholera, Gumboro, Fowl pox, Coccidiosis and pullorum. In the report, CVL team 
identified the following as reasons for the increase in disease incidences: the number 
of chickens raised in the villages was higher creating room for multiple infections; 
poor extension and veterinary services; possibility of poor quality, handling and 
administration of vaccines; feed contamination and poor feeding; poor handling and 
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administration of veterinary drugs; presence of counterfeit drugs in rural markets; 
and poor disease diagnosis capacity in rural areas.  
RIU worked with relevant actors to address these problems and during the process of 
seeking solutions new knowledge was demanded and innovation took place. 
Different actors were involved and several organisational solutions were also 
adopted. For example, RIU organised a higher level meeting with representatives 
from the Ministry, producers, hatchery owners and input suppliers to address the 
drug and vaccine quality problem. The ministry explained that drug quality control 
and regulation required a higher intervention that included other regulatory 
authorities and government departments beyond the Ministry of Livestock, including 
the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA). This meant engaging and 
influencing more actors beyond the Ministry of Livestock. 
Since the drug quality control and regulatory system was weak, and time was needed 
to strengthen it, the programme decided to select one trusted drug supplier to work 
with. This was an immediate solution to control and track the quality of drugs 
distributed to producers. It also created a possibility to sue or claim for 
compensation. Bytrade Tanzania Limited, a large scale vet drug importer was 
therefore selected and introduced to producers. The company’s veterinarian visited 
all producers, inspected their sheds, held village meetings and conducted training on 
disease management especially on how to reduce incidences of common poultry 
diseases. He also discussed the major poultry diseases, their treatment, and drug 
handling and administration.  
The company was also linked with hatchery owners, feed manufacturers and breeder 
farms to supply veterinary drugs, disinfectants, and feed additives, etc. They also 
supported district stockists to sell Bytrade products and established linkages with 
producers for treatment and provision of veterinary advice through their trained 
veterinarians. Basically Bytrade established an intensive outreach programme as part 
of company’s business strategy. And as their veterinarian said during the interview, 
working with rural poultry producers was possible at that time because the 
organisational dynamics among the producers was higher, the business volumes were 
significant, and their purchasing power was also appropriate. Working with Bytrade 
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exclusively reduced mortality rate significantly and it was effective in ensuring only 
high-quality drugs were supplied within the network. 
Another solution involved working with the Ministry to improve the capacity to 
diagnose diseases in the field. The focus was to help producers and extension 
workers to know the symptoms and act accordingly. So, RIU worked with a small 
technical team and developed a comprehensive manual on poultry diseases. The 
manual describes the major poultry diseases, their causes, symptoms, treatment and 
control/prevention. Basically, the manual is also meant for rural producers so the 
language used is simple and with lots of pictures. The measurement units used are 
also simple and easy to understand. Such a role has never been played by the 
Ministry before, and neither has such a localised manual ever been produced before 
in Tanzania. The manual is now distributed and used by different programmes and 
actors in the country. Producers were also linked to the Veterinary Investigation 
Centre (VIC) in Dar es Salaam (which is responsible for the Eastern zone) for 
detailed laboratory examination, diagnosis and post-mortem checks. 
9.6 Producers lacked business and entrepreneurship skills 
At the beginning of RIU, and during the first stakeholders’ meeting lack of 
entrepreneurship spirit and zeal was identified as a major cause of poverty in the 
Coast Region. RIU used poultry as an entry point to change the situation (Ref. 
Section 6.5 of this thesis). It was obvious that producers lacked business and 
entrepreneurship skills and they were not used to producing chicken for the market. 
After producers went through the first business cycle it became clear to RIU that 
most producers lacked basic business skills. For example, some producers sold all 
the chickens and spent all the money, with nothing left as capital for the next round. 
Others sold at very low prices to traders because they could not negotiate based on 
production costs. So RIU decided to conduct an entrepreneurship course specifically 
tailored to poultry business. This was a four-day training on how to run a poultry 
business. They also acquired knowledge on enterprise management, record keeping, 
pricing, marketing, saving and reinvesting.  
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The training consisted of a special component which focused on addressing attitudes, 
individual competency and personal development. After the experience with the first 
batch of producers, RIU decided to train all producers approximately a month and a 
half after they received chicks. Reading from the different training reports, this 
approach made it easier for producers to learn because they were already in the 
business. They looked for solutions during the training rather than only absorbing 
what was being taught. They closely participated in sessions and guided some of the 
content with regard to what they preferred to learn according to their experiences. 
Such interest to learn and participation (citing own experiences as examples) might 
have not emerged if the training was delivered before producers started their 
enterprises.  
Reports show that the content of the training kept improving with time as more 
sessions were ran. This happened because RIU used one trainer who kept learning 
from producers’ circumstances and adjust the training accordingly. The content of 
the training is now used by other rural poultry programmes in Tanzania. 
9.7 Solving the marketing paradox 
Most producers did not have enough capacity to negotiate with urban markets and 
traders. In most cases producers fetched very low prices while middle-traders made 
larger margins when selling in urban areas. RIU linked producers directly with the 
wholesale buyers (holding centres) to help them get a profitable wholesale market. 
RIU supported producers in marketing because staff wanted to ensure that producers 
paid back the 60% loan which was used to pay for the chicks. So representatives 
from each village were supported to visit different buyers in the city and negotiate 
for business. The ex-RIU programme officer said during the interview:  
[“We let them experience the market and know how it behaves. They 
heard what consumers want in terms of weight, etc. It was important 
that they experienced the problems with logistics and even pay the 
marketing costs. They faced the risks of chicken dying during 
marketing. This experience helped them a lot when they later 
negotiated with a wholesale buyer who went to collect chickens right 
from their villages.” (Interview with ex-RIU staff, May 2013)]. 
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Finally, it was agreed that RIU would buy all mature chickens and put them in a 
holding ground for buyers to buy from. So RIU created a small unit called KukuDeal 
which was responsible for collecting and marketing live chicken from programme 
villages. This arrangement demanded organisation in the field and specific 
administrative procedures. RIU field reports and innovation diaries reveal that, 
several meetings were organised with producers to design the arrangement. Finally it 
was agreed that, a week before collection, all chickens will be weighed, sorted and 
recorded. Then RIU would send a truck to collect those that passed the market 
weight, and RIU would pay instantly. This was meant to shift the marketing risk to 
KukuDeal and allow producers to start a new business cycle. It also meant to 
aggregate volumes and attract consistent (regular) buyers. 
RIU reports mention four challenges that emerged from the above arrangement as 
follows; (i)the weight of mature chickens could not be controlled as weighing and 
sorting was not properly done; (ii) the collection process took a lot of time and 
chickens died in the process; (iii) carrying cages were poorly made and caused 
unnecessary death; (iv) moving with cash and paying producers in the open was 
risky; (v) holding ground costs were high because some birds needed feeding to gain 
market weight. As a follow up, RIU organised village meetings and the following 
solutions were proposed; (i) RIU distribute weighing scales and champions would 
weight and record. All under-weight birds should not be sold to KukuDeal. (ii) 
Collection will be done from specific collection points, not from producers’ homes; 
(iii) RIU imported chicken cages from China; (iv) all producers opened bank 
accounts and RIU paid through the accounts. This introduced the use of delivery 
notes signed by producers upon collection; and (v) buyers will be informed before 
collection, and only chickens with the appropriate weight were collected. 
Implementing the above solutions marked the beginning of a special service delivery 
model where producers received inputs and service from RIU, then RIU through 
KukuDeal would buy the end products from producers. In fact, this approach led to 
the current KukuDeal poultry contract farming scheme (I discuss this scheme later in 
the chapter). So a meeting with 14 poultry traders and small scale buyers was held in 
Dar es Salaam and informed them of the new volumes of mature chicken coming 
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from the RIU target villages. The buyers were also introduced to KukuDeal and the 
holding grounds. The meeting agreed on the price and working mechanisms.  
9.8 Improving access to finance: Contract farming emerges 
By May 2010, about 932 producers had gone at a least through one production cycle 
with RIU’s support. However, very few managed to go to the second cycle on their 
own. This was due to lack of capital for re-investment. Moreover, it was evident that 
the role played by RIU, especially in coordinating input procurement and delivery 
was very relevant if the network which had emerged was to continue. So in June 
2010, RIU through KukuDeal introduced poultry contract farming, and supported 
rural producers to keep batches of between 100 and 200 birds, with up to 3 cycles in 
a year. The approach was used by RIU to upscale the programme to other regions. 
This approach is still used by KukuDeal and has also been adopted by other 
organisations who work with rural poultry producers in Tanzania.  
Through contract farming, KukuDeal acts as a private aggregator who provides 
services to rural producers through the network of chick producers, drug and vaccine 
suppliers, feed manufacturers, extension service providers and a business trainer. 
Basically, RIU pays for all inputs and delivers them to the rural areas, then buy 75% 
of all outputs (25% is left for family consumption and for rural markets) and sell to 
the formal urban markets. Then RIU deducts the loan and pays producers through 
bank accounts linked to mobile money accounts on their mobile phones. 
KukuDeal mobilised producers to keep between 200-300 chickens in order to obtain 
substantial numbers of matured chicken that could be used to develop an organised 
and integrated marketing system for indigenous chicken. The contract farming model 
was also seen as an avenue for development of the overall sub-sector which is 
inclusive of more small and medium producers (producers and hatcheries). Through 
contract farming producers have increased their production cycle from 1 to 3 cycles 
per year. The number of chickens raised per household has increased from 5-10 to 
100 and now to between 200 and 300. At the end of each production cycle producers 
are able to sell and get lump-sum payments thus earning an additional income of 
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approximately TZS 900,000/- (about $600 for 200 chickens) just from poultry (These 
figures were extracted from the RIU End of Project Report, June 2012). 
Therefore, through experimentation, a service delivery model emerged and which is 
now replicated in other places and with other agents. Of particular interest here is the 
observation that, there are basic features of the process which have not changed even 
with the contract farming model. Those include; (i) sensitization is done to a larger 
community to create a mental shift before a programme runs in a new area; (ii) 
negotiations for input supply are done before orders are pressed; (iii) a significant 
number of producers is still a requirement before the programme can start; (iii) 
intensive learning by doing is assured by contracting an extension service provider to 
visit producers daily for 30 days when they received their first batch of chicks; (v) 
entrepreneurship training is provided at least after 45 days after receiving chick. 
In Tanzania contract farming is more popular in crop farming but not in poultry. RIU 
tried the approach with rural poultry producers and encouraged their growth in the 
industry. The all-in all-out RIU contract provided producers with the necessary 
inputs and support services. It also provided the market where producers’ gained a 
lump-sum income from wholesaling. Lump-sum payments triggered the need for 
banking services among producers. It also encouraged producers to do financial 
planning, budgeting, and saving. Previously over 90% of smallholder producers 
working with the programme did not own bank accounts or use banking services 
(RIU, 2011a). 
9.9 Addressing policy and regulatory issues 
As the number of actors and volumes traded increased, it became necessary for the 
government to closely monitor and enforce regulations in the industry. This included 
regulations around disease control, creating a conducive business environment, 
promoting fair trade and in assuring the quality of inputs, veterinary drugs, and 
vaccines. The industry also became viable and relevant for government funding and 
support particularly in research, training and extension. So meetings with 
government officials were organised to address policy challenges and also lobby for 
government support specifically in poultry breeding research. In addition, these 
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meetings provided a platform for the government to elaborate on existing 
regulations. For example, poultry breeders were introduced to the new Animal 
Diseases Regulation for Hatcheries and Breeder Farms, and they had opportunity to 
review and propose amendments. They also lobbied for import tax exemption for 
incubators and other hatching machinery. 
Poultry stakeholders also lobbied and pushed for a national perspective towards 
characterisation of indigenous chicken breeds and the government accepted funding 
of a characterisation research programme through the Tanzania Commission for 
Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the then National Livestock Research 
Institute (NLRI) now TALIRI. The objective of the programme was to breed and 
select the best indigenous chicken breeds which could be promoted for commercial 
production (eggs and meat) and also to facilitate their availability and multiplication 
through establishment of parent and grandparent stock farms. The Research is still 
going on with additional funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation under 
the African Chicken Genetics Gains (ACGG). Visit http://africacgg.net/about/ for 
details about ACGG. 
Furthermore, engagements with the government and the increasing volumes of 
transactions in the industry attracted attention of high public offices. For example, 
the President of Tanzania H.E. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete requested to be briefed about 
the progress and achievements made in the poultry subsector. And as a result of the 
meeting, the government is now paying special attention to the industry. This was 
also echoed by The Prime Minister Mr. Mizengo Peter Pinda’s directives made to the 
Parliament in June 2012 to commercialise rural poultry as a strategy to trigger 
innovation in the entire poultry subsector and therefore reduce poverty. 
Consequently, and since then more actors both from public (including development 
partners) and private sector have been attracted to invest in the industry. The 
approach used to develop the industry has also changed from focusing on subsistence 
production for household nutrition to also include producing for the market to gain 
income. 
The policy dialogues also prompted stakeholders to mobilise themselves into strong 
associations to engage with the government on policy and practice matters. The 
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following associations have been created; The Tanzania Poultry Breeders 
Association (TPBA); The Tanzania Feed Manufacturers Association (TFMA); 
Tanzania Commercial Poultry Association (TCPA); Tanzania Poultry Professionals 
Association (TPPA); and initiatives are underway to form an apex body. There are 
also numerous rural poultry producer groups registered by Local Government 
Authorities. As the sector expanded the government role became relevant both to the 
actors in the industry and to the government itself. It also drew attention of the high 
level offices for inclusion in national poverty reduction strategies which changed 
how the industry was perceived and developed. Gradually the urban bias is being 
reduced and therefore the industry is being freed from the political lock-in. 
9.10 Summary and conclusions 
The chapter makes it clear the shock explained in Chapter 8 enabled RIU and other 
actors to know exactly when and where to intervene. And it thus became possible for 
RIU to rely on the context to determine what to do. It elaborates that, after the shock 
RIU adopted ‘a bottleneck approach’ to solve problems as they emerged. This led 
RIU to manage multiple processes to articulate needs, seek and utilize solutions, 
which became the major determinants of innovation processes in the industry.  It was 
after ‘the shock’ when capacity gaps were revealed at different levels. And as actors 
sought solutions to fill in these gaps, innovation happened. Some of these solutions 
were organisational, and others were technological. And many came from the RIU 
program itself. 
In the chapter, I have described how this became a continuous process which created 
a myriad of processes that stimulated demand for new knowledge, technology and 
organisational forms. In fact, the chapter makes it very clear that it was when actors 
utilized these solutions, like applying new husbandry practices and technologies like 
vaccines; investing in new hatchery technologies and practices; designing new input 
distribution and logistics in rural areas; etc., that the unlocking, and creation of the 
new path (i.e. the transformation) took place. 
By describing the different challenges facing the supply system after the demand 
shock, the chapter demonstrate how problems emerged randomly as growth 
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unfolded. Most of the problems could not be predicted in advance, and could not 
emerge before certain events have occurred. The chapter emphasizes the importance 
of developing the industry as a system where every challenge is addressed regardless 
of its sectoral or thematic label.  
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Chapter 10 Analysis and Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis is about promoting agricultural innovation in poor economies where 
agriculture is the main source of livelihood, and where most farming is small scale 
farming. The focus is therefore on how to transform an industry dominated by 
subsistence producers to increase learning and productivity. By transformation I 
mean the process of making visible shifts away from the unproductive organisational 
and technological trajectories which are responsible for the current high levels of 
poverty and inequality. This perspective therefore, makes creation of new 
technological and organisational trajectories central to my thesis.  
This chapter summarises the findings of this study and locates them within wider 
research and development debates in ‘agriculture’ and ‘innovation’ for poverty 
reduction. I first present the general discussion on key issues emerging from the 
analysis, then summarise main conclusions including a reflection of the journey I 
walked to produce the thesis. 
10.2 Analysis 
The thesis has presented an in-depth analysis of innovation behaviours in the rural 
poultry industry in Tanzania and identified mechanisms for the observed persistence 
of the traditional production system, a system known for its subsistence tendencies. It 
also analysed the RIU facilitation process which promoted interactions and learning 
in the industry. The study was inspired by the work of a DFID-funded RIU 
programme in the rural poultry industry in Tanzania which I coordinated for four 
years. The programme achieved significant transformations which attracted more 
actors and investment to the industry. The aim of this research was therefore to 
investigate the work of RIU and establish how innovation can be promoted in 
industries dominated by subsistence producers and achieve equitable growth, and 
more importantly, to clarify the role of the public in all that. 
The next section presents the analysis of innovation behaviours in rural poultry 
production. 
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10.2.1 Explaining subsistence behaviours 
Before RIU intervened, poultry production in rural Tanzania was mainly subsistence 
and innovation was generally low. As it was made clear in the introduction, 94% of 
poultry production is under the traditional system, and most rural households keep 
between 1-20 poultry birds. The current demand for poultry products is higher than 
domestic supply and imports satisfy almost 60% of urban demand. This raises the 
question: Why are rural producers not producing for the market to earn more 
income? This question links to the fact that poultry technologies are available in the 
country, and commercialisation is already happening in urban and peri-urban areas. 
Moreover, the same rural producers who manage poultry as a subsistence activity 
have commercialised other commodities like coffee, cotton, rice and sunflower. So 
the first research question for this study is ‘why is innovation generally low in the 
rural poultry industry?’ 
The above question was contextualised within a broader enquiry of why subsistence 
agriculture persists in poor countries despite the advances in agricultural 
technologies, increase in food demand, expansions in trade and markets, and more 
importantly, after over fifty years of support and investment in agricultural research 
and development in those countries. According to the World Bank Report of 2013, 
about 80 per cent of farms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) excluding South Africa are 
small farms of close to subsistence nature. In fact, Frank Ellis (2005) warns that ‘the 
persistence, and even deepening, in SSA of a type of small farming that is getting 
smaller all the time, and which demonstrates an even greater orientation towards low 
level subsistence than was the case twenty or thirty years ago, should be of great 
concern to all those working on poverty reduction objectives in the continent. He 
argues further that much of rural Africa is sliding into greater vulnerability where the 
slightest disturbance in the normal rhythm of the seasons causes quite 
disproportionate food security crises (Ellis, 2005; p.1).  
To answer that question, literature explains that high poverty levels which cause low 
affordability of inputs and services, high transactions costs, poor access to markets, 
poor infrastructure and high risk nature of agriculture in such countries are the major 
barriers to exit subsistence production (Cadot et al., 2010; P. Pingali et al., 2005; 
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Shepherd, 2006; Zant, 2012). Actually, Wouter Zant explains that these factors 
reinforce each other to create what he called a ‘subsistence trap’ where it becomes 
even harder to exit (Zant, 2012). But these explanations do not explain why a large 
number of producers would commercialise other commodities like coffee, cotton, 
maize, etc., but consistently choose to keep poultry as a subsistence activity despite 
the growing demand for poultry meat and eggs. 
This thesis departs from the premise that rural producers operate within complex 
smallholder production systems which constitute a myriad of possibilities to provide 
for their livelihood needs which tend to influence production decisions in a very 
complex way. This makes reasons for the persistence of subsistence tendencies 
equally vast and complex, such that it is difficult to identify a small number of 
factors to explain it. Therefore, in the light of path dependence theory, this study 
integrates various explanations provided by the literature to describe the persistence 
of subsistence (low innovation) tendencies in rural poultry. In agricultural research, 
path dependence and lock-in have been used to study the adoption of pest-control 
strategies (Cowan & Gunby, 1996; Ugaglia et al., 2011; Wolff & Recke, 2000) 
where chemical crop protection (CCP) and the integrated pest management (IPM) 
were treated as competing technologies. In this thesis, I have treated the traditional 
and the commercial poultry production systems as competing trajectories. I then 
established why the traditional system dominates in rural Tanzania.  
Analysing the lock-in from assessing actors’ behaviours involved examining 
existence of three types of lock in, i.e. the cognitive, structural and political lock-in. 
And analysing from the ‘systems structures’ involved studying interactions (extent 
and type) in the industry as a proxy for innovation. I then used the concepts of 
‘organisational thinness’ and ‘fragmentation’ to explain why interactions are low. 
Findings on the latter are discussed in section 10.2.2 below. 
Using the Path Dependency (PD) Theory (Arthur, 1989) the study explains why rural 
producers are not switching from the traditional system despite the known economic 
benefits of commercialisation. Results show that producers are locked-in the 
traditional poultry production system because of three major reasons. First, the low-
cost and social nature of the traditional system itself is impeding the switch to the 
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commercial system; second the dominant actors in the rural innovation space i.e. 
government extension, NGO’s and donor projects are deliberately blocking the 
switch by encouraging natural breeding and discouraging use of external inputs; and 
third, society is reinforcing the social nature of the activity including how it is 
managed, how products are disposed of, and how knowledge is shared. This is 
contrary to the theory of innovation where cross-learning from heterogeneous actors 
is paramount. Similar findings are reported by Cowan and Gunby and Ugaglia and 
her colleagues who found that switching from chemical pest control lock-in in 
tomato growing in Ghana and from pesticide lock-in in grape growing in France 
respectively, was blocked by the inferior technology  itself (Cowan & Gunby, 1996; 
Ugaglia et al., 2011). 
The study analysed feedback loops in the poultry production system and established 
that reliance on natural breeding hinders scalability and that growth in such a system 
is not assured without introducing an external source of chicks. The analysis also 
highlights that production in the traditional system is socially driven thus limiting its 
market structures. For example, pricing mechanisms are socially determined and less 
directed towards profit oriented production. Reliance on social sources of foundation 
stock and husbandry knowledge also makes the community self-sufficient thus 
locking it within the limits of its own abilities and means. Furthermore, the tendency 
to allocate fewer resources for poultry makes switching difficult, and any attempt to 
push for more resources to be allocated needs to either introduce a new source of 
such resources or facilitate reorganization of existing household priorities, which is 
in itself a very complex process. 
The study elaborates further that certain ‘mental frames’ and ‘cognitive paradigms’ 
exist based on scientific findings regarding the low genetic potentials of local breeds, 
and society’s desire to feel self-sufficient in knowledge and inputs. Such mental 
frames are found to play a significant role in shaping the current innovation 
behaviours in the industry, including those of researchers and policy makers. The 
research findings have created a bias against use of certain technologies and 
innovation. The thesis therefore emphasises that exploring the role played by such 
factors when analysing innovation in smallholder agriculture is paramount. 
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High transaction costs were also found to cause the ‘lock-in’ because in rural areas 
poultry is considered a subsistence commodity almost by default, thus majority 
producers are not investing in it. This creates insufficient demand for inputs and 
services needed to lower supply costs. As a result, individual attempts to 
commercialise face high transaction costs making switching prohibitively costly and 
unattractive. 
10.2.2 Explaining interactions 
The thesis starts from the premise that innovation co-evolves as actors interact in a 
very complex manner. And that low innovation implies low interactions among 
heterogeneous actors. Therefore, to ask ‘why innovation is generally low’, is also to 
ask ‘why interactions are low.’ As an attempt to answer those two questions, the 
study analysed both ‘the actors’ and ‘the system’ (or the industry).  
The study used the agricultural innovation system (AIS) framework to articulate the 
interaction space within the traditional poultry production system. This includes 
investigating routines and perceptions which lead to interactions within the poultry 
enterprise (as an agency) and the poultry industry in general. The study equates 
‘interactions’ to ‘knowledge flows’ and ‘exchanges of any sort’. This is based on the 
assumption that whenever an interaction occurs either knowledge flows (or utilised), 
or goods and services are exchanged (e.g. inputs) and trigger demand for knowledge 
associated with using the exchanged goods or services. By establishing what triggers 
knowledge to flow, it was possible to know what triggers interactions, and vice 
versa. Since the AIS framework emphasises studying innovation as a process of 
accumulating and applying knowledge between and among heterogeneous actors 
within a system (Spielman, 2005; p.1), the study traced retrospectively why and how 
knowledge was accumulated, applied and shared within a single poultry producing 
household and across the community. Then linked these processes with human 
purposes (and expectations) of keeping chickens. By doing this it was possible to 
isolate and analyse interaction triggers. 
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The analysis considered the rural poultry industry in Tanzania: 
 to be like any other innovation system with unique sets of traditions, 
competencies and institutional composition;  
 an industry with institutional infrastructure to facilitate innovation among 
different actors like producers, input supply firms, and support agencies like 
extension and research institutions;  
 a composition of dynamic innovation processes where heterogeneous actors 
interact as they use knowledge to generate products and services;  
 an industry generally characterised as a non-knowledge intensive industry 
where firms/actors possess less-developed innovative capabilities;  
 an industry considered to be located in the periphery of the national poultry 
sector hence with a limited capacity to innovate and stimulate growth patterns; 
and, 
 an industry which suffers from the absence of relevant actors with rich resource 
bases and technological capabilities (Abdelqader, Wollny, & Gauly, 2007; 
Kitalyi, 1998; Mack, Hoffmann, & Otte, 2013), causing the industry to exhibit 
organisational thinness (Salamonsen, 2014) because of low interactions and 
learning abilities of its key actors, as well as because of its periphery location. 
Existing literature considers the industry to be technologically weak because of three 
factors;  (i) the type of breed handled which is perceived to be of low genetic 
potential (Malago, 2009; Rodríguez, Herrero, & Baltenweck, 2011), (ii) the poverty 
characteristics of the producers who are perceived to be risk averse and unable to 
meet costs of commercial inputs (Kitalyi, 1998; Roothaert et al., 2011), and (iii) the 
remoteness of producers’ geographical locations where transaction costs are argued 
to be very high, and which make learning and exchange of goods and services very 
costly and unaffordable to most producers (Minga et al., 2001; Rodríguez et al., 
2011). Literature also explains the sustenance and dominance of subsistence poultry 
production as the result of producers’ inability to exit due to high costs associated 
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with the decision to produce for the market (referred in the literature as ‘switching 
costs’)(Cadot et al., 2010; Pingali et al., 2005; Zant, 2012). This makes causes of low 
innovation in the industry a result of factors related to the links between the nature of 
the chicken (as a commodity) and characteristics or abilities of the producer 
(human) in relation to their environment (i.e. social, economic, political and 
physical).  
Linking agricultural commodities with system behaviour 
The RIU experience shows that the nature and type of agricultural commodities like 
poultry influence the structure and behaviour of agricultural systems of which they 
are a part. Therefore influencing such systems involves influencing both human and 
nonhuman components of the system. This study establishes that, what makes it a 
‘chicken’ is what fulfils human needs and is also what drives human decision 
regarding how to produce and use its products. Chickens, like other agricultural 
commodities tend to influence how different actors engage with them from 
production to consumption. This is the case even after breeders have manipulated 
their genetics to acquire different humanly preferred traits like early maturing, high 
yielding, drought or pest/disease resistant (thus turning their seeds and embryos into 
technology). The ‘maize-ness’ and the ‘chicken-ness’ continue to influence decisions 
and processes along the respective value chains though not necessarily as 
technologies, but as a unique species with a specific nature and life cycle.  
Producers decide whether or not to engage with a certain agricultural commodity 
based on perceived traits (or characteristics) of the crop linked to other cognitive 
criteria (social, cultural, economic and ecological, etc.) like soil type, rainfall 
patterns, perceived economic value, labour requirements, nutritional values, etc. 
Characteristics of these commodities also influence decisions on choices for 
agronomic practices like planting time, use of certain inputs, size of the plot to be 
cultivated, as well as on how much to invest, etc. Therefore, as they influence 
production, marketing and utilization decisions, agricultural commodities tend to 
determine types of interactions needed to effect such decisions. For example, cassava 
requires specific inputs (e.g. planting materials, pesticides, harvesting tools etc.) and 
knowledge which is different from those needed in tomato farming. Hence, it is the 
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“cassava-ness” that demands the farmer to interact with a cassava researcher, 
cassava trader, or a cassava flour miller instead of interacting with a horticulturist or 
a chicken breeder.  
Agricultural commodities also determine what is exchanged during interactions, e.g. 
vaccines vs. herbicides; and knowledge on how to feed chickens vs. how to apply 
fertilizer. Based on rationalization and cognitive reasoning a farmer decides which 
cassava researcher, trader or a miller to interact with, when and how. The farmer also 
decides which vaccine, which brand of fertilizer and which market to go to, etc.  
Therefore, had it not been for chickens and their nature of reacting to Paramyxovirus 
1 (PMV-1) and suffer the Newcastle Disease, poultry producers wouldn’t have 
sought to interact with vaccine distributors, nor would there be such a vaccine 
invented (research), produced (manufacturing), promoted (extension) or distributed 
(traders) in the first place. Likewise, had it not been for the poultry producer, 
chickens wouldn’t have been domesticated, researched, vaccinated, nor would 
vaccines been produced and utilised after all. Therefore, it is neither the human nor 
the chicken (commodity) alone that determines an effective interaction. Rather it is 
an outcome of fusing that which is dynamic in a human actor and that which is 
dynamic in a non-human actor (or actant as called by Brunor Latour) in a particular 
agricultural enterprise. 
From the study, it is explicit that chickens have needs set by nature as conditions for 
them to meet producer’s expectations. Where the producer is not self-sufficient in 
providing them, he/she is forced to either choose not to provide them at all, or get 
them from elsewhere. And that requires an interaction. Even the knowledge about 
these conditions may come from external sources such as fellow producers, friends, 
families, extension staff, or media. Thus the ‘chicken-ness’ entails specific needs, 
which necessitate interactions once the producer opts to fulfil them as means of 
meeting his/her own expectations. Therefore chickens have set conditions if they are 
to fulfil their side of the bargain, and through those conditions they influence how 
producers choose to interact. So any external decision (e.g. from a politician or 
NGO) to limit producers from providing such needs limits what the chicken could 
have produced as benefits to the producer. 
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Commodities like chickens also determine types and number of systems a particular 
farmer gets involved in. Two agricultural commodities therefore provide a possibility 
for one farmer to operate (interact) in more than one system. And the producer may 
behave differently in each system. For example, he/she may be business orientated in 
one, but subsistence in another. This challenges tendencies to define rural producers 
based on their behaviours observed on single commodity chains. Another example is 
that, the same producer can be aggressive in seeking and paying for dairy extension 
services but not for poultry. So concluding that such a farmer cannot afford extension 
services will be wrong. Commodities also dictate how and when the farmer should 
interact in a particular system. Moreover, certain interactions happen just once in a 
season, e.g. during the planting season, or during harvesting. Therefore, while there 
are many factors that determine interactions in an agricultural system, the nature of 
agricultural commodities also plays a role which should not be ignored. As Watson 
wrote “There is no ‘bird-watching’ without the ‘bird’ and the ‘birder’, although both 
existed before the hybrid bird-watching evolved (Watson, 2010; p.3). 
In her book ‘Thinking in Systems’, Donella Meadows defines a system as a set of 
things interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behaviour 
over time i.e. an interconnected set of elements coherently organised to achieve a 
purpose. By things she refers to people, cells, molecular ‘or whatever’ implying that 
objects, humans and animals can be active parts of the system (Meadows, 2008; p.2). 
Thus in her definition, agricultural commodities like crops, livestock, inputs, etc., are 
components of agricultural systems. In her view, most persisting problems in society 
are intrinsic systems problems resulting from undesirable characteristics of system 
structures that produce them. Hence solving such problems needs human courage 
and wisdom to restructure systems. However, she warns that while a system may be 
influenced by outside forces, how the system responds to these forces is purely a 
characteristics of itself, and a complex phenomenon in the real world (Meadows, 
2008; p.2). The author argues that systems behaviours emerge from their structures 
of both human and nonhuman components. 
Linked to Donella Meadow’s view, is the actor-network theory (ANT) originally 
developed in mid-1980s by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law which 
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explains the role of ‘nonhuman actants’ in influencing type, direction and rate of 
innovation (including interactions) in socio-technical systems. Literature has not 
demonstrated how agricultural commodities influence structures and behaviours in 
agricultural systems. Most studies treat agricultural commodities as passive actors 
and as subjects of human choosing and manipulation with little or no ‘self-
determined’ influence in the innovation processes. However, the analysis of RIU 
reveals the active role played by chickens to influence innovation processes as 
elaborated below. 
Theorizing the active role of a chicken in poultry systems 
A chicken farmer exists because he/she keeps chickens. Separate the two, and the 
chicken farmer ceases to exist. Therefore, a chicken farmer can be recognised as a 
dynamic unit involving the keeper (human), the kept (chicken) and the process of 
‘keeping’ chicken. Arguably, what determines this relationship is the interaction 
between man and chicken achieved through the process of keeping, and how the 
chicken responds to the “keeping”. This means in this particular context, while the 
decision on whether or not to relate to the chicken and the reasons thereof (e.g. 
whether to keep it as a pet, or for family food or as a business, etc.) ultimately lies 
with the farmer his or her ability to actually interact does not. Rather, the ability to 
interact is embodied in the husbandry processes (and related technologies or artefacts 
like vaccines and feeds) and the physiology of the chicken (how it feeds, what makes 
it fall sick, how it reproduces, etc.), which in essence shape the “keeping”. Therefore, 
the chicken keeper’s decisions to interact in the poultry system are influenced not by 
human behaviour alone, but also by the nature of the chicken (what it needs), the 
ecology (what is available as feed or what affects the chicken) and how he/she keeps 
the chicken (husbandry practices). Thus the producer’s ability to relate with the 
chicken towards fulfilling his or her own expectations lies on his ability to interact 
with husbandry processes determined by the physiology of the chicken as well as 
with sources of poultry inputs and services provided in the physical and socio-
economic environments.  
The final outcome of the farmer-chicken relationship (with respect to the goals set by 
the farmer) principally relies on how the chicken responds to the ‘keeping”, i.e. how 
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it responds to vaccines, feeding, treatments etc., Therefore, this study argues that 
being non-human does not make the chicken a passive actor in this relationship, but 
rather as an agent sharing the power to influence the emergent behaviour of the 
network (or system) in which it is a part (Watson, 2010). Therefore, focusing on 
developing producers alone, without considering the nature and needs of the chicken 
and the environment where the activity is carried out (including the various sources 
of knowledge, inputs, services, etc.) as a system, is bound to produce limited results. 
A look at poultry research literature shows significant investment in studying the 
chicken in order to influence its response to the environment and therefore fulfil 
human needs. Most attempts to influence this relationship towards making specific 
targets have often been by either: (i) adjusting /improving the keeping through better 
husbandry practices or by use of technologies (which might be done through 
educating or changing the ways of the farmer)(Boki, 2000; Dwinger & Unger, 2006; 
Riise et al., 2005); and/or through (ii) influencing/improving how the chicken 
responds to the keeping (e.g. through manipulating the biology or physiology of the 
bird) (Grobbelaar et al., 2010; Malago, 2009; Minga et al., 2001). Whereas such 
initiatives have created valuable information and technologies, they have not helped 
rural producers to use poultry as a tool for alleviating poverty.   
This study highlights that poultry management processes are basically determined by 
both human-related quests and the nature of the chicken. On one hand, the purpose of 
keeping chickens (i.e. for household nutrition vs. for commercial purposes) 
influences the decision on scale of production, investment in technologies and even 
how to dispose of its products. While on the other hand, the nature of chickens, e.g. 
being a live animal with specific needs and ways of living, as well as the 
perishability of its products (i.e. meat and eggs) demand that certain routines are 
strictly followed if chickens are to survive and be productive. Such demands include, 
feeding, keeping chicks warm, vaccinating against certain diseases, selling eggs or 
meat within a certain period (else they go bad), feeding chicks immediately after they 
are hatched as they can’t be stored, etc. These natural characteristics of the chicken 
make poultry management unique and call for specific logistical arrangements on 
transportation, quality control, storage, marketing etc. The breed of the chicken (i.e. 
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local vs. improved) also influences production choices (traditional vs. intensive), 
perceptions on values (social vs. economic), research focus (low vs. high 
innovation), consumption habits and even marketing strategies and prices.  
Therefore key innovation decisions around poultry production, marketing and 
consumption, including how and when to interact with others in the industry, are 
potentially influenced by why and how chickens are kept as well as the nature of 
chickens, and that of its products. This makes analysing rural chicken keeping as a 
human-chicken constituency helpful in understanding factors determining innovation 
in the rural poultry industry beyond technology and science. 
Analysing ‘mutual constitutions’ in agro-industries 
The study used the rural chicken farm as the unit of analysis. This proved to be more 
appropriate in understanding how interactions happen and what causes them to 
happen. The farm is representing a mutual constituency involving humans and 
chickens (as a commodity). In this constituency both man and chicken are considered 
to mutually shape the innovation process as they influence each other using what is 
embedded in the ‘chicken keeping’ or poultry husbandry. The study used the mutual 
constituency as the unit of analysis mainly for two reasons. One, it was useful in 
explaining how the behaviour of rural chicken farms is shaped and is being shaped 
by society, and which is mostly determined by how society perceives the nature of 
the breed as being ‘local’ and not ‘improved’. And two, looking at a poultry farm as 
a constituency made it possible to explain how the collective behaviour of producers 
(as they represent different farms or constituencies) determines the behaviour of 
other actors in the industry, who must relate with them as constituencies and not only 
as individuals. The study makes it clear that it is the inter-constituency relationships 
which determine the general behaviour of the industry.  
Literature describes ‘mutual constitution’ as a social construction standing between 
and away from social and technological determinism by regarding neither society nor 
technology as sole determinants of effects of technology. Rather, it recognises the 
interdependency between humans and technologies, and their non-deterministic 
contribution in creating an emergent phenomenon whose nature is not predictable. It 
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therefore recognises “The co-evolution process among that which is technological, 
and that which is social”  (Sawyer & Studies, 2013; p.4). This study learns from the 
sociotechnical systems literature which argues that whatever influences the human 
also influence the linked relationship between the human and the technology, and not 
the technology itself, and vice versa. So the analysis looks at poultry keeping as a 
constituency where both man and chicken determine types, rates, level and impacts 
of technological decisions in the industry. For example, in a chicken-producer 
system, whatever influences the chicken, will not influence the human/producer as an 
object of the system, rather it will affect how the farmer relates with the chicken. 
This means changing the breed of the chicken will not change the physiology of the 
farmer rather it may change how the farmer feeds or vaccinate this new breed of 
chicken. Consequently, if the change in breed results in increased productivity, then 
this is a result of both the change in feeding on the part of the farmer, and the feed 
conversion ability of the chicken as a result of its new genetics. Thus neither 
improving the breed of the chicken leads to increased productivity, nor is improving 
feeding alone. 
Literature describes the interdependence and inextricably linked relationship between 
features of an object or system and the social governing factors, and involvement of a 
broad range of human actors as the premise of sociotechnical research (Sawyer & 
Studies, 2013). Apparently, most studies on poultry production have hardly analysed 
this interdependence. Existing poultry studies tend to focus in isolation, the 
behaviour of the producer, of the chicken, and the technological issues surrounding 
the keeping in order to influence the former. This study however, explains that 
analysing the ‘mutual human-chicken constituency’ is more informative than looking 
at the producer (human agency) and the chicken (commodity agency) separately. 
Section 7.24 of this thesis explains that there are two interdependent levels of 
interactions which are necessary for learning and innovation in rural poultry industry. 
Those are the ‘human-agency’ level and the ‘enterprise-agency’ level interactions. 
The RIU experience shows that, industry-wide innovation in subsistence-based 
industries is determined by the collective behaviour of a significant number of 
individual producers to form a collection of agencies which constitute the need to 
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interact and innovate. A further analysis of the ‘enterprise-agency’ shows that it 
emerges when humans (human agency) relate with commodities (commodity 
agency) in a specific way. Therefore there is a relationship between humans and a 
specific commodity through which innovation occurs as a construct of a ‘mutual 
human-commodity constituency’ and of how the constituency relates with what is 
outside itself (including other constituencies) to meet specific goals and expectations. 
Thus, it is the inherent goal seeking processes within similar and related 
constituencies that shape innovation processes within a given industry. 
Based on discussions above, the study introduces the concepts of ‘human-agent’ (i.e. 
a chicken producer, a farmer, or hatchery owner) who interacts with a ‘commodity-
agent’ (i.e. the chicken, rice, maize, goat, chicks, vaccines, etc.) in a particular way 
to create a human-commodity constituency or the ‘enterprise-agency’ (i.e. chicken 
keeping, maize farming, chick production/hatchery, feed manufacturing, any other 
business or enterprise) around which the human agent has built expectations and 
purpose. The identity of the ‘enterprise agency’ emerges from blending 
characteristics of the ‘human agent’, the nature of the ‘commodity agent’, needs, 
expectations, and all processes within the enterprise, as influenced by the 
environment. The process may also involve utilization of different commodities and 
processes as inputs, technologies and skills. Examples of enterprise agencies in a 
poultry system are hatchery businesses; vaccine manufacturing or distribution; and 
feed manufacturing. These represent mutual constituencies of humans and certain 
commodities. It is therefore the interactions between and among multitudes of 
heterogeneous but related ‘enterprise agencies’ that makes an agro-industry. And 
unless such agencies have affinity for each other, interactions and innovation will not 
happen, even where the human agents from those enterprises know each other. As 
explained in Chapter 7 of this thesis, if a rural poultry farm relies on natural 
breeding, making the farmer meet the hatchery owner does not alone guarantee 
innovation. 
The thesis therefore supposes an innovation process which starts without cognizance 
of existence of innovation demand or supply. Rather, it starts from perceiving needs 
to create expectations followed by a myriad of decisions (both inside and outside the 
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constituency) to pursue these expectations. This portrays innovation as unconscious 
processes to small producers where innovation demand, supply and utilization co-
evolve as multiple decisions are made within the ‘enterprise agency’ (i.e. the 
‘producer-commodity constituency’), and multiple interactions are then made with 
the rest of the constituencies in the industry. This makes pursuing expectations as the 
conscious process and which could be the focus for innovation facilitation. This is 
contrary to the traditional extension-based rural development approach where 
communicating information on management and technology to make producers 
aware of innovation options available is advocated as the main approach for rural 
development.  Again, informing the poultry producer (human agent) about a vaccine 
alone does not guarantee its adoption. Other constituencies to supply the vaccine 
must be present and able to work with such particular enterprises.  
Basically, the study suggests that what triggers an innovation process in rural-based 
agro-industries is not the knowledge of, or presence of technology or innovation, but 
the reconstruction of expectations within different ‘enterprise agencies’ and the 
process of re-organising them to gain capacities to meet new expectations. This 
includes synchronizing and harmonising multitudes of expectations of ‘human 
agents’ and their constituencies, both individually and collectively. The study thus 
proposes that agricultural innovation is analysed as constructed by relationships 
between humans and agricultural commodities (to create a farm or an agricultural 
activity/enterprise); and between that which emerges as humans relate to agricultural 
commodities and other enterprises in the sector. This makes triggers for agricultural 
innovation more social (organizational) than technological.  
The study also argues that, without re-organising a significant number of rural 
‘enterprise agencies’ to mirror economic purpose and expectations, promoting 
innovation to increase profitability in subsistence –based agro industries is bound to 
fail. This is particularly because new innovations are likely to introduce competing 
goals in subsistence-based livelihood systems. For example, introducing commercial 
goals and the subsequent technologies in poultry farms which rely on natural 
breeding is inefficient because part of the marketable stock has to be left behind as a 
breeder stock. This means foregoing part of the sales from every production cycle as 
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future inputs. Therefore understanding the nature and dynamics within a particular 
‘producer-commodity constituency’ (enterprise), and the role they play in initiating 
and defining how rural innovation networks are created, provides insights of how 
agricultural innovation can be facilitated in industries dominated by poor producers. 
While the ‘human-agency’ level interactions are needed to channel information and 
make choices and decisions, the ‘enterprise-agency’ gives purpose to the interactions 
and produce value. It is therefore the ‘enterprise agency’ that produces a need and 
the ‘human-agency’ which uses the information to make decisions on the type of 
interactions, and carry out the actual interaction with other ‘human-agencies’ (who 
also represent the interest of their enterprise) to satisfy the need. This means making 
a hatchery owner (i.e. human-agency A) interact with a rural producer (human-
agency B) who relies on natural breeding is meaningless. The situation will remain 
so until the two enterprises (enterprise agencies) relate, i.e. need each other. The 
study therefore identifies creating the relationship between rural poultry enterprises 
and other enterprises in the industry as the pre-requisite for promoting innovation in 
the industry. 
The analysis also explains that the collective behaviour of a significant number of 
similar constituencies (enterprises) determines how the rest of the system behaves 
towards them. For example, if a majority of producers do not use external inputs, 
then input suppliers will not open input shops in those villages. This means changing 
a significant number of rural enterprises (constituencies) is necessary to facilitate 
interactions in rural industries. The study demonstrates that, facilitating such a 
change requires the creation of new expectations within the constituencies. This will 
then create new needs that synchronise with those of other related constituencies 
(agencies) present in the industry. The new needs will make human agents in such 
enterprises perceive self-insufficiency in inputs and services, and justify creation of 
mechanisms for continuous interactions, exchanging and learning. I discuss this 
further in the next section. 
In addition, by grounding the analysis on how producers reason and act both as 
individuals (i.e. in individual constituencies) and as a group (i.e. as a collection of 
constituencies), the study argues for a development process which starts by building 
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producers’ individual and collective capacities to influence relevant institutional 
arrangements in their favour. This recognizes the power of rural producers to 
influence behaviours in agro-industries of which they are a part. The study argues 
that such powers can be unleashed using external facilitation to create institutional 
arrangements and innovation structures which are friendly and useful to small 
producers. This way of positioning rural producers in the analysis departs from the 
perspective where traditional (or poor) producers are seen as ‘weak’ or ‘vulnerable’; 
and as mere recipients of modern knowledge about farming techniques (Barrett, 
Carter, & Timmer, 2010; p.448). As a contrast, this study considers rural poultry 
producers to have the upper hand in shaping their innovation trajectory if provided 
with rigorous smallholder friendly facilitation and brokerage services. The 
facilitation can consolidate their individual abilities into one big powerful actor who 
can send noticeable signals into the market in the form of input or service demand, or 
supply of output. The study refers to this kind of consolidation of demand as creation 
of an ‘input demand shock’ where a significant number of producers are supported to 
demand inputs and therefore become significant players in the input market. 
Re-thinking self-sufficiency and diversification 
The study is grounded on wider systems thinking, and specifically on innovation 
systems theory focusing on interactions and learning. The AIS framework is used 
with more attention paid to the enterprise domain to illustrate how producers have set 
their expectations on poultry as a livelihood activity and how those expectations 
define their behaviour towards the activity and as an agricultural commodity. By 
interrogating existing poultry management routines and behaviours, and how these 
are defined by the pre-determined social roles of chickens, the study explains that the 
perceived ‘self-sufficiency’ in knowledge and technology among rural producers 
hinders innovation in the industry. Moreover, research, policy and development 
practice are currently reinforcing  the perception by promoting the idea that ‘self-
sufficiency’ is ‘good’ for the poor as it cushions them from shocks and market 
instabilities. Consequently, they isolate them and block interactions with other actors. 
At this point the study distinguishes ‘output self-sufficiency’ from ‘input self-
sufficiency’ arguing that each affects farm decisions and the entire industry 
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differently. However, they also tend to influence each other to some degrees. In the 
study, output self-sufficiency refers to household or farm producing to satisfy 
consumption needs, e.g. producing own foods, etc., and being input self-sufficient 
refers to sourcing most (if not all) production inputs from within the farm. While 
both types of self-sufficiency externally promote diversification and therefore reduce 
specialization at industry level (as everybody tends to produce everything), as well as 
diminishing scale (as the same resources especially land and labour are thinly 
allocated to produce various products), input self-sufficiency’ has relatively more 
implications on the level of interactions in the poultry industry. The more producers 
perceive, or aim to be input self-sufficient, the less they interact with other actors in 
the poultry industry. When other actors in the industry perceive that producers are 
operating as input self-sufficient, they reinforce that tendency by withdrawing from 
supplying inputs. Once, producers choose to change and source inputs outwards, they 
are initially faced with a supply and demand deadlock, which makes the shift to 
commercial production difficult and very costly unless a significant number of 
producers make the shift together. 
I also argue from the study that, perceiving input (including knowledge) self-
sufficiency promotes ‘pseudo vertical integration’ where producers believe that they 
can source (or are sourcing) all inputs and knowledge they need from within the farm 
(or from within a closed community), when in actual fact there is no sufficient 
supply.  It also leads producers to exclude technologies and innovations which are 
beyond what they know or have. As a result, the input self-sufficiency impression 
hinders opportunities for interactions while leaving the farm still unproductive.  It 
thus promotes organisational thinness as fewer actors are needed to satisfy farms’ 
needs.  Therefore, given the small size of these farms and their poor resource bases, 
it is arguable that perceiving ‘self-insufficiency’ can actually trigger interactions, 
learning and growth. The very same shocks that poor producers might be protected 
from could be potential sources of innovation and growth if well supported to deal 
with them. 
Excessive diversification at household level can be a strategy to manage risks, but 
this also hinders specialization in production which in aggregate should lead to 
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increased productivity (Smith, 1976: Vol.1). It limits social division of labour as 
everybody in a village produces small amounts of everything. According to Adam 
Smith (ibid), specialization of labour leads to a complex social division of labour 
which leads to society’s wealth. Small production of everything by everybody does 
not facilitate extensive technical division of labour. While diversification by small 
poor households in rural Africa may cushion them from risks but in aggregate it 
hinders the growth of the society in general. Therefore, this reductionist view of 
focusing at the growth and productivity of an individual poor household as if isolated 
from the growth of the entire society or industry is among the causes of low 
innovation and low productivity.  It hinders specialization and therefore hinders 
accumulation of society’s wealth. According to Smith, ‘division of labour is a 
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature…. the propensity to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another’ (Smith, 1976: Vol.1: 25, cited in Payne 
and Philips, 2010: Pg. 13). More exchanges of goods are needed to create a stronger 
division of labour which the poor producers need in order to strengthen their 
presence in the market, a presence they inevitably need given the current global 
forces. 
Regarding organisational thinness and fragmentation, results from the innovation 
context analysis show existence of only a few organisations promoting use of new 
knowledge, and later triggering investment in innovation in the rural poultry 
industry. Actors in the knowledge and intermediary domains (i.e. research 
organisations, NGOs, and extension service providers) were found to be the major 
cause of organisational thinness and fragmentation observed in the industry because 
they discourage producers interacting with commercial input suppliers. Having the 
majority producers operating under the traditional system is also found to cause 
fragmentation especially in the enterprise domain where commercial exchange of 
goods and services is central in connecting actors. Therefore, the thesis argues that it 
is the routines embedded in the traditional production system itself that cause 
fragmentation in the enterprise domain, as well as between producers and actors in 
the demand domain and in the support services cluster. This means that, in order to 
reduce organisational thinness and fragmentation, the persistence of the traditional 
production system has to be altered to create affinity for other enterprises in the 
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industry. This includes introducing the ‘business element’ as the motive for 
interactions. 
10.2.3 Explaining ‘unlocking’ and ‘path creation’ 
The analysis of the RIU programme clearly shows that despite their indeterminate 
and unpredictable nature, complex agricultural systems can be deliberately 
influenced to produce desired ‘emergent’ behaviours. There is a window provided by 
complex systems through which human intent is embraced to become part of 
complexity that steers processes that form desired ‘emergent’ behaviours. Short-term 
human determinism is allowable when influencing complex systems, though only as 
one of many inputs and possibilities that produce systems behaviours. From the study 
RIU managed to facilitate and manoeuvre processes until the commercialisation 
behaviour emerged as desired. This was achieved by facilitating producers to change 
their ‘expectations’ and their ‘relationship with poultry keeping’. The system was 
then induced into an ‘input demand shock’, followed by what RIU called a 
‘bottleneck approach’ to articulate needs emerging from the shock. Using the 
approach, RIU sought solutions to specifically build actors’ capacity to satisfy the 
new demand. In the process of doing that, a new economic equilibrium was achieved 
and adapted by actors in the system. 
Through facilitation, linking, creating partnerships and cushioning small producers 
from risks, the programme managed to build networks, promote learning and 
transform the Tanzania rural chicken industry from being dominated by subsistence-
based backyard activities, into a commercially viable industry that improves rural 
income as well as attracting more actors and investment to upgrade processes and 
technologies. Although the context is temporary and therefore unpredictable over 
time, and that innovation emerges from a complex web of interactions, the study 
shows that it is indeed possible to initiate and manage innovation processes and 
achieve broad objectives such as poverty reduction. 
Commercialising subsistence agriculture 
Increased per capita income and urbanisation are increasing the scope for economies 
of scale in food marketing and distribution. At the same time, the size of the market 
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for distributors and retailers is increasing because of the reduction in their transaction 
costs. As a result the volume of food marketing handled by supermarkets has 
increased, pushing for substantial organisational and institutional changes throughout 
the food marketing chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2001). Such changes also include 
the setting of private grades and standards for food quality and safety, and the 
adoption of contracts between buyers and sellers at various points along the food 
marketing chain. Consequently, sub-contracting for products of specified quality and 
traits is emerging as the new form of interaction between retail food chains and 
producers (Pingali, Meijer, & Khwaja, 2005; p.1). These trends of changes lead to 
the risk of power concentration on a few food retailers and large market 
intermediaries which threatens the existence of small traders and small businesses. It 
also means the gradual disappearance of smallholders who are unable to meet the 
private standards on health and safety set by the market (Dolan and Humphrey, 2001; 
Reardon and (Berdegué, 2002a; cited in Pingali, Meijer, & Khwaja, 2001). 
Changes which are happening in the marketing and consumption sides of the food 
systems have already set commercialisation in motion. Producers are left with almost 
no other choice but to fit in if they want to survive with farming as their source of 
livelihood. Subsistence producers have to ‘choose’ (as it will not happen by chance) 
to participate in the market. The question is therefore, what makes subsistence 
producers choose not to produce for the market? And what has the potential to make 
them change? I have tried to investigate how RIU triggered the desire to 
commercialise the indigenous chicken enterprises in Tanzania and what were the 
barriers they had to overcome. While answering those questions, analysing this 
brings to light what was actually constraining commercialisation and consequently 
innovation in the industry. 
What hinders commercialisation? 
Pingali characterises food production systems into subsistence, semi-commercial and 
commercial systems (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995, cited in Pingali et al., 2001) and 
in another paper, Pingali et. al., (2010) argues that what hinders commercialisation in 
subsistence agriculture is related to their choice of crops (including the ability to 
switch between crops), high transaction costs, and their inability to meet specified 
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market requirements in terms of quality, quantity, and delivery standards. They 
therefore argue that, given the trends in food marketing, it is far more important for 
small producers to gradually transit towards producing commercial staple crops 
because commercialisation has changed the structure of food systems and the cost of 
exchange for producers of both types of crops has significantly increased. Moreover, 
commodities are increasingly differentiated based on particular requirements causing 
new transaction costs to emerge and inhibit small producers’ entry into competitive 
markets (Ibid).  
Apart from recognising that there are contrasting opinions regarding the value of 
commercialising smallholder agricultural production in poor countries, that is, there 
are opponents and proponents of the idea (see Ellis, 2005 for the debate), I have not 
established an opinion on whether commercialisation is good or bad for small 
producers. However, I have come down  in favour of commercialisation because 
there are small producers in Africa whom, given the opportunity, would prefer to 
switch (referred to as ‘switchers39’ in Cadot, Dutoit, & Olarreaga, 2010) than 
otherwise. And by making this choice, I am emphasising the right to choice of 
development path by the small producers themselves. Literature presents cases of 
small producers who switched from subsistence production once presented with the 
opportunity to do so, even if it meant switching for just a short period. See  Berkeley, 
Vakis, Sadoulet, & Janvry, 2003; Byerlee, Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2009; Cadot et al., 
2010; Otte, 2005; Riise, Permin, & Kryger, 2005.  
Agricultural commercialisation as a development ‘issue’ is not new and the move 
away from traditional self-sufficiency to producing based on market trends is 
increasingly being witnessed in most developing countries (P. L. Pingali & 
Rosegrant, 1995). In the literature commercialisation is often portrayed as an 
‘inescapable’ choice to smallholders if they are to survive. For example, Pingali et. 
al., (2010) mention that with increasing economic growth, small farm production 
systems could only survive by gearing themself up to some degree of 
commercialisation and not remain static (p.3). Wouter Zant argues that 
                                                 
39 These are producers who overcome the barriers to exit subsistence agriculture by 
overcoming risks and transaction costs. See Cadot, Dutoit, & Olarreaga, 2010 
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commercialising the overwhelming subsistence agriculture is inevitable if poor 
countries whose economies are agrarian-based must come out of poverty. He says: 
“the widespread subsistence farming leads to low productivity and 
low growth in agriculture. And since developing countries have large 
agricultural sectors with a comparative advantage vis-à-vis non-
agricultural sectors, large multiplier effects from agriculture to the 
remaining sectors of the economy and few alternative growth 
strategies (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010), a stagnant agricultural 
sector is likely to obstruct the economic growth potential of these 
countries.(Zant, 2012)” 
The authors also explain that the process keeps changing and becoming even more 
apparent and challenging to smallholders. The process now entails much greater 
integration between producers and the output market with a strong emphasis on 
standards in relation to quality and safety. This means commercialisation in this 
context is about ‘making subsistence producers fit for market’ which means 
facilitating changes and adjustments at the producer side rather than from the market 
side. 
The question is therefore who is excluding who from the market? Is it the nature and 
demands of the market that out rightly exclude the subsistence producer? Or is it that 
the subsistence producer has chosen to exclude him or herself by not producing what 
the market wants? This study concludes that subsistence producers have to negotiate 
their way to the market by organizing a significant number of them to signal the 
market (i.e. send significant noises to the market), so that the market can re-organise 
and accommodate them. The study also makes it clear that achieving that has a social 
cost which should be paid through facilitation, brokering and cushioning risks until 
producers are strong enough to be on their own. 
This study provokes discussions on whether promoting less-resource intensive 
technologies and innovations among the poor is the best strategy for lifting them out 
of poverty, rather than seeking to gradually upgrade their capacities. Putting the 
question differently, I ask, should strategies for improving agricultural performance 
for poverty reduction in Africa continue to focus on choosing appropriate 
technologies for the poor, or on upgrading their expectations (i.e. causing positive 
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mental shifts) and capacity to choose and utilize better technologies? As explained 
earlier, this study emphasises on upgrading rural producers’ expectations coupled 
with initiatives to build their capacities to pursue them as a way to improve their 
technological choices and abilities. 
Promoting innovation from a victim perspective? 
The performance of African agriculture is now a concern to the global community 
more than it was a decade ago (AGRA, 2013; Bates & Block, 2013; de Janvry & 
Sadoulet, 2010). It is increasingly blamed for causing global poverty as it fails to 
sustain the lives of Africans who depend on it for livelihood. According to 
economists, the current production systems in African agriculture are inefficient 
because they engage the largest proportion of the continent’s land and labour to 
produce very little marketable surplus which is needed for growth. In other words, by 
engaging 60% of her labour in unproductive agricultural activities, Africa is holding 
back her own economic growth. This makes existing agricultural production systems 
the target for Africa’s economic solutions. 
My concern, which was supported by the study, is linked to the established view that 
majority of those engaged in agriculture in Africa are poor, illiterate and live in rural 
areas deprived of amenities like electricity, water, transportation and communication 
infrastructure, allegedly important for modernization. This view has therefore 
constructed a ‘victim of unfair development’ whose interpretations evoke sympathy 
and empathy from the developed world, where countries are perceived to have been 
favoured by the development discourse. Therefore, by looking through the eyes of 
‘victimhood’, development policy and practice see rural producers as victims of 
marginalization, resource deprivation, bad policies (governance), and bad 
development interventions, etc. While I may not have problems with the observation 
that rural producers are marginalised, my problem is how the observation is then 
used to define development policies and programmes. Often, this leads to using 
identities like ‘the vulnerable’, the ‘marginalised’, ‘the resource poor’, ‘the poorest 
of the poor’, ‘traditional producers’, etc. which tend to justify and determine the 
type of interventions thought to be particularly appropriate.  
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Within the ‘victim’ perspective, agricultural interventions often protect and even 
patronise the small producer. As a result, only what is perceived to be within the 
victim’s means is allowed. Any effort to expose him or her to higher levels of 
resource use, (or risks), is deemed ‘unsustainable’, ‘exploiting’ or increasing 
vulnerability. Unfortunately, for the past 50 years this kind of gatekeeping has been 
the norm, and the vulnerable are still vulnerable, and so are the marginalised even 
where projects worth millions of dollars were implemented to help them. The fact is, 
this kind of gatekeeping starts and ends with a victim, because what justified the 
victim tends to persist throughout the project. It is not eliminated in the course of 
implementation. The questions are therefore, from whose eyes does the victim 
emerge? And from whose choice of a path is the victimhood expected to end? My 
argument here is that, and learning from the analysis of RIU interventions, there are 
no victims in agricultural development. Rather we have different people developing 
from different contexts and following different paths. Thus what matters is the 
presence of unbounded exposure to choices (of both opportunities and solutions-
technological or not) and the capacity to pursue expectations embedded in those 
choices (i.e. capacity to identify needs, to seek and utilize solutions).  Furthermore, 
the role of the poor to interact and negotiate in development should not be ignored. 
The poor too have the right to negotiate and compromise as necessary. 
Meeting the social cost of building rural innovation networks 
After producers accepted to change their routines and commercialise, they went 
through a process of internalising the idea. This involved engaging themselves in 
series of discussions and mental evaluation both at individual and society level. 
Afterwards, they negotiated with other actors to know exactly what would change 
and what they were supposed to do. These processes were facilitated by RIU and had 
a ‘social cost’ which was paid for by RIU.  These negotiations built the initial trust 
among actors as well as established a mental picture of how interactions would look 
like. It is during these negotiations when roles and responsibilities of each actor were 
laid down. RIU played a very important role in filling capacity gaps during the 
negotiations. This implies that if negotiations had taken place without RIU, the 
intended partnerships wouldn’t have been realised. In essence, it was these prior 
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discussions that made all partnerships possible, and which happened to change the 
role of RIU beyond bringing actors together into ‘cushioning risks’ and therefore 
‘levelling negotiating grounds’. As a matter of fact, none of these two roles were 
envisaged initially by the programme management. 
Therefore, the thesis introduces the concepts of ‘sketching envisaged networks’ and 
that of ‘meeting the social cost of building networks’ as important steps and roles of 
an innovation facilitator (or broker) towards promoting innovation in an industry 
dominated by subsistence producers living in rural areas. The former role involves 
building trust among actors before they re-organise their routines to accommodate 
expected changes, while the later ensures all actors have the capacity to engage with 
subsistence producers and do business with them, otherwise nothing would change 
because existing support services such as from financial institutions are not designed 
to work with such industries. Apparently, the thesis makes it clear that playing these 
roles requires significant flexibility within the programme plans and finances. 
10.3 Conclusions 
10.3.1 Contribution to knowledge 
The theory of path dependency and specifically the concepts of lock-in, 
organisational thinness and fragmentation can explain why innovation is prevalently 
low in rural poultry. Combined with the use of innovation context analysis using the 
Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) framework, the theory can establish the extent 
of interactions and organisational mix in a particular industry, and what hinders or 
blocks interactions or emergency of actors to promote innovation. In this study it is 
evident that, knowledge generators and intermediary actors can actually promote low 
interactions among actors as well as lock an industry into an inferior technology or 
innovation. The theory also helps to unveil policy factors that create a lock-in. This is 
a new finding since most ‘lock-ins’ tends to be associated with the market and users’ 
behaviour.  
In the light of the path dependency theory and findings in the chapter, policy makers 
may gain new insights on how their decision to aggressively promote inferior 
technologies or production systems in poor economies may actually lower 
innovation, or lock-in a certain industry to an inferior path. It also highlights how 
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promoting certain ideas like self-sufficiency and diversification can hinder 
innovation and therefore counteract good intentions. This challenges policy makers 
to consider the long-term consequences of protectionist ideas often imposed on poor 
producers in developing countries. It also opens up new thinking on how and where 
to intervene to create new development paths by presenting more choices to small 
producers. 
10.3.2 Reflections and future research 
Data used in this research is limited to what RIU did, what happened, and how actors 
and the industry responded. It does not capture the dynamics within RIU 
management to correspond to what gave the programme the ability to do what it did. 
For example, it would have been interesting to show how planning, reporting, 
staffing and budgeting were done while taking such a flexible approach and still be 
able to satisfy the donor. However, given the scope and time of this PhD research, it 
was not possible to conduct an in-depth analysis of RIU as the broker and reveal the 
internal dynamics of being indeterminate and still be a successful donor programme. 
The study did not capture information on potential risks associated with 
commercialisations and the RIU interventions in general. RIU reports explain that 
commercialising rural poultry enterprises causes some unintended shifts which may 
not be desirable depending on how the society is organised around poultry business. 
Mechanisms to manage such shifts are important. Such problems only emerge and 
can therefore not be predetermined (RIU, 2011a). 
Examples of such risks include a shift in gender roles which could cause problems to 
women and girls as discussed above. Another risk is movement of nutritious foods 
from rural to urban markets for economic gain, while depleting resources in rural 
areas. High demands for quality agricultural products in urban areas may persuade 
farmers to sell all their produce to these markets leaving none for consumption in 
rural areas. Therefore, a deeper analysis to understand such dynamics, and to 
understand the mechanism used by RIU to buy only 75% and leave behind 25% of 
the poultry produce to encourage local consumption and selling might reveal useful 
information on how to reduce negative impacts on rural nutrition. 
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The study also did not capture the effects of the changes in poultry production 
system on crop farming. Poultry keeping provides farmers with easy access to money 
in a short amount of time, and although this is a positive gain it may reduce farmers’ 
efforts in crop farming and cause imbalances in food production. For example, an old 
lady mentions during interviews that she stopped farming because keeping chickens 
was easier and more profitable to her. However, other interviewees made it clear that 
the income from poultry had improved crop production because the extra income is 
used to hire extra labour and buy inputs. While RIU promoted poultry keeping as a 
supplementary activity it is worth analysing the trade-offs, and the dynamics of 
situating the commercial poultry enterprise in the rural farming and livelihood 
systems. 
The study did not analyse the effects of establishing direct links between rural 
producers and input suppliers, and with markets. Chances are, such links could have 
negative implications be it social, economic or environmental. For example, there 
could be loss of jobs for some stakeholders in the value chains e.g. middlemen, 
traders; increase in grain prices as more producers use them to feed chicken, less 
social exchanges of chicken as gifts, etc. RIU addressed the first issue by integrating 
some of the ‘losers’ into other activities along the value chain such as in production, 
transportation or marketing. However, the chances are that more jobs were created in 
the urban than in the rural areas where they were lost. Therefore understanding such 
dynamics and how to address them is useful for future learning 
10.3.3 Implications for policy 
The study makes it clear that transforming an industry dominated by subsistence 
producers is beyond transforming an individual farm, firm or actor. It is about 
creating new expectations, new relationships, new vision, new routines and new 
institutions, rather than supplying knowledge, promoting technologies, addressing a 
few selected institutional problems, or simply linking actors. It also means avoiding 
sticking to predetermined notions of how the poor should be developed (i.e. seeking 
to deliberately avoid using certain technologies in the spirit of appropriateness, etc.) 
which may tend to limit how the industry would restructure. The process involves 
redefinition and reconfiguration of perceptions, rules, roles, relationships and 
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institutions to create new paths without pre-conceived ideas of what is relevant and 
what is not. This means, setting the system free from pre-established narratives 
regarding subsistence and allow it the opportunity to redefine itself. For example, 
from the start RIU did not make pre-assumptions of the kind of technologies to be 
promoted, but allowed actors and situations to determine the most suitable solutions, 
by looking at what was needed, then combine what respective actors could do with 
RIU’s support to fill in gaps. 
Setting the system free from subsistence narratives means letting go scientific fears, 
prejudices and conclusions regarding what ‘the poor can or cannot’, or what is 
appropriate and what is not, and give them the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in relation to 
what it takes to afford a new trajectory. This is important because, unless it is 
believed (no matter how temporary) that poor producers can afford a new production 
paradigm if they want to, and giving them the freedom and support to experiment, 
then it is very unlikely that they will innovate as a group. As the study explains in 
Chapter seven, there is a lacuna to be crossed by subsistence producers before they 
could commercialize. And bridging that lacuna was among the most important roles 
that RIU played. In fact, that ‘bridge’ entails the ‘social cost’ of experimentation 
needed to change behaviours of a significant number of producers who are needed to 
transform the industry. And meeting the cost of this bridge is probably what is 
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List of interviews 
II. Individual Interviews 
 INTERVIEWEE WARD/POSITION DATE 
Ex-RIU Staff  
1. Robert Levi Mgeni Monitoring Officer (left in 2010) 4/5/2013 
2. Pamela Lwakabare (F) Innovation Officer (left in 2010) 7/5/2013 
3 Dennis M. Mbangulla Innovation Officer (after Pamela) 12/5/2013 
4 Matilda S. Mndeme (F) Field Coordinator 13/5/2013 
5 Jwani Tranquilino Jube (F) Communications Officer 20/5/2013 
6 Eliasa Saidi Entrepreneurship/Business Trainer -“- 
7. Sella Gavile Driver 21/5/2013 
RUVUMA and NJOMBE REGIONS (Control)  
Songea Rural District  
1. Rehema Mapunda (F) Mtyangimbole Ward 6/6/2013 
2. John Maseko (F) -“- -“- 
3. Oliver Nyoni -“- 7/6/2013 
4. Ahmad Komba -“- -“- 
5. Juliana Kyula (F) -“- 8/6/2013 
6. Hassan Lahi -“- -“- 
7. Joseph Menace Banda -“- 9/6/2013 
8. Hilda Shupa (F) -“- -“- 
9. Hamdan A Hamdan Peramiho Ward 12/6/2013 
10. Emerenciana Komba (F) -“- -“- 
11. Peter Ngonyani -“- 13/6/2013 
12. Bernada Kawonga (F) -“- -“- 
13. Grace Lima (F) -“- 14/6/2013 
14. Albanus Nyoni -“- -“- 
15. Moses J. Ndonde -“- 15/6/2013 
16. Pili Cletus (F) Mahanje Ward -“- 
17. Eleutherius Mvulla -“- 19/6/2013 
18. Agenta Kilewa (F) -“- -“- 
19. Christian Ngonyani -“- 20/6/2013 
20. Krista Kristom Mlowe (F) -“- -“- 
NJOMBE REGION (Control)  
Njombe Rural District  
1. Godlove Kiukila  Ikuna Ward 25/7/2013 
2 Grace Nyagawa (F) -“- -“- 
3 Jairos Mhoka -“- -“- 
4 Jofrey Mhoka -“- 26/7/2013 
5 Joyce Nyagawa (F) -“- -“- 
6. Lucy Mtagawa (F) -“- 28/7/2013 
7. Sarah Kihindo (F) -“- -“- 
8. Rahel Mwinami (F) -“- 29/7/2013 
9. Petro Kiwale -“- -“- 
10. Jackson  Andrea Mwanza Igima Ward 02/08/2013 
11. Job Lumuliko Mwanza -“- -“- 
12. Joyce Nathan Simkoko (F) -“- -“- 
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13. Matrida Mwepelwa (F) -“- 03/08/2013 
14. Milka Msemwa (F) -“- -“- 
15. Ndonina Kitalula (F) -“- -“- 
16. Ngati Tewele -“- 06/08/2013 
17. Norice Mng'ong'o -“- -“- 
18. Suzana  Simon Mpolya (F) -“- 07/08/2013 
19. Veronica Nyamle (F) -“- -“- 
20. Yalileni Mwanzanila -“- -“- 
 PWANI (COAST) REGION (RIU beneficiaries)  
Bagamoyo District  
1. Juto Abdallah Fukayosi  03/9/2013 
2. Mwakombo Mtoro (F) -“- -“- 
3. Muharami Mtoro (F) -“- 04/09/2013 
4. Ramadhani Saidi Mtawa -“- -“- 
5. Nuru Mshamu Saidi (F) -“- 05/09/2013 
6. Mwishamba Rajabu (F) -“- -“- 
7. Godfrida P. Sungura (F) -“- -“- 
8. Elizabeth Mathias (F) Kiwangwa 08/09/2013 
9. Hilda Chilongola (F) -“- -“- 
10. Lameck Malau Mbalani -“- -“- 
11. Muharam Kimela -“- 09/09/2013 
12. Saidi R. Chambela -“- -“- 
13. Siwema S. Tanganyika (F) -“- -“- 
14. Innocent L. Lyimo Bong’wa Magomeni 13/09/2013 
15. Joshua N. Msechu -“- -“- 
16. Esther N. Msechu (F) -“- 14/09/2013 
17. Triphona A. Temba (F) -“- -“- 
18. Winifrida A. Gumbo (F) -“- 16/09/2013 
19. Mwansiha Hussein (F) -“- -“- 
20. Mary A. Kisima (F) (Champion) 17/09/2013 
21. Anna Komba (F) -“- -“- 
22. Leticia Baisi (F) -“- -“- 
23. Dickson Chahe (VALEO) Chalinze (Extension staff) 20/09/2013 
24. Herman Mahuwi -“- -“- 
25. Maria Godwin Kimaro -“- 21/09/2013 
26. Esther Matingisa (F) -“- -“- 
27. Sipora Salali (F) -“- 22/09/2013 
28. Tumaini Mbise -“- -“- 
29. Ezra Ngulwa -“- 23/09/2013 
30. Willima Jeuri -“- -“- 
31. Domina Kimaryo (F) -“- 24/09/2013 
32. Latiel Mbise -“- -“- 
Kibaha District  
33. Mary Wanna (F) Galagaza 26/09/2013 
34. Siwangu Nchimbi (F) -“- -“- 
35. Paulo Lalusa -“- 27/09/2013 
36. Issa Athumani -“- -“- 
37. Christina David (F) (Champion) 28/09/2013 
38. Mabua Mtumbati Mussa -“- -“- 
39. Julieth Paulo (F) -“- 29/09/2013 
40. Bora Saburi (F) -“- -“- 
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41. Maulid Ngenje -“- -“- 
42. Shwabe Shomari -“- 30/09/2013 
43. Bwana Kimbwapule -“- -“- 
44. Chacha Makuru -“- -“- 
Rifiji District  
45. Sauda S. Mkumbaru (F) Kibiti Ward 01/10/2013 
46. Salma A. Mlawa (F) -“- -“- 
47. Rehema M. Mtulia (F) -“- 02/10/2013 
48. Salumu M. Mkendo (F) -“- -“- 
49. Jumanne Mkumba -“- 03/10/2013 
50. Rajabu M. Munilwa -“- -“- 
51. Ayubu A. Simba -“- 04/10/2013 
52. Abdara S. Mkumbo -“- -“- 
53. Mwanaisha S. Lipunda (F) -“- 05/10/2013 
54. Hamis s. Nyuambara -“- -“- 
55. Maimuma S. Mkongea Bungu Ward (Champion) 06/10/2013 
56. Omari J. Mkosa -“- -“- 
57. Zuhura O. Kanyampa (F) -“- 07/10/2013 
58. Juma E. Alberto -“- -“- 
59. Maua M. Mtandika (F) -“- 08/10/2013 
60. Saidi a. Ndaro -“- -“- 
61. Zena K. Roya (F) -“- 09/10/2013 
62. Shani K. Mtyangu (F) -“- -“- 
63. Mohamedi H. Mpayuka -“- 10/10/2013 
64. Yasini a. Joli -“- -“- 
Mkuranga District  
65. Shabani A. Kindamba Magoza 12/10/2013 
66. Hasani M. Maranga -“- -“- 
67. Selemani S. Mahinde -“- 13/10/2013 
68. Amina M. Mpate (F) -“- -“- 
69. Hadija M. Mbopotile (F) -“- 14/10/2013 
70. Halissa J. Heri (F) -“- -“- 
71. Hamis K. Manzi -“- 15/10/2013 
72. Zuhura H. Almasi (F) -“- -“- 
73. Sadi A. Kindamba (F) -“- 16/10/2013 
74. Ally Kindamba -“- -“- 
75. Asia M. Maluku (F) Kimanzichana 17/10/2013 
76. Salima Milanzi (F) -“- -“- 
77. Hadija Malekela (F) -“- 18/10/2013 
78. Zubeda Lema (F) -“- -“- 
79. Omari Masisi -“- 19/10/2013 
80. Yahaya Kamkosa -“- -“- 
81. Habibu Mbepo -“- 20/10/2013 
82. Eugenia Njau (F) -“- -“- 
83. Hasani Kimbendengu -“- 21/10/2013 
84. Hadija Ukata (F) -“- -“- 
85. Kamkosa Siraji -“- -“- 
 OTHER ACTORS (Inputs suppliers,  service providers, Government) 
1. Dr. Samora Mshanga District Livestock Officer -Songea 05/06/2013 
2. Fr.  Feed producer - Peramiho Catholic church 11/06/2013 
3. Dr. Ngwale District Livestock Officer -Njombe 04/08/2013 
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4. Mr. Mpete Feed Producer (Mpete feeds Njombe) 05/08/2013 
5. Prof. Lekule Feed producers - Tanfeeds 09/08/2013 
6. Dr. Mgaya Veterinary Drug Supplier - 20/08/2013 
7. Dr. Msami Vaccine supplier  (importer)  22/08/2013 
8. Mr. Mrindwa Chick Producer – Msigani Hatchery 25/09/2013 
9. Dr. Mlinga Chik Producer 25/09/2013 
10. Dr. Mang’ana Veterinary shop owner, Kibaha 01/10/2013 
11. Dr. Kaijage Ministry of Livestock Development and 
Fisheries 
03/11/2013 
II. Group Interviews 
GROUP  DATE 
1. FGD with Ex-RIU staff  25/5/2013 
FGDs in Songea and Njombe (non-RIU target areas)  
1. Mtyangimbole Songea District 22/6/2013 
2. Peramiho -“- 23/6/2013 
3. Mahanje -“- 24/6/2013 
4. Ikuna Njombe District 13/8/2013 
5. Mtwango -“- 14/8/2013 
FGDs in Coast Region (RIU target areas)  
1. Fukayosi and Kiwangwa Bagamoyo District 10/09/2013 
2. Bagamoyo -“- 18/09/2013 
3. Chalinze -“- 25/09/2013 
4. Galagaza Kibaha District 01/10/2013 
5. Bungu Rufiji District 11/10/2013 
6. Kibiti -“- 11/10/2013 
7. Magoza Mkuranga District 22/10/2013 
 
